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ABSTRACT
This thesis is an analysis of Australian political and military 
strategy during and after the Second World War. In 1941-42 Australia 
was faced with a particularly difficult situation, for at a time of 
great national danger she was beset with a change of government, a 
change of major alliance partners and a change of geopolitical strategy. 
The ensuing problems had to be resolved by a small group of political 
and military leaders and public servants.
They had to operate within close limitations. First, the country 
had a small population and weak economy, and was largely unprepared 
for war. Second, strategic decisions had to be made in a framework of 
coalition war with Britain and America. Third, Australia lacked its 
own intelligence and diplomatic services. Fourth, attitudes of reliance 
upon British advice in particular, and external advice in general, were 
deeply ingrained. Fifth, partly as a result of the above considerations 
Australian decision-planners lacked experience in matters of strategy 
and foreign policy.
Australia's experience during the Second World War revealed a lack 
of a sophisticated and coherent approach to national strategic decision­
making. The Prime Minister, John Curtin, deferred to the Allied 
Commander-in-Chief, General Douglas MacArthur, on questions which 
should have been decided by the Australian government alone. The 
attempts of the Australian Commander-in-Chief, General Sir Thomas Blarney 
to advocate a policy designed to serve Australia's national interests 
were often ignored by the government. And because the government both 
lacked experience of military affairs and distrusted the military, it 
relied heavily upon the guidance of the civilian Secretary of the 
Department of Defence, Sir Frederick Shedden.
Nevertheless, during the war Australia made important advances in 
her capacity to make independent strategic decisions and to secure an 
independent voice and role in allied strategy. An indigenous intelligence 
organisation was developed, the Department of External Affairs was 
expanded, and the Australian armed services achieved a high international 
reputation on the battlefield. Finally, Australia secured leadership 
of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan. The Second 
World War was a major turning point in Australia's evolution as an 
independent nation. An important part of that evolution was the 
development of Australia's capacity to formulate its own national 
strategic and foreign policies and to undertake independent military 
action in support of those policies.
Australia's experience during the Second World War provides vital 
lessons for the present. The principal lesson is the need for adequate 
organisational machinery for strategic decision-making; and political 
and military leaders and public servants must be trained and prepared 
to deal with politico-strategic problems. There are, however, other 
important lessons; accurate intelligence is crucial, mobilisation 
procedures need to be examined, principles need to be established and 
officers trained for inter-allied cooperation, and the Australian forces 
need to possess the ability to operate independently. Nevertheless, 
despite changes in science and technology and in the world balance of 
power, strategic decision-making still relies primarily upon the 
judgement of individuals. Although there were shortcomings in strategic 
decision-making in the Second World War, in the long term Australia's 
interests did not suffer greatly because of them. If similar shortcomings 
are displayed in the future, the nation may not be so fortunate.
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INTRODUCTION
If the strategy be wrong, the skill of the general 
on the battlefield, the valour of the soldier, 
the brilliance of the victory, however otherwise 
decisive, fail of their effort.
Alfred Thayer Mahan,
Naval Administration and Warfare
This study is primarily concerned with two matters; first, the
national direction of war, or strategic decision-making, and second,
the problem of strategic co-operation between allies. In other words,
the theme is strategy. Jomini defines strategy as 'the art of directing
the greater part of the forces of an army on to the most important point
2of a theatre of war, or a zone of operations', but strategy now has
a wider meaning. Liddell Hart describes it as 'the art of distributing
3and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy'. The highest
level of strategy, which integrates national and alliance policies with
4operations by armed forces, has been called grand strategy. In Liddell
Hart's view, the role of grand strategy is 'to co-ordinate and direct
all the resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment
of the political object of the war - the goal defined by fundamental
5policy. The unprecedented global and coalition warfare of the Second
1. Quoted in John M. Collins, Grand Strategy> Principles and Practices 
(Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland, 1973), p.237.
2. M. Howard, 'Jomini and the Classical Tradition in Military Thought' 
in M. Howard (ed), The Theory and Practice of War3 Essays Presented to 
Captain B.J. Liddell Hart (Cassell, London, 1965), p.16.
3. Liddell Hart, Strategyj  The Indirect Approach, 4th Edition (Faber 
and Faber, London, 1967), p.335.
4. E.M. Earle (ed), Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, 1943), p.viii.
5. Liddell Hart, StrategyThe Indirect Approach, pp. 335, 336.
2
World War lifted strategy further than ever before out of the purely 
military sphere into the field of politics and international relations.
To some writers, the Second World War was a major turning point in
strategic analysis. For example John Lukacs has written:
During the Second World War the sharp lines separating 
war and peace, and soldiers from civilians - 
distinctions that may have been one of the most 
important achievements of European civilization 
after the seventeenth century - were being washed 
away. Perhaps this was the most important - and 
ultimately the most barbaric - development of the 
war. 7
That is, strategy no longer involved merely the armed forces, but the 
whole community. And with the development of nuclear weapons and 
ballistic missiles, and the onset of the cold war, further definitions 
of strategy were developed. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff have found 
Liddell Hart's definitions to be inadequate for the present age, and 
they have reversed his approach. In his celebrated chapter on 'The Theory 
of Strategy' Liddell Hart sees 'military strategy' as 'pure strategy' 
and describes it as 'the art of the general'. Grand strategy is a 
higher art, and although Liddell Hart recognises it as important, he
g
concentrates on military strategy. The US Joint Chiefs begin their 
definitions with national strategy, which they describe as:
The art and science of developing and using the 
political, economic, and psychological powers 
of a nation, together with its armed forces, 
during peace and war, to secure national 
objectives.
National objectives are the fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a 
nation towards which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of
6. M. Matloff, 'Strategy', Encyclopaedia Britannicas Volume 21 (Chicago, 
1972), p.289.
7. John Lukacs, The Last European War3 September 1939/December 1941 
(Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1977), p.239.
8. Liddell Hart, Strategy 3 The Indirect Approach, Chapter XIV.
3the nation are applied. Military strategy accordingly is defined 
as:
The art and science of employing the armed 
forces of a nation to secure the objectives of 
national policy by the application of force, or 
the threat of force.9
The advantage of the US definitions is that they cover equally 
the states of peace and war. But it might also be argued that since 
many countries, such as Australia, have no readily discernible national 
strategy in times of peace, recognition should be given to a field of 
strategy which falls somewhere between the national and military levels. 
Perhaps it might be called politico-military strategy. It would embrace 
strategic decisions and policy which involve the use of arms, diplomacy 
and perhaps trade, but which stop short of attempting to marshal the 
full resources of the country.^-0 It may well be important to develop 
a national strategy, but until one exists it is hardly relevant to use 
the term in attempting to analyse actual strategic policies.
Whatever the current situation, the pressure of the Second World 
War forced the Australian leaders to plan in terms of a grand or 
national strategy for at least the duration of the war. And for a study 
of Australian strategic decision-making during the war Liddell Hart's 
definition of grand strategy may be considered adequate.
9. The US definitions are given in the Australian Joint Services Staff 
Manual, JSP (AS) 101.  For an argument that the JCS definitions are more 
relevant than those of Liddell Hart see Lieutenant-Colonel Andrew P. O'Meara, 
'Strategy and the Military Professionals', Military Review, January 1980.
10. The Australian services have adopted the US definition of military 
strategy but not of national strategy. However the Australians do agree 
with the US definition of strategy: 'The art and science of developing 
and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as 
necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, 
in order to increase the probabilities and favourable consequences of 
victory and to lessen ,the chances of defeat'. Perhaps this definition 
describes the strategic decisions made by the Australian government.
11. For a discussion of an approach to developing national strategy in 
Australia see Lieutenant-Colonel J.S. Baker, 'The Requirements of National 
Strategy', Defence Force Journal, No.10,  May/June 1978.
4Liddell Hart listed some of the elements of grand strategy. These
include economic resources and manpower, moral resources, diplomatic,
financial, commercial and ethical pressures, and the distribution of
power between the services and industry. He noted that grand strategy
looks beyond war to peace. 'The sorry state of peace, for both sides,
that has followed most wars can be traced to the fact that, unlike
strategy, the realm of grand strategy is for the most part terra incognita -
. 1 2still awaiting exploration and understanding1.
Just as there are few studies of Australian generalship, so too
are there few analyses of Australian strategic decision-making in
13times of war. Although the tactical battles - the exploits of 
individual soldiers, units, aircraft and ships - have been well 
covered in the official histories, unit histories and personal accounts, 
the great strategic decisions, as they affected Australia, have received 
less attention. It is true that they are recorded in the official 
histories, but as a backdrop to the battles and as an explanation of 
why the fighting took place. There is little attempt to delineate in 
a comprehensive fashion the development of national war policy and how 
it meshed with the grand strategy of the allied coalition.
During the Second World War Australian strategic decision-making 
made two important steps forward. In the first place, unlike during 
the First World War, Australia demanded some influence over the strategic
12. Liddell Hart, Strategy> The Indirect Approach, p.336.
13. Australian defence decision-making has been dealt with to some degree 
in D.M. Horner, Crisis of Command, Australian Generalship and the 
Japanese Threat (ANU Press, Canberra, 1978); and J.M. McCarthy, Australia 
and Imperial Defence 1919-39 (University of Queensland Press, St. Lucia,
1976). There are a number of theses on the subject and these are listed 
in the bibliography. Aspects of Australian strategic decision-making
are covered in most volumes of the official war histories, but not in 
a comprehensive fashion. The best account is in the two civil volumes 
by Hasluck.
use of her forces. In the second place, Australia had to argue not only
with Britain regarding the use of her forces in an imperial context, but
also with the leaders of the Grand Alliance in a global context.
As the war progressed the various elements of Australian grand
strategy changed in emphasis. At the outbreak of war the overriding
consideration was the British connection. Indeed R.G. Menzies, the
Australian Prime Minister, set the tone when he announced that because
Britain had declared war on Germany, 'as a result, Australia is also 
14at war'. This pronouncement was not quite as forthright as Andrew 
Fisher's pledge in 1914 to support Britain 'to our last man and our last 
shilling',because the Australian government had some reservations,
Support for the British connection had to be balanced against the development 
of capabilities to resist the threat posed by Japan to Australia's security. 
Yet eventually the government agreed to send an expeditionary force 
to help Britain, the major ships of the RAN were placed under Admiralty 
control, and the Empire Air Training Scheme was initiated.
By early 1940 all three Service Chiefs in Australia were seconded 
British officers.
After Japan entered the war, national security from direct attack 
rapidly became the most important element in the Australian government's 
strategic policy, but it was soon to be matched by the problems of 
co-operating with the Americans. As the Japanese threat receded, the 
problems of managing relations with the United States became of increasing 
importance. Whereas at the beginning of the war the dominant 
consideration had been the British connection, four years later it was
14. Broadcast Message by R.G. Menzies, 3 September 1939, R.G. Neale (ed), 
Documents on Australian Foreign Policy 1937-493 Volume J J ,  1939 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 1976), p.221.
Hereafter described as DAFP.
15. E. Scott, Australia During the War (Angus and Robertson, Sydney,
1938), p.22.
5
6the American connection, and much of this study is concerned with
Australian attempts to influence American strategy. This aim was pursued
at two levels: politically in Washington with Roosevelt and the Combined
Chiefs of Staff and to a lesser extent through Churchill to the Combined
Chiefs; and militarily through the headquarters of General Douglas
MacArthur. In the first case Australia had almost negligible influence;
but the Canadians, who were geographically closer and on more intimate terms
with their larger allies, achieved little more.^  However in the second
case Australia had more opportunity to influence strategy than other minor
powers. The Canadians, despite having troops in Italy and north-west
Europe, had less access to Eisenhower and Alexander than Curtin and Blarney
had to MacArthur. Thus while Australia's influence was limited, it was
brought to bear with unusual directness.
A major element of Australian grand strategy was the problem of
national resources, particularly allocation of manpower and provision of
equipment for the forces raised. This problem persisted throughout the
war. It affected Australia's ability to send troops to Malaya and, as
the war progressed, became the most important factor in determining the
. . 17magnitude and hence the location of the Australian military effort.
This work does not examine Australian manpower planning except to note
18the restrictions it placed upon Australian strategy.
There were a number of other facets to the problem of shaping 
Australian grand strategy. One was the momentum of previous decisions.
The Singapore strategy locked Australia into a defence system from which
16. It might be observed that of the dominions, Australia and Canada had 
the most analagous and yet the least comparable experiences during the 
Second World War.
17. It should be noted that throughout the thesis, except when used as 
part of the official designation, Australian Military Forces, the term 
military is used in its broadest sense to include army, navy and airforce.
18. For an account of manpower planning see P. Hasluck, The Government and 
the P e o p l e 1941-1945 (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1970), Ch.5;
S.J. Butlin, War E c o n o m y 1939-1942 (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 
1955), Ch.14; and S.J. Butlin and C.B. Schedvin, War Economy> 1942-1945 
(Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977), Ch.2 and 14.
7she escaped only after the fall of that ill-fated island. Similarly, 
decisions such as the establishment of the Empire Air Training Scheme, 
the sending of three divisions to the Middle East, and the formation of 
the South-West Pacific Command for combined operations under American 
leadership, affected later strategy in a way which was not perceived 
at the time. With respect to American strategy, Maurice Matloff has 
commented:
As U.S. Military resources poured swiftly into the 
Pacific, American strategists learned that forces in 
being had a way of generating their own strategy.
Ground and air forces concentrated in Australia 
after the Japanese sweep through the Western 
Pacific area could not be left idle.-*-9
From the Australian point of view this was a fortunate consequence.
As the war progressed, Australia's post-war aims became an
increasingly important element in strategic policy. Whereas American
strategic policy-making tended to lose sight of the post-war aims,
20particularly in Europe, the Australian government became increasingly 
concerned about the nature of the peace in the Pacific. The United 
States' failure was caused in part by the Joint Chiefs of Staff who
21
exercised wide powers and applied military criteria to political situations. 
Military men did not gain similar power in Britain or Australia. Also, 
the Americans saw something sinister in the nature of the British 
concern for the post-war order in Europe. But it should be recalled 
that, as Liddell Hart has emphasised, the aim of Grand Strategy should be
19. M. Matloff, 'The American Approach to War, 1919-1 945 '  in M. Howard 
(ed), The Theory and Practice of War, p.237.
20. A more extreme critique of American strategy is found in J.F.C. Fuller, 
The Conduct of War 1789-1961 (Eyre Methuen, London, 1 9 7 2 ) ,  pp.239-310 .  
Maurice Matloff, the US Army's chief historian, agrees that the US was 
least successful in the area of grand strategy; by contrast with that
of military strategy. There was no grand design for war and peace.
M. Matloff, 'The American Approach to War, 1 9 1 9 - 1 9 4 5 ' ,  p.241.
21. S.P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Harvard University 
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1 9 5 7 ) ,  p.344. Fuller, The Conduct of 
War 1789-1961, p . 273.
to secure peace. Montgomery has observed that if this aim is not
understood by statesmen, 'they will throw away the fruits of tremendous
23sacrifices and all the slaughter will have been useless'.
Effective tactics and military strategy are much easier to design 
if the general knows the enemy's plans. So too with grand strategy. 
Hence intelligence is a vital element in decision-making. But how much 
should be shared with allies? The sharing of intelligence in the 
Second World War was one of the more remarkable manifestations of allied 
co-operation.
The organisation for strategic decision-making in Australia during
the Second World War is discussed in Chapter One, but two general
problems should be mentioned here. After working in a number of allied
headquarters during the Second World War, the Australian-born Air Vice-
Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry set out to examine the nature of the
higher direction of war. He wrote:
the more I reflected, the clearer it became 
that Political Direction and High Command are 
concerned so essentially with personalities 
and those antinomies of human nature in war 
or peace that all other considerations are 
secondary.^ 4
This view is highly relevant to Australian higher direction in the
25Second World War. Indeed the relationship between MacArthur, Curtin 
and Blarney cannot be understood without examining their personalities.
22. Liddell Hart, Strategy3 the Indirect Approach,P• 336. Michael Howard has 
also stressed this aspect. M. Howard, Studies in War and Peace (Temple 
Smith, London, 1970), p.197.
23. Field Marshal Viscount Montgomery, A History of Warfare (Collins, 
London, 1968), p.552.
24. Air Vice-Marshal E.J. Kingston-McCloughry, The Higher Direction of 
War (Jonathan Cape, London, 1955), p.13.
25. Most participants interviewed by the author mentioned this factor. 
Major-General L. de L. Barham, who was Blarney's chief operational staff 
officer for the last years of the war, stressed that many of the decisions 
taken could only be understood in the light of the personalities of 
Blarney and MacArthur. Interview, 11 December 1978.
Nothing illustrates this, factor better than MacArthur's statement,
26 ''I shall return1.
Entwined with the problem of personalities is that of the command 
relationships between the generals and the politicians, and between 
the different national generals in allied forces. In any discussion 
of strategic decision-making it is therefore necessary to delineate 
the chain of command responsibility. With respect to Australia it 
is important to examine what influence Blarney was able to exert as 
Commander of the Allied Land Forces.
A word should be said about the general problems of coalition
warfare. As one writer has observed:
Wartime allies, like mistresses, should be selected 
with circumspection and deliberation. To enter 
into hasty or emotion-inspired transitory 
attachments, be they for private or public reasons, 
is to invite disaster embracing a relationship 
marked for persistent turbulence that begins with 
musunderstanding intent and ends with vexatious 
dissolution.27
How much more unstable is an alliance likely to be between two unequally
balanced military powers? Since the Second World War a number of books
have appeared suggesting that in both the military and political spheres
2 8of the war Australian wishes were disregarded by the great powers.
Some of their authors assume that Australia ought to have been an equal 
ally with Britain and the USA and thus have no difficulty in proving 
fault when they reveal that Australia was not, in fact, an equal ally. 
Nevertheless, Australia did have a special relationship with the USA
9
26. W. Manchester, American Caesar3 Douglas MacArthur3 1880-1964 
(Hutchinson, Melbourne, 1979), p.271.
27. J.B. Agnew, 'The Improbable Alliance: The Central Powers and 
Coalition Warfare 1914-1918', Parameters3 Vol.I, Winter 1972.
28. For example, Roger Bell, Unequal Allies3 Australian-American 
Relations and the Pacific War (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne,
1977); P. Firkins, Australians in Nine Wars (Rigby, Adelaide, 1971); 
Cecil Edwards,Bruce of Melbourne3 Man of Two Worlds (Heinemann, London, 
1965).
and Britain, which gave her unique access to decisions on global strategy. 
Furthermore, even if Australia could not determine where her forces should 
be employed, she had every right to have a voice in the matter. And 
in the final analysis, Australian leaders could always withhold the use 
of these forces if they disagreed with a proposed operation. In this way 
Australia had a continuous influence over allied strategy. It is more 
worthwhile, therefore, to examine how far Australia positively influenced 
allied strategy, than to catalogue those occasions when Australian wishes 
were ignored. The test of a coalition is not whether all parties are 
completely happy, but rather whether or not the coalition works.
In the interests of military efficiency it has been shown to be
preferable that power should be concentrated in a committee of alliance
representatives, although the smaller the committee the better it
is in terms of military efficiency. National sovereignty may have to
be sacrificed to keep the committee small. This system, however, is
open to the danger that the great powers may make decisions in accord
29with their own interests and sweep aside those of the lesser powers.
They may use the argument of military efficiency to justify retention 
of supreme authority in their own hands exclusively, as the Americans did 
in the Pacific from 1942. The only solution to this problem is for the 
lesser powers, such as Australia, through agitation, to convince the 
great powers that they are acting contrary to their own long-term 
interests. In this respect public opinion may play a part, but political 
leaders must use it carefully in order to preserve the strength of 
the coalition.
29. It is worth observing that in the later stages of the Second World 
War even the United Kingdom found difficulty in maintaining what it 
considered its proper status in strategic decision-making against the 
growing power and assertiveness of the United States. Churchill wrote to 
Smuts on 3 December 1944, 'it is not so easy as it used to be for me to 
get things done'. Quoted in C.P. Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments3 The 
War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Department of National Defence, Ottawa, 
1970), p.137, fn.
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On balance it appears that Australia's case was well and strongly 
put to the great powers. Menzies, Casey, Bruce, Curtin and Evatt did 
not allow Churchill and Roosevelt to forget that Australia had her own 
special interests. This Australian attitude contrasted with that of 
Canada under MacKenzie King. However, after the war, British politicians 
criticised Canadian leaders for not concerning themselves, as Australia had, 
over the higher direction of the war.30 There is an old saying that 'the 
creaking wheel gets the grease'.
If Australia's leaders felt compelled to put their case strongly, 
they were amply justified in doing so. Not only were they frequently
not consulted by Britain and the United States on military matters
. 31 . . .concerning Australia, but also they were sometimes given little
information of the progress of the war. Churchill actively sought to
limit the information provided and bullied the Dominions Office to this
32end. Indeed Churchill preferred that the really important information
30. Ibid.. , pp.186, 187.
31* For example, the Australian government was not consulted before the 
Dakar operation in September 1940, despite the fact that an Australian 
cruiser was taking part. The Australian government agreed to the campaign 
in Greece in April 1941 after it was led to believe by the British 
government that General Blarney concurred. But Blarney in fact opposed 
the campaign. During the last years of the war thousands of RAAF aircrew 
were involved in the strategic bombing campaign over Europe, but the 
Australian government was not consulted about the wisdom of the campaign, 
and in fact could have used the aircrews to advantage elsewhere.
32. For example, on Christmas Day 1940 he wrote: 'No departure in 
principle is contemplated from the practice of keeping the Dominions 
informed fully of the progress of the war. Specially full information must 
necessarily be given in respect of theatres where Dominion troops are 
serving, but it is not necessary to circulate this to the other Dominions 
not affected. Anyhow, on the whole an effort should be made not to 
scatter so much deadly and secret information over this very large 
circle ... While therefore there is no change in principle, there should 
be considerable soft-peddling in practice. I wish to be consulted before 
anything of a very secret nature, especially anything referring to 
operations or current movements, is sent out'. Winston Churchill, The 
Second World War3 Volume II3 Their Finest Hour (Cassell, London, 1949), 
p.631.
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should be transmitted only on a prime minister to prime minister basis.
His concern for secrecy can be understood, but as a Canadian historian 
has put it:
One would scarcely think, sometimes, that the 
communities he is excluding are mature nations 
having the closest ties with Britain, making 
enormous contributions to the prosecution of 
the war and possessing governments of the 
highest degree of responsibility.33
34And as the war continued Churchill's attitude scarcely changed.
There are two major levels of allied co-operation: grand strategy, 
involving political leaders, diplomats and chiefs of staff; and battle­
field co-operation. The two interact and at times individuals may find 
themselves operating in both spheres, as did MacArthur, with his unique 
independence of action as Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific 
Area.
Although many volumes have been written on coalition warfare at 
the highest level, relatively few works deal with battlefield co-operation. 
For diplomats and politicians, coalition warfare at the highest level 
is a natural extension of their profession, but the soldier who can 
manage the forces of a coalition is a rare figure. As Martin Blumenson 
noted:
To reach that stratospheric position and remain 
there, he must be aggressive, bold, ruthless and 
enterprising - in short, he has to possess all the 
traditional military virtues. He is then told to 
do a job that requires tact, tolerance, forbearance,
33. Stacey, op.cit., p.154.
34. In a memorandum to the Cabinet secretary on 27 February 1942 he 
detailed the Cabinet arrangements for the next week: 'Monday, 5.30 PM 
at No.10, General parade, with the Constant Attenders, the Chiefs of 
Staff and the Dominions and Indian representatives. Business: the 
general war situation, without reference to special secret matters 
such as forthcoming operations; and other appropriate topics'. 
Churchill, op.cit., Volume IV, p.78.
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with patience - qualities that had little to do 
with his previous advancement.-*5
For most of the war Australian military leaders were involved in battle­
field co-operation with allies. In major campaigns from Libya in 1941 to 
Borneo in 1945, Australian army commanders either were under the command 
of an ally, or they themselves commanded allied forces. Australian 
naval and air commanders invariably found themselves subordinate to 
allied commanders.
Just as the decisions at the conference table affected the outcome 
of battles, so too the outcome of battles affected Australia's status in 
allied councils. For a small power, performance on the battlefield and 
military credibility influences the notice taken of her military and 
political leaders. The failure of the Australians to halt the Japanese in 
the early stages of operations on the Kokoda Trail increased MacArthur's 
influence over Curtin and Blarney. The abject failure of the Americans 
at Buna gave Blarney leverage to resist MacArthur's designs. But, when 
the coalition includes a great and a minor power, the great power can 
afford failures and retain its dominant position. The lesser power, if 
its forces do not perform well, suffers an immediate loss of influence.
* * * * *
What is there to learn from a study of Australian strategy and 
its relationship to allied grand strategy in the Second World War?
35. M. Blumenson and J.L. Stokesbury, Masters of the Art of Command 
(Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1975), p.244. Wavell also recognised 
the difficulties of a military coalition when he wrote: 'There is no 
doubt of the principal stumbling-block to good relations and fruitful 
combination of resources: it is national pride and susceptibility. And 
there is also no doubt that the principal agent to resolve the difficulties 
and to create harmony is the personality of the leading commanders ... It 
may be seen irrelevant to judge a general on his relations with his 
Government or his power to deal with his allies, yet these are almost 
always important factors; and a general who cannot obtain the confidence 
of his Government, and persuade them of the soundness of his plans or 
dissuade them from unsound strategy, or who quarrels with his allies, may 
forfeit both fame and victory'. Field Marshal Earl Wavell, Soldiers and 
Soldiering (Jonathan Cape, London, 1952), pp.84, 85.
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Probably Clausewitz's most often quoted dictum is that 'war is a mere
36continuation of policy by other means . In his view all wars are
to be regarded as political acts and to understand this aspect of war
is 'the first, the grandest, and most decisive act of judgment which
the Statesmen and General could make'. It is 'the first, the most
37comprehensive, of all strategical questions'. Any campaign which does
not further the aims of national policy is a waste of blood and effort.
Therefore, the most fundamental questions concerning a nation's war
effort are not those concerned with performance on the battlefield,
nor those of national administration, but those relating to the advancement
of policy objectives; in other words, the planning and execution of.
national strategy.
This study is concerned essentially with these matters. General
Fuller wrote of the Americans in the Second World War that
they did not know how to wage war, and in consequence 
they did not know to make peace. They looked upon
• • • *5 0war as a lethal game in which the trophy was victory. °
Many of the factors which caused this situation in America also existed 
in Australia, which, like America, had not previously been involved 
continuously and consistently in international politics. The government 
had not developed a coherent national strategy for the consistent 
pursuit of political goals by a combination of diplomatic and military 
efforts. But except for the period when Australia was directly threatened 
by invasion, Australia had only a minor role in the lethal game, and
36. R.A. Leonard (ed), A Short Guide to Clausewitz on War (Weidenfeld 
and Nicolson, London, 1967), p.57.
37. Ibid., pp.58, 59. See also the edition of Clausewitz, On War, edited 
and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1976), pp.87, 88, 89,which translates the 
above statements as: 'War is merely the continuation of policy by other 
means'; 'the first, the supreme, the most farr-reaching act of judgment 
that the statesman and commander have to make'; 'the first of all 
strategic questions and the most comprehensive'.
38. Fuller, op.cit., p.308.
therefore the government felt it necessary to examine closely the 
relevance of this role in terms of its own national interest. In the 
light of these remarks, to what degree could it be said that Australia, 
like the United States, fell into the trap described above by Fuller; 
and given Australia's limited resources and influence, how successful 
were Australian decision-makers in ensuring that the nation received 
full value for the blood shed by its armed forces.
15
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CHAPTER ONE
BEFORE PEARL HARBOUR, September 1939-December 1941
The Organisation for Strategic Decision-Making in Australia
In a modern democracy Grand Strategy, the highest level of
military decision-making, is not the province of military men. As
Sir John Fortescue put it:
Generals with their armies and admirals with 
their fleets are mere weapons wielded by the 
hand of the statesman. It is for him to 
decide when to strike, where to strike and 
how to strike.1
Nevertheless, the greatest problem in the conduct of war lies in the-
relationship between a government and the technical heads of the service
departments. Indeed Lord Haldane wrote that he knew 'of few questions
military or constitutional in which such obscurity prevails as in those
2concerned with the higher direction of war'.
It was not always so. In earlier centuries the difference between 
civil and military leaders was small, and in fact soldiers and statesmen 
were usually interchangeable, Alexander, Julius Caesar, Henry V, Gustavus 
Adolphus, Cromwell and Marlborough are but a few examples. Even when 
generals such as Wellington in Spain were clearly subordinate and 
responsible to the government, the length of communications from the 
political masters to the battlefield ensured a high degree of independence.
1. Ford Lecture 1911, quoted in Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Statesmen 
and Sea Power (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1946), p.vii. Alfred Thayer 
Mahan has also written on this question: 'The office of the statesman
is to determine and to indicate to the military authorities the national 
interests most vital to be defended as well as the objects of conquest 
or destruction most injurious to the enemy'. Ibid.
2. Quoted in F.A. Johnson, Defence by Committee3 The British Committee 
of Imperial Defence 1885-2959 (Oxford University Press, London, 1960), 
p.123.
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Lieutenant-General Sir Sydney Rowell, who in New Guinea in 1942 was
sacked as a result of the lack of military understanding by the Prime
Minister, observed that:
It must have been a great relief for Wellington 
not to be called up by radio-telephone each night 
by his Prime Minister, and not to have a constant 
flow of political snoopers arriving by jet 
aircraft at the airfield nearest his headquarters 
in Spain.3
Perhaps the first modern war where a democratically elected civilian
leader could exercise close strategic control over his generals was
the American Civil War. President Lincoln has been criticised for
abusing this new capability, but undoubtedly by doing so he saved the
Union. Nevertheless, he understood completely the different roles of
politicians and generals. Thus he wrote to General Ulysses Grant:
The particulars of your plans I neither know 
nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self- 
reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to 
obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you.
While I am very anxious that any great disaster, 
or the capture of our men in great numbers shall 
be avoided, I know; these points are less likely 
to escape your attention than they would be mine.
If there is anything wanting which is within my 
power to give, do not fail to let me know it.4
But while giving freedom to Grant for the execution of military strategy,
Lincoln retained control of grand strategy.
The bitter controversy between the British Prime Minister, Lloyd 
George, and his Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field Marshal 
Sir William Robertson, in the First World War is a prime example of the 
difficulties of modern civil-military relations. Perhaps it was the 
genius of Winston Churchill which made the system work in the Second World 
War, but the brilliant work of Sir Maurice Hankey between the wars on
3. Paper entitled 'Co-operation Between Allies in Time of War', 
Rowell Papers, AWM.
4. B. Catton, Grant Takes Command (J.M. Dent & Sons, London, 1970), 
p.177.
the Committee of Imperial Defence provided a secretariat which eased the 
tension between the politicians and the military leaders. After the USA, 
entered the Second World War the Americans took up many (but not all) 
of the aspects of the British system.
Just as in Britain the development of the machinery for strategic 
decision-making was dominated by one man, Hankey, so too in Australia. 
Indeed it is scarcely possible to separate a discussion of the Australian 
machinery from an account of the work of Sir Frederick Shedden. Further­
more, from his key position within the machinery Shedden was able to 
influence the direction of strategic policy to a degree which has not 
been generally recognised.
Shedden was well qualified for his role. He had joined the Department 
of Defence in 1910 before his seventeenth birthday, and in the First 
World War he served overseas as a young pay officer with the task of
reorganising the AIF pay system. In 1928 he attended the Imperial Defence
5College where the commandant was Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond. The 
following year he carried out research on financial administration in 
London. Then in 1932 and 1933 he was attached to the British Cabinet 
Office and the Secretariat of the Committee of Imperial Defence. Here 
he came under the influence of Hankey, and by correspondence and by 
visits during his trips to London with respective Australian Prime
g
Ministers, Shedden maintained a friendship with both Hankey and Richmond.
It is from his relationship with Hankey and Richmond that Shedden developed
7his belief in 'blue water strategy' and Imperial Defence, and Hasluck
5. For a biography of Richmond see Arthur J. Marder, Portrait of an 
Admiral (Jonathan Cape, London, 1960). Richmond's ideas were elaborated in 
many books; perhaps the best was Statesmen and Sea Power.
6. Interview with Mr S. Landau, Shedden's wartime personal assistant,
14 December 1978; Stephen Roskill, Hankeys Man of Secrets, Volume III 
(Collins, London, 1974), pp.127, 136, 487, 498, 502, 588, 590-2, 606.
When Hankey visited Australia in 1934 Shedden was assigned to him as ADC;
MP 1217, Boxes 73, 75, Overseas Personal Correspondence.
7. Landau interview, 14 December 1978.
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thought that it was 'due to him, rather than to any other single 
influence, that Australian defence policy in pre-war years was linked 
so closely to British thinking ... Shedden worked neatly and assiduously
g
under the guidance of London'. Nevertheless, Shedden claimed that he
9was an exponent of Australia's sovereign rights in defence matters, and
after he visited London with Menzies in early 1941 he was more critical
of British policy.
It was not surprising that Shedden's appointment in November 1937,
at the age of 44 years, as Secretary of the Department of Defence, heralded
a period of 'revolution in the Department's approach to its tasks and a
sharp rise in the range and quality of its work'.^° Significantly, the
first matter dealt with by Shedden on his appointment was a rearrangement
of his responsibilities so that he could concentrate on the policy side
of the department and be freed from administration."^ Shedden's influence
during the war can be gauged by the fact that from the time of his
appointment until 1946 (which is the limit of this thesis), when he was
12still Secretary, there were seven Ministers of Defence, five Chiefs of
13 14the General Staff, four Chiefs of the Naval Staff, and four Chiefs of
15the Air Staff.
8. Sir Paul Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness 3 Australian Foreign Affairs 
1941-1947, (Melbourne University Press, 1980), pp.12, 13.
9. Memorandum, Shedden to Curtin, 4 March 1944, Blarney Papers 154.1.
10. W. Perry, 'Sir Frederick Shedden, 1893-1971, An Appreciation',
The Victorian Historical Magazine, Vol.42, No.3, August 1971.
11. Cabinet Agendum signed by J.A. Lyons as Minister of Defence,
22 November 1937, MP 1217, Box 1021.
12. These were J.A. Lyons, H.V.C. Thorby, G.A. Street, R.G. Menzies,
J. Curtin, J.A. Beasley and F.M. Forde. Other ministers acted as Ministers 
of Defence (or Defence Coordination) at various times.
13. Major-General J.D. Lavarack, Lieutenant-General E.K. Squires,
General Sir Brudenell White, Lieutenant-Generals V.A.H. Sturdee and 
J. Northcott.
14. Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Hyde, Admirals Sir Ragnar Colvin, Sir Guy 
Royle and Sir Louis Hamilton.
15. Air Vice-Marshal R. Williams, Air Vice-Marshal S.J. Goble, (Acting), 
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Burnett, Air Vice-Marshal G. Jones.
Acting on his experience with the Committee of Imperial Defence, 
Shedden initiated work on the War Book, which set out in detail the various 
measures to be adopted by the armed services and by the departments both 
in the precautionary stage and in the war stage. Communications,
proclamations, plans and Cabinet submissions were prepared and held in
16 . readiness. Furthermore, he sought to organise the Australian war
administration along the lines established by Hankey in Britain. Although
the British system influenced Australia, there were fundamental differences.
In Britain there was no separate Deaprtment of Defence, and although
there was eventually a Minister for Co-ordination of Defence, the main
body for co-ordination was the Committee of Imperial Defence and its
various sub-committees. After the outbreak of war the War Cabinet Defence
Committee took over the role of the Committee of Imperial Defence, but
17the sub-committee system remained.
Theoretically the Defence Committee (Operations), presided over
by the Prime Minister and attended by selected cabinet ministers and
the service chiefs, decided British war policy, but as the war progressed
Churchill attended many Chiefs of Staff Committee meetings. It was this
latter forum, to which cabinet ministers were invited on an ad hoc
basis, which was the focal point of the British war strategy. The work
of Sir Hastings Ismay, Churchill's Chief of Staff, representative on
the Chiefs of Staff Committee and secretary to the Defence Committee,
should not be overlooked, but his role was to oil the machinery, not
18to provide its impetus. This came from the extraordinary dynamo of 
Winston Churchill, balanced by the more cautious Chiefs of Staff.
16. For a description of the war book in further detail see Hasluck,
The Government and the People 1939-1941, pp.122-142.
17. For an account of the Defence Committee see F.A. Johnson, op.cit.
18. For a personal account of Ismay's role see his autobiography, The 
Memoirs of General the Lord Ismay, (Heinemann, London, 1960). Also James 
Leasor, War at the Top (Michael Joseph, London, 1959), for an account of 
Ismay's deputy,General Sir Leslie Hollis. See also an untitled chapter
by Sir Ian Jacob, Ismay's other deputy, in J. Wheeler-Bennett (ed), Action 
This Day3 Working with Churchill (Macmillan, London, 1968).
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In Australia, the equivalent of the British Defence Committee was
the Council of Defence, which, less the official and service members, on
the outbreak of war became the War Cabinet, and this was the controlling
19body for the higher direction of the war. In was, in effect, an
executive sub-committee of the Cabinet in matters relating to the active 
conduct of the war. The secretariat of the Council of Defence became the 
secretariat of the War Cabinet, but unlike the Council of Defence the 
War Cabinet did not incorporate service representatives, although these 
could be called upon when required. Two defence bodies, however, did 
provide advice to the War Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, which 
was created on 4 September 1939, consisted of the Chiefs of Staff of the 
three services, and it gave advice in regard to operational matters 
and strategic appreciations. A larger body, the Defence Committee, 
which included the Chiefs of Staff, an officer of the secretariat of 
the Department of Defence, and on occasions the Controller-General 
of Munitions, the Controller of Civil Aviation, and the Chairman of
the Principal Supply Officer's Committee, gave advice on defence policy
, . 20 as a whole.
Then in October 1940, in an effort to involve the Opposition,
another body was formed to offer advice to the War Cabinet. This was
the Advisory War Council, which included members of all the parliamentary
parties. The party system continued to function as in peace-time,
but the Council gave increased stability to the government and enabled
Parliament to function more smoothly. Furthermore, experience on the
Council proved extremely valuable to Curtin and his senior ministers
21when they found themsleves forming the government a year later.
19. For planning documents indicating that the War Cabinet would include 
the ministers and secretariat of the Council of Defence see MP 1217, Box 462. 
See also Cabinet Minute 194, 26 September 1939 and attached documents in 
DAFP, Vol.II, pp.286-293.
20. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.439.
21. Interview with Mr S. Landau, Shedden's personal assistant, 14 December 
1978.
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Until the arrival of General MacArthur in early 1942, and even then
to some extent, the Advisory War Council was the focal point of Australian
strategic decision-making. Although it had only an advisory capacity
the presence of four or five cabinet ministers meant that Advisory
War Council minutes could be and often were accepted as War Cabinet minutes
During the crucial period of the war the important strategic decisions
were determined by the Advisory War Council and ratified immediately as
War Cabinet decisions. As with the War Cabinet, the Chiefs of Staff could
be called upon to attend, and General Rowell recalled attending a
Council meeting in early 1942: 'I had to contend with three King's
Counsel's (sic) in Menzies, Spender and Hughes, and it wasn't roses
22all the way by any means'.
The above organisation for strategic decision-making in Australia 
worked tolerably well for the first two years of the war. The Chiefs of 
Staff offered advice on questions such as the strengths and deployment 
of the forces, and, when requested, provided appreciations on the defence 
of Australia. But the fundamental weakness was the absence of an 
organisation to provide for the high level joint operational command 
of the forces. The Chiefs of Staff exercised no joint and little service 
command function. General Blarney, the Commander of the Second Australian 
Imperial Force in the Middle East, was responsible not to the CGS or even 
to the Chiefs of Staff, but directly to the Minister for the Army.
The lack of high level command machinery did not seem important while 
the Australian forces were operating overseas under British commanders,
22. S.F. Rowell, Full Circle (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974) 
p.104. The Australian system resembled that of Britain in the First World 
War, the drawbacks of which have been described by General Sir Frederick 
Maurice: 'The method of having the Chiefs of Staff in attendance at War 
Cabinet meetings involved great waste of the time of the Chiefs of Staff 
and they were rarely as ready to speak their minds at War Cabinet meetings 
as they would be to a Prime Minister with whom they were in close 
association'. Maurice to Churchill, 14 February 1942, quoted in W.S. 
Churchill, The Second World War3 Volume IVs The Hinge of Fate (Cassell, 
London, 1951), p.79.
but when in mid 1941 the government began consideration of the defence 
of Australia, problems ai?ose. And, as will be recounted, after Japan 
entered the war the question of high level command became vital.
Although this thesis is concerned with strategic decision-making, 
it should not be forgotten that strategy and defence were but a part 
of the overall responsibility of the government. Thus both the Menzies 
and Curtin governments developed cabinet committees to handle the economic 
mobilisation of the country's resources. And the Full Cabinet continued 
to deal with the legislative programme, budgetary proposals and 
miscellaneous matters.
Nevertheless, domestic questions were dominated by the overriding 
importance of defence policy which was decided in the War Cabinet. In 
the Menzies government in 1941, the War Cabinet consisted of Menzies who 
was the Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Coordination, A.W. Fadden, 
the Treasurer, W.M. Hughes, the Attorney-General and Minister for the 
Navy, P.C. Spender, the Minister for the Army, J. McEwen, the Minister 
for Air and Civil Aviation, Senator Foil, the Minister for the Interior 
and Information and Senator McBride, the Minister for Supply and 
Development and for Munitions. Of the above ministers, Menzies, Fadden, 
Hughes, Spender and McBride were original members of the Advisory War 
Council. McEwen joined in August 1941 and McBride left in October 1941.
Significantly, the Minister for External Affairs, Sir Frederick 
Stewart, was not included in the War Cabinet or Advisory War Council,
and his absence emphasises the lack of influence and importance of the
23 . . . .Department of External Affairs. The Australian High Commissioner in
London reported directly to the Prime Minister's Department, and in
mid 1941 Australia had diplomatic representatives in only four other
23
23. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness3 p.7.
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countries, USA, Japan, China and Canada. While it is true that
John McEwen, as Minister for External Affairs in 1940, played a
significant part in Australian efforts to assist the coup in New
24Caledonia, there is little other evidence to indicate that the
Department of External Affairs influenced strategic decision-making before
the Japanese attack. By contrast, as P.G. Edwards has observed, the
Australian High Commissioner in London, the former Prime Minister,
S.M. Bruce, 'was more important in Australian external policy than any
of the succession of Ministers for External Affairs between 1939 and 
251941'. And if the Department of External Affairs had little effect 
on strategic and defence policy-making, the other non-service departments 
had even less.
The change in government in October 1941 brought only a slight
change in emphasis. With Doctor Herbert Evatt as Minister the Department
of External Affairs expanded its scope and increased in importance,
but his suspicion of officers of the Department hindered the efficiency
26of its operations. For all Evatt's energy, bluster and noise his 
influence on strategic policy-making was not paramount.
24. Margot Simington, 'Australia and the New Caledonia Coup d'etat of 
1940', Australian Outlook, Vol.30, No.l, April 1976; idem, 'Australia 
and New Caledonia, October 1940-January 1941: A Case in Australian 
Foreign Policy Making', RMC Historical Journal, No.3, 1974.
25. P.G. Edwards, 'Menzies and the Imperial Connection 1939-1941', in 
C. Hazlehurst (ed), Australian Conservatism> Essays in Twentieth Century 
Political History (ANU Press, Canberra, 1979), p.207. For an expansion
of this point see P.G. Edwards, 'The Rise and Fall of the High Commissioner:
S.M. Bruce in London, 1933-1945', in A.F. Maddern and W.H. Morris-Jones, 
Australia and Britain 3 Essays on a Changing Relationship (Sydney 
University Press, Sydney, 1980).
26. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p.14 and Ch.3.
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For the first year or more of the Labor government, the Prime Minister,
John Curtin, and Evatt worked closely together, but by 1943 there were
increasing signs of both personal and political differences. As
P.G. Edwards has observed:
Two rival centres of [foreign] policy-making were 
being formed. Curtin, as Minister for Defence as 
well as Prime Minister, was advised principally by 
MacArthur, Shedden and the defence establishment, 
while Evatt drew about him a coterie of friends, 
and selected members of the Department of External 
Affairs. The one placed emphasis on smoothing 
Australian relations with both the United Kingdom 
and the United States: the other tended to assert 
Australian independence of the great powers.27
As with the Menzies government, ultimate power in the Labor government 
rested with the War Cabinet which consisted of Curtin, the Prime Minister 
and Minister for Defence Coordination, F.M. Forde, the Deputy Prime Minister 
and Minister for the Army, J.B. Chifley, the Treasurer, Dr Evatt, the 
Minister for External Affairs and Attorney-General, J.A. Beasley, the 
Minister for Supply and Development, N.J.O. Makin, the Minister for the 
Navy and for Munitions, A.S. Drakeford, the Minister for Air and for Civil 
Aviation, and after 11 December 1941, J.J. Dedman, the Minister for War 
Organisation of Industry. Of the above ministers, Curtin, Forde, Beasley, 
Makin and Evatt were members of the Advisory War Council. Although Chifley 
attended on occasions when other members were absent, he did not become a 
member of the Council until July 1945, when, after the death of Curtin, 
he became Prime Minister.
Despite the increasing influence of Evatt and the Department of 
External Affairs in the area of diplomacy and foreign policy, and despite 
the irtipact of the Departments of the Treasury, Post-War Restruction, 
and War Organisation of Industry on the attempts to balance the
27. P.G. Edwards, 'Evatt and the Americans', Historical Studies, Vol.18, 
No.73, October 1979. Later in the war, on 19 January 1944, the UK High 
Commission reported to the Dominions Office: 'Relations between the Prime 
Minister and Evatt are not good. It seems that there is a tendency for 
the two to work in watertight compartments'. Cable 74, PREM 4 42/2.
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war effort, the most important department with respect to war policy in
general,and strategic and defence policy in particular,was the Department
28of Defence. It will be of value, therefore, to examine further the 
role of the department, which for a while was known as the Department 
of Defence Co-ordination, and of its permanent head, Shedden.
While in Britain there was no separate Department of Defence before
the war, in Australia there were no separate service departments. But
at the outbreak of war as a result of Shedden's initiative, the Department
of Defence was abolished, and the Department of Defence Co-ordination
was established to control the newly formed departments of Navy, Army,
Air and Supply and Development. The Prime Minister became the Minister
of Defence Co-ordination, and Shedden continued as the permanent head
of the new department. Throughout the war, under the various Prime
Ministers - Menzies, Fadden, Curtin and Chifley - the department was
the linch-pin of the Australian war effort. Hasluck has explained how
the various groups worked together.
The Department of Defence Co-ordination (and, 
after April 1942, the Department of Defence) was 
in fact the central and, in some respects, the 
supreme component of the machinery for the higher 
direction of the war because, throughout the war, 
the Prime Minister himself held the portfolio of 
Defence Co-ordination or of Defence; the department 
was the Secretariat of War Cabinet and all 
business flowing to and from War Cabinet passed 
through it; and its organisation embraced the 
Defence Committee and the Chiefs of Staff Committee 
for both of which it provided the secretariat, 
as well as being represented on the Defence Committee.
28. In The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.471, Hasluck wrote that 
the Treasury took 'a lively interest in higher policy and the organisation 
of the war effort ... On such a question as the production of tanks in 
Australia Treasury now argued grand strategy ... with the greatest assurance'. 
Nevertheless the Treasury did not play an important role in strategic 
decision-making when compared with the Department of Defence.
29. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.443. In fact 
during the short period when Fadden was Prime Minister R.G. Menzies 
remained the Minister for Defence Co-ordi.nation. When Curtin died in 
July 1945 and Chifley became Prime Minister the Minister of Defence was 
J.A. Beasley.
Sir Frederick Shedden, Secretary of the Department 
of Defence, 1937-1956.
(National Library of Australia, Negative No.L6626)
When it is remembered that Shedden remained as secretary of the department 
throughout the war, his great influence can be understood. Furthermore, 
when, after MacArthur arrived in Australia, the Prime Minister, John 
Curtin, instituted the Prime Minister's War Conference consisting of 
himself and MacArthur, Shedden became secretary of that too.
It would be incorrect to equate the roles of Ismay and Shedden, 
for in Britain the secretary of the War Cabinet was Sir Edward Bridges.
As secretary ‘of the Defence Committee Ismay was Bridges' deputy, and 
although Ismay controlled the various sub-committees, Shedden was head 
of a much larger and more complex department. If anything, the comparison 
should be made with Sir Maurice Hankey who, before he retired in 1938
and his job was divided, was secretary of both the Cabinet and the
30Committee of Imperial Defence. Shedden tried to model himself upon 
that great English civil servant, and attempted to organise the Australian
war administration along the lines established by Hankey in the Imperial
31War Cabinet. Nevertheless Shedden recognised the importance of Ismay, 
and during the war he established a relationship with Ismay and his
deputies Hollis and Jacob, both of whom served in the British Ministry
32of Defence after the war.
Lacking miltary knowledge and experience Curtin and Chifley as
33Prime Ministers relied heavily upon Shedden's advice. He scrutinised 
carefully the propositions put forward by the military chiefs, and his 
papers contain numerous letters to the chiefs on matters of military
30. For an account of Hankey's role see Stephen Roskill, Hankey3 Man 
of Secrets, Three Volumes (Collins, London,1970, 1972, 1974).
31. On 7 May 1944 Shedden visited Hankey, and afterwards Hankey wrote in 
his diary that Shedden said 'that he models himself entirely on my methods'. 
Quoted in Roskill, Hankey3 Man of Secrets, Vol.Ill, p.591.
32. Landau interview, 14 December 1978; MP 1217, Box 15, Diaries 
1939-1941.
33. Landau interview, 14 December 1978.
27
28
administration. Many of Curtin's letters to the military chiefs and
ministers on matters of policy are revealed to have been not only drafted
34by but initiated by Shedden. Menzies too relied heavily on Shedden, 
but Menzies had ideas of his own about imperial defence, and since
Shedden's views were much the same there was less need for the Secretary
35to offer strategic advice to his Minister. In the opinion of Sir
Percy Spender, Shedden exercised the greatest influence of any person
36upon the Australian war effort. Shedden himself modestly agreed with
this assessment and told Hankey in 1944 that he was 'really the main force
37for running the war in Australia'. Hard working, balanced, dominating 
and ambitious, yet shy and eschewing publicity, Shedden was a great . 
Australian public servant.
While not always agreeing with Shedden's approach, senior defence
38public servants have praised him highly. Yet inevitably such a man has
34. mp 1217, passim.
35. Interestingly, when Parkhill was defeated at the 1937 election Shedden 
recommended to the Prime Minister, Lyons, that Menzies should be appointed 
as the new Minister for Defence. Menzies was not appointed. Shedden 
Diary, 1941, MP 1217, Box 15.
36. Interview with Sir Percy Spender, a war-time member of the Advisory 
War Council, 11 October 1978.
37. Roskill, Hankey3 Man of Secrets, Vol.II, p.591.
38. Interviews with S. Landau, 14 December 1978, Sir Percy Spender,
11 October 1978, Mr Garry Armstrong, 17 August 1976, Vice-Admiral Sir John 
Collins, 9 October 1978, Mr J.P. Buckley, 22 January 1979, Air Marshal 
Sir George Jones, 24 January 1979, Vice-Admiral Sir Henry Burrell, 1 
February 1979.
39. Sir Frederick Chilton wrote that Shedden 'had a real presence and 
powerful personality. He was ruthless with those who crossed him, and 
devasting with those in his Department who could not rise to his exceptional 
standards of performance ... Shedden's "forte" was top level policy and
its broad application. He was not a good administrator in the sense of 
leadership of a team ... He ruled by fear - and this stultified initiative. 
But as head of the small policy Dept of Defence, he was superb'. Letter 
from Brigadier Sir Frederick Chilton, 28 July 1979. Chilton was Deputy 
Secretary of the Department from 1950 to 1958 before becoming Secretary 
of the Department of Repatriation. Another senior defence public servant 
wrote: 'Shedden's brilliance as a Secretariat Co-ordinator and his tremen­
dous capacity to maintain order in all work with which he was associated, 
more particularly in the chaos of war, was a very significant factor. From 
his return from Britain, the Higher Defence Organisation grew in stature, 
order and precision. Channels of communication became clear-cut;
(cont'd)
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his critics. The pre-war CAS, Sir Richard Williams, has written:
He had been well groomed by [his predecessor M.L.]
Shedherd in the art of keeping Chiefs of Staff 
and others away from the Minister and was not 
lacking in his appreciation of the Minister's 
increased dependence on the Secretary by this 
action.4®
. . .  41Other military chiefs respected but did not like Shedden. He kept
himself aloof from his department, 'and like other permanent heads
he did not always work in an atmosphere of sweetness and light ... in
the administration of his Department he could be authoritarian, strong-
42willed and undeviating'.
Nevertheless some senior servicemen had a high opinion of him. To
Sir Thomas Blarney , 'He represented the highest devotion of the Australian
43Public Service ...' And Sir Sydney Rowell, a later Chairman of the
Chiefs of Staff Committee, has written that Shedden
had an unrivalled knowledge of matters associated 
with Commonwealth defence and he was a tireless and 
meticulously accurate worker. If it could be said 
that he had a fault it was in his complete absorption 
in the work he was doing, leaving little time for outside 
activities. He had critics both at home and abroad; in 
the main these were service people who couldn't match his 
intellect or who were jealous of his power aid influence.44
39. (cont'd)
duplication was cut to a minimum. He was excessively modest, dedicated to 
work'. Lecture by Mr Garry Armstrong to the Australian Staff College,
8 May 1978, Transcript from Mr Armstrong.
40. Sir Richard williams, These Are Facts} The Autobiography of Air Marshal 
Sir Richard WilliamsKBE3 0BS DSO (Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1977), 
p.236. Chilton (letter, 28 July 1979) wrote that he thought that Williams 
was living in the past here. He thought that Shedden was 'concerned to see 
that defence advice was fully thought through, coordinated and presented 
through the appropriate machinery'.
41. For example, Lieutenant-Generals Berryman and Wynter did not like him. 
Blarney respected him (Berryman interview, 10 October 1978, also Gavin Long 
Diary, No.l, p.30). Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins had a poor opinion of 
him (Interview, 9 October 1978). Professor W.E.H. Stanner, research 
officer for the Ministers for the Army, Spender and Forde, found Shedden
to be slow, pedantic and over secretive. (Interview, 4 June 1979).
42. Perry, 'Sir Frederick Shedden, 1893-1971. An Appreciation'. Landau, 
himself a later departmental head, did not agree with Shedden's adminis­
trative methods (Interview, 14 December 1978).
43. Blarney's Memoirs, from Mr T.R. Blarney.
44. Rowell, Full Circle, p.194.
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Rowell had a happy personal relationship with Shedden.
Despite the critics Shedden's reputation remains high. To
J.J. Dedman, he was 'one of the most capable and sagacious of the many
public servants I was privileged to be associated with during the
45eight years I held office as a Minister'. In the opinion of Sir Paul
Hasluck, Shedden was 'one of the few outstanding men in the civil side
of the Australian war effort. Discretion, orderly arrangement and
careful groundwork were so large a part of his training and his method
46that his achievement was often hidden'.
It is not claimed that Shedden completely dominated strategic 
decision-making in Australia during the war. Menzies and Curtin were 
not men to be dominated. But they were busy politicians and were willing 
to accept, almost without question, the advice proferred by Shedden on 
strategic matters. Indeed, on many occasions they accepted Shedden's 
opinions rather than those of the Chiefs of Staff, especially when 
Shedden demonstrated that the Chiefs were divided in their views. 
Shedden's position was strengthened by the fact that government 
administration was divided between Canberra, Sydney and Melbourne.
After Curtin became Prime Minister the War Cabinet met more frequently 
in Canberra than in Melbourne which Menzies had preferred. However 
the Chiefs of Staff remained in Melbourne, and they therefore had to 
communicate with the Prime Minister through Shedden who established 
himself in Canberra when Curtin was there.
45. John J. Dedman, 'Encounter over Manus', Australian Outlook, August 
1966, Volume 20, No.2, p.142.
46. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.444. For 
further comments by Hasluck see Diplomatic Witness, pp.12-14.
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Despite Shedden's influence, most ideas on strategic policy
still emanated either from the Chiefs of Staff, or, after March
1942, from General Sir Thomas Blarney, the Commander-in-Chief of
the Australian Army, and General Douglas MacArthur, the Allied
Commander-in-Chief of the South-West Pacific Area. The military men
therefore had a vital role in strategic decision-making, but in
most cases their advice had to be filtered through Shedden's
Secretariat, and this fact must be born in mind when discussing
47Australian strategic policy-making m  the Second World War.
47. The above lengthy description of Shedden's role and personality 
should not be read to imply that his role was more important than 
that of Menzies, Curtin, Blarney and MacArthur. But they are all 
well-known personalities who have been described in numerous books 
and articles, and it has not been considered necessary to describe 
them in as much detail as Shedden. Furthermore, the role of senior 
public servants has not been given sufficient attention. In 1980 
Hasluck wrote: 'In writing the civil volumes of the official war 
history I took the view that the person who bears the political 
responsibility for action should be credited with having taken the 
action. Now, in a more personal account of the war years, I take the 
liberty of passing on most of the credit for war-time administration 
to the senior public servants'. Diplomatic Witness, p.158.
Strategic Decision-Making Before Pearl Harbour
Australian strategic decision-making during the war in the Pacific 
from December 1941 until September 1945 must be viewed against the back­
ground of the events in the first two years of the Second World War. Although 
Menzies, Shedden and the Chiefs of Staff were all active disciples of 
imperial defence, it should not be assumed that before Pearl Harbour 
they gave no consideration to the Japanese threat in the Far East. The
threat of Japan had, in fact,formed the focal point of Australian defence
48planning since before federation in 1901. Between the wars the main 
point of discussion had been not whether Japan was a threat, but rather 
how Australia should go about protecting itself against that threat.
Should Australia rely completely on imperial defence, or should she plan 
to resist a Japanese invasion without the help of the empire? With a 
population of barely 7 million, a small industrial base, a huge coastline, 
and remote from powerful friends, Australia had little capacity for 
effective self-defence. But imperial defence in the Far East was based 
on the British assurance that their main fleet would be located at 
Singapore, and the Australians were never confident that the British 
would be able to fulfil their promise.
Australian strategic decisions during the first year of the Second World 
War were made in the context of the so-called Singapore strategy, and the 
dilemmas faced by the strategic planners were similar in nature to those
48.. The Australian fear of Japan and the estimates of the Japanese 
threat is covered in D.M. Horner, 'Australian Estimates of the Japanese 
Threat, 1905-1941', in P.A. Towle (ed), Estimating Foreign Military 
Power., (Croom Helm, London, 1981, forthcoming).
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dealt with by their predecessors during the previous twenty years.
The decisions of 1939 and 1940 also created the framework for Australian
strategy during the remaining years of the war. From February 1941
to February 1942 there was constant tension in senior government and
defence circles between placing Australian security in the hands of
the Empire and the fear that the imperial planners in Whitehall were
not giving their full attention to the Far East.
For the first two years of the war Australian strategic and defence
policy-making was dominated by the Prime Minister R.G. Menzies. Hasluck
described Menzies as:
A man of fine presence, ease of manner, poise 
and style, he incurred the suspicion of being 
vain, of lacking sincerity, and of being aloof.
A man of keen intellect he inevitably had often 
made lesser men seem foolish.5®
Menzies1 words and deeds during his first term as Prime Minister reflect
the tension mentioned earlier between fear for the security of Australia
and the need to cooperate in imperial defence. For example in June 1939,
soon after he became Prime Minister,he had asked the British government
for an assurance that in the event of war with Japan a fleet would be
51sent to Singapore. But despite numerous other expressions of doubt,
33
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49. Australian strategic decisions during the first two years of the war 
have been dealt with by many writers, and this chapter seeks to do no more 
than touch on a few highlights. Important journal articles for this period 
include: J.J. Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions Before Pearl Harbour', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XII, No.3, December 1967; 
Ian Hamill, 'An Expeditionary Force Mentality? The Despatch of Australian 
Troops to the Middle East, 1939-1940', Australian Outlook, August 1977,
Vol.31, No.2; J.M. McCarthy, 'Singapore and Australian Defence 1921-1942', 
Australian Outlook, August 1971, Vol.25, No.2; J.M. McCarthy, 'The 
Defence of Australia and the Empire Air Training Scheme: 1939-1942', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XX, No.3, December 1974; 
J.M. McCarthy, 'Australian Responses to the European War 1939-41', 
Australian Journal of Defence Studies,, Vol.l, No.2, October 1977; J.M. 
McCarthy, 'The Imperial Commitment 1939-41', Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, Vol.XXIll, No.2, August 1977.
50. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1939-1941, p.115.
51. Cable, Menzies to Chamberlain, 24 June 1939, in DAFP, Vol.II, p.134.
indeed deep misgivings, about British policy, by instinct and temperament
52Menzies was an imperialist. And his vision of a united imperial war 
effort shines through his policies during 1940 and 1941. Even after 
he became severely disillusioned in London in April 1941 he clung to 
his concept of imperial defence. Heartened by his enthusiastic reception
in London he came to believe that he might have a role to play in the
53 54direction of the imperial war effort. Indeed he might even lead iti
And if that happened then perhaps he could bring some balance to imperial
strategy. Menzies' continuing commitment to imperial defence even after
Churchill had demonstrated that he did not share the same view was to
55contribute in part to his resignation from the position of Prime Minister.
Menzies' attitude towards Britain and his belief in the concept of 
imperial defence were essential parts of Australian strategic decision­
making before Pearl Harbour. But leaving aside this unifying theme, 
strategic decision-making during this period might be divided into three 
phases. The first phase was from September 1939 to November 1940. During 
this time the government began to raise and deploy its armed forces 
to fight an imperial war against Germany and Italy. But the forces were 
deployed only after much hesitation by the government. It needed a 
qualified assurance from the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston 
Churchill, that Britain 'would undertake to send adequate naval forces
52. For a discussion of this question see P.G. Edwards, 'Menzies and 
the Imperial Connection, 1939-1941'.
53. On 11 June 1941, Ismay wrote to Brooke-Popham that Menzies 'went
down very well over here, and there was a large body of opinion which hoped 
that he might stay as a permanent member of the War Cabinet'. Brooke-Popham 
Papers V/l, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King's College, 
London.
54. Shedden wrote in his diary at the time about Menzies: 'Radical as 
it may sound, why should not a Dominion statesman lead the Empire in war?'
MP 1217, Box 15.
55. Menzies realised that only the Australian Prime Minister could be 
guaranteed a seat in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. Therefore in August 
1941 he suggested returning to London. The resulting accusations 
contributed to his downfall.
to prevent any serious catastrophe', and an announcement from Japan
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that she would 'not interfere now that war has broken out in Europe but
57will proceed exclusively towards a solution of the China incident', 
before the Australian government could freely contemplate sending an 
expeditionary force to help Britain. Even then the Australian decision
was accelerated by an earlier announcement that New Zealand was sending
58 .a force. Menzies summed up the Australian position when he wrote to
S.M. Bruce, the Australian High Commissioner in London:
As to Japan - I have had a growing feeling for some 
time that though the Far East is a major problem to 
us, it is a relatively minor one to Whitehall.59
Despite Australian fears, old attitudes died hard. For example, the
new Australian CAS, the British officer, Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles
Burnett, wrote to Air Marshal Drummond: 'I am a Scotsman as you are an
60Australian, but I am an Imperialist first and foremost'. Soon after
the beginning of the war, but not before some misgiving, the government
61placed the major ships of the RAN under Admiralty control, and the 
Empire Air Training Scheme, begun in November 1939, was initiated to
56. 8th Meeting of Dominion Ministers, 20 November 1939, PRO: CAB 99/1. 
Cable C38, Casey to Menzies, 23 November 1939 stated that the British War 
Cabinet approved the following: 'should Japanese encroachment begin, or 
should Great Britain pass into a state of war with Japan, the Admiralty 
would make such dispositions as would enable them to offer timely resistance 
either to a serious attack upon Singapore or to the invasion of Australia 
and New Zealand. these dispositions would not necessarily take the form
of stationing a fleet at Singapore, but would be of a character to enable 
the necessary concentrations to be made eastward in ample time to prevent 
a disaster'. DAFP, Vol.II, p.429.
57. Cable, Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, to Lord 
Halifax, Foreign Secretary, dated 5 September and received 9 September 1939, 
E.L. Woodward and R. Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy3 
1919-1939, Third Series, Vol.9, (HMSO, London, 1955), p.525.
58. Cable 301, UK High Commissioner to Dominions Office, 24 November 1939, 
DAFP, Vol.II, pp.431-434.
59. Letter, Menzies to Bruce, 11 September 1939, DAFP, Vol.II, p.257.
60. Quoted in J.M. McCarthy, Air Power and Australian Defence: A Study 
in Imperial Relations 1923-1954, Ph.D Thesis, ANU, 1971, p.243.
61. G. Hermon Gill, Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, (Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1957), pp.73-77.
provide Australian pilots for operations in Europe under RAF
n  6 2control.
Although the government relied heavily on advice from London, these 
decisions were all made independently by the Australian government. It 
might be argued that the Australians had few options, and their restricted 
capacity to make independent decisions was partly their own fault.
Having publicly advocated the value of imperial defence they could hardly 
reject the concept at the first sign of hostilities, especially 
considering Australia's sentimental attachment to Britain. Furthermore, 
to support Britain in Europe in 1939 and early 1940 seemed good strategic 
sense, for if Germany could be held in northern France, as it had been in 
the First World War, Britain would probably be able to send enough of her 
fleet to Singapore to deter the Japanese.
The collapse of France, the fall of the Netherlands and the entry 
of Italy in mid 1940 changed the complexion of the war. On the one hand 
the danger in the Far East increased, for it seemed that the French 
colonies of Indo-China and New Caledonia, and the Netherlands East Indies 
might be tempting targets for the Japanese. On the other hand the loss 
of the French fleet, and the hostile presence of the Italian fleet in 
the Mediterranean, meant that the Royal Navy would be unable to reinforce 
Singapore. And the Italians in Libya and Abyssinia threatened the Suez 
Canal - a traditional link in imperial defence - and the oil fields of 
the Middle East. So the events of mid 1940 added two extra areas of 
conflict or potential conflict to the strategic map, the Middle East 
and the Far East, and both made demands on the Empire's scarce military 
resources. The result was that Australia eventually decided in September 
to reinforce the Middle East with a second division, and in November 
offered to send a brigade to Malaya with the understanding that it 
might eventually go to the Middle East.
62. D. Gillison, Royal Australian Air Forces 1939-1942, (Australian War 
Memorial, Canberra, 1962), pp.86, 87.
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The decision to send the 7th Division to the Middle East focusses
attention on the Australian decision-making process and the Australian
concept of imperial defence. On 29 June the United Kingdom government
asked if the Australian government could provide a division for the
defence of Singapore, pointing out that:
... we can no longer concentrate upon the defence 
of Singapore Island entirely but must consider the 
defence of Malaya as a whole, particularly the security 
of up-country landing grounds. For this reason and 
because we cannot spare a fleet for the Far East at 
present, it is all the more important that we should 
do what we can to improve our land and air defences 
in Malaya.63
Since Australia had only one division (the 6th) in the Middle East, and 
the others were not yet trained and equipped, this proposal was resisted, 
but it should have served as a warning to the Menzies government.
J.J. Dedman has noted that: 'The whole issue of the relative importance 
of home defence, now aligned with the holding of Singapore as against 
assisting the United Kingdom to retain control of Egypt and the Suez Canal 
[was] here brought to a head'
At that time the Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Colvin, and the 
Chief of the Air Staff, Air Marshal Burnett, were officers seconded from 
the British services, while the Chief of the General Staff was the 63 year 
old Sir Brudenell White,who had been called out of retirement earlier in 
the year. He was one of Australia's most distinguished soldiers, but
he was out of touch with modern warfare.^ He was a firm supporter of
66imperial defence and advocated sending forces to the Middle East.
63. Cable 228. Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs to Commonwealth 
Government, 28 June 1940, DAFP, Vol.Ill, pp.517, 518.
64. J.J. Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions Before Pearl Harbour', p.339.
65. C.E.W. Bean, Two Men I Knew (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1957),pp.215-220.
66. W.M. Hughes recalled that in the War Cabinet White said: 'Our strategy 
is based on the navy being here to help us when it is needed. Our strategy 
is based on us holding in the Middle East, holding the canal; on us holding 
Singapore; on Japan not coming into the war'. Gavin Long Notes No.45,
20 February 1944, AWM. See also War Cabinet Minute 345,18 June 1940, DAFPs 
Vol.Ill, p.452.
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Furthermore, there was a widely held attitude that Australian forces 
had an important role to play on the battlefield and would not be suitable 
for garrison duties.
Menzies supported these views, and even when the Chiefs of Staff
changed their mind and presented a report on 23 August stating that
6 7Singapore was more important than the Middle East, War Cabinet apparently
6 8did not agree. The Chiefs of Staff had received a British appreciation 
that the defences in the Far East were dangerously understrength and 
had advised that the 7th Division should be sent to Malaya. By this time 
White had been killed in an aircrash and had been temporarily replaced 
by Major-General J. Northcott. The following month Lieutenant-General 
Vernon Sturdee was appointed CGS, and he was to retain the appointment 
for two more years, including the vital period of early 1942.
Apparently the decisive factor in the government's decision that
69the 7th Division should proceed to the Middle East, was a cable sent 
by Churchill as a 'foreword' to the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff.
appreciation with the aim of inspiring the Australians 'with a much
70greater degree of confidence'. Churchill promised that:
If ... contrary to prudence and self interest,
Japan set about invading Australia or New Zealand 
on a large scale, I have explicit authority of Cabinet 
to assure you that we should then cut our losses in 
the Mediterranean and proceed to your aid, sacrificing 
every interest except only the defence position of this 
island on which all depends.^
67. Report by the Australian Chiefs of Staff, 27 August 1940, CRS A2071, 
item 186/1940.
68. War Cabinet Minute 459, Melbourne, 28 August 1940, toc.cit.
69. Ibid.
70. WM (40)222, 8 August 1940 quoted in W.J. Hemmings, Australia and 
Britain's Far Eastern Defence Policy 1937-42, B.Litt Thesis, University 
of Oxford, 1977.
71. Cable 262, Churchill to Menzies, 11 August 1940, MP 1217, Box 533.
This promise was militarily worthless, for if Japan so dominated the 
seas as to be able to invade Australia on a large scale there would be 
little that Britain could do. By then Singapore would have fallen.
But the reaction of the Australian government shows that it had not yet 
learnt to be sceptical towards the British Prime Minister. Australian 
strategic decision-makers might theoretically have had the authority 
and capacity to act independently, but in practice, till November when 
they offered Britain a brigade for Malaya, they scarcely did so. The 
decision to offer the brigade in November was a direct result of the 
report of the October conference in Singapore which revealed grave 
deficiencies in men and equipment.
The second phase in strategic decision-making was from November 1940 
to June 1941. This period was one of growing disillusionment with British 
strategic policy, realisation that Australia had little influence 
over that policy, and vigorous, though unsuccessful, attempts to alter 
the policy and to secure a measure of influence. By the end of 1940 
Australia had almost exhausted its ability to make independent force 
deployments for the defence of Australia. In March 1941 the government 
decided to assist the Netherlands East Indies with the defence of Dutch 
Timor and Ambon, and in June 1941 agreed to a British request to send 
another brigade to Malaya, but in essence the government was locked into 
the strategy it had pursued in 1939 and 1940.
It would not be exact to mark November 1940 as the starting point
of disillusionment with Britain. After all, a year earlier Menzies
72had suspected Britain of treating Australia like a colony. In May 1940 
the government had viewed with caution the British plan to redirect the
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72. Cable, Menzies to R.G. Casey, 1 December 1939, DAFP, Vol.II, pp.441, 
442.
AIF convoys to Britain, and in September Menzies had expressed his
74dismay over the lack of information on the Dakar debacle.
Nevertheless, it was in November 1940, after the receipt of the
discouraging report of the Singapore Conference, that Menzies decided to
75go to London to press the case for the reinforcement of the Far East.
The events of the first half of 1941 were to confirm Australian 
suspicions that for Churchill the Empire stopped at the Suez Canal. The 
victory of the Australians in Cyrenaicia in January was a smoke-screen 
which, for the moment, clouded the true strategic picture. With a minimum 
of consultation with the dominions, Churchill sent the Australian and 
New Zealand forces to certain defeat in Greece. Despite six months'- 
preparation the defences of Crete proved to be inadequate, and in the 
Western Desert the untrained, ill-equipped 9th Australian Division 
provided the only substantial resistance to Rommel's advance on Egypt. 
British strategic direction in the first six months of 1941 did not inspire 
confidence.
Menzies' efforts to influence British strategy in the Far East were 
singularly unsuccessful. He was unable to secure a firm commitment from 
the British to send a fleet to the Far East. They argued further that 
they were not able to offer a guarantee to the Netherlands East Indies, 
and pointed out that the reinforcement programme for Malaya was many 
months away from completion. Even the air strength planned for Malaya 
would be less than that recommended by the commanders in the Far East,
73. Cable 228, Commonwealth Government to Secretary of State for Dominion 
Affairs, 17 May 1940, DAFP, Vol.Ill, p.305.
74. Cable, Menzies to Churchill, 29 September 1940, CRS A1608, item 
F 41/1/7.
75. Advisory War Council Minute 39, Canberra, 25 November 1940, CRS A2682, 
Vol.l.
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and the air defence of Malaya was based on the assumption that the
76Japanese air force was less effective than that of the Italians.
Australia's lack of influence was emphasised by the outcome of
the Anglo-American staff talks in Washington in early 1941 where it was
decided that in the event of war with Japan the first priority would be
the defeat of Germany. The Australian government was shocked to learn
that if Japan attacked only the Netherlands East Indies or British
possessions the American President thought that his country would not
approve a declaration of war against Japan. And if the Americans did
. 7 7join the war they would have to fight a 'holding war' in the Pacific.
The Acting Prime Minister, Arthur Fadden, wrote later that 'If Australia 
were to be abandoned by these two great powers until the war in Europe
was decided, we and our countrymen might well be pulling rickshaws before
78long'.
The final straw came on 1 May when Menzies in London learnt that, 
without consulting him'or his government, the British government had
advised the American government that they supported the US plan to move a
79large part of the US Pacific fleet to the Atlantic. The Australian govern-
80ment had little option but to concur, and its claims that it succeeded in 
having the plan modified to leave considerable forces in the Pacific were 
probably an exaggeration. Thus, by the time Menzies returned to Australia 
on 24 May 1941 it was clear to the Australian government that it could 
have little influence on allied strategy.
76. COS (41)230, 11 April 1941, MP 1049/5, item 1855/2/394; MP 1217,
Box 625; PREM 3 156/4 and CAB 99/4.
77. Cable 114, Watt to Department of External Affairs, 12 February, 
received 13 February 1945, CRS A2671, item 64/1941.
78. A.W. Fadden, 'Forty Days and Forty Nights: Memoir of a War-time 
Prime Minister', Australian Outlook, Vol.27, No.l, April 1973, p.6.
79. COS (41) 154th Meeting, 1 May 1941, MP 1217, Box 626.
80. Hasluck, The Government and the People> 1939-1941, p.346.
41
The third phase in Australian strategic decision-making is from June
to December 1941, which although it spans three governments, still marks a
period of relatively constant policy and attitude. With the decision on
11 June to send the only uncommitted AIF Brigade to Malaya Australia had all
81but exhausted its strategic options. After the British defeats in the
Middle East and his experiences in London where he found British strategic
direction to be dominated to a dangerous extent by Churchill, there is
little wonder that Menzies supported the requests of the Australian commander
in the Middle East, General Blarney, to evacuate the 9th Division from
Tobruk. Australia's request was not motivated by internal political
considerations nor unreasoned bloody-mindedness, but was a result of a lack
82of confidence in the British approach to strategy and grand strategy.
Menzies' attitude was maintained by the two following governments.
From the point of view of grand strategy the Australian government 
was now in a position of extreme difficulty. It knew that the British 
government could do little more either to strengthen the defence in 
Malaya or to provide Australia with more arms and equipment. Yet the 
strategic situation in the Middle East was precarious; the only Australian 
formations not actually in action were those recovering from their ordeals 
in Greece and Crete, and even several of their battalions were soon involved 
in bitter fighting in Syria. The German attack on Russia on 22 June added 
a further complication for it released Japan from the fear of war with 
Russia and enabled it to expand southwards, initially into southern Indo­
china. All Australia could do was support Anglo-American diplomatic moves, 
while at the same time trying to improve the home defences.
81. War Cabinet Minute 1145, Melbourne, 11 June 1941, CRS A2671, item 
189/1941.
82. For an account of the episode see Hasluck, The Government and the 
People3 1939-1941, Appendix 10; Barton Maughan, Tobruk and El Alamein 
(Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1966), Ch.8; Sir Percy Spender,
Politics and a Man. (Collins, Sydney, 1972), Ch.15.
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Menzies returned to Australia and called for 'an unlimited war 
effort', and there was a substantial reorganisation of the government.
Belatedly, the Defence Committee was ordered to prepare joint operational
8 3plans to meet attacks on specific areas of Australia. On 11 July
the War Cabinet decided to recall Major-General Sir Iven Mackay from
04the Middle East to become GOC-in-C of the Home Forces. But when it
came to grand strategy the government could do little. Hasluck described
one meeting of the Advisory War Council as a 'straw-clutching discussion
85of diplomatic possibilities'.
When Japan threatened Thailand in early August the Australian 
government urged Britain to take a firm stand and emphasised that the
'early despatch of capital ships east of Suez would itself be the most
86powerful deterrence and first step'. There is no evidence that this 
plea was the deciding factor in Churchill's eventual decision to send 
the Prince of Wales and the Repulse to the Far East. More likely he 
was influenced by the Americans; in August he signed the Atlantic 
Charter with President Roosevelt.
A further reaction in Australia to the belief that it could do 
little to influence events was the expression of the view that Australia 
should be represented in the United Kingdom War Cabinet. Menzies himself 
hoped to go to London, but was politically embarrassed and resigned, 
and the new government led by Arthur Fadden selected a former Prime 
Minister, Sir Earle Page, to represent Australia in the British War 
Cabinet and specifically to seek the reinforcement of Singapore. There 
was no guarantee that he would be able to achieve any significant influence.
83. War Cabinet Minute 1136, Melbourne, 10 June 1941, CRS A2673, Vol.7.
84. The appointment was announced on 5 August. War Cabinet Agendum 
146/1941, Supp 4, 29 October 1941, CRS A2671, item 146/1941.
85. Hasluck, The Government and the People3 1939-1941, p.530.
86. Cable, Menzies to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 10 August 
1941, quoted in Hasluck, The Government and the People3 1939-1941, p.531.
43
For a while there was a mood of optimism that war in the Far East 
could be averted. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Far East,
Air Chief-Marshal S ir  Robert Brooke-Popham, visited Australia in  mid
87
October and presented an encouraging picture of the situation in  Malaya.
The new Labor government led by Johh Curtin demonstrated a w ishful
optimism about events in the Far East exemplified by the decision during
November to reinforce the AIF in  the Middle East. John Dedman summed
up the policy of the government in which he was a minister:
So long as it  thought that there was a possibility  
that Japan would not go to war, [the government] 
was unwilling to weaken the British position in 
the Middle East, where the second western desert 
offensive was about to be launched.88
Despite the experiences during the period from October 1940 to 
June 1941, the Menzies, Fadden and Curtin governments continued to be 
unduly influenced by the opinions expressed from London. The different 
manner in which Australian and British  authorities interpreted Japan's 
intentions is illustrated by the comments of the Australian DCGS, 
Major-General S .F .  Rowell, who, in the emergency had been recalled from 
the Middle East in September. In mid 1941 the War Office had told the 
Australian Liaison Officer in London that Australia was tending to over­
estimate the capacity of the Japanese and to under-estimate the Australian
O Q  . . .  . . .
powers of resistance. Rowell replied to this 'ill-informed criticism
by the protagonists of the blue-water school' with considerable feeling :
Rightly or wrongly we are not prepared to gamble 
on the period which may, or may not, elapse between 
the commencement of operations in the Far East and 
the stage when it is 'our turn next' . . .
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A2682, V o l .3.
88 . J .J .  Dedman, 'Defence Policy Decisions before Pearl Harbour', p . 346.
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It  is d iffic u lt  to understand the War Office 
motive in suggesting that we are overdoing the 
defence of this country. They should appreciate 
that the AIF , the only force we can legally send 
out of the country, is a volunteer force and 
goodness knowswe are doing our best to make it  
as large as possible even though it  has had very 
profound effect on the AMF by draining it of the 
best personnel.
We certainly have retained a few AIF units,
some being for external commitments in the NEI 
to which they are the only troops we can legally 
send. It  may be noted that despite the serious 
deterioration of the Far Eastern situation we 
w illingly  sent another Brigade Group to Malay 
recently even though we were aware that it  brought 
the strength of infantry there above the figure 
fixed as adequate by the United Kingdom Chiefs of 
Sta ff . Incidentally , we cannot help contrasting 
the keenness to get AIF troops in Malaya with the 
general complacency of the place where it  is very 
much a '9  to 5 ' war with ample time off for sport.
In brief it  can be said that even i f  the blue 
water school could reduce us to a state of great 
complacency vis-a-vis Japan they would not be 
able to get any more out of u s.0*0
To the Australian defence planners the information now coming
91
m  from all sources revealed Japan's increasing preparations for war.
On 6 October the Combined Operational Intelligence Centre (COIC) 
reported that Japan's preparations for war were considered to be almost 
complete. On 27 October it  was reported that the Japanese Navy is now
fully mobilised on a war fo o t in g ', and on 1 December, 'Japan is now
92
ready to strike in any direction from Indo-China at any moment'.
90. Letter, Rowell to Wardell, 2 October 1941, AWM 4 2 5 /1 1 /7 , Part 1.
91. During 1940 and 1941 Australia had established her own intercept 
organisation under Captain T .E . Nave RN. Originally an RAN officer he 
had joined the RN, and before returning to Australia in early 1940, had 
headed the intercept component of the Far East Combined Bureau (FECB).
As well as breaking some Japanese naval codes, Nave's organisation was 
able to intercept the tra ffic  of the Japanese Consul-General in Australia.
92. COIC Weekly Intelligence Summaries, June-December 1941, AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 . 
The COIC was an organisation, staffed by members of the three services, 
with the task of preparing intelligence summaries for joint headquarters 
and for the War Room at Victoria Barracks.
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General Rowell was convinced that a Japanese attack was imminent, 
and the fact that the information contained in the COIC summaries was 
taken seriously is indicated by an army planning directive which began: 
'The general situation is such that war between the British  Empire and 
Japan must be regarded as a p r o b a b ilit y '. The directive anticipated 
that the possible Japanese courses, in  order, would be:
1. Attack on Malaya with the object of seizing Singapore.
2. Attack on the Netherlands East Indies and British North 
Borneo.
93
3. Invasion of Australia or New Zealand.
On 29 November R .G . Casey, the Australian Minister in Washington,
reported that a Japanese task force of five divisions was assembled for
94
a southward advance. On 4 December news was received from Vice- 
Admiral C .E .L .  Helfrich , the C-in-C of the Netherlands East Indies Navy,
that the Japanese Navy had begun to move.9  ^ The Dutch cryptanalysts
96
had also broken the Japanese codes. On 6 December Casey reported:
I was told by a secret but reliable source 
today that the Japanese Government had 
instructed Japanese Embassy at Washington
93. Operation Planning Directorive N o .l , possibly written November 1941, 
by General Rowell, AWM 2 4 3 /6 /5 .
94. Cable 1049, Casey to Department of External A ffa irs , 29 November 
1941, CRS A 981 , Japan 185, Part I I I .
95. L . Farago, The Broken Seal3 The Story of ’Operation Magic’ and the 
Pearl Harbor Disaster (Barker, London,1 9 6 7 ), p . 350. The Australian o ffic ial 
historian recorded: 'On the 4th December, the day the Japanese Pearl 
Harbour force reached its south-eastward turning point, Long, the Director 
of Naval Intelligence , signalled to the Captain on the Intelligence
Staff (COIS) Singapore: "Information received 1800 GMT 3rd December 
4am 4th December Melbourne time from reliable Dutch source Kenado that 
eight transports twenty warships left Palau proceeding towards N E I". 
Singapore replied soon after noon, Melbourne time, on the 5th: "No 
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Royal Australian Navy 1939-1942, p . 474. Farago states ( p .351 ), although 
no other evidence has been discovered, that Casey was ordered to take 
the information to the White House.
96. e .R . Thorpe, East Winds Rain (Gambit, Boston, 1967), p . 51.
yesterday afternoon to begin destruction of 
papers and records. Please regard this 
information as completely secret.'7
98
Clearly this was 'Magic' information.
To the Prime Minister, Curtin, this news would have come as no surprise, 
for in late November, Kawai, the Japanese minister, had reportedly told 
him that the momentum towards war was too great to be stopped. Soon
after that Curtin had learnt that Kawai' s staff were burning their
99
papers.
Yet to the last some Australians seemed to think that there would 
be no outbreak of war. General Rowell, the DCGS,recalled that Colonel 
Hodgson, the Secretary of the Department of External A ffa irs , told him
on the evening of 8 December that until two days before the attack they
100
thought that war in the Far East could be averted. Rowell has written
that Army Headquarters was ' forbidden to issue any instructions to
Commands that war with Japan was in e v ita b le ', but that he wrote personal
101
letters to the GOCs warning them of approaching war. Furthermore,
Evatt, the Minister for External A ffa irs , would not allow the Japanese
102
representative's quarters in Melbourne to be 'bugged '.
Few important independent strategic decisions affecting the defence 
of Australia were made by the Australian government during 1941. In
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March the government decided to send troops to Ambon and Dutch Timor 
in  the event of war with Japan. In June it  decided to send an additional 
brigade to Malaya, and just before the outbreak of war the government 
decided to send forces to Portuguese Timor. Australian representatives 
also took part in the Singapore conference with the aim of increasing 
cooperation and coordination in the Far East. Australian strategic 
planners, however, had little  room for manoeuvre, for they found them­
selves locked into a strategic policy which had been decided the previous 
year. Once the troops in the Middle East had been committed it  was 
not p o litically  acceptable to recall them to Australia. Perhaps the 
only strategically viable option would have been to renegotiate the ' 
Empire Air Training Scheme to ensure greater autonomy for RAAF units 
in  Britain  and therefore make it  easier for Australia to have a say in 
their deployment, but this move was unlikely to be suggested by the 
CAS, Sir Charles Burnett, who was an RAF officer  and a fierce proponent 
of imperial defence.
In the terms of organising the country for war the achievement
103
of the Menzies government was notable. Most of the government depart­
ments and many of the directors-general - departmental heads with excep­
tional powers of direction, control and expenditure - remained unchanged 
during the Curtin government. Nonetheless the organisation of the Home 
Army showed the danger of trying to maintain forces beyond the capability 
of the country. The m ilitia  was seriously depleted in men and equipment 
so as to maintain the AIF. Clearly the defence chiefs did not envisage 
the rapid Japanese successes between December 1941 and February 1942, and 
they assumed that when Japan decided to attack there would be many months 
for the m ilitia  to m obilise.
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policy is titled , 'The Notable War Record of the Menzies Government'.
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A u stra lia 's  efforts to influence allied  strategy were singularly
unsuccessful. During h is  v is it  overseas Menzies did not persuade
Churchill or his Chiefs o f S ta ff  to increase the defences of Malaya, nor
even to promise to defend the Netherlands East In dies . Fadden has claimed
that his and New Zealand 's representations ensured that less US capital
ships were transferred to the Atlantic than had been planned; but some
senior American naval o fficers  held sim ilar views and may have had
104
greater influence in  this issue . There is no evidence that Page 's
overseas mission influenced Churchill's  decision to send the Prince of
Wales and the Repulse to Singapore. Perhaps the constant pressure from
Australia during 1940 and 1941 made Churchill aware of the need to send
105ships, but probably the Americans influenced him just as much.
Only in  the Middle East , where there were three AIF d iv isio ns , was 
Australia able to influence military strategy to some degree. And even 
there Australia had l itt le  influence over the campaigns in which her troops 
formed the majority of the forces taking part.
Liddell Hart has observed that considering the threat to Britain  
in  the latter h alf  of 1940 , and Churchill's  courageous decision to 
reinforce the Middle East , it  'would be unjust to find fault with the 
provision made for Malaya during this period . . .  it  was remarkable 
that the garrison was reinforced by six  brigades during the winter of
104. For example Admiral Kimmell, C-in-C, US Pacific  F leet , thought 
that i f  more ships were sent to the Atlantic it  would invite Japan to 
attack. Cable 421 , Casey to Department of External A ffa ir s , 8 June
1941, CRS A3300, item 123.
105. On 12 August, the UK Chiefs of Sta ff  decided to give considerations 
to 'what steps could be taken immediately to improve the position in
the Far E a s t '.  (Roskill, The War at Sea, V o l .l ,  p . 5 5 4 ) . The Chiefs had 
considered Menzies' cable of 11 August and also one from Churchill fore­
shadowing the signing of the Atlantic Charter. The British  Chiefs were 
aware of Am erica's disappointment with B r ita in 's  failure to ascribe the 
Royal Navy any in it ia l  major role in the defence of the Far East.
Three Prime M inisters in two months, Curtin, Fadden 
and Menzies.
(AWM Negative N o .42826)
John Curtin, Prime Minister of 
Australia , 1941-1945.
(AWM Negative N o .3870)
1940- 41'. However he is critical of Churchill in 1941 regarding his
neglect of the Far East. Moreover, in the second half of 1941, 600
modern aircraft were sent to Russia while few reached Malaya. No long
range bombers arrived in Malaya while hundreds nightly bombed Germany
107
in raids that were 'palpably futile  at that stage of the w a r '. 
Australia had no say in those decisions, and the reactions of the 
Australian government, people and m ilitary leaders in early 1942 must 
be understood against the background of the lack of consultation and 
the weaknesses in British strategy during the previous two years.
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The New Government ,
When Japan attacked on 7 December (Australian time) the Labor
government had been in power for two months. It  remained in power for
the remainder of the war, under the leadership of John Curtin for almost
108
the whole period as Prime Minister and Minister of Defence.
A former union organiser and editor of the Westralian Worker, Curtin 
was now aged 56 . He had led the party since 1935, had restored coherence 
to it  and prepared it  for war-time responsibility . Although he was loyal 
to the party, politically  s k ilfu l , honest and approachable, he, like
106. B .H . Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (Cassell, London, 
1970 ), p . 231.
107. Ibid.
108. There have been three unsatisfactory biographies of Curtin:
A .Chester, John Curtin (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1943 ); Irene 
Dowsing, Curtin of Australia (Acacia, Blackburn, Victoria , 1969), and 
Lloyd Ross, John Curtin3 A Biography (Macmillan, Melbourne, 1977 ). The 
latter is the most detailed study, but it  has many errors of fact. 
Curtin 's  war-time papers have not survived. The closest papers are 
those of F .G . Shedden, and Ross completed his book before they became 
available .
his party, lacked experience in government. Fifteen of the nineteen 
new ministers including Curtin had not held office before. Yet Curtin 
had some unattractive features. Shy, tense, unforgiving of criticism , 
Arthur Calwell observed that one his 'weaknesses was his habit of 
spurning his colleagues' . ^ 0 Some members of his cabinet remained 
implacable enemies. Nevertheless even Curtin 's  p o litical opponents 
have praised his performance during the war. S ir  Percy Spender believed 
that while Curtin was austere and detached, he 'stood above' all- of his 
m inisters: 'a  kindly , warm hearted man, despite a rather prim and 
somewhat cold appearance; he was an outstanding wartime le a d e r '. ^  
Fadden» from whom he had taken over as Prime M inister, thought that . 
'there was no greater figure in  Australian public life  in  my lifetim e . . .
clear in mind and expression, firm in principle . . .  he was a man of
112
unusual po litical courage'. Menzies wrote that, 'confronted by a
practical and d iffic u lt  world, [Curtin] grafted a pragmatic approach
on to the historic dogmas of his party, and so made a fine place in
113
Australian h isto ry '.
109. Tennant described Curtin as 'a  political virtuoso who could judge 
the temper of his associates and keep them all running smoothly together . 
He could smell plotters and rebels and he had wonderful tim ing '. Kylie 
Tennant, Evatt3 Politics and Justice (Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1 9 7 0 ) ,
p . 130. Calwell wrote that Curtin accepted power 'with profound humility 
and exercised it  with an agonizing sense of personal responsibility 
which ultimately k illed  h im '. loc.cit., p . 135.
110. A .A . Calwell, Be Just and Fear Not (Lloyd O 'N e il l , Melbourne, 1972 ), 
p . 48. Ross, op .cit., p . 24, wrote that 'The stand-offishness that some 
acquaintances noted was the defence of a timid man who offered friendship 
which was too often ab u sed '.
111. Spender, op.cit., p . 146.
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113. R .G . Menzies, Afternoon Light (Cassell, Melbourne, 1967), p . 130.
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It  is paradoxical that during the 1930 's  the defence policy of 
the Labor Party had followed more closely the thinking of senior army 
officers than had the UAP, for since the turbulent days of the anti­
conscription campaign the Labor Party had represented all that these 
army leaders mistrusted. Few of the new ministers had served in the 
forces, most were anti-conscriptionist and unsympathetic towards the 
m ilitary , and a number held beliefs  which members of the Staff Corps 
believed to be hostile towards their position in the army. Not only 
was the new ministry unsuited by training, experience and prejudice 
to control the armed forces, but also it  had /e k/ qualifications 
to tackle matters of foreign policy and world affa irs . Few ministers 
held university degrees, but they were all hardened p o litic ians , sensitive 
to the electorate, and often ruled by principles established by years 
of class struggle in the depression of the 1920s and 1930s and even 
e a r l ie r .
Curtin was characteristic of this image. Gaoled for anti-conscription
activities in the First World, he had developed an early hatred of
m ilitarism . Yet, unlike many of his contemporaries, he had tried to
fam iliarise himself with matters of defence and foreign policy. But in a
party which included many men who believed war was promoted by capitalism ,
Curtin  could only move slowly. The result was an emphasis on the land
and air  defence of Australia and a basic policy of 'non-participation in
foreign w ars '. The Second World War further modified these views. Thus
although in 1937 he said that the chief strength of Australia 's  defence
114
had to lie  with aviation, by mid 1941 he seemed to realise that it
115
would lie with seapower.
52
114. Daily Mirror (Sydney), 21 September 1937.
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His constant probings in the Advisory War Council, balanced by a 
rational and responsible approach, enabled him to influence, i f  only 
marginally, the direction of Australian policy during 1941 before he 
became Prime Minister. In July 1941 the Acting British High Commissioner 
reported on the 'discreditable behaviour' of some Labor Party people 
like J .A . Beasley,but spoke of Curtin as ' restrained1 .
During his second v isit  to Australia in October 1941, Brooke-Popham 
had to deal with the new Prime Minister, and 'was very favourably 
impressed by h im '. Brooke-Popham wrote that Curtin gave him 'the 
impression of being straight' and was 'honestly fu ll out to do all he 
[could] to push on with the war'.^17 The o ffic ia l  historian , Gavin •
Long, was even more to the point when he wrote in his diary that 'the
tortoise Curtin would not be outstripped by the hare Menzies on any
, 118 
course .
Some commentators have claimed that the mainspring of Curtin 's
government was what was described as 'the big fo u r ', Curtin, Chifley ,
119
Evatt and Beasley. This was not the case. The powerful inner group
1 2D
on important policy discussions was Curtin, Chifley and J .H . Scullin . 
Scullin , the former Prime Minister, was not in the Cabinet but he was 
a wise counsellor. Chifley , the Treasurer was Curtin 's  loyal lieutenant, 
friendly , warm, tolerant and shrewdly practical. I f  he lacked Curtin 's  
intellect and vision , he provided quiet strength. While Curtin was
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116. Despatch from R .R . Sedgwick, Acting High Commissioner, 14 July 1941,
WP (41) 198, CAB 6 6 /1 8 .
117. Letter, Brooke-Popham to Street, 28 October 1941, Brooke-Popham 
Papers V / 2.
118. Gavin Long Diary N o .4, Canberra, 26 April 1944.
119. Whitington, op.cit., p . 94. Allan D a lzie l , Evatt the Enigma (Lans- 
downe Press, Melbourne, 1967 ), p . 28.
120 Shedden Manuscript, Book 4 , Box 4 , Chapter 57, p . 4. See also 
J .R . Robertson, J.H. Scullin; a political biography (University of Western 
Australia, Nedlands, 1974 ), p p .462, 463. Robertson asserts that Scullin  had 
no influence on strategic policy . Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p . 127, 
mentions S c u llin 's  influence.
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concerned with winning the war, Chifley , a doctrinaire socialist  was 
concerned with post-war social order. While Curtin worried about matters 
of grand strategy and defence policy ,Chifley  concentrated on the economy.
Nevertheless the other senior Labor ministers should not be over­
looked in discussing strategic policy. The Attorney-General and Minister
121
for External A ffa irs , Dr Herbert Evatt, has been mentioned. Formerly
the youngest Justice of the High Court of Australia, he had a tremendous 
capacity for work and application. Insatiably ambitious and occasionally 
ruthless,he was an outstanding Australian, but he could be exceedingly 
rude and at times had d ifficulty  restraining him self.
The Minister for Shipping and Supply was J .A . Beasley, who, like 
Chifley and Forde, had held office  in the Scullin  government which he had 
helped bring down. Thereafter he had led the Lang Labor Group - the 
Non-Communist Labor Party - in Federal Parliament, and in that capacity 
had served on the Advisory War Council. After the Non-Communist Labor
Party reunited with the ALP in February 1941 Beasley 's loyalty toward
12 °
Curtin never wavered. “ Spender has left  an incisive impression:
Beasley was a fighter - an in-fighter - with a 
b itter , caustic tongue when he wanted to use i t .
He could be quiet and disarming, friendly and easy, 
but i f  a discussion was not going his way, the mask 
would be removed, revealing a determined, relentless 
man with a keen mind who asked and gave no quarter, 
and was not over-scrupulous in debate. Only the most 
courageous sought to do battle with him . . .
I did not find Beasley a person of much personal 
attraction. Friendly today, you could never be sure 
he would not tear a few strips o ff you tomorrow.
But he was a first-class administrator, and a tower of 
strength to the Labor administration. He served 
Australia well in the war years. When he became 
first  Resident Minister in England, and then High 
Commissioner for Australia in London, he was less 
successful. 123
121. For a biography of Evatt see Tenant, op.cit. and D a lzie l , op.cit. See 
also Spender, op.cit., Sir  Alan Watt, Australian diplomat (Angus & Robertson, 
Sydney, 1976) and P .G . Edwards, 'Evatt and the Americans' and Hasluck,
Diplomatic Witness, p p .14-16 and C h .3.
122. Whitington, op.cit., p . 95.
123. Spender, op .cit., p . 184.
J .A .  Beasley, Minister for Supply and Shipping, 
1941-1945, Defence, 1945, High Commissioner for 
Australia in UK 1946-1949.
(AWM Negative N o .4513)
F.M. Forde, Minister for the Army 
1941-1945, Defence 1946, Deputy Prime 
M inister, July 1945.
(AWM Negative N o .10012)
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Throughout the war 'K il le r ' Beasley worked in close cooperation with
124
Dr Evatt.
Curtin 's  Deputy Prime Minister was Francis Michael Forde, whom
he had defeated by one vote in the 1935 election for leadership of the
party. Forde was a masterly politician  with long service to the party.
He had been elected to the Queensland Parliament in 1917 at the age of
27 and to the Federal Parliament in 1922. In the Scullin  government
in 1930 and 1931 he had held the portfolio of Trade and Customs. Now
he was Minister for the Army.
Forde' s most valuable characteristic was loyalty. Indeed one
historian noted that 'he repeatedly allowed his own opinions to be
125
submerged under those of his P a rty '. S .M . Bruce described him as
126
'quite  a decent little  man without any very great capacity ', and
127
this comment summed up the views of most of Forde's  contemporaries.
The problem was that Forde had absolutely no knowledge of m ilitary matters
128
and at times sought expert military advice from non-military sources.
124. Tenant, op.cit., p . 135; D a lzie l , op .cit., p . 28.
115. D .A . Gibson, quoted in Colin A. Hughes, Mr Prime Minister, Australian 
Prime Ministers 1901-1972 (Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1 976 ), p . 135.
116. Notes by Bruce on conversation with Forde, 2 April 1943, CRS M100,
April 1943.
117. Interviews with Sir  Percy Spender, 11 October 1978, Professor W .E .H . 
Stanner, Forde' s research o ffice r , 4 June 1979, E .H . Cox of the 
Parliamentary Press Gallery, 20 November 1978, B .J .F .  Wright, PA to the 
CGS, Sturdee, 12 October 1978, G. Armstrong of Forde' s s ta ff , 17 August 
1978. See also Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p . 170. In his autobiography 
Politics and a Man Spender described Forde as 'a  ranter, a disclaiming 
speaker expressing himself extravagantly' ( p .210) .
128. Blarney Memoirs, Chapter 9 , p p .10, 11. On 20 April 1943 Major-General 
R .H . Dewing, the British  Liaison Officer in Australia , reported to the 
War Office that he was amazed to find how little  Forde seeir.ed 'even to 
attempt to understand and master problems of his department. His knowledge 
of army problems is so meagre as to make it  quite impossible for him 
to speak with either understanding or authority for his own m in is tr y '.
WO 106 /4839 .
When Blarney became Commander-in-Chief of the Army in March 1942 he
129
tended to ignore Forde. Hasluck observed that Forde 'had a negligible
130
influence on policy in spite of his s e n io r it y '. Yet Forde tried to
do his best and considering the powers granted to Blarney, General Rowell
131
doubted whether anyone could have handled the position better.
The only senior minister with military experience was J .J .  Dedman 
of the Department of War Organisation of Industry, and although he 
played a crucial role in balancing the war effort between military 
operations and production, he did not play an important part in strategic 
decision-making.
Like his senior ministers Curtin lacked expertise in defence policy 
matters. He had little  understanding of military discipline or the
duties and responsibilities of commanders, and he never attended meetings
132 . . .
of the Chiefs of Sta ff . His decisions, therefore, depended on the
advice tendered by the government's professional advisers, particularly 
Shedden.
Curtin began discussions with Shedden immediately after taking o ffice , 
and was advised to read a paper that Shedden had prepared in 1929 entitled
'An Outline of the Principles of Imperial Defence with Special References
133
to Australian Defence '. In essence, the paper stated that, because
Australia was an island continent, its first  line of defence was seapower. 
In a war against Japan alone the United Kingdom with an adequately 
defended Singapore base would deploy a Far Eastern Fleet to defend 
Australia against invasion. I f  the United Kingdom was at war with Japan
129. Cox interview, 20 November 1978.
130. Hasluck, diplomatic Witness, p . 19.
131. Rowell, Full Circle, p . 165.
132. Interview with Air Marshal S ir  George Jones, 24 January 1979.
133. Shedden had written the paper whilst in England, soon after 
completing the course at the Imperial Defence College. A copy is in 
MP 1217, Box 39. For information on Shedden's advice to Curtin, see 
Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 2, C h .16, p p .6 , 7.
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and a European power, the United States would be likely  to give support
as an a lly . From the beginning Shedden established himself as Curtin 's
main adviser on strategy, but like many other careful public servants
he was cautious in giving his minister unwelcome advice. Whereas
with Menzies he had stressed imperial defence, with Curtin he emphasised
the reliance upon America and the need to maintain Australian sovereignty.
In  a letter written shortly before he died in 1971 Shedden wrote:
With the entry of Japan into the war, Defence Policy 
emerged from a subordinate role in B ritish  Common­
wealth Co-operation, to the assertion of Australian 
sovereignty in  the control of its  own forces when 
the security of the country was at s t a k e . 134
The events of the following months were to prove the validity  of that
statement, and both Shedden and Curtin were to play important roles
in the process of change. However their success in maintaining
A u stra lia 's  sovereignty in  the period after March 1942 is another matter.
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134. Letter , Shedden to Mr W .A . Wood, Director of the ANU Press, 
unsigned and undated due to Shedden's death, Shedden Manuscript, Box 1.
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CHAPTER TWO
AUSTRALIAN STRATEGIC DECISION-MAKING,
December 1941-February 1942
During the three months following the outbreak of war in the Far 
East a number of principles were demonstrated about the way a small 
country such as Australia could influence the strategic decisions of 
her powerful a ll ie s , Britain  and America. Several facts were outstanding. 
Australia was not involved nor consulted during the discussions between 
Churchill and Roosevelt over the priorities  and direction of global 
strategy. Australian representations for reinforcements were not heeded; 
after balancing the needs of other theatres Britain  sent what she could 
to the Far East, but A ustralia 's  claims made little  difference. Further­
more the American forces were sent to Australia in itia lly  to provide 
a base for the Americans in  the Philippines and the Netherlands East 
Indies (N E I) , not for the exclusive defence of Australia. Despite the 
extreme dissatisfaction  of Australia, New Zealand and the Netherlands, 
control of the new ABDA Command^ remained firmly in  British  and American 
hands. Only by using the ultimate weapon of the denial of her forces 
was Australia able to influence allied  strategy, and this effect  was 
achieved only after two months of frustrating attempts to influence 
the councils of power against the background of mounting fears for the 
safety of the Australian mainland.
The Situation in Australia
Throughout the early months the Australian government grappled 
with a large number of problems on different levels. There were what
1. This was the joint American, B ritish , Dutch, Australian Command 
which covered the Burma, Malaya, Netherlands East Indies area. It  
operated from 15 January to 25 February 1942.
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might be termed the c iv ilian  problems; that is the changes in 
industrial, commercial and social life  brought about by total war.
Then there was the strategic problem which also had many aspects.
At the highest level was the world-wide strategy for the conduct of the 
war, and the question of Australian representation and consultation.
At a lower level was the problem of determining the strategy to be 
followed for the defence of Australia, and interacting with this and 
the allied  global strategy was the decision over the employment of the 
1st Australian Corps. A further defence problem was that of organising 
the Australian forces, particularly the army, to meet the increased 
threat.
It  is not necessary to deal here with the problems of organising
2
the Australian Army, but the problems of defending Australia should
be explained briefly  to understand why, and with what background, the
Australian leaders sought to influence a llied  strategy. Indeed the
outbreak of war in the Far East elevated the defence of Australia from
a local matter to one which directly affected allied  strategy, and
the Australian defence planners were forced to re-orient their thinking
from a situation where they had been on the periphery of global strategic
decision-making, to one where, at least in their own eyes, they had a
3
vital role to play.
2. For a discussion of this topic see the author's book, Crisis of 
Command, Chapters 3, 4 , 5 .
3. This process did not take place overnight, and indeed during 1941 it  
had been increasingly realised by Australian planners that the defence
of Australia was important to allied  strategy. The Japanese attack finally  
confirmed these views. The changed circumstances have been described in 
another way: 'Australia was now viewed as the central focus of the regional 
framework. The ability  to concentrate purely on Australia as the regional 
pivot enabled its local, forward and regional defence planning to be 
potentially rationalized into a comprehensive overall scheme'. Carolyn 
A. O 'B rien , 'The Historical Evolution of Australian Strategic and Defence 
Th inking ', World Review, V o l .18 , N o .l , April 1979. See also C .A . O 'B rien , 
'Oceans Divide, Oceans Unite: The Concept of Regional Security in Australian 
Defence P lann ing ', Australian Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XXV,
N o .2, August 1979.
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For the Prime Minister, Curtin, the impact of Japan's attack was an 
ordeal, and his reliance upon Shedden and the Chiefs of Staff was demon­
strated quite early . At the War Cabinet meeting on the morning of 8 December
1941 the Chiefs of Staff outlined the emergency measures being taken,
4
including the despatch of troops to Koepang (Tim or). The three Chiefs
of S ta ff , Admiral Sir  Guy Royle, Lieutenant-General Vernon Sturdee
and A ir  Chief Marshal S ir  Charles Burnett, were experienced o fficers ,
but in  Shedden's view their efforts were disappointing, and he advised
Curtin that:
the information they had to present as to 
preparedness for this emergency was, I thought 
scrappy and meagre, and I almost gathered the 
impression that this new and nearby threat to 
Australia was merely another incident in the present 
war, in which we had added to our enemies by one, 
though, of course, we had gained another ally .
I think the Government must press it  right 
home that this is a new war . . .
Shedden recommended that the Chiefs of Staff  prepare an appreciation
covering defence capabilities and the likely forms that an attack on
5 6
Australia might take. Curtin agreed and the Chiefs were so ordered.
At the same time the United Kingdom was asked for an up-to-date 
7
appreciation. The British  reply, which was received on 12 December,
stated that events were moving too quickly for a general review.
However it  was 'not considered that there was any immediate large-sclae
threat' to Australia. The Australians were referred to the British  Far
East Appreciation of 12 August 1940. An interesting comment in the cable
, 8
was that 'We must not forget that Germany . . .  is s t il l  the main enemy .
4. War Cabinet Minute 1557, Melbourne, 8 December 1941, CRS 
A 2684, item 586 /1941 .
5 . Letter, Shedden to Curtin, 8 December 1941, MP 1217, Box 555.
6 . Letter, Curtin to Shedden (written by Shedden), 8 December 1941,
loo.cit. Also Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 1, C h .7, p . 4.
7. Cable 778, Curtin to Dominions O ffic e , 8 December 1941, MP 1217,
Box 571.
8. Cable 817, Dominions Office to Curtin, 11 December 1941, Zoo.e.it.
On 11 December the Australian Chiefs of Sta ff  presented their
appreciation to the War Cabinet. Shedden was now pleased with the work
of the Chiefs , whom he said later 'showed extremely sound judgment in
anticipating that the Japanese would first  attack the vital links in
the South and Southwest Pacific  Area, of the island line of communications
9
from the United States to A u s t r a l ia '. The appreciation stated that
the attack on Malaya 'might well be a first  step in  the Japanese plan
for a major attack on A u stra lia ', and that 'the possib ility  of a direct
move on Australia via the islands to the north and North East must
now be considered '.
This attack would start, it  was argued, by attempts to occupy Rabaul,
Port Moresby and New Caledonia, from which bases the attack on Australia
could be launched. Therefore the Chiefs recommended that to hold these
areas a minimum of a brigade group with anti-aircraft and coastal defences
should be stationed in all three localities as well as on Timor. I f
Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies were occupied, and the bases
to the north were captured, then the Japanese would be in a position
to invade Australia . All these situations were possible and they advised
that it  was 'necessary to establish and train now the forces that would
be required to prevent and to meet an in v a s io n '. One would have thought
that this would have been an admirable aim a year earlier . The
appreciation also recommended that proposals for a joint US-Australian
10
effort  to defend Rabaul should be accelerated.
On 15 December the Chiefs of Staff  recommended that Darwin should 
be retained as a fleet operational base, that the garrison of Port Moresby
9 . Shedden Manuscript, Book 4 , Box 1, C h .8 , p . l .
10. Defence of Australia and Adjacent Areas - Appreciation by Australian 
Chiefs of Staff - December 1941, CPS A 2671, item 14 /30 1 /2 2 7 . Also AWM 
2 4 3 /6 /1 5 .
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should be increased to one brigade group, that Rabaul should be left
with its  existing  garrison of one battalion group, and that an independent
company should be sent, to New Caledonia 'to  enhance the morale of the
[French] . . .  and for demolition purposes '. They realised that the Pdbaul
garrison of one battalion would be too small to resist an invasion
successfully , but they considered it  essential, 'to  maintain a forward
air observation line as long as possible and to make the enemy fight
11
for this line rather than abandon it  at the first  threat '. In view
of the almost non-existent navy and air  force available in Australia,
and the untrained and ill-equipped m ilitia , which formed the only
available military force, the decision of the Australian Chiefs of Staff
12
not to reinforce the north-eastern approaches seems unchallengeable.
It  is also important that the psychological situation effecting
the government and the defence planners is understood. Professor
W .E .H . Stanner, who was one of the personal assistants to the Minister
for the Army, F.M . Forde, recalled that Forde tended to panic during
this period. Stanner had been an assistant to Spender, the previous
Minister, and although during 1941 he had not formed a particularly high
13
opinion of the CGS, he was now impressed by S turdee's calm approach.
One indication of this tendency to panic was a memorandum from 
F .R . S in c la ir , the Secretary of the Department of the Army, to Forde on 
9 December 1941. S inclair  suggested the formation of a guerilla army 
and urged Forde to meet Major Irvine-Andrews VC, who was supposed to
11. Chiefs of Staff  Appreciation, 15 December 1941, War Cabinet Agendum 
No .418 /1941 , 18 December 1941, CRA A 2671, item 14 /301 /227 .
12. This subject is discussed at more length in the author's book, Crisis 
in Command, C h .3. An interesting view offered by Whitington, The House 
Witt Divide, p . 99 is that Curtin overruled the Chiefs of Staff,who wanted 
to make a stand at Rabaul. Whitington provides no evidence of this view 
which does not appear to be supported by the documents.
13. Interview with Professor W .E .H . Stanner, 4 June 1979.
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be an expert on guerilla warfare. Sturdee was surprised and told the 
M inister :
The general attitude of the writer of this paper 
is one of complete defeatism. In  his despair 
he is forced into misleading and inaccurate 
statements . . .
I feel bound to state that it  is a matter 
for regret that so highly placed an officer 
should, in  these critical times, have seen fit  
to produce a proposal in such despairing terms 
without consulting any of the Government's military 
advisers.15
In his own defence Sinclair  pointed out that the memorandum was written
at the request of the M inister, and in doing so Sinclair  claimed that
16
he was exercising his rights as a free citizen  of the Commonwealth.
Other observers also misunderstood the resolve of the government,
and leaders such as Sturdee, to deal with the problem in a calm, reasoned
manner. Thus the US defence attache in  Melbourne advised Washington
in early January 1942 that:
the major idea among Australian chiefs of defence 
departments, except the Navy, is that the first  
mission of defence personnel and equipment is 
to protect areas not at present threatened, instead 
of forwarding them for offensive operations in areas 
already under attack or threatened. 1^
That the Australian Chiefs of Staff were fully alive to the need for
strengthening the north-eastern approaches is indicated by their
appreciation of 15 December 1941. It  was as a result of this paper that
the garrison of Port Moresby was increased to a brigade group, which
was the lim it of the maintenance capacity, and the decision was taken
neither to reinforce nor to withdraw the Rabaul garrison. While certain
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14. Memorandum, Sinclair  to Forde, 9 December 1941, Blarney Papers, DRL 
6643 , item 'Secretary and Public Service M iscellaneous'.
15. Memorandum, Sturdee to Minister, 30 January 1942, lo.oit,
16. Memorandum, Sinclair  to Minister, 2 November 1943, loc.cit.
17 . Memorandum, Brig-Gen. Raymond E. Lee for Assistant Chief of Sta ff , 
WPD, 9 January 1942. Quoted in US O ffic ia l  History, Draft Chapter 1, 
AWM 4 9 2 /4 /3 8 .
aspects were to prove unfortunate, it  might be argued that the overall
strategy outlined in  the appreciation has withstood the test of events.
Thus throughout December the Chiefs of Staff were under constant 
pressure to produce appreciations for a worried government, but these 
appreciations had to be read in conjunction with events taking place 
around the world, and from the beginning it  was realised that Australia 
would have to rely on British and American support. Requests for 
support took two forms: for the reinforcement of Malaya, and for the 
provision of naval and air forces to combat an anticipated Japanese 
thrust towards Australia 's  line of communications with America. Further­
more, in a determined, but often vague fashion, the government sought 
representation in the allied  decision-making machinery.
Danger in Malaya
Although the Australian defence planners realised that the greatest
threat to Australia would ultimately come from the north-east approach,
the events in Malaya focussed their early attention. After a ll , the
Australian defence policy for the previous twenty years had been based
on the security of Singapore. The Australian commander in Malaya, Major-
General H. Gordon Bennett, was already making efforts of his own to
influence allied  strategy, and on 13 December, before his troops had
been in action, he wrote to the Minister for the Army to express his
19
concern at the lack of air support. In a letter to Army Headquarters
20
he reiterated this point: 'I  fear another C re te '.
On 11 December Curtin had reminded the Dominions Secretary that 
Menzies had been assured by the Secretary of State for Air in April 1941
18. See Crisis of Command, p p .35, 36.
19. Letter, Bennett to Forde, 13 December 1941, MP 729 /6 , item 13 /40 1 /4 0 2 .
20. Letter, Bennett to Army Headquarters, 13 December 1941, Bennett 
Papers MSS 807-19 item 2. Mitchell Library.
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18
that in the event of war in  the Far East there would be an immediate
review of a ir  resources with a view to their redisposition to meet the
dangers on all fronts. He had emphasised that this contingency had now 
21
arisen. Bennett's plea spurred him, and the Advisory War Council
which met on 16 December, to again cable London, and the next day Curtin
told Churchill:
We have consistently emphasised the need for 
strengthening the air  defence of Malaya,
Mr Menzies having fully discussed the subject 
during his v isit  to London.
Curtin suggested that the British  Chiefs of Staff opinion, that 336
aircraft would be sufficient and that Japanese standards were lower
22
than those of Ita ly , needed urgent revision .
At the same time a cable was received from Britain  that the naval 
reverses and the loss of the forward aerodromes in Malaya as the Japanese 
had advanced southward, had created for the land forces a situation which 
had not been contemplated. In the Advisory War Council on 18 December 
Menzies said 'that this was a fatuous statement,as a battleship force 
for the Far East had only recently been made available. It  was always
clear, in view of the shortage of an equipment, that the Japanese
23
would have temporary Naval and Air sup erio rity '. Menzies probably 
had in mind the British  pre-war statement that Singapore would have to 
be prepared to withstand an attack for 90 days before the British Fleet 
arrived.
Obviously some members of the Advisory War Council were becoming 
disenchanted with the British  approach. This attitude would not have 
been helped by a message from S ir  Earle Page, the Accredited Australian
21. Cable 795, Curtin to Secretary of State for Dominion A ffa irs , 11 
December 1941, CRS A 981 , item Defence 59 , P t .2 .
22. Cable Johcu 9 , Curtin to Churchill, 17 December 1941, PREM 3 142 /6 .
23. Advisory War Council Minute 602, Canberra, 18 December 1941, CRS 
A 2682, V o l .I I I .
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Representative in London, which, although it  stated that the British
Chiefs of Staff were anxious to reinforce Singapore 'in  every possible
way i f  they could find physical practical means of doing s o ',  added
24
that 'their  recommendations seem to baulk at immediate means'.
Meanwhile, Bennett was becoming even more concerned by the rapid
Japanese advance, and on 17 December he cabled Sturdee requesting
25
reinforcement by an Australian division from the Middle East. The
next day Major-General Northcott, who was passing through Malaya after
v isiting  the Middle East, cabled Sturdee and recommended the immediate
26
despatch of a machine-gun battalion. The government reacted vigorously
to these recommendations and Sturdee took up the question with Brooke- 
27
Popham. Churchill was informed of the deliberations, and he was 
reminded that the Australian government had 'long pressed the United
28
Kingdom Government on the provision of the strength considered necessary '.
Brooke-Popham agreed that the situation was grave and that reinforce­
ments were urgently required, but although he said he would be delighted
29
with another AIF d ivision , he did not press for i t ,  and Sturdee
explained to the Minister for the Am y  that it  would take from eight
30
to ten weeks to move a division from the Middle East. The result was 
that the government decided to despatch a machine-gun battalion , the 
last of the trained AIF battalions in  Australia,plus almost two thousand 
largely un-trained reinforcements to Malaya.
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24. Cable P16, Page to Curtin, December 1941, CRS M100, item 12.
25. Cable, Bennett to Sturdee, 17 December 1941, received 18 December
1941, AWM 5 5 3 /2 /3 .
26. Cable, Northcott to Sturdee, 19 December 1941, AWM 5 5 3 /2 /3 .
27. War Diary HQ FE, 19 December 1941, WO 112 /15 .
28. Cable Johcu 10, Curtin to Churchill, quoted in  H istorical Note on 
Malayan Compaign, MP 1217, Box 578.
29. Cable, Brooke-Popham to Sturdee, 20 December 1941, WO 112/15 and 
AWM 2 8 5 /3 /1 0 .
30. Memorandum, Sturdee to M inister, 21 December 1941, AWM 2 8 5 /3 /1 0 .
Although the government viewed the situation in Malaya with 
increasing alarm, what capacity did Australia have to influence events 
within Malaya? Soon after the outbreak of war the British  government 
had decided to establish a War Council in Singapore to be chaired by
Duff Cooper, who became the Resident British  Minister with Cabinet r.ank.
. 31
The British  announced that Bennett would be invited to attend, but
the Advisory War Council in Australia felt  that Australia should be
represented by someone with the status of a Minister. A Minister was
not available , but Mr V .G . Bowden, the Australian Trade Commissioner
„  3 2at Singapore,was appointed.
Apparently the government's decision was not made clear to Bennett, 
who wrote later that he 'was not aware of the highly important part
33
[Bowden] was playing. He never came near AIF HQ for any inform ation '.
Bennett attended the first  two meetings of the War Council but, like
the other fighting commanders, he could not afford the time to continue,
and only later did he learn that Bowden was attending on behalf of
34
Australia . Bowden was not, however, completely suited to represent 
Australia on such a body. Before his appointment to Singapore he had 
been the Australian Trade Commissioner at Shanghai and had been absent 
from Australia for many years. Nor was he properly briefed by the
31. Cable M45 3, Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs to Prime 
Minister, 12 December 1941, received 13 December 1941, CRS A 1608, 
item G 3 3 /1 /2 .
32. Advisory War Council Minute, N o .609, Canberra, 18 December 1941,
CRS A 2680, item 149/1941 .
33. Letter, Bennett to Long, 14 February 1954, Bennett Papers, MSS 807-5» 
Mitchell Library.
34. Letter, Bennett to Long, 31 January 1954, loc.cit.
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35 . . .
government. Bennett was quite definite about Bowden's role: 'Bowden
may have represented the Australian Government but he did not represent 
36
the A I F ' .
Clearly Bennett felt that he was more qualified  than Bowden to 
advise the government on the situation in Malaya, but within a few days 
of each other they both sent important messages to the Australian 
government. The first  was from Bennett, who on 19 December wrote a 
long letter to Forde describing the rapid withdrawals down the Malay 
peninsula and his b e lie f  that the senior commanders had shown a 'lack 
of drive and determination'. Bennett was anxious that his letter should 
not be used without his approval since 'I  would probably find the door 
closed to me, i f  it  were discovered that I was criticising  the higher 
command'. ^
A few days later Bowden followed with a cable received in Australia
on Christmas Eve. He said that the deterioration of the position in
Malaya was 'assuming landslide proportions'. He believed that without
air  reinforcement Singapore would fall  and that the need for decision
38
and action was a matter of hours not days. Curtin and the Australian
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35. Letter, Lionel Wigmore to Long, 22 May 1944, Gavin Long Notes, 51. 
Before Bowden's appointment Curtin sought the advice of S ir  John Latham,
a former leader of the National Party and the recently returned Ambassador 
to Japan. Latham wrote that Bowden 'is  a competent man and has much 
commercial experience. Without in any way reflecting upon his capacity,
I think it  must be admitted that he has not the standing or the prestige 
which would enable him to make any representations to the authorities at 
Singapore upon any question of high strategy '. (Latham Papers, NLA MS 
1009 /65 /6  39.) On Bowden's appointment Evatt cabled to Duff Cooper that 
'We have confidence in  his judgment and coolness '. (CRS A 1608, G /33 /1 /2 )
36. Letter, Bennett to Long, 31 January 1954, Bennett Papers MSS 807-5, 
Mitchell Library.
37. Letter, Bennett to Forde, 19 December 1941, AA 1974/398 . Bennett's 
diary indicates that he did not send the letter until the following day 
after pondering whether to send it . Gavin Long Correspondence, Gordon 
Bennett Diary, Part 1.
38. Cable 73, Bowden to Evatt, 11 .51  p .m ., 23 December 1941, received
24 December 1941, MP 1217, Box 571, L. Wigmore, The Japanese Thrust (Aust­
ralian War Memorial, Canberra, 1957 ), p . 182 , claims that this cable was 
received in  Australia on 25 December.
The Governor-General, Lord Gowrie, reading the 
proclamation announcing that Australia is at war 
with Japan. Standing is Mr F. Strahan, Secretary 
of the Prime M inister 's  Department. Seated is 
Forde and Curtin.
(AWM Negative N o .43287)
Mr V .G . Bowden, Australian 
representative on the Singapore 
War Council. His reports 'were 
grave and proved true ' .
&
♦
Commodore J .A . Collins , RAN, 
Commanding China Force and Major- 
General H. Gordon Bennett, GOC 
AIF (Malaya).
(AWM Negative N o .10309) (AWM Negative N o .10103)
War Cabinet were convinced that Bowden was correct. Whatever the
doubts some observers might have had about Bowden's su ita b ility , he
continued to provide sound advice to the government. In respect to
this message, Churchill had to admit that Bowden's views 'were grave 
40
and proved true '.
Focus on Washington
It  had not taken the Australian government long to realise that
the entry of the USA into the war added a new dimension to strategic
planning. Thus on 13 December Curtin had sent a message to President
Roosevelt welcoming the opportunity of cooperating with America, and
offering the use of Australian fa c ilit ie s . He also sought American help
41
in securing New Caledonia. When Casey delivered this message
Roosevelt asked him to tell Curtin that the Americans had already started
sending forces to the area. Casey requested that Australia be represented
at the forthcoming conferences and was given some encouragement, but
he was less successful with his pleas for Singapore, and reported
42
that the Americans were more interested in the Philippines.
39. Memorandum, Casey to US Under-Secretary of State, 24 December 1941,
CRS A 3300, item 101.
40. Churchill, op.cit., V o l .IV , p . 4.
41. Cable 153, Evatt to Casey, 13 December 1941, MP 1217, Box 538.
This cable was prepared by Shedden as Secretary to the Advisory War Council. 
Cable 154, Evatt to Casey, 17 December 1941, CRS A 816, item 3 1 /301 /136 . 
Memorandum, Casey to Roosevelt, 13 December 1941, CRS A 3300, item 124. 
Menzies later claimed that he had suggested sending the cable at an 
Advisory War Council meeting. At first  his proposal had been received 
as audacious, but when he had explained that he had done such tilings 
before, his suggestion had met with ready acceptance. Cable 10, British  
High Commissioner to Dominions Secretary, 9 January 1942, PREM 4 50 /2A .
42. Cable 1162, Casey to Curtin, 17 December 1941, MP 1217, Box 538;
CAble 1170, Casey to Curtin, 18 December 1941, CRS A 816, 3 1 /301 /136 ;
CAble 1185, Casey to Curtin, 20 December 1941, loc,cit.
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With the arrival of Churchill in America for discussions over the
means of controlling the strategy of the now global war, the focus of
decision-making moved firmly to Washington. On 22 December Casey
reported that Roosevelt might press to have an American accepted as
the Commander-in-Chief of a Pacific  and Far East theatre and that
General MacArthur, the American commander in the Philippines, might be
nominated. 'I  understand1, said Casey, 'that although not devoid of
human fr a il it ie s , he is a good m an'. Casey suggested that it  might be
advantageous for the Australian government itself  to suggest an
43
American Commander-in-Chief.
The Advisory War Council, which met on 23 December, agreed that
4
the future of Australia was bound up with the conversations in  Washington, 
and that day Curtin cabled Roosevelt and Churchill appealing for more 
reinforcements for Singapore. At the same time Curtin told Roosevelt
that i f  the US government wished, Australia would gladly accept an
. . 45
American commander m  the Pacific  area.
As soon as Bowden's warning arrived in Australia, Evatt, the Minister
for External A ffa irs , forwarded a copy to Casey and it  was received
46
in Washington on Christmas Eve. The next day Churchill replied at 
considerable length to the Australian requests for the reinforcement 
of Malaya, stating that he did not share the Australian view that there 
was a danger of an early reduction of what he called the 'Singapore 
fo rtress '. He listed  the reinforcements on the way to the Far East, but 
emphasised that he did not want to take forces away from Auchinleck,
43 . Cable 1188, Casey to Curtin, 22 December 1941, MP 1217, Box 535.
44 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .623 , Canberra, 23 December 1941, 
loc. cit.
45. Cable 1103, Curtin to Roosevelt, 23 December 1941, loc,cit,
46. Memorandum, Casey to US Under-Secretary of State, 24 December 1941, 
CRS A 3300, item 101.
the British  Commander in the Middle East, who had victory over Rommel 
'w ithin  our g r a s p '. He promised to send more definite news in the next 
47day or two.
In the meantime the Australian Chiefs of Staff had been examining 
the British  plans in  detail. They believed it  was not a question of 
what Auchinleck could spare, but what the emergency in  the Far East 
demanded 'to  avert devastating blows' to the allied  situation in Malaya. 
With this in  mind the g-overnment now directed Casey to try once more: 
'Please understand that stage of suggestion has now passed. Continuous 
over-statements by British Far Eastern Commands as to degree of prepared­
ness have produced a very serious effect on public opinion . . .  This is
48
gravest type of emergency'. But Casey was unsuccessful with Churchill,
49
his Chiefs of Staff and with the Americans, and Churchill told him,
'You can 't  kick me round the room, I 'm  not k ic k a b le '. °
It  is obvious that by now the Australian government was becoming 
intensely frustrated by the apparent lack of response from Churchill 
over the reinforcements for Singapore. At the same time the government 
continued to urge the Americans to send reinforcements to Australia.
This frustration was given vent in Curtin 's  article in the Melbourne 
Herald of 27 December in which he stated that Australia looked to America 
'free  of any pangs' of kinship with the United Kingdom. Roger Bell in 
Unequal Allies has analysed the effect of this article , and has concluded 
that despite comments to the contrary, in the long run it  had little
47. Cable, Churchill to Curtin, 25 December 1941, quoted in Churchill, 
op.cit. , V o l . i v ,  p . 4.
48. Cable 164, Evatt to Casey, 26 December 1941, A 3300, item 101.
49. Cable 1220, Casey to Department of External A ffa irs , 26 December
1941, CRS A 3300, item 101, and item 123.
50 . Lord Casey, Personal Experiences s 1939-1946 (Constable, London,
1962 ), p . 81.
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From: Morton, op .cit ., p . 162.
impact on Australian relations with America. But it  had an unfortunate
effect  on Churchill who, in a bitter cable to Curtin spoke of the
Australian 'mood of panic ' and offered to broadcast to the Australian 
52
people. Thus after three weeks of war in  the Far East the Australian 
government felt  that it  had achieved little  sympathy in London or 
Washington for the strategic position facing Australia, and they were 
convinced that both Malaya and Australia were in great p e r il . In the 
face of these threats the tone of the government's telegrams became 
increasingly sharp - the stage of gentle suggestion had passed indeed.
Strategic Analysis versus Politics and Emotion
The events of January 1942 have been covered in detail in a number
of books. Hasluck has explained Australia 's  claims for reinforcements
which continued from those made earlier in  December 1941, and he has
described A ustralia 's  largely fruitless efforts to secure a voice in  the
53
higher direction of the war. Wigmore has covered the formation of
the ill-fated ABDA Command and A ustralia 's  effort to achieve representation
54
on the headquarters staff . These topics have also been discussed
and analysed by B ell , particularly in respect to A ustralia 's  relationship
55
with America. In  addition, the British  and American o ffic ia l  histories 
have described the important Arcadia conference in Washington when it
51. B ell , op .cit .,  p . 49.
52. Cable, Churchill to Curtin, 29 December 1941, PREM 4 50 /15 .
53 . Hasluck, The Government and the People3 1942-1945, C h .l . Although 
Churchill and Roosevelt in Washington opposed Australia 's  wish to be 
represented in the 'jo in t  bo d y ', the British  Chiefs of S ta ff , in  London, 
thought otherwise, and on 29 December 1941 they reported: 'We think 
that it  would be necessary to have representatives on this joint body of 
those Allies and of the Dominions interested in the South-West Pacific  
A re a '. CAB 6 6 /2 0 , WP (41) 307.
54. Wigmore, op.cit., C h .10 , 13.
55. B e ll , op .cit., C h .2, 3.
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was agreed that the European war should have first  priority , and also the
establishment of the Combined Chiefs of Staff Committee, the body which was
to be responsible for the allied  direction of the w a r . ^  Churchill
has reproduced in his war memoirs many of the bitter cables between
himself and Curtin stemming from his anger over Curtin 's  article of
27 December and culminating in Curtin 's  'inexcusable betrayal' cable 
57
of 23 January. Furthermore, the American o ffic ia l  histories have
described the decision to send American troops to Australia, in itia lly
to form a base to reinforce the embattled forces in the Philippines
and ABDA Command, but eventually to establish a base for an offensive
58
northwards against Japan. It  is not necessary to recite once more 
all the developments during a period which was vital for inter- allied 
relations.
Despite strong representations by the Australian government 
throughout January, little  real influence was obtained. The achievement 
of Australian representation in  the British  War Cabinet,and the formation 
of the London Pacific  War Council, did not, in the long run, provide 
for consultation in the formulation of Allied  strategy. Partly as a 
result of Australian argument Darwin was included in the ABDA Command 
and the Anzac naval area was established, but these were relatively 
minor concessions. Sim ilar results might well have eventuated without 
Australian representation.
But i f  little  was achieved during January, attitudes were developed 
which were to have an important impact during the remaining months of
56 . m. Matloff and e .m . Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 
1941-1942 (OCMH, Washington, 1952 ), C h .6 , 7. J .R .M . Butler, Grand 
Strategy> Volume I I I ,  June 1941-August 1942, Part I I  (HMSO, London, 1 9 6 4 ) .
57 . Churchill, op .cit., V o l .IV , C h .53.
58 . Matloff and Snell, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, 1941-1942, 
C h .6 , 7. S . Milner, Victory in Papua (OCMH, Washington, 1957 ). L. Morton, 
Strategy and Command: The First Two Years (OCMH, Washington, 1962 ).
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1942. Thus, in a memorandum to the Prime Minister on 9 January 1942,
Shedden discussed the advantages of concentrating the AIF in the Pacific
theatre. He dealt firstly  with the military advantage which included
a strengthening of the defences in the area and a shorter line of
communication for reinforcement and supplies. He went on to add that
the concentration of the AIF in the theatre would 'have a stimulating
effect on the sp irit  of the Australian p e o p le '. However, Shedden's
final argument showed an awareness of the problem of allied  cooperation:
. . .  the concentration of the AIF in the Pacific  
threatre would greatly increase the proportion 
of Australian Forces in a theatre so vital to 
us. It  ensures the unity of direction and operation 
of the AIF. It  greatly strengthens our claim to 
a voice in the higher direction of operations in 
this region and makes undeniable our claim for a 
Joint A llied  Council for the Pacific  theatre. By 
developing USA cooperation in Australia through 
the machinery recently approved and by winning 
the Americans to an understanding of the 
strategical position in the South-West Pacific  
as we see i t ,  we can get inside the President's  mind 
more readily through his Commanders here. Every 
opportunity is thus presented for the Commonwealth 
to develop, by weight of hard facts, a position 
which w ill  render the Government largely independent 
of the ineffectual pleadings hitherto necessary with 
Mr Churchill.
59
Curtin minuted that he endorsed 'the submission as a whole1.
Here was the blueprint for Curtin 's  later relationship with MacArthur, 
and it  reveals the important role of Shedden. Not only did he look 
beyond the military aspect, on which he suggested Curtin should seek 
further advice from the Chiefs of S ta ff , but also he correctly inter­
preted the attitudes of the Prime Minister.
The discussions during January 1942 also raise questions of 
Australian strategic decision-making which have not been examined in 
other works. During December 1941, January 1942 and February 1942 the 
Chiefs of Sbaff produced nine appreciations and seventeen reports for
59. Memorandum, Shedden to Curtin, 9 January 1942 ,with Curtin 's  hand­
written comments of the same date. MP 1217, Box 573. Shedden did not 
realise that MacArthur would find it  exceedingly d iffic u lt  to 'get inside' 
the mind of a President who heartily disliked him.
the Prime Minister and the War Cabinet.^0 In these appreciations they 
dwelt at length on the defence of Australia and a llied  strategy in  the 
Far East and P ac ific . Royle, who barely six  months earlier had been 
the British  Fifth  Sea Lord, had no hesitation in vigorously attacking 
the Admiralty's appreciation. After examining the United Kingdom Far 
East Appreciation of 23 December, the Australian Chiefs of Staff  commented 
that the situation disclosed was 'most unsatisfactory . . .  In other words,
the United States Pacific  Fleet,on which we had based great hopes is
• , ,  . . 61 
unable or unwilling to assist .
Although most of Curtin 's  cables were drafted by Shedden, they
were often based on the views of the Chiefs of Sta ff , two of whom,
Royle and Burnett, were British  o fficers . At least once the Chiefs
found it  necessary to keep Evatt from jumping to conclusions. When Evatt
suggested that Casey had 'gone o ff on a frolic  of his own' over the
62
area of the South-West Pacific  for which the US Navy would be responsible,
63
the Chiefs pointed out that they agreed with Casey's proposal.
The most contentious issue during January was the 'inexcusable
betrayal' cable sent to Churchill on 23 January, resulting from the
increasingly deteriorating situation in Malaya, where the Australians had at
last been in action. On 19 January Bennett reported to Sturdee that
the Indian troops had not stood firm and that the British  units were
inexperienced in local conditions. Further withdrawals could be avoided
64
only i f  all units fought as well as the Australians. The next day
60 . A list  of these appreciations and reports is in MP 1217, Box 573.
61 . Report by Australian Chiefs of S ta ff , 29 December 1941, CRS A 2671, 
item 445/1941 .
62 . Teleprinter message N o .59, Evatt to Shedden, 4 January 1942, CRS A 
816, item 31 /301 /136 .
63 . Teleprinter message M 28, Wilson to Shedden, 5 January 1942, loo.cit.
64 . Signal, Bennett to Sturdee, 19 January 1942, AWM 5 5 3 /2 /3 .
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Sturdee received a cable from Bennett that two of the Australian
battalions had been cut o ff and that the '45 Indian Infantry Brigade
65
was a burden, not an a s s e t t '. Another message received on the same
66
day said that re lief  for the Australian battalions was 'im practicable '.
6 7
Further pessim istic messages were received on 21, 22 and 23 January,
and on the 23rd Bowden reported that the position was 'desperate and
.68
possibly irretrievable .
These cables were considered at a War Cabinet meeting in  Melbourne 
on 23 January, presided over by the Deputy Prime Minister, Forde, in 
the absence of Curtin who was in Western Australia. After discussing 
the serious position in Malaya with the Chiefs of S ta ff , who were present, 
it  was decided that strong representations should again be made to 
Churchill, with particular reference to the lack of support for the 
AIF in Malaya, and to the employment of Indian troops who had not proved 
suitable for the type of warfare under the conditions in Malaya.
The meeting was also advised that the Japanese Navy had attacked 
Rabaul that morning, although it  was not yet certain i f  the town had 
been captured. Admiral Royle said that he thought Japan had 'so  much 
on her hands' that Australia 'd id  not offer  a very attractive targ et ',
69
but he could not discount the possibility  of an attack on Port Moresby.
Meanwhile Churchill too had been receiving pessim istic reports from 
Malaya. On 19 January General Wavell, the newly appointed Supreme 
Commander of ABDA Command, warned Churchill that he doubted whether
76
65 . Signal, Bennett to Sturdee, 19 January 1942, received 20 January,
CRS A 816, item 31 /301 /136 .
66 . S ignal, Bennett to Sturdee, 20 January 1942, loo.cit.
67. Signal, Bennett to Forde, 20 January, received 21 January 1942, to 
Sturdee, 21 January 1942, to Forde, 22 January, received 23 January 1942, 
to Forde, 23 January 1942, loo.oit.
68 . Cable 66 , Bowden to Curtin, 23 January 1942, quoted in draft cable 
Johcu 21 of 23 January 1942, MP 1217, Box 571.
69. War Cabinet Minutes 1741, 1942, Meeting Melbourne, 23 January 1942, 
CRS A 2673, Vol.X .
Singapore could be held for long once Johore was lost, and the next
day he advised,as previously mentioned, that the whole of the 45th
71
Indian Brigade and two Australian battalions had been cut o f f . Churchill
reacted by preparing a paper for the Chiefs of Staff Committee in  which
he suggested that the evacuation of Singapore and the diversion of
72
reinforcements to Burma should seriously be considered.
73
Churchill's  paper, which Page described as a 'defeatist  n o te ',
was discussed by the Chiefs of Staff at their meeting at 10 .30  a.m. on
74
21 January, but there was no definite conclusion. At the meeting
of the Defence Committee that evening the CIGS insisted that the
. . 75
decision should be left  to Wavell, as A llied  Supreme Commander.
Page, who attended the Defence Committee meeting, vigorously opposed
the suggestion, and he told the War Cabinet meeting, which followed the
Defence Committee, that 'Australia  would never stand our men being
deserted . . .  the course [Churchill] proposed would be more fatal and
injurious to the lives and fortunes of the army and the war than standing
76
and fighting at Johore on the line that was th e re '. As a result of
70. Cable, Wavell to Churchill, 19 January 1942, quoted in Churchill, 
op.cit . , V o l .IV , p p .46, 47.
71. Cable, Wavell to Chiefs of S ta ff , 20 January 1942, toe. cit.
12. Memorandum, Churchill to Ismay, 21 January 1942, Churchill, op.cit.
V o l .IV , p p .48 , 49. Also PREM 3 168 /6 . The CIGS, General Brooke, was 
harbouring similar thoughts and on 20 January wrote in his dairy: 'News 
from Far East is bad and I am beginning to be very doubtful whether Singapore 
w ill hold out much longer '. Diary, 20 January 1942, 5 /5 ,  Alanbrooke 
Papers, Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, K ing 's  College, London.
73. Page's Diary, 21 January 1942, Page Papers AWM.
74. Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs of Sta ff  Committee, 21 January 1942,
CAB 79 /7 .
75. War Cabinet, Defence Committee (Operations), Meeting 10 .00  p.m .
21 January 1942, PREM 3 16 8 /6 ; also CAB 6 9 /4 .
76. Page's Diary, 21 January 1942, Page Papers, AWM. The minutes of 
the meeting in PREM 3 1 6 8 /6 , contain no record of Page even speaking, 
although he is listed as being present.
these discussions nothing was done, and Wavell continued to rely on
the previous instructions from Churchill, which emphasised that Singapore
77
was to be defended to the last.
By this time the first  brigade of the 18th British  Division had
reached Singapore, but the remainder of the division was s t il l  in its
78
convoy crossing the Indian Ocean. The o fficer  responsible for the
escort of the convoy from the Sunda Straits was an Australian, Commodore
79
J .A .  Collins, who had been appointed Commodore Commanding, China Force.
Collins' appointment emphasised the differences between British  naval
attitudes towards the RAN and British  Army attitudes towards the
Australian Army. RAN and RN officers were on a common Admiralty list
and there was nothing remarkable about an Australian naval o fficer  being
given a command in a British  force. It  is unlikely that this would
have occurred quite so freely in the army. On the other hand RAN officers
had not been educated to feel any particular responsibility towards the
Australian government. Thus the senior Australian army officer  in the
ABDA Command, General Lavarack, reported at length to the Australian
government, while it  never occurred to Collins, the senior Australian
80
naval o fficer  in the area, to do likewise. I f  Collins felt  d issatisfied  
with his instructions from the ABDA Command HQ or ABDA Float (the naval 
component of HQ ABDA Command), he had the right of direct appeal to the 
Admiralty.
During this period the British  Chiefs of Staff had become anxious 
about the security of the convoys proceeding to Singapore, and on 19 
January they reminded Wavell that i f  Collins was not satisfied  with the
77. Cable, Churchill to Wavell, 20 January 1942, Great Britain Cabinet 
O ffic e , Principal War Telegrams and Memorandum3 1940-1943 (KTO Press, 
Nendeln, Liechtenstein, 1976 ), hereafter Telegrams Far East.
78. G il l , op.cit., V o l .I I ,  p . 527.
79. J .A . Collins, As Luck Would Have It  (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1965) , p . 107.
80. Interview with Collins , 9 October 1978.
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'escort arrangements he should represent the matter to y o u '.
Collins was not, in fact, happy with the arrangements and told Wavell
that he could not guarantee the safety of the convoys, and that he was
worried about the reports of disorder in  Singapore. Wavell told Collins
that the highest authority demanded that the convoy should get through,
and when Collins hesitated Wavell added that i f  it  did not, " I  shall
have to tell the world that the Royal Navy had lost Singapore '. This
was enough to'quieten' Collins who said later that perhaps he 'should
82
have had more guts and pressed W a v e ll '. The last convoy carrying 
the remaining troops of the 18th Division was bombed between Sunda Strait 
and Singapore and the Empress of Asia (16 ,909  tons) was sunk, but the
83
troops were taken o ff  and the convoy reached Singapore on 5 February.
The Australian government never learned that its senior naval officer
in the area had advised against the convoy proceeding.
The government did , however, receive advice that the British  had
considered evacuation of Singapore, for on 23 January Page reported
that at the Defence Committee meeting on the evening of 21 January the
question had been raised as to whether 'evacuation should not now be
considered '. Page said that this would cause 'irreparable loss of
prestige and I think irreparable damage to the allied  cause '. He told
the Australian government that it  had been decided to wait for a couple
of days to see i f  the Australians and Indians could fight their way
84
back to the main army.
This news was received in Australia after the War Cabinet meeting 
which had decided to send the cable to Churchill making strong
81. Cable G 5240, (MO 10 ). Chiefs of Sta ff  to Wavell, 19 January 1942,
Telegrams Far East.
82. Interview with Collins, 9 October 1978.
83 . G ill , op.cit., V o l .l , p p .527 , 528.
84. Cable P29, Page to Curtin, 9 .35  p .m .,  22 January 1942, received 
23 January 1942, MP 1217, Box 571.
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representations on the defence of Malaya. But now, in the absence
of Curtin, Evatt amended the third paragraph of the cable, which had
asked for W avell1s assessment, to read:
Page has reported the Defence Committee has been 
considering evacuation of Malaya and Singapore.
After all the assurances we have been given, the 
evacuation of Singapore would be regarded here and 
elsewhere as an inexcusable betrayal. Singapore 
is a central fortress in the system of Empire and 
local defence . . .  we understood that it  was to be 
made impregnable and in any event it  was to be 
capable of holding out for a prolonged period until 
arrival of the main fleet.
In  a separate cable to Page, Evatt asked him to inform the Australian
government as to where the suggestion had arisen since this knowledge
86
would be helpful in  formulating the Australian view. A few days
later Page explained that W avell's  appreciation had not raised the question
of evacuation, but had mentioned the d iffic u lt ie s  associated with a
87
prolonged siege of Singapore Island .
At the War Cabinet meeting on 24 January Evatt referred to Page 's
telegram advising that evacuation was being considered, and said that
that government had made strong representations that Singapore should
not be evacuated. The minutes noted that 'the Chiefs of Staff concurred
88
in this v ie w '. The next day the Advisory War Council also endorsed
89
the cable and apparently there was no discussion. Nevertheless, later
85. Cable Johcu 21, Curtin to Churchill, 2301 hours, 23 January 1942, 
Second Draft as revised by Dr Evatt and the Chief of the Naval S ta ff ,
MP 1217, Box 571. The amendments made by the CNS referred to naval 
disposition in  paragraphs 7 and 8 of the telegram. See also CAB 6 0 /2 1 , 
WP (42) 34.
86 . Cable 11, Curtin to Page, 25 January 1942, CRS M100, January 1942.
87. Cable P33, Page to Curtin, 28 January 1942, too.cit.
88 . War Cabinet Minute 1748, Meeting Melbourne, 24 January 1942, CRS A 
2673, V o l.X . The meeting was chaired by Forde.
89. Advisory War Council Minute 709, Meeting Melbourne, 26 January
1942, CRS A 2681, V o l .IV .
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in the year Spender asserted that both Menzies and McEwen had dissented
from the government's reply. Shedden claimed that neither he nor the
90
minute secretary, Quealy, had any record of this dissent.
Churchill took immediate exception to the cable and he informed
Curtin that the 18th British  Division and some Hurricanes were on the
way. He continued:
In such circumstances I really cannot pass without 
comment such language to me as 'inexcusable b etray al '.
I make a ll  allowances for your anxiety and w ill not 
allow such discourtesy to cloud my judgment or lessen 
my efforts on your behalf.
It  would however make it  very d iffic u lt  for your 
representative to be present at our most intimate and 
secret councils i f  ex parte accounts of tentative 
discussions are to be reported to you and made the 
basis for the kind of telegrams you have sent me.
. . .  You have made it  clear in public that you 
place your confidence in the United States. I have 
some recent and I believe true knowledge of the view 
they take, and I doubt very much whether they would 
share your opinion . . .  The great idea over there is 
China. We are very glad you should consult with them 
and set up any arrangement necessary for that purpose.
Pray continue to invoke our assistance in securing 
attention to your v iew s.91
In the War Cabinet on 26 January Churchill expressed regret that Page
had not informed his government of the Defence Committee's decision to
92
give highest priority  to the defence of Johore and Singapore. Page 
wrote that Churchill 'then went o ff the deep end about the Australians 
generally, and said i f  they were going to squeal he would send them all
90 . Minute, Shedden to Curtin, 3 September 1942, MP 1217, Box 571.
91 . Cable 109, Churchill to Curtin, 25 January 1942, PREM 3 1 5 0 /3 . The 
first  draft of the telegram began: 'You really have no right to use 
such language to me as "inexcusable b e tr a y a l " '. The amendment was made 
by the Dominions Secretary, Lord Cranborne. Some d ifficulty  has been 
encountered in determining whether this cable was sent. At the War Cabinet 
meeting on 23 January Churchill said that he did not propose to answer 
Curtin 's  telegram. On the other hand Churchill's  formal reply on 31 
January to the technical points in Curtin 's  telegram began by referring
to Cable 109 of 25 January. Cable 139, Dominions Office to Australian 
Government, 31 January 1942, PREM 3 168 /6 .
92. War Cabinet Minutes, 26 January 1942, CAB 65 /2 9 .
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home again out of the various fighting zones '. In reply Page said 
that rather than looking after themselves the Australianshad been 
looking after the Empire, 'and i f  anybody had been looking after
93
themselves it  was the chaps this end1. F inally , on 31 January,
Churchill sent an assurance to Curtin that a ll  possible support was 
being given to the Australian troops and that there was no evidence
94
that the performance of the Indian troops had 'been d iscreditable '.
Subsequently Churchill wrote that Curtin 's message did not decide
the issue: ' I f  we had all been agreed upon the policy we should . . .
certainly have put the case "bluntly" to W a v e ll '. Churchill realised
the effect which a British  'scuttle ' would have had on American opinion;
nevertheless he acknowledged that there was 'no doubt what a purely
95
military decision should have b e e n '.
But Churchill felt  that the Australians could not escape some
responsibility for the decision, and he emphasised this to Curtin a
month later when Singapore had been lost and he was trying to persuade
96
the Australians to allow the 7th Division to reinforce Burma. Churchill
93. Page's Diary, 26 January 1942, Page Papers, AWM. These exact words 
were not used in the War Cabinet minutes which recorded Page 's  view 
that Curtin probably had in  mind 'that since the beginning of the war 
Australia had never been unwilling to send her Imperial Forces overseas. 
In doing so she had denuded herself to a dangerous e x ten t '. CAB 65 /29 .
94 . Cable 139, Churchill to Curtin, 31 January 1942, PREM 3 16 8 /1 .
95. Churchill, op.cit . ,  V o l .IV , p p .81 , 82. Brooke agreed with Churchill 
and wrote later: 'Looking back on our decision to send 18th Division to 
Singapore, in the light of after events I think we were wrong to send it  
to Singapore, and that it  would have served more useful purposes had it  
been sent to Rangoon'. Notes on My L ife , 19-23 January 1942, 3 /A /V , 
Alanbrooke Papers.
96 . Cable 233, Churchill to Curtin, 20 February 1942, PREM 3 63 /4  and 
CRS A 816, item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
wrote in his war memoirs that 'i t  was not for Mr Curtin, after taking
so strong a part in the discussion, to feel that he had no more share 
97‘
in  i t ' . Churchill was aware of the paradox that in January 1942
Australia continued to urge reinforcement of a threatened area without
stopping to think whether the reinforcement could achieve anything,
while a month later, when the reinforcements consisted of the Australian
Corps, every consideration was given to their effective u tilisatio n .
There was much strength in  Churchill's  argument. Although there
can be no disagreement with the Australian appeals for reinforcements
from early December until the battles in Johore, i f  the situation was
as bad as Australia claimed it  should have been obvious that a point
would be eventually reached when the campaign was lost. It  was the
duty of the Australian Chiefs of Staff to make some effort to determine
that point. After the news of disaster on 19 January, the Australian
government apparently did not weigh carefully the question of whether
the evacuation of Singapore might then have been the correct military
decision, even i f  it  might have been politically  impossible.
On 16 January the Chiefs of Staff had stated categorically that
98
i f  Malaya were lost then Australia would be vulnerable to attack.
This opinion was s t il l  held on 21 January when Curtin reported the views
of the Chiefs to Churchill:
So long as we retain a foothold in Malaya and the 
islands of the Malay Barrier remain in our hands we do 
not consider that Japan w ill  attempt a major attack 
against Australia . . .  It  is a race against time in 
Malaya in which the enemy w ill  do everything possible 
by air  and submarine attacks to prevent our reinforce­
ments getting through.99
97 . Churchill, op.cit., V o l .IV , p . 145.
98 . Chiefs of Staff  Paper N o .3, 16 January 1942, CRS A 2670, item 
32/1942 .
99 . Cable, Curtin to Churchill, 21 January 1942, CRS A 816 , item 31 /3 0 1 /
136.
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Apparently the Chiefs did not take into account that i f  Singapore became
a beleaguered fortress, Britain  would not have the ships or planes
to relieve i t ,  and thus Japan would not be prevented from operating
elsewhere at w ill .
Although the Australians did not receive W avell1s personal messages
to Churchill, they were kept informed by W avell's situation reports,
and by messages from Bennett and Bowden. Neither of the Australian
representatives actually suggested evacuation, but it  was a question
which should probably have been put to them. When the US Chief of
Staff  read Curtin 's  message he commented that it  would be 'crim inally
100
negligent not to make plans for evacuation in  advance.
Late January was therefore a time requiring clearly considered 
decisions, and was not the time for scoring points o ff  the British  
government which, it  must be admitted, had previously deceived Australia
over the security of Singapore.'*'0 ^ There almost certainly was an
102
'inexcusable betray al ', but that fact should not have clouded the 
judgment of the Australians.
Australia 's  firm stand over the non-evacuation of Singapore 
emphasises the point that it  is relatively easy for a small power to 
offer advice to a great power, secure in the knowledge that the great 
power must bear the responsibility for the final decision. I f  the point 
could be considered as somewhat academic it  did not prove to be the
100. Cable 49, Casey to Department of External A ffa irs , 25 January 1942, 
CRS A 816, item 31 /301 /136 .
101. There is an extensive body of literature on this topic. See, for 
example, McCarthy, Australia and Imperial Defence; Hemmings, Australia 
and B r ita in 's  Far Eastern Defence Policy 1937-42; Ian Hamill, The 
Imperial Commitment, The Singapore Strategy in the Defence of Australia 
and New Zealand 1939-1942, MA Thesis, ANU, 1974.
102. C .A . Vlieland, the British  Secretary of Defence in  Malaya from 
1938 to 1941, in a typescript 'D isaster in the Far East, 1941- 2', held 
in the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, agreed with Curtin 
that it  was an 'inexcusable b e tray al '.
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following month when the destination of the 1st Australian Corps was 
discussed. 1
Comment must be made about the role of Dr Evatt, whom Menzies
103
described as 'a  seething mass of frustrated am bitions'. Shedden
observed that 'Evatt sought to take the initiative in  drafting replies
to the personal cables from Churchill to Curtin, and this led to
difficulties  between the Defence draft [prepared by Shedden for the
104
Minister of Defence] and those of E v a t t '. Despite the terse nature
of the telegrams between Curtin and Churchill before 23 January, it
is unlikely that Curtin would have used the terms 'inexcusable b e tray al '.
In  Curtin 's  absence Evatt, not the Deputy Prime M inister, Forde, seized
control of policy-making, and gave vent to his prejudices against the
British  government and his nationalistic  ambitions.
The new British High Commissioner in Canberra, Sir  Ronald Cross,
tried to give Churchill some idea of the political situation in Australia.
He believed that there was a
lack of appreciation of the war as world-wide, 
involving world-wide strategy, that makes 
Ministers feel entitled to some prior claim 
on Great Britain for their local defence needs in 
M alaya .. .
103. Menzies, Afternoon Light, p .5 2 .
104. Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 4, Chapter 57, p p .6 , 7. Shedden has 
claimed that a relatively innocuous decision made in late 1941 that the 
decoding and encoding of the personal cables between Curtin and Churchill 
should be handled by the Communication Section of the Department of External 
A ffa irs , rather than by the Prime M inister's  Department, 'proved to be 
unw ise ', for it  gave Evatt the opportunity, denied to other Cabinet 
M inisters, of reading all the messages, sometimes before they reached 
Curtin. Yet it  should have been Curtin 's  prerogative to decide what he 
wished to put to the War Cabinet. On the other hand a scrutiny of the 
personal cables between Curtin and Churchill,and also the cable register 
shows that they continued to be handled by the Prime M inister's  Department. 
Nevertheless there is no doubt that Evatt did re&d the cables and often 
took the in itiative  in drafting replies. Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness3
p p .10, 11 , has written that the Department of External Affairs did not 
secure control of all external communications until 1944.
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Lack of experience of the w orld 's a ffa irs , 
moreover, is a factor which contributes 
importantly to A ustralia 's  great sensitiveness 
about her nationhood.
In this connection, however, one must also 
look for the hand of Dr Evatt. Australia 's  
sensitiveness about her status is a reality 
and Dr Evatt may well trade on it  for his own 
ends. He is an able man, reputed to be a most 
ambitious careerist, anti-Whitehall i f  not 
prejudiced against the Home Country (or he might be 
described as Australian n a tio n a list ), and 
may be quite ready to seek his personal advancement 
through asserting Australia 's  right to plough her own 
furrow. He and Mr Beasley are the two most 
prominent members of the left wing faction in the 
Labour Party. They are not 'Curtin men' though 
they possess great influence with the Prime 
Minister. For the moment they run in double harness, 
but i f  the Prime Ministership became vacant the 
harness would snap as both raced for the throne.
Cross continued to have a high opinion of Curtin, but he thought that 
Curtin had failed ' to resist his left  wing leader Evatt and he probably 
. 106 cannot do so .
But Curtin claimed that the pressure for a strong approach to 
Britain  came not just from within his own party. He said that on one 
occasion Hughes, the leader of the United Australia Party, had sent 
him a telegram telling  him that he should reply to Churchill in 
'peremptory' terms. After the receipt of one of Churchill's  telegrams, 
Menzies had said 'T e ll  him to think up another', and Spender, the 
former Minister for the Army, was always urging him to 'demand' represen­
tation. Curtin said 'that  he was the one always endeavouring to use 
moderate language
105. Cable 10, Cross to Dominions Secretary, 9 January 1942, PREM 4 50/7A . 
See also Cable 37, Cross to Dominions Secretary, 14 January 1942,
CAB 6 6 /2 1 , WP (42) 29.
106. Cable 53 , Cross to Dominions Secretary, 21 January 1942, Zoo.cit.
Also CAB 6 6 /2 1 , WP (42) 33. Cross suggested applying economic or financial 
pressure to Australia,but this idea was rejected by the British  government. 
Minute, Dominions Secretary to Churchill, 22 January 1942, Zoc.cit.
107. Memorandum by Cross, 5 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
MAP 2
The Japanese Advance Through the Netherlands Indies and to Rabaul.
From: Wigmore, o p .c it ., p . 393 .
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Colonel Van S. Merle-Smith, US military attache, 
Mr Nelson T. Johnson, US Minister to Australia, 
Mr Arthur Fadden and the Governor-General,
Lord Gowrie.
(AWM Negative N o .9595/10)
Admiral Sir Guy Royle, Chief of the Naval 
Staff and First Member of the Naval Board,
1941-1945.
(AWM Negative N o .17725)
Not only was it  the most important example of the way Australia could, 
i f  only in a negative fashion, influence Allied  strategy, but it  
emphasised a number of other problems inherent in coalition warfare.
These included the problems faced by national military commanders in 
an international force, and the d ifficulties  confronting the defence 
planners of a minor country seeking to play a part in the A llied  war 
effort.
The incident has been described in detail in a number of books,
but i t  is necessary to recount briefly  the outline of the story. On
26 January 1942 Lieutenant-General S ir  John Lavarack, the GOC of the
1st Australian Corps, and his senior staff o fficers , arrived in  Java
as the advance party for a force which was then preparing to leave the 
112
Middle East. The situation in the Netherlands East Indies was
fraught with uncertainty, but Lavarack was soon convinced that the
situation was 'g r im ', and he believed that the Japanese might seize
113
southern Sumatra before the main body of his corps could arrive.
He knew that he did not have full knowledge of the intentions of the
Combined Chiefs of S ta ff , but on 6 February, in a letter to Sturdee,
he warned the Australian government that the plans for the Australian
114
Corps might need to be changed.
Major-General C .E .M . Lloyd, the Australian Deputy Intendant-General of 
the ABDA Command,had no such reservations, and he felt that Lavarack
88
111. See, Hasluck, The Government and the People3 1942-1945, C h .2, 
Wigmore, op .cit., C h .20, Churchill, op .cit., V o l.IV , C h .9 , Butler, op.cit 
V o l .I l l ,  Part I I  and S ir  Earle Page, Truant Surgeon (Angus and Robertson, 
Sydney, 1963).
112. Berryman Diary, 26 January 1942.
113. Appreciation by Lavarack's  senior intelligence o fficer , Lieutenant- 
Colonel K .A . W ills , 2 February 1942, AWM 70 3 /3 /2 1 .
114. Letter, Lavarack to Sturdee, 6 February 1942, AWM 5 4 1 /1 /4 ;  MP 1217, 
Box 573.
was not strong enough in the 'Alice in Wonderland situation in  Ja v a '.
On 8 February he wrote to Sturdee's  deputy, Major-General Rowell,
urging that the proposal to keep the corps in Java was completely
, 115 
unsound.
Lavarack, however, believed that there would s t il l  be time for
. . 116 
a decision when the convoys reached Ceylon, but by 12 February
there was news that a fast personnel-carrying ship, the Orcades with
3,400  Australian troops, had been sent ahead of the main convoy, and
. . . 117
would soon by arriving at Oosthaven in  Southern Sumatra. That night
Lavarack prepared an appreciation recommending that the AIF should
not be landed in  the N E I, and the next morning he showed the appreciation 
118
to Wavell. During the morning conference the news was received at
13 9
W av ell 's HQ that Singapore was expected to fall  within 24 hours, and
Wavell asked Lavarack to delay sending the appreciation while he prepared
120
a similar one to send to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the War Office .
The cables,which were despatched on 14 February, recommended that the
121
AIF should not land in the NEI. Wavell suggested that there were
'advantages in diverting one or both divisions of the AIF to Burma
122
or A u s t r a l ia '. Like Malaya, Burma also had been invaded by the
Japanese.
115. Lloyd to Gavin Long, 16 May 1943, in Gavin Long Notebook, N o .l , p . 27.
116. Berryman Diary, 9 , 12 February 1942.
117. Wigmore, op.cit., p . 454. The Orcades formed a one-ship convoy, JS2, 
Convoy JS1, which arrived at Oosthaven at about the same time as
the Orcades, carried mainly equipment for the troops on the Orcades plus 
the 1st Squadron of the 3rd Hussars, G il l , op.cit., V o l .l , p p .563, 570,
575.
118. Java Interlude, an account prepared by the military History Section 
based on Java Adventure, by Captain Curtis Wilson, who was Lavarack's  ADC, 
AWM 5 5 6 /2 /1 .
119. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries (William Morrow, New York,
1946 ), p . 90 .
120. Wigmore, op.cit., p . 444.
121. Cable SD 5649, Lavarack to Sturdee, 14 February 1942, AWM 5 4 1 /1 /4 .
Cable 01157 , Wavell to Curtin, 14 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 5 2 /3 02 /142 .
122. Ibid .
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On 16 February, with the news that Singapore had surrendered
123
the previous day, the Australian Chiefs of Staff reviewed W avell's
appreciation plus a paper which Sturdee had prepared before the receipt
124
of W av e ll 's and Lavarack's cables. The Chiefs recommended that ' i f
possible, all Australian forces now under order to transfer to the Far
125
East from the Middle East should be diverted to A u s tr a lia '. The
. . 126 
next morning, after a night of agonising over the decision, Curtin
cabled Churchill, Page, Wavell and the New Zealand Prime M inister,
requesting that urgent arrangements be made for the diversion of the
127
AIF to Australia. This cable was confirmed as government policy
128
at a War Cabinet meeting on 18 February.
Meanwhile, on the evening of 17 February in  London, the P acific  
War Council discussed a personal message from Wavell to Churchill 
advising that it  would be 'extremely precarious' to land the AIF
Corps in the NEI, and recommending that at least one Australian division
129 . . . 130
should be diverted to Burma. The Pacific  War Council agreed,
and in  two cables despatched from London early on the morning of
123. Cable OPX 1786, Wavell to Curtin, 15 February 1942, MP 1217, Box 571.
124. Paper by the Chief of the General Staff on Future Employment of AIF, 
15 February 1942, AWM 5 4 1 /1 /4 .
125. Teleprinter message, M 668, Wilson to Shedden, 16 February 1942m 
MP 1217, Box 573.
126. Ross, op.cit., p . 260; also interview with E. Harold Cox, 20 November 
1978.
127. Ca>ble 127, Curtin to Churchill, 17 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
5 3 /3 0 2 /1 1 2 .
128. War Cabinet Minute 1896, Sydney, 18 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
52 /30 2 /1 4 2 .
129. This message dated 16 February from Wavell to Churchill was sent to 
Australia in Dominions Office cable 219, 18 February 1942 and received 
on 19 February, CRS A 816, item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 ; also PREM 3 166 /5 .
130. Minutes of Pacific  War Council Meeting, 17 February 1942, CAB 99 /26 .
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18 February, Page urged the Australian government to endorse this recommend­
a t io n .^ 3^ Bruce also sent a cable supporting Pag e .’'"3^
On Thursday 19 February, the day Darwin was bombed for the first  
time, the Advisory War Council met to discuss the destination of the 
7th Division. Despite the disagreement of the non-government members
of the Council the War Cabinet decided that the government's decision
133
would remain unchanged.
Meanwhile, during the day other information became available.
134
Page, who claimed to have been 'staggered' by Curtin 's  reply, cabled
from London pointing out that the Australian government had not received
Wave 1 1 's appreciation of 16 February and requesting that a final decision 
135
be deferred. Wavell cabled from Java that Lavarack agreed with
136
his view that the Corps should be used to reinforce Burma, and
Lavarack himself cabled that he agreed with Wavell. He added, however,
that he was not personally in a position to judge the home defence
137
situation in Australia. But there was little  chance of the government
changing its mind, and late on 19 February two cables, drafted by
138
Evatt, were despatched to Page emphasising that the decision was unchanged.
131. Cables P43 and P44, Page to Curtin, 18 February 1942, CPS A 816, 
item 52 /30 2 /1 4 2 .
132. Cable 31A, Bruce to Curtin, 18 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
1 3 3 .Advisory War Council Minute N o .777, Sydney, 18 February 1942, CRS A 
816, item 5 2 /3 02 /142 . Also Spender, op.cit., p p .148, 149.
134. Page's Diary, 18 February 1942, Page Papers AWM.
135. Cable P46, Page to Curtin, 18 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 52 /302/142 ,
136. Cable OPXO 1529, Wavell to Curtin, 18 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
137. Cable ol538 , Lavarack to Sturdee for Curtin, 18 February 1942, AWM 
5 4 1 /1 /4 .
138. Cables 28, 29, Curtin to Page, 19 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 . Tenant, op .cit ., p . 135, claims that the despatches were 
written by Evatt. Notes on cables in MP 1217, Box 573 show which ones 
were drafted by Evatt, and when they were submitted to Curtin, who after 
a week without sleep, was in  hospital. See also Calwell, Be Just and 
Fear Not, p . 198.
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After receiving the first  of these two cables Page made a final
appeal to the Australian government, adding that the US government
had decided to send a division to Australia and that Australia should
139
reciprocate by allowing one Australian division to go to Burma.
But after a secret session of parliament on 20 February Curtin again
140
confirmed the decision.
Before the receipt of Curtin 's  final confirmation Churchill had
141
seemed w illing  to accept the Australian decision, but at 9 .0 0  p.m .
on 20 February he ordered the Admiralty to tell the convoy to steam 
142
northwards, and ten minutes later he cabled an appeal to Curtin.
He did not mention that the convoy was heading towards Burma, but
emphasised that the Australian force was the only one which could reach
143
Rangoon m  time to prevent its loss. At the same time, Churchill
144
urged Roosevelt to appeal to Australia, which he did in cables
145
directly to Curtin, and through Churchill and Casey to Curtin.
After a special War Cabinet meeting on 21 February the Australian
146
government again confirmed the decision, which reached Churchill on
147 . .
the morning of 22 February. However the convoy no longer had sufficient
139. Cable P47, Page to Curtin, 19 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 5 2 /302/142 ,
140. Cable 30, Curtin to Page, 20 February 1942, Zoc.cit,
141. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 1 .00  p.m . 20 February
1942, PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
142. Memorandum, Ismay to Churchill, 23 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
143. Cable 233, Churchill to Curtin, 20 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
144. Cable, Churchill to Roosevelt, 20 February 1942, PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
145. Cable 326, Casey to Curtin, 20 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
52 /30 2 /1 4 2 ; cable 72, Roosevelt to Curtin, 21 February 1942, MP 1217,
Box 573; cable, Roosevelt to Churchill, 21 February 1942, PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
146. War Cabinet Minute 1915, Canberra, 21 February, 1942, CRS A 2673,
V ol.X .
147. Cable 136, Curtin to Churchill, 22 February 1942, PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
fuel to sail directly to Australia , and Churchill explained the
situation to the Australian government in a message sent on the afternoon
of 22 February. Since there was to be a three or four day delay before
the convoy could sail for Australia , Churchill again asked the Australian
148
government to change its mind. However, in  a reply sent on 23 February
the Australian government stated that it  was 'quite impossible to
reverse a decision which was made with the utmost care and which we
149
have affirmed and re- affirm ed'. That day Churchill informed Curtin
. 150
that the convoy would proceed to Australia.
This was not, however, the end of the incident, for no sooner had
it  been finally  agreed that the 7th Australian Division was not going
to Burma, than the possibility  of diverting the convoy to Ceylon was
raised. In view of the Australian decision regarding Burma, the British
government was not w illing  to approach the Australian government, but
both Page and Bruce urged Curtin that it  was important to Australian
security to hold Ceylon,which was threatened by the Japanese fleet
151
in the Indian Ocean. Furthermore, i t  was suggested that to assist
with the defence of Ceylon would 'create an atmosphere of goodwill'
152
after A ustralia 's  refusal to reinforce Burma. The Australian Chiefs
15 3
of Staff agreed that Ceylon occupied an important strategic position, 
and the Australian government offered the two brigades of the 6th
93
148. Cable 241, Churchill to Curtin, 22 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 ; PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
149. Cable 139, Curtin to Churchill, 23 February 1 9 4 2 ,Zoc.cit.
150. Cable, Churchill to Curtin, 23 February 1942, Zoc.cit*
151. Cable 34, Bruce to Curtin, 23 February 1942, cable P51, Page to 
Curtin, 24 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 5 2 /302 /142 .
152. Cable 36, Bruce to Curtin, 27 February 1942, Zoc.cit.
153. Report by Chiefs of S ta ff , Defence of Ceylon, 28 February 1942, 
Zoc.cit.
. . 154
Division which had not yet departed from Suez. Churchill thanked
155
Curtin 'most cordially ' for his 'proferred h e lp '.
The controversy over the destination of the Australian Corps
brings into focus the problem of strategic decision-making in  coalition
warfare. Ismay was convinced that there could be no real joint decision
making; the best a minor country could do was to exercise its veto
over the employment of its troops. He cited the convoy disagreement
156
as a prime example of this principle . Churchill's  reluctance through
out the war to allow Australia any real opportunity for consultation 
meant that Australia had little  alternative but to apply a veto.
Although the Pacific  War Council could only make recommendations 
to the Combined Chiefs of S ta ff , the Australians had been told that 
it  would enable them to have a voice in strategic decision-making.
The Australians had doubted the value of such a body being established 
in London, and the episode with the convoys proved that the doubts 
were well founded. During the dispute it  became clear that Churchill 
had no desire to include Australia, or any other minor country, in  the 
decision-making process, and that representation would have to be made 
independently to each of the great powers. It  is easy to understand 
why Curtin sought to establish direct and close relations with MacArthur 
once the South-West Pacific  Area command was established a month later.
Nevertheless, these clear lessons were confused by the role of 
Page, and Dedman has perceptively pointed out that the controversy 
was probably caused by Page's and perhaps Churchill's  misreading of 
Curtin 's  cable of 17 February. Dedman noted that the first  part of
154. Cable 160, Curtin to Churchill, 2 March 1942, Zoo.cit.
155. Cable 256, Churchill to Curtin, 4 March 1942, Page Papers AWM.
156. Ismay, op.cit., p . 245.
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95
the cable contained merely the opinions of the Chiefs of S ta ff , while
the second part stated the government policy , which explicitly  requested
the diversion of the AIF to Australia. He argued that Page took as
government policy the one sentence of the Chiefs of Staff opinions
which stated that they were 'mindful of the fact that the strategic
position of Burma may necessitate some reinforcement there until
157
other troops were available from elsewhere'.
Undoubtedly Dedman was right. In his memoirs Page quoted only the
158
first  paragraph of the cable, and he remained unshakeable in  his
159
b elie f  that the first  paragraph actually represented government policy.
Furthermore, in an explanation cabled to Curtin on 27 February Page
claimed that he acted in conformity with the first  paragraph which he
160
took as 'a  definite instructio n '.
It  is d iffic u lt  to escape the conclusion that his task in London
had become too much for Page. Indeed Dedman believed that Page's
'fa ilure  to master his b r ie f . . .  precipitated the controversy'. Dedman
did not think that Page had w ilfully  deviated from his instructions,
but he thought that i f  Page had not pressed the case for Burma then
161
the Pacific  War Council would not have recommended the diversion.
Even when the Australian government had made its position unmistak­
ably clear to Page, he continued to work for the reinforcement of Burma. 
Thus on 19 February he had a conversation with Churchill in  which he
157. John J . Dedman, 'The Return of the AIF from the Middle E a s t ',  
Australian Outlook, V o l .21 , N o .2, August 1967.
158. Page, op.cit., p . 335.
159. Ib id . , p . 346.
160. Cable P54, Page to Curtin, 27 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
52 /30 2 /1 4 2 .
161. Dedman, 'The Return of the AIF from the Middle E a s t '.  On 17 March 1943 
Page's military adviser, Colonel A .W . Wardell, told Shedden that Page 'had 
created a deplorable impression' - people had been unable to discover what 
he wanted to do, and he had exerted little  influence. Shedden replied that 
he gathered this ' from the incoherent nature of the cables we have received 
and the non-observances by . . .  Page of instructions which had been 
conveyed to h im '. Notes of Discussions, MP 1217, Box 14.
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said that i f  he could be given certain assurances about the position
162
in Burma he thought that he could secure Australian consent.
These assurances could not be given, but Page went so far as to withhold 
Curtin 's  reply to Churchill in the hope that the Australian government 
would change its mind.
Obviously Page had developed a substantial personal commitment to
reinforcing Burma. He had been sent to Britain  to establish a system
for Australian representation in  strategic decision-making, and after
the Pacific  War Council meeting of 17 February he had felt satisfied
that he had at last achieved this aim. Curtin 's  cable had arrived
. 1 6 3
mid-way through the meeting, and perhaps Page had read what he wanted
to see, for he wrote later that he 'f e lt  certain that Burma was the
, 164 p lace ' .
Page 's  own writings indicate his lack of understanding of the 
situatio n :
The Pacific  War Council could have been an executive 
body i f  the Australian Government had backed up its 
decisions, but when its recommendations had been made 
after definite advice by Wavell, backed by Roosevelt, 
supported by the Army Chiefs in Australia, and finally  
agreed by the Pacific  War Council, then turned down 
by one constituent Government, the Council automati­
cally becomes advisory and the laughing-stock of the 
Services.
. . .  though I got the instructions and acted on them, 
the Australian Government repudiated them and the 
Council became quite n u g a t o r y . 1^5
Much of this was plainly untrue. The Australian Army chiefs did not
166
support the recommendations. Both Sturdee and Blarney opposed them
162. Page's Diary, 19 February 1942, Page Papers, AWM.
163. Cable P54, Page to Curtin, 27 February 1942, CRS A 816, item 
52 /30 2 /1 4 2 .
164. Page's Diary, 17 February 1942, Page Papers, AWM.
165. Paper written by Page in early 1942 - no date. Page Papers, AWM.
166. Blarney Memoirs.
and Lavarack's support was qualified  by his claim that he did not 
know the situation in Australia. At no stage did the government 
repudiate its instructions. But the statement shows Page's commitment 
to making the Pacific  War Council an executive body and therefore 
his desire that Burma should be reinforced.
With regard to the Ceylon garrison, Page also created the wrong 
impression when he wrote that the government 'dilly- dallied  with the 
matter for several weeks t il l  the first  divisions had passed Ceylon, 
and finally  just managed to send back, after being a day out, every- 
, . . 167 
thing being loaded and reloaded again, two brigades of the 6th D iv is io n '. 
It  was only five days from the receipt in Australia of Page 's  request 
until the government offered the troops to Britain , and the two brigades 
were not sent back. Rather they had not yet left  Suez. But perhaps 
Page himself gave some indication of his d ifficulties  when he wrote
in April 1942 to Curtin: ' I  went through since January the worse period
168
of acute mental distress of my whole l i f e ' .
Although Page must bear much of the responsibility for the contro­
versy, the role of Churchill must not be overlooked. It  is true that
. . .  . . . 169
Page, and the British High Commissioner, Sir Ronald Cross, both
encouraged Churchill to believe that an appeal to Curtin would be
successful, but on 20 February, the day of his appeal to Curtin,
Churchill admitted to the Chief of the Naval Staff that further appeals
167. Paper written by Page in early 1942 - no date. Page Papers AWM.
In his memoirs Page wrote that he advised Churchill to leave two brigades 
of the 7th Division in Ceylon in  anticipation of the government's 
approval. (Page, op.cit . ,  p . 348 .) There is no evidence that Churchill 
did so, and having been once bitten , it  is unlikely that he would have 
done so.
168. Letter, Page to Curtin, 24 April 1942, MP 1217, Box 475.
169. Cable 160, Cross to Dominions O ffice , 21 February 1942, PREM 3 6 3 /4 .
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were not likely to affect the Australian decision. Churchill's
cable was less than candid, creating the impression that the convoy
was at that time sailing  towards the NEI and would soon be headed in
171
the opposite direction from Rangoon.
When the Australian government rejected this appeal Churchill
hoped that during the delay created by refuelling the ships the situation
in Burma would develop in such a way as to provide him with further
172
grounds for a request to Australia. But the Australians were not
w illing  to give the matter further consideraton, and Page took umbrage
173
at Churchill's  request, w riting to him immediately to complain that
he had previously been given advice that the convoy's destination had 
174
not been varied. At the same time Page sent o ff a hurried telegram
to Curtin urging that, notwithstanding the government's natural resent­
ment, recriminations should be avoided as they could only harm the
175
objective of 'maximum cooperative effort in the allied  cause '.
Bruce was appalled by Churchill's  cable and its possible repercussions, 
and he cabled urgently to Curtin. He acknowledged that Churchill's  
message was 'arrogant and offensive and contradicts the assurances given 
to P ag e ', and that any reaction would be ju stifie d , but he urged 
restraint in the Australian reply. Bruce said that he held 'no b r ie f
98
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170. Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meeting, 20 February 1 9 4 2 ,loc.cit.
171. Cable 233, Churchill to Curtin, 20 February 1942, loo.cit.
172. Cable, Churchill to Wavell, 22 February 1942, PREM 3 166 /4 .
173. Page wrote in his diary that he received news by phone of the 
telegram which Churchill had 'stupidly sent to A u stra lia ', Page Papers AWM.
174. Letter, Page to Churchill, 22 February 1942, loc.cit.
175. Cable 1613, Page to Curtin, 0125 hours, 23 February 1942, received 
23 February, MP 1217, Box 571.
for the Prime M i n i s t e r ', nonetheless 'a  c r is is  in  the relatio n s
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176
between A u stra lia  and the United Kingdom a r is in g  out o f  the action  o f 
one man must be a v o id e d '. Bruce reported that a senior  M in ister , S ir  
S ta ffo r d  Cripps, had sa id  that C hurchill was 'so  near the end o f h is
177
tether . . .  that allowance must be made for the tone o f h is  t e le g r a m '.
But the A ustralian  reply was already  on the way. C urtin , whom
178
Evatt described  as 'g re a t ly  shocked' by C h u r c h il l 's  actio n , complained
that i t  appeared that C h urch ill  had treated  A ustralian  approval 't o
179
th is  v it a l  diversion  as merely a matter o f  fo rm '. N evertheless ,
Page 'was pleased  to note the restra in ed  tone o f ' C u r t in 's  reply  to
C h u r c h ill , which he b e lie v ed  would 'a s s i s t  future relation s  between'
180
the governments. Furthermore, a fter  receiv ing  an explanation  from
Ism ay, Page was convinced that the delay in  inform ing Curtin o f the
181
diversion  o f the convoy was d u e 'to  in a d v e r te n c e '.
In  simple terms the dispute was a r e fle c t io n  o f the d ifferences
182
in  strateg ic  perspective  between Canberra, London and Washington.
176 . The fe e lin g  was m utual, for C h urch ill d is l ik e d  Bruce. On 12 February 
1943 after  the 9th D iv is io n  had returned to A u s tra lia  from the Middle E a s t , 
C h urch ill  wrote to A ttle e . 'The p o sit io n  o f  Mr Bruce is  h ighly  anomalous.
The Australians have now moved th e ir  la st  troops away from the general war 
zone to th e ir  own a ffa ir s  . . .  I think he should be brought up w ith  a round 
t u r n '.  PREM 4 5 0 /1 1 .  This also  gives some idea of the degree of importance 
Churchill attached to the defence of Australia.
177 . Cable 33A, Bruce to C u r tin , 0110 h o u rs , 23 February 19 42 , received
23 February, CRS M100, item  February 1942 .
178 . E va tt , 'C h u rc h ill  versus C urtin : Burma and the A I F ' ,  in  Tenant ,op. cit. 3 
p .3 6 6 .
17 9 . Cable 13 9 , Curtin  to C h u r c h ill , 23 February 19 42 , CRS A 81 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
180 . Cable 16 37 , Page to C u r tin , 24 February 1942 , MP 1217 , Box 57 1 .
181 . Ibid.
182 . Brooke later  wrote: 'The outlook p r e v a ilin g  in  A u s tra lia  at that 
time was d e fin it e ly  paro c h ial  and centered so lely  on its  own d irect  
personal secu rity . Doctor Evatt was certa inly  the worst propagandist of 
this  p o l i c y '.  Notes on My L i f e ,  22 February 19 4 2 , 3 /A /V  Alanbrooke Papers.
Even i f  the A ustralian  government was w il l in g  to accept that i t  could 
not be represented in  the decision-making b o d ie s , i t  b e lie v ed  that its  
voice should be heard when matters concerning A ustralian  defence and 
troops were being  d iscussed . What A u s tra lia  needed was evidence that 
her voice was be in g  heard . A t t le e , the B r it is h  Deputy Prime M in ister , 
had to agree w ith  Bruce that i f  A u stralia  had been advised o f intentions  
to recognise the importance of A u stra lia  as a v it a l  b a se , and i f  the 
time and scale o f  reinforcem ents had been in d ica te d , A u s tra lia  might
have approached the problem of the diversion  to Burma more sympatheti-
183 . . .
c a lly . In  the absence o f  this  sort o f inform ation the A ustralian s
fe lt  that they had l it t le  option but to look to th e ir  own defences .
From the outbreak o f war w ith  Japan the A ustralian  C h iefs  o f
S t a f f  had emphasised the v u ln e ra b ility  o f  A u stralia  and the fact  that
this  v u ln e ra b ility  would increase i f  Singapore were captured. In
p a r t ic u la r , the CGS, Sturdee , had argued consistently  during the previous
ten years that the event might occur, so i t  is  not su rp risin g  that he
took the lead in  advising  the government that the convoys should return 
184
to A u s tr a lia . At the Chiefs of S t a f f  meeting of 16 February the
burden was squarely  upon Sturdee , for the other two c h ie fs , Burnett 
and Royle, were B r it is h  o f f ic e r s . They fe lt  that any advice they might
o ffe r  could be b ia s e d , and consequently they told  Sturdee that they
185 . ,
would unreservedly support him. This is  not to suggest that the
183 . Cable 35 , Bruce to C u rtin , 27 February 1942 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
184 . On 14 February Sturdee prepared  a paper recommending the diversion  
of the convoys to A u s tr a lia , and on the morning o f  15 February he 
telephoned the Prime M in ister  to urge him to order the d iv ers io ns .
185 . Interview  with B . J .F .  Wright QC, 12 October 1978 . W right was S tu rd ee 's  
ADC and later  MA. W right was not present at the Chiefs  of S t a f f  meeting 
but was told  these deta ils  by the late Douglas M enzies , the Secretary
to the Defence Committee.
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other ch iefs  were in  any way d islo yal to the A ustralian  government.
Indeed  Curtin  sa id  that although C o lv in , R o yle 's  predecessor , always
echoed Adm iralty o p in io n , Royle was more independent. As Royle sa id  o f
h is  attitude  toward the Adm iralty : 'Frankly  I think that my superior
186
[RN] o ffic e r s  are wrong and I am r i g h t ' . But the documents show that
throughout the period  Sturdee was the main spokesman for the c h ie fs .
General Rowell, S tu r d ee 's  deputy, wrote that th is  was 'the  most fa te fu l
187
recommendation [Sturdee] had to make in  his  s e r v i c e '.  When the
Chiefs  o f  S t a f f  met the War Cabinet on 18 February to discuss th e ir
recommendations, Sturdee informed the m inisters that he would tender
188
his  resign ation  i f  the A IF  was not returned to A u s tr a lia .
C u r t in , however, agreed completely w ith  Sturdee ; indeed before
the rece ip t  o f S tu r d ee 's  paper on 15 February , C u r tin , or perhaps
Shedden, had prepared a cable to Page and C urch ill  which followed
189
much the same lin es  as S tu r d e e 's  p ap er . I t  w i l l  be re ca lled  that on
9 January Shedden had advised  Curtin  that the A IF , then in  the Middle
190
E a s t , should be returned to A u s tr a lia . When Menzies told  Curtin
191
on 14 February that the troops should be sent to Burma, Curtin  
reminded him that he had long advocated a p o licy  o f defence of A u s tra lia }  
But at times some m inisters acted in  a less ratio nal fash io n .
Spender has le ft  a v iv id  reco llectio n  o f the emotional reaction o f some
18 6 . Curtin  to Gavin Long, Sydney, 2 October 1943 , Gavin Long Diary 
N o .1 , AWM.
187 . S .F .  Row ell, 'G eneral Sturdee and the A ustralian  A rm y ', Australian 
Army Journal, August 1 9 66 , p . 9 .
188 . Letter  from Colonel J .P .  Buckley , 20 August 1974 , and in terv iew ,
22 January 19 79 . Buckley is  S tu r d ee 's  son-in-law and was an o f f ic e r  of 
the Department of Defence u n til  he re t ire d  recently . War Cabinet Minute 
1 8 9 6 , Sydney, 18 February 1 9 4 2 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
189 . For a d raft  o f  the cable see MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 5 7 3 .
190 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 9 January 1942 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 57 3 .
191 . L e tte r , Menxies to C u r t in , 14 February 1942 . loo.cit.
192 . L e tter , Curtin  to M en zies , 16 February 1 9 4 2 , loc.cit.
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members o f the Advisory War Council at the meeting on 19 February, and
described  how during the d iscussio n  one m in iste r , Beasley , l e f t  the room
b r ie f l y . 'Suddenly  he returned , b u rsting  into  the room in  a very agitated
sta te . Loudly he proclaim ed, as I reca ll  h is  words, "The Japs have
193
bombed Darwin 1 That settles  i t i "  I t  was an odd p erfo rm an ce '. During
this period  C e c il  Brown, a jo u rn a list  from the Columbia Broadcasting  System,
interview ed  C u r t in , Evatt and Forde. Brown found Evatt p assio nately
194
b ia s ed  against B r it a in , and he wrote that Forde proved to be 'one  of
the most in cred ib le  men I have ever encountered in  p o l it ic a l  l i f e  . . .  In
h is  o ffic e  in  Parliam ent House he acted as harassed  as i f  a Japanese
d iv is io n  were chasing  him . His manner was to keep sa y in g , "Y e s , y es , y e s " r
195
whether you were saying anything or n o t ' . When Curtin  became i l l
Evatt drafted  a number o f cables sent to C h u r c h ill , and E v a t t 's d raft
o f the A u stralian  governm ent's f in a l  reply to C hurchill o f  22 February
196
was more strongly  worded than that f in a lly  despatched by C urtin .
Not only was A u s t r a l ia 's  d ecis io n  ca re fu lly  considered by the C hiefs  
o f  S t a f f  and the p o l it ic a l  lead ers , but events were to prove that they 
had judged co rrectly . This question was examined in  d e ta il  by the o f f ic ia l  
h is t o r ia n , L ionel Wigmore, who concluded that i t  was h ighly  doubtful 
whether the 7th D iv is io n  could have saved Rangoon. At best  i t  could have 
helped in  the w ithdrawal from Pegu and would have taken p art  in  the long 
retreat  to In d ia :
193 . Spender, op.cit., p p .14 8 , 149 . H asluck , Diplomatic Witness, p p .4 3 , 44 
provides further evidence of the governm ent's nervousness and the ag itatio n  
in  the Advisory War Council on 19 February 1942 . Hasluck wrote that 
although 'as  a war h is to r ia n  I t r ie d  to deal fa ir ly  w ith  the Curtin  
government, I now record that my personal observations o f the A u stralian  
M in is te r s , in cluding  the Prime M in iste r , at the time of the c r is is  in  early  
1 9 4 2 , was that they were lackin g  in  fo r t itu d e . They were in  a state  of 
jit t e r s  when bad news cam e ', ( p .43)
194 . Brown, op.cit., p . 52 4 . H asluck , Diplomatic Witness, p . 42 also  noticed  
E v a t t 's  d istr u st  of B r it a in .
195 . Brown, op.cit., p . 51 9 . See also  H asluck , Diplomatic Witness, p . 148 , 
for a s im ilar  description  of Forde.
1 9 6 . See MP 1 2 17 , Box 571 . The f in a l  d ra ft  was probably prepared by 
Shedden and was approved by C urtin .
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In  that event i t  could not have been returned 
to A u s tr a lia , rested , and been sent to New 
Guinea in  time to perform  the crucial role 
i t  was to carry out in  the defeat  o f  the 
Japanese o ffensive  which would open there in  
Ju ly . The A l l ie d  cause, th erefo re , was w e ll  served 
by the sound judgment and s o lid  persisten ce  o f 
General Sturdee , who m aintained h is  advice against 
that o f  the Chiefs  o f S t a f f  in  London and 
W ashington ; and by the tenacity  o f  Mr Curtin  
and h is  M inisters who w ithstood the well- 
meaning pressure o f Mr C hurchill and President
R o osevelt .197
W a v e l l 's b iographer thought that i t  was 'a  hard  but surely  a ju st
, . . , 1 9 8  
d e c is io n ' .
The probl&ms faced by the defence planners in  A u stra lia  h ig h lig h t
a further q uestio n . What inform ation d id  they have to work on? They
were not given complete access to the decisions  o f  the Combined C hiefs
of S t a f f ,  and in  the absence o f  this  inform ation they had to rely  on
whatever could be e l ic i t e d  by the A u stralian  representatives in  London
and W ashington , and at that time there was no senior  full-time m ilitary
199
o f f ic e r  in  e ith e r  ca p ita l .
The best  advice would come from the A ustralian  commander on the
spot , Lavarack , and he had no knowledge of e ith e r  the s itu atio n  in  
200
A u s t r a lia , or o f the plans o f the Combined C hiefs  o f  S t a f f . Yet 
although he had a re sp o n sib ility  for the safety  o f  h is  corps, he d id  not 
want to appear to be com plaining ju st  because the s itu atio n  was grim ;
as h is  BGS, B r ig a d ie r  Berryman put i t ,  i t  was th e ir  'duty  to be cheer-
201
f u l ' .
197 . Wigmore, op.cit., p p .464- 465.
198 . John Connell and Michael Roberts, Wave'Ll, Supreme Commander 1941-1943 
(C o ll in s , London, 1 9 6 9 ) , p . 196 .
19 9 . The senio r  m ilitary  o f f ic e r  in  London was Colonel A .W . W ardell. 
General Smart arrived  in  Washington in  A pril and moved to London in  
September when he was replaced by General Sturdee .
200 . Cable SD 5 6 4 9 , Lavarack to Sturdee , 14 February 1 9 42 , AWM 5 4 1 /1 / 4 .  
L e tte r , Lavarack to Sturdee , 19 February 1 9 42 , Lavarack Papers in  the 
possession  o f  Dr J .O .  Lavarack .
201 . Berryman D iary , 9 February 1942 .
I t  appears that Lavarack was somewhat h esitan t  about p ressing
h is  views on the government. On 2 February h is  senior  in te llig e n c e
o ff ic e r  prepared a paper which concluded that i f  p art  o f the corps
202
arrived  before the Japanese attacked it  could be lo st . On 6 February
Lavarack warned Sturdee of the p o te n tia l  problem , but i t  was not u n til
the night of 12 February, w ith  the serious s itu atio n  on Singapore Is la n d ,
203
that he prepared an appreciation  to be sent to the A ustralian  government.
Even then the despatch o f this  cable was delayed u n til  14 February
w hile  W avell prepared a s im ilar  one to be sent to the Combined C hiefs
o f S t a f f  and the War O f f i c e . N evertheless , Lavarack 's  advice arrived
in  A u s tra lia  in  s u f f ic ie n t  time for a dec is io n  to be made before  the
convoy le ft  Ceylon. Lavarack had stated  e a r lie r  that that was the time
204
when a decis ion  would have to be made.
Again  on 16 February Lavarack urged that the A IF  should not be 
205
sent to the N EI, and he put the same view on 18 February. In  this
last  cable he supported Wave 1 1 's  argument that the corps sho uld  be used
to reinforce  Burma, but he added that he was not personally  in  a p o sitio n
206
to judge the home defence s itu a tio n  in  A u s tr a lia . Only then did
Lavarack , who had been absent from A u s tra lia  for over e ighteen  months,
receive a cable from the A u stralian  government that the home defences
207
were 'f a r  from s a t i s f a c t o r y '.  On b ala n ce , therefore , i t  is  d i f f i c u l t
to c r it ic is e  the attempts made by Lavarack to advise the government 
in  A u s t r a lia , and i t  seems p o ssible  that he developed a r e a l is t ic
104
202 . Appreciation  by Lieutenant- Colonel K .A .  W i l l s ,  2 February 19 4 2 , 
AWM 70 3 / 3 / 2 1 .
20 3 . L e t t e r , Lavarack to Sturdee , 6 February 1942 , AWM 5 4 1 / / 1 4 .
20 4 . Berryman D iary , 9 February 1942 .
20 5 . C ab le , Lavarack to Sturdee , 16 February 1 9 42 , CRS A 816 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
20 6 . Cable 015 38 , Lavarack to Sturdee , 18 Febraury 1 9 4 2 , AWM 5 4 1 /1 / 4 .
2 0 7 . Cable 5 , Curtin  to Lavarack , 19 February 1942 , CRS A 81 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
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approach to the s itu atio n  e a r l ie r  than the Supreme Commander,
W avell.
208
The Fate o f Blackforce
Despite its  strongly stated  view s, the A ustralian  government did  
not achieve a ll  its  demands about the destinatio n  o f  the 1st A u stralian  
Corps, and Lavarack in  Java was faced with a further problem w hich , 
although minor in  terms o f  global strategy , was nonetheless o f  great 
importance to A u s tr a lia . This concerns the fate of B la ck fo rce , and 
needs to be retold  in  some d e t a i l , for i t  brings  together in  microcosm 
a l l  the problems o f  a l l ie d  cooperation in w ar, p a rtic u la r ly  those 
problems faced by a small country.
I t  w i l l  be reca lled  that on 12 February Lavarack had received  
news that the fast  l in e r  Orcades was expected sh o rtly , and orders had
been issued  for the troops on board to land at Oosthaven in  Southern
209 . 210
Sumatra. Late on 15 February the troops began to disem bark, but
follow in g  the surrender o f  Singapore that day , Lavarack succeeded
in  persuading  W avell that they should be re-embarked, and the Orcades
211
proceeded to B atavia . W avell made this d ecisio n  during a conference
with the Governor-General o f  the Netherlands East In d ie s , Adm iral H e lfr ic h
and General Ter Poorten. He fe lt  bound to warn the Governor-General
that in  the circum stances the A ustralian  government might be reluctant
212
to allow  their  troops to land m  Java . To the Dutch, however,
the a rr iv al  of the Orcades was an in d ica tio n  that the a l l ie d  promises
208 . The composite brigade  o f A ustralians  on Java was known as B lackfo rce , 
a fte r  its  commander, B r ig a d ie r  A .S .  Blackburn VC. I t  had an approximate 
strength o f  2 ,9 2 0  personnel.
209 . See p . 89 .
21 0 . Wigmore op.cit.,  p p .4 5 4 , 4 5 5 . The troops included  the 2 /3  MG 
B attalio n  and the 2 /2  Pioneer B a tta lio n .
21 1 . L etter  by Berryman in  Army Journal, June 1971 .
212 . Despatch on Operations in  South-West P a c i f ic , January 15th-February 
25th 1942 , by General S ir  Archibald W av ell , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 3 7 /3 0 1 /2 6 7 .
o f help would be kept, and they urged W avell to order the disem barkation
213
at Batavia  o f the 3 ,4 0 0  A u stralian  so ld iers  aboard. Both Lavarack
214
and Lloyd opposed this  a ctio n , and Lavarack sent a 'most immediate'
cable to S tu r d e e :
Have represented they should not be disembarked 
Java . Supreme Commander not in  agreement and 
anxious to avoid appearance p re c ip ita te  change 
plan  which might compromise relatio n s  Dutch 
and prestige  generally . Also w ishes use them 
protect aerodrome in  Java .
Lavarack also  took the opportunity to urge that the remainder o f the
215
AIF  should not be sent to the N E I.
In  S tu rd ee 's  view the troops from the Orcades were 'm erely the
advance party  o f the whole m ovem ent'. He re a lis e d  that i f  they were
d istr ib u te d  in  Java  i t  would be 'extrem ely  d i f f i c u l t ,  i f  not im possible ,
to withdraw them e v e n t u a l ly ', and recommended that the matter should
216
be considered by the War Cabinet which was meeting on 18 February.
Meanwhile the Orcades lay an anchor at B a ta v ia , and re ferrin g  to the
lack o f  decision  over the s h ip , Berryman wrote in  h is  d ia r y , 'Rome
217
burns w hile  Nero f i d d l e s '.  However, the War Cabinet considered
that since the troops were now w ith in  the ABDA Command, W avell should
218
be asked what he intended to do with them, and later  that day Curtin
1 0 6
213 . Notes o f  interview  with  Lloyd by Gavin Long, Melbourne, July  1948 . 
Long Correspondence - Lloyd , AWM.
21 4 . Ib id . , and le tter  Lavarack to C u r t in , 5 September 1943 , MP 1217 ,
Box 5 7 3 .
215 . Cable Lavarack to Sturdee , 16 February 19 42 , CRS A 81 6 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /  
142 . An o r ig in a l  copy o f  this  cable has not been located , and the above 
copy is in  the body o f a te lep rin te r  message from Sturdee to Shedden
on 17 February. Berrym an's le tter  in  Army Journal says the s ig n a l  was 
sent on 17 February, but h is  diary  in d icates  i t  was on 16 February, 
as also  does Lavarack ' s le tter  to Curtin  on 5 September 1943 .
216 . T elep rin ter  message, Sturdee to Shedden, 17 February 19 42 , CRS A 81 6 , 
item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
21 7 . Berryman D iary , 17 February 1942.
218 . War Cabinet Minute N o .1 8 9 6 , Sydney, 18 February 1 9 42 , CRS A 8 1 6 , 
item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
cabled W avell: 'Would be glad to know urgently what are your own
219
plans m  regard to these m e n '.
W avell was also in  receip t  o f  the recommendations o f  the P a c if ic
War Council to the Combined C hiefs  o f  S t a f f ,  which included  the statement
that 'Ja v a  should be defended w ith  the utmost resolution  by a ll  forces
at present in  the is la n d . There should be no w ithdrawal o f  troops
220
or a ir  forces o f  any n a t io n a l it y , and no s u r r e n d e r '. Using this
as an in s tr u c t io n , and taking  C u r t in 's  cable as advice that the matter 
was in  h is  hands, W avell ordered the disem barkation o f  a ll  men except 
those without personal weapons. The next day he informed Curtin  that
221
the men were needed for aerodrome defen ce , and were be ing  disembarked.
It  w i l l  be reca lled  that Lloyd had claim ed that Lavarack was
222
not strong enough in  Java , and he told  the o f f i c i a l  h is to r ia n  that
i f  Blarney had been there the A IF  troops would never have landed from 
223
the Orcades. This view has been supported by A .J .  Sw eeting , a
member o f  the s t a ff  o f  the A ustralian  o f f i c i a l  war h is t o r ia n , who
claim ed th at : 'the  landing  o f  any p art  o f  the A u stralian  Force in  Java
was a blunder which probably would never have occurred had Blarney been
224
present at the t im e '. But Berryman has fervently  denied  L lo y d 's
225
claim s, and later  w rote:
21 9 . Cable 34 , Curtin  to W a v e ll , 18 February 1 9 4 2 , toe.cit.
220 . Cable N o .2 2 , C hiefs  o f S t a f f  to W av ell , 18 February, Telegrams Far 
East.
221 . Cable OPX 1560 , W avell to C u r t in , 19 February 19 4 2 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
222 . See p . 8 8 , 89 .
22 3 . Lloyd to Long, 16 May 1 9 43 , in  Gavin Long Notebook, N o .l ,  p . 27 .
22 4 . A .J .  Sw eeting , review  o f  F .K . N o rr is , No Memory for Pain in  Army 
Journal, March 1971.
225 . Berryman was ir r it a t e d  by Lloyd , whose manner he described  in  h is  
diary  (20 February 1942) as 'a  cross between a smirk and greasy p atron­
a g e '.  Perhaps Berryman, who had been a b r ig a d ie r  when Lloyd was a 
lieutenant- co lo nel, and had much more exp erien ce , was put out that Lloyd 
was now a m ajor-general.
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As C h ief  o f  S t a f f  to Lavarack , I wrote the reports 
and sign al messages w ith strong recommendations 
against our troops be in g  landed in  Java , and I consider 
the p art  we p lay ed , was our most important co ntribution  
to our army during the w ar. Furthermore, I subm it, no 
General could have done more than Lavarack . . .
I submit that Blarney could not have done more 
than Lavarack . . .  great cred it  should go to Lavarack 
for the strong recommendations and reports which we 
forwarded to our Government, and for Lavarack 's  
refusal for any o f  our troops to be landed u n til  told  
by our Government to obey W a v e ll 's  o r d e r s .226
Perhaps i f  i t  had been Blarney rather than Lavarack who had made
the representation  to the government, they might have supported him ,
rather than put the question  back to W a v e ll . Perhaps Blarney would have
disregarded  W a v e l l 's in stru ctio n s  and ordered h is  troops to stand fa s t .
But that is  sp ecu latio n . Lavarack had every righ t  to fe e l  that he had
not received  complete support from the government and he wrote la te r :
In  my opinion at the tim e, no usefu l m ilitary  
purpose could p o ss ib ly  be served by landing  
these almost h elp less  units and I represented 
this strongly  to the Government. The Government, 
unfortunately  in  my o p in io n , re ferred  the matter 
back to General W avell , w ith  whom I had already 
d isa g reed , and he decided  to land the m en .227
Lavarack 's  ADC wrote that 'a l l  that General Lavarack could do was express
228
d issen t  and o b e y '. There was one more action to be taken.
Another fast  personnel s h ip , the Mount Vernon carrying  three to
four thousand men o f  the A IF , was steam ing ahead of the main convoy, but
226 . L etter  by Berryman in  Army Journal, June 1971 . Berryman fe l t  very 
deeply about this  matter and, on 29 A p ril  1971 wrote to Lieutenant- 
General S ir  Thomas Daly , the CGS, 'T h is  is  the f ir s t  time I have gone 
to p r in t  over any matter regarding  the 2nd A I F ' . (Berryman P a p e r s ) .
2 2 7 . L e tte r , Lavarack to C u r t in , 5 September 1943 , MP 1217 , Box 573 . 
Shedden closely  checked Lavarack 's  le tte r  again st  departmental records, 
but could fin d  nothing to co ntradict the above statem ent. Memorandum, 
Shedden to C urtin , 9 September 1 9 4 5 , loo.cit. See also  MP 1 2 17 , Box 266 .
22 8 . Java Interlude, awm 5 3 3 /2 / 1 .
Lavarack was successful in  having  the ship  conform to the movements
229
o f  the main convoy, thus d iv e rtin g  it  from Java .
The A ustralian  government was not p leased  when W avell reported
on 19 February that the troops had been disem barked, and when on
21 February the government confirm ed its  decision  that a l l  the A IF  should
be returned immediately to A u s t r a lia , Sturdee cabled W avell that this
meant that Lavarack and h is  s t a f f  should be evacuated from Java to
A u s tra lia  as soon as p o s s ib le . He also  urged W avell to evacuate the
230
troops who had been disembarked from the Orcades. S tu r d ee 's  message
crossed a message from Lavarack that arrangements were in  tra in  for
231
th e ir  evacuation once a f in a l  d ecisio n  had been taken about Java .
But a f in a l  decis io n  had been made. W avell had received  the
recommendations o f the P a c if ic  War Council on 18 February, and in struction s
from the Combined C hiefs  o f S t a f f  (CCS) on 20 February. Now on 22
February came further in struc tio n s  from the CCS that a l l  men o f f ig h tin g
units for whom there were arms had to continue to fig h t  w ithout thought 
232
o f  evacuation . In view o f  t h is , Wavell re p lie d  to Sturdee that the
troops could not be evacuated although preparations were being  made to
do so i f  the policy  were to be a ltered . He also  informed Sturdee that
Lavarack had le ft  for A u s tra lia  by plane and that the AIF Corps s t a f f
233
had s a ile d  on the Orcades. W avell added to the d raft  of h is  reply
the comment that 'L lo yd  c o n c u r s ', but Lloyd s a id  that he d e fin it e ly  did
234
not and W avell struck out the words.
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22 9 . L e tte r , Lavarack to C u r tin , 5 September 1 9 43 , MP 1217 , Box 5 7 3 ;
C able , Lavarack to Sturdee , 18 February 1942 , AWM, 5 4 1 /1 / 4 .
2 30. Cable 5 1 2 8 , Sturdee to W av ell , 21 February 1 9 4 2 , AWM 5 4 1 /1 / 4 .
2 31. Cable 1858 , Lavarack to Sturdee , 21 February 1 9 4 2 , CRS A 81 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
232 . Cable 0 0 5 9 Q /2 2 , Combined C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  to ABDA, Telegrams Far East.
2 3 3 . Cable 0 2 0 0 6 , Wavell to Sturdee , 22 February 1 9 42 , AWM 5 4 1 /1 / 4 .
234 . Lloyd to Gavin Long, 16 May 19 43 , Gavin Long Notes N o .l ,  AWM.
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In  the view o f  the government, however, the troops who had been
disembarked from the Orcades were advance p arties  o f  the 6th and 7th
D iv is io n s . They were 'p a r t  and parcel o f  [the] A IF  formations being
235
diverted  to A u s tra lia  and should re jo in  them' . Hence on 24 February
Page and Casey were instructed  to inform  the B r it is h  and American
governments o f  the A u stralian  governm ent's in sisten ce  that W avell should
236
be given the necessary authority  to evacuate the troops. The
A u stralian  government inform ed Wavell o f  this message, and requested
that should the s itu a tio n  deteriorate  before  the receip t  o f  these orders ,
237
he should arrange the evacuation .
Page in  London was ' very angry' at this  latest  demand which he-
2 38
described  as 'c r a v e n '.  On the evening  of 24 February he r e p lie d  to
Curtin  that he had inform ed him on 18 February o f  the recommendations o f
the P a c if ic  War Council and on 22 February o f  further recommendations.
He now thought that i t  was 'q u ite  im possible ' for the P a c if ic  War Councils
in  Washington and London ' to do more at this  p o in t  of time or at this  
2 39
d is t a n c e ' .
W avell also in d ica te d  that he had no in ten tion  o f  bowing to the
wishes o f the A ustralian  government, and he sent back what h is  C h ief
240
o f  S t a f f ,  Pow nall, described  as 'a  pretty  warm te leg ram '. He referred
to h is  orders from the Combined C hiefs  of S t a f f  and concluded:
23 5 . Cable 23 7 , Department o f External A f fa ir s  to Casey , 24 February 
1 9 4 2 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
2 36 . Cable 32 , C urtin  to Page , Cable 4 3 , Evatt to Casey , 24 February 
19 4 2 , Zoc.cit.
2 3 7 . Cable 39 , C urtin  to W av ell , 24 February 19 42 , Zoc.cit.
23 8 . Memorandum, Ismay to C h u r c h ill , 24 February 1 9 4 2 , PREM 3 , 1 6 6 /4 . 
Ismay and Bridges told  Page that they could not understand any government 
making h is  'p ath  so h a r d '.  P a g e 's  D iary , 24 February 1 9 4 2 , Page Papers.
23 9 . Cable P 5 2 , Page to C u r t in , 9 .5 5  p .m . ,  24 February 1 9 42 , received
25 February 19 4 2 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
24 0 . Brian  Bond (ed) , Chief of Staff, The Diaries of Lieutenant-GeneraZ 
Sir Henry PownaZZ, VoZume 2, 1940-1944 (Leo Cooper, London, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  p . 90 .
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Do not consider these orders give me any 
d iscretio n  to remove fig h t in g  troops. Their 
removal would have most unfortunate e ffe c t  
on Dutch not to mention opin ion  of our own 
troo ps .2 4 1
Pownall was even more e x p l ic it , and he wrote in  h is  d iary :
To the last  the A u stralian  Government kept up 
th e ir  damnable attitude  . . .  Now the Australians 
have shown up th e ir  true colours. Not so much 
the troops and commanders themselves (though some 
o f  the latter  have very d is t in c t  signs o f  
'se p a ra tism ')  as th e ir  Government, activated  
presumably by a mixture o f  p u b lic  opinion in  
A u s tra lia  and common f u n k . 242
It  was now clear  that there had been various in terpretatio ns  of the
recommendations o f  the P a c if ic  War C oun cil. The A ustralian  government
had em phasised the in stru c tio n  that there should be no attempt to
land the A ustralian  Corps in  the NEI, and that the A u stralian  p o licy
o f taking  a l l  o f th e ir  forces back to A u s tra lia  was accepted. Wavell
had em phasised the in struc tio n  that 'strenuous resistance  should be
m aintained in  Java by forces already ava ilable  t h e r e '.  But w hile  the
troops were aboard the Orcades were they 'a lread y  ava ilable  th e re '?
In  ordering  the disem barkation W avell was tech n ically  in  breach o f  the
in struc tio n  that no attempt should be made to land the A ustralian  Corps,
o f which the troops were a p a rt . But the cable of 18 February, the
day the troops landed , contained  recommendations only . The in stru c tio n s ,
243
which were the same as the recommendations, came two days la t e r .
A c r it ic  o f W avell could be excused i f  he claim ed that as soon as 
W avell received  C u r t in 's  message requesting  inform ation on h is  plans 
he ordered the men to be disem barked, thus presenting  the government 
w ith  a fait accompli.
241 . Cable OPX 0 2 4 0 9 , W avell to C u r t in , 25 February 1 9 42 , CRS A 81 6 , 
item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 ;  MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 57 3 .
24 2 . Bond, op.cit.,  p p .9 0 , 91 .
243 . C able , CCS to ABDACOM, 20 February 1942 , Telegrams Far East
Part o f  the reason for the d is s a t is fa c t io n  o f  the A u s tra lia n
government was that i t  d id  not receive copies o f  the instruction s
issued  by the Combined C hiefs  o f  S t a f f . The P a c if ic  War Council had
been esta b lis h ed  to give the A ustralian  government a vo ice , but the
Council could only make recommendations. When Wavell quoted CCS
in structio n s  to the A u stralian  government, Sturdee had to contact
the American General B r e t t , who had ju st  flown in  from Java , to fin d
244
out what those in stru ctio n s  were.
In  ordering  the A u stralian  troops to disem bark, perhaps W avell was
making the sort o f decision  which only a Commander-in-Chief can make.
The ship  had brought almost 3 ,0 0 0  experienced  f ig h tin g  men, and there
were about 6 ,0 0 0  RAF and unarmed personnel to evacuate , not to mention
women clerks who had been evacuated from Malaya. Even Lloyd had to
admit that the net loss to the a l l ie d  cause o f  diseirbarking the
245
A ustralian  troops 'was n i l ' .  Furthermore, the decision  was in  line
w ith  W a v e ll 's  view o f  the necessity  to fig h t  hard for Java . Lavarack
was convinced that W avell was serio usly  contem plating a last- ditch
d efen ce , and on 19 February he wrote that W avell 't a lk s  o f h im self
and m yself shouldering  a musket, though I d o n 't  see that two o ld  gentle-
. 246
men like  us could be o f  much use .
To L lo y d , who remained for a few days a fter  Lavarack departed , 
i t  was 'a  c lear  case o f  the e v il  o f p o l it ic a l  in fluence  on m ilitary  
d is p o s it io n s '.  B la ck fo rce , he said  l a t e r , ‘was in  fact s a c r if ic e d  to 
the cause o f Dutch frien d sh ip s  . . .  I personally  thought i t  was nonsense 
and s t i l l  think  s o ' .  Lloyd had high  praise  for W avell , but he b e liev ed
24 4 . Memorandum, Shedden to S ecretary , Department o f  the Army, 26 
February 1 9 42 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
2 4 5 . Lloyd to Gavin Long, 16 May 1 9 4 3 , Gavin Long Notes, AWM.
246 . L e t t e r , Lavarack to Sturdee , 19 February 1942 , Lavarack Papers, 
in  possession  o f  Dr J .O .  Lavarack .
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that the 's t r a in  o f  1941 made him so t ire d  that in  1942 in  Java he
was very stale  and apt to stress the p o l it ic a l  im plications o f  m ilitary
247
o p eratio n s , or lack o f  them, too m uch '. Yet over a year later
Wavell was s t i l l  convinced that h is  action had been co rrect, and he
wrote to Lavarack :
I have never doubted your p e rfec t  straigh t  
forwardness and loyalty  to me. That was a very 
d i f f ic u l t  decision  for everybody . . .  I have 
always regretted  that I had to land [the troops] 
who had f in a lly  to be le f t  in  Java ; but in  the 
circumstances at the time I do not feel  that we 
could have acted  o therw ise . We had to support the 
Dutch so long as there was any po ssible  h o p e .248
On 25 February the A u s tra lia n  government was s t i l l  concerned about
B la ck fo rce . A fte r  re-examining the ca b les , Sturdee was o f  the opinion
that  i f  the government wanted to press for the evacuation o f  the force ,
then a request would have to be made to the Dutch for p re fe r e n t ia l
treatment for the A ustralian  troops. By now the ABDA Command had been
d isso lv ed  and command in  Java had reverted  to the Dutch. A p o ssible
b asis  for such a request would have been that the troops were p a rtic u la r ly
valuable as they were an in teg ral  part  o f  an A u stralian  d iv is io n , and
249
they were troops who should never have been disembarked in  the NEI.
The Prime M in ister  decided  that the m atter should be considered  by the 
250
War C o u n c il , but in  the meantime Lavarack , who was now in  Melbourne,
advised  Sturdee that he d id  not think that i t  would be practicab le  to
251
evacuate the troops. At the War Cabinet meeting on 2 March Curtin
recalled  th a t , despite h is  message to Lavarack on 19 February ordering  
the A IF  to be evacuated, Wavell had over- ruled Lavarack . However,
24 7 . L e tter , Lloyd to Wigmore, 14 July  19 48 , Long Correspondence - Lloyd , 
AWM.
24 8 . L e tte r , W avell to Lavarack , 22 December 1 9 43 , Lavarack Papers,
F ile  Java  Part  1.
24 9 . T elep rin ter  message, M 896 , Sturdee to Shedden, 25 February 1 9 4 2 ,
CRS A 8 1 6 , item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
25 0 . Memorandum, Shedden to Secretary  o f  the Department o f Army,
26 February 1942 , loc.cit.
251 . Memorandum, Sturdee to Shedden, 2 March 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 57 3 .
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the government now decided  that i t  would not press for the return o f  
the troops, although i t  decided  to send a message to Java requesting
t h a t , in  the event o f  resistance  becoming im p o ss ib le , they should be
252
affo rded  an opportunity to escape . But on 5 March General S it w e l l ,
the B r it is h  army commander in  Java , reported that evacuation was now
25 3
im possible owing to a shipping  shortage , and on 12 March the a l l ie d  
force in  Java surrendered . Of the 2 ,9 2 0  A ustralian s  in  B la ck fo rce ,
36 were k i l l e d  and the remainder captured. Approximately one th ird  of
„ . . . 254
these men d ied  in  c a p t iv ity .
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252 . War Cabinet Minute 1 9 3 2 , Melbourne, 2 March 1 9 4 2 , Zoc.cit. That
day Sturdee cabled General Ter Poorten in  Java to pass on the governm ent's 
request. He w ished Ter Poorten 'every  success in  the arduous and noble 
duty o f  defending  J a v a '.  CRS A 8 1 6 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
25 3 . Cable 2 9 , S itw e ll  to Sturdee , 5 March 1 9 42 , too. cit.
254 . Wigmore, op.cit., p p .5 0 6 , 64 2 .
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CHAPTER THREE
BATTLEFIELD COOPERATION WITH THE BRITISH 
1941-1942
The most important aspect of in tern atio n al  relatio ns  dealt  w ith  
by the a l l ie d  leaders was that o f m ilitary  relatio ns  w ith  respect to 
grand strategy and strategy . The tone, and indeed the substance , of 
these relation s  was governed by many fa c to r s , the p e rso n a lit ie s  of the 
national le a d er s , geographic lo catio n , na tio n al power, and the previously  
perceived  roles of the co un tr ies , which developed from th eir  past  
exp erien ce , that i s ,  th e ir  h is to ry . To these in fluences  must be added a 
further determ inant o f a l l ie d  strateg y , performance on the b a t t l e f ie l d , 
and the problems of cooperation at the m ilitary  le v e l . Therefo re , i f  
the commander o f  the forces of a minor country was to have any in fluence  
on the course of a l l ie d  strategy , he could achieve that in fluence  through 
the performance of h is  troops and by dem onstrating h is  own m ilitary  a b i l it y . 
Furtherm ore, the capacity  for cooperation d isplayed  by the commanders 
and s t a f f  at a l l  levels  could d irectly  a ffe c t  the in fluence  o f the 
minor m ilitary  power.
The importance o f  these factors was demonstrated during the f ig h tin g  
in  Malaya and Jav a , for during this p erio d  B r it is h  and A ustralian  relation s  
reached one of their  lowest p o in t s . And the attitudes  o f the m ilitary  
men in  Malaya and Java d irec tly  in fluenced  those o f the p o l it ic ia n s  in  
A u s tra lia  and England . Therefore to understand the shaping of a l l ie d  
strategy  in  early  1942 i t  is  important to appreciate  the problems of 
b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation at that tim e.
MAP 3
The Conquest of Malaya.
From: Wigmore, op.cit . , p . 280 .
The Role of the GOC A IF , Malaya
Much o f  the controversy concerning re lativ e  performances in  the 
Malayan campaign centres on the role of the GOC AIF  (M a la y a ), Major-General
H . Gordcn Bennett . Like Blarney, and later  Morshead, in  the Middle E a s t , 
Bennett had a d irective  which set out the w ell- established  p r in c ip le s  
for the employment of the A ustralian  troops. These were that the force 
was to reta in  its  A u stralian  id e n t it y , that no p a r t  of the force was
to be employed apart from the whole w ithout B e n n e tt 's  consent, and that
i f  the GOC Malaya in s is t e d  in  an emergency on d ispersing  the A u stralian
fo rc e , Bennett was to reg ister  a p ro te st , comply w ith  the order and
report immediately to Army Headquarters, M elbourne .^
The B r it is h  army commander in  M alaya, Lieutenant- General A .E .  P e r c iv a l ,
claimed in  la te r  years that when he took command in  May 1941 he asked
the Commander-in-Chief, A ir  C h ief Marshal S ir  Robert Brooke-Popham, whether
there were any instructio ns  d e fin in g  h is  authority  over the A IF  . He was
informed that there were no such in stru c t io n s . Perc ival claimed that
2
Bennett never showed him h is  d ir e c t iv e .
P erciv al was, however, aware o f the sp ecia l  r e s p o n s ib il it ie s  of the
GOC AIF* and in  conversations with Bennett he agreed that he w ould  make
every e ffo r t  to retain  the A IF  as one fo rc e . Bennett conceded that, i f
3
circum stances demanded i t ,  the AIF might be s p lit  up. Thus when the 
27th Brigade arrived  in  Malaya in  August 1 9 4 1 , brin g in g  B e n n e tt 's  force 
to two b r ig a d es , Perc ival gave Bennett the role o f defending Southern
I .  Wigmore, op.cit., p . 6 5 .
2 . Le tter , Percival to Maj-Gen F .E .  Sim pson, 29 October 1 9 45 ; Notes by 
Lieut- General A .E .  Perc ival on certa in  sen io r  Commanders and other m atters; 
Perc ival Papers, Im perial War Museum (IW M ). See also Despatch by Major 
General A .E .  Percival CB, DSO, OBE, MC, 8 December 1941-15 February 1942 ,
CRS A 8 1 6 , item 3 7 /3 0 1 /3 3 0 .
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Notes by Lieut-General A .E .  P erc ival e t c . ,  Perc ival Papers.
Johore. This provided  the A ustralian s  w ith  a more responsible  role and
made i t  more lik e ly  that the d iv is io n  would fig h t  as a formation under 
4
it s  own commander.
But Percival remained uneasy about the arrangement. He was aware
that Bennett was communicating w ith  h is  own government and acknowledged
B e n n e tt 's  righ t  to do so.He was not sure, however, what would happen i f
Bennett declin ed  to cooperate. I f  such a s itu a tio n  arose , wrote P e rc iv a l ,
the p o sit io n  would 'be  quite  im p o s s ib le '. P erc iv al d id  not claim  that
Bennett had made things d i f f i c u l t ,  but  wrote later  that ,
I had to p u ll  him up once or twice on such 
matters as d irect  communication with the 
A ustralian  Press on defence problems b u t , 
generally  speaking , we tr ie d  to tackle the 
rather uneasy s itu a tio n  w ith  commonsense and 
dealin g  w ith  each problem as i t  a ro se .^
Bennett continued to keep h is  d ire c tiv e  in  mind, and on 13 December 1941 ,
before  his  d iv is io n  has been in  a c t io n , he wrote to the M in ister  for
the Army, assuring  him that he would do h is  'utm ost' to re s is t  any attempt
to d iv ide  the A IF :
Should any requests come to you to force me 
to disgorge a portio n  of my force to a s s is t  
B r it is h  troops I do hope that you w il l  stand 
by me. I am quite  convinced from the ta c tica l  
and strategic  p o int  of view that i t  would be 
unsafe to take any of our troops to any other 
portion  of M alaya .^
Another exmaple of the type o f problem fac ing  the commander of 
a national force occurred on 27 December 1941 when a War O ffic e  d irectiv e  
was forwarded to Bennett forbidding  any requests to the A u stralian  
government for manpower. Bennett r e p lie d  that he had a re sp o n sib ility  to
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4 . Wigmore, op.cit.,  p . 9 8 .
5 . L e tter , Perc ival to Sim pson, 29 October 1945 , Perc ival Papers.
6 . L e tter , Bennett to Forde , 13 December 1941 , MP 7 2 0 /6 ,  item 1 3 /4 2 1 /4 0 2 .  
Part  o f this letter  is reproduced in  H . Gordon Bennett, Why Singapore Fell 
(Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1944) , p . 6 9 ,  but the above quoted p art  is 
not reproduced there.
the A ustralian  government to keep them inform ed, and he forwarded
7
a copy of the correspondence to A u s t r a lia . Bennett sa id  later  that he
8
thought that h is  cables were intercepted  and read by HQ Far E a s t .
On a number of occasions after  the f a l l  of Singapore Bennett claimed
that the relations  between h im s elf , h is  s t a f f  and Malaya Command, were
9
'most frien dly  th ro ugh o ut ', but B e n n e tt 's  G S O I, Colonel Thyer, has
asserted  that relatio ns  w ith  P e r c iv a l , H eath , (3rd In d ian  C o rp s ), Key
(11th  In d ian  D iv ision ) and Simmons (Singapore Fortress) were 's t r a i n e d '.
Thyer thought that Bennett was incapable  o f  subordinating  h im self to
Malaya Command, or of cooperating whole-heartedly w ith  other commanders.
He recognised  that Bennett may have been merely b a tt lin g  for the 'r ig h ts
and e n t it y ' o f the A IF , but the resu lt  was 'a  d enial  o f  unity  of command
and in tegratio n  o f e f f o r t ' .  When the 3rd In d ian  Corps was fig h t in g  in
northern Malaya Bennett at no stage suggested that A IF  troops could be
10
sent to help the re s is ta n c e . N everth eless , when Bennett was given 
resp o n sib ility  for the defence of Northern Johore on 8 January 1 9 42 , 
he agreed to the separation of h is  force between Eastern and Western 
J o h o r e . I n  Thyer 's  op in ion  that was 'a  most unfortunate d e c is io n ,
12
both in  p r in c ip le  and in  the lig h t  of subsequent ta c tic a l  f a i l u r e s '.
7 . Bennett, op.cit . , p . 85 .
8 . Le tter , Bennett to Long, 15 January 1954 , Bennett Papers, ML MSS 807-5. 
P erc iv al claimed that he did  not see any o f  B en n e tt 's  despatches. P e r c iv a l 's  
comment on O f f i c i a l  H isto ry , P erc ival P ap ers , Box 2.
9 . L etter , Bennett to Secretary  o f  M ilitary  Board, 27 March 1 9 42 , Blarney 
Papers 3 3 .2 1 ;  le tte r , Bennett to Gavin Long, C . 1956 Bennett Papers,
ML MSS 807-5.
10 . Operations of the 8th A ustralian  D iv is io n , Malaya, 1941- 42, by 
Colonel J .H .  Thyer, from a narrative  prepared by Colonel C .H . Kappe , CAB 
1 0 6 /1 6 2 . Frank Legg, The Gordon Bennett Story (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 
1 9 6 5 ) ,  p . 17 3 , claims that Bennett got on w e ll  w ith  the B r it is h , but that 
the firmness with which he implemented h is  d irectiv e  p o ssibly  created the 
im pression 'o f  a lack of c o r d i a l i t y '.
11 . C able , Bennett to Sturdee , 10 January 1 9 42 , AWM 5 5 3 /2 / 3 .
1 2 . J .H  Thyer, 'Foreword to the Grim Glory of the 2 /1 9  B a ttalio n  A I F ' ,  
in  Army J o u r n a l June 1976 .
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B en n ett 's  sp ecia l  r e s p o n s ib il it ie s  as GOC AIF  were not the only
cause o f f r ic t io n , for he never h e sitated  to openly c r it ic is e  B r it is h  
13
methods in  Malaya. Although there was much truth in  B e n n ett 's
c r it ic is m s , h is  p erso n ality  made i t  d i f f i c u l t  for the B r it is h  to accept
h is  c r it ic ism . The o f f i c i a l  A ustralian  war correspondent in  World War I ,
C .E .W . Bean, had observed during that war that Bennett was 'hot in  anger,
yet had a ch illy  m a n n e r '. He was jealous and c r it ic a l  of h is  superiors
14
and contem poraries. General Glascow sa id  'Bennett is a p e s t ' .  The
jo u r n a lis t , Ian  M orrison, in  Malaya in  19 41 , found Bennett to be
a rasping b i t t e r , sarcastic  person given to expressing  
his  views w ith  great freedom. As a resu lt  he quarrelled  
w ith  a good number o f  peo p le . But he did  have a fo rc efu l 
p e rso n a lity . He was imbued w ith  a tough, ru th less , 
aggressive  s p i r i t .15
B en n e tt 's  dow nfall was h is  ambition and ego , which had been exacerbated
by a b e l ie f  that he had been over-looked e a r l ie r  in  the w a r . ^  In
May 1940 General Sturdee had observed that Bennett had pressed  for a
senior  appointment in  the army because o f  'h is  opin ion  that he was capable
17
of making improvements in  the Army's e f f i c i e n c y '.  When Bennett was •
thwarted in  h is  am bitions he blamed the S t a f f  Corps, and in  Malaya this
18
was m anifest in  his  disagreem ent w ith  h is  G S O I, Colonel Rourke. Rowell
1 3 . For an exam ple, see an interview  with C ecil  Brown of the Columbia 
Broadcasting  System, in  Brown, Suez to Singapore, p p .211 , 213 . Bennett 
h im self described  h is  attitude  at a press conference as 'somewhat b itte r  
and c r i t i c a l ' .  Bennett , op .cit ., p . 144 .
1 4 . Bennett to Long, 3 December 19 45 , Gavin Long Notes, 10 3 , AWM.
15 . Ian Morrison, Malayan Postscript (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1 9 4 3 ) , 
p . 15 7 .
16 . See letters in  the Bennett Papers , ML MSS 807-2. For a d iscussio n  o f 
these questions see A .B .  Lodge, Decline  and F a l l : The Second World War 
Career of Lieutenant- General H .G . B ennett , MA(Qual) Sub- thesis, U niversity  
o f  NSW, RMC Duntroon, 1980 .
1 7 . L e tter , Sturdee to Adjutant- General, 9 May 1940 , M ilitary  Board 
Proceedings, P & S , 6 5 /4 0 .
18 . L e tte r , Kent Hughes to Gavin Long, 18 June 19 53 , Bennett Papers 807-4; 
Gordon Bennett D ia ry , July  1 9 41 , Gavin Long Correspondence, AWM.
later  w rote : 'H aving  spent a week w ith  [Bennett] in  Malaya on my way
19
home in  [August] 1941 I 'm  sure he was somewhat out of b a la n c e '.
The previous chapter has described  the reaction  in  A u s tra lia  to
B e n n e tt 's  cr it ic ism  of the poor performance o f the B r it is h  and In d ian
20 . . .  
troops during the Muar b a t t le s . Bennett also  vented h is  c r it ic ism
to HQ Malaya Command, and sa id  that i f  the two A u stralian  battalio ns
21
cut o f f  at P a r it  Sulong were lo s t , 'a l l  A u s tra lia  would know the r e a s o n '.
B r it ish  s t a f f  o ffic e r s  agreed that the A ustralian s  had been 'b ad ly  let
down' by the 45th In d ian  B rigade , and that as a resu lt  of the performance
of the B r it is h  troops in  the b a ttle  'B r i t is h  and A ustralian  troops were
22
as sulphuric  acid  is  to w a t e r ' . P e r c iv a l , however, thought that the
b attles  had shown that B e n n e tt 's  'techniqu e  in  the conduct of operations
was very much out o f d a t e '.  Furtherm ore, Perc ival b e liev ed  that from
about 25 January onwards B e n n e tt 's  'p erso n a l am bitions dominated his
outlook to the detrim ent of h is  duties as commander A IF . He was not a
man to contemplate with equanim ity the p o s s ib il it y  of spending the rest
of the war as a POW and he probably  knew that h is  r iv a l , Blarney, was
23
due to return shortly  to A u stra lia  from the Middle E a s t ' .
On 27 January 1942 Bennett wrote a long letter  to the M in ister  for 
the Army, Forde, which gives a valuable  in s ig h t  into  h is  mood at the 
tim e. He began by stating  that he considered  that i t  was time 'A u s tr a lia  
took a firm  stand and set about wrecking the e ffete  conservatism  and 
arrogance on which the En glish  army system is  b a s e d '.  He said  that
19 . Le tter , Rowell to H etherington , 13 July  1971 , Hetherington Papers AWM.
2 0 . See Chapter Two, p . 76 , 77 .
21 . Report from LO W estforce (Major A . A rb u th n o t ), 0830 hou rs , 20 January 
1942 , Appendices to War Diary HQ Malaya Command, WO 1 7 2 /2 0 .
22 . Inform ation about certa in  aspects o f  the HQ MC during the la s t  few 
days in  Singapore , by A /M ajor  W .R . W a lle r , G S02 , HQMC, WO 1 7 2 /1 6 .
23 . Notes by Lieut- General P erc iv al e t c . ,  P erc ival Papers . On this day 
P erc ival informed Bennett that he had decided  to withdraw to Singapore . 
Bennett , op.cit., p . 148 .
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A u stra lia  would have to 'c u t  the p a in ter  completely w ith  the War O f f ic e , 
otherwise there w il l  soon be no War O f f ic e  to follow  s la v is h ly , as we d o ' .  
He then went on to c r it ic is e  the In d ia n  troops who had 'run  away' and 
the B r it is h  troops who had 'la ck e d  f i g h t ' .  He was c r it ic a l  of P e r c iv a l , 
but even more so o f Lieutenant General H eath , and added that he would 
'not  allow  the AIF  to be slaughtered  on the a lta r  o f  H e a th 's  i n e f f i c i e n c y '.
Bennett b eliev ed  that the B r it is h  leadership  was at fa u lt  and that 
the only solution  was that 'A u s tr a lia  should p e r s is t  that the higher 
commands be given to A u s t r a l ia n s '.  The B r it is h  would oppose this  idea 
because i t  would take away their  jo b s , but Bennett said  'fra n k ly  that 
they are more in terested  in  job- getting than in  w inning  the w a r ' . He 
thought that he should have been promoted to lieutenant- general when 
he had been given command o f  W estforce as the 'E n g lish  o ff ic e r s  respect 
rank - and l it t le  e l s e ' .
Bennett explained  that to restore the p o s it io n  would require  two
good assault  d iv isio n s  and he hoped that two A IF  d iv is io n s  would soon
a rr iv e . He then brought up another m atter:
are you going to send a Corps Commander w ith  them, 
or are you going to give me command? I know local 
co n d itio n s . I have had experience in  f ig h tin g  the 
Japanese . When the war commenced, I was senior to 
both Blarney and Lavarack and was superseded, not 
on account o f  in e f f ic ie n c y , but merely because of 
jea lo u sy . A lso , certa in  people wanted to see a 
permanent so ld ier  and not a c it iz e n  so ld ier  at the 
head . I f  you bring  anyone e lse  here to command 
the A u stralian  Corps when i t  a r r iv e s , I w i l l  ask 
to be r e lie v e d . I w i l l  take i t  as a note of lack of 
confidcncc in  mo. I was a Major General when 
Lavarack was a Lieutenant C o lo n el.
Bennett concluded by warning Forde to treat  the letter  as personal and
c o n fid e n t ia l . He did  not want the local command to know that he had
'been so scathing  about th e m ', as he had to work w ith  them, and he said
that he was 'on quite  frien dly  terms - in  sp ite  of my h o stile  attitude  
. 24
on some matters .
24 . L e tte r , Bennett to Forde, 27 January 19 42 , Personal Papers of 
F .M . Forde, AA 1 9 7 4 /3 9 8 .
The A ustralian  government did  not know quite  what to do about
. . .  25
cr itic ism  of P erc iv al from both Bennett and Bowden, and in  the end
. 2 6
Forde asked Bruce to make c o n fid e n tia l  enq u ir ies  about P e r c iv a l .
Bruce rep lied  that a re lia b le  source had told  him that P e r c iv a l 's  manner 
was 'not  good and he had no power o f expressin g  h im s e l f '.  Bruce said  
that the matter was one for W avell to handle and he 'd id  not think in  
present atmosphere i t  would be advisable  for me to take any action  h e r e '.
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B r it is h  C riticism s of the A ustralian s
Without a doubt the c r it ic a l  attitude  displayed  by the A ustralian s
2 8
before and during the f ig h tin g  ir r it a t e d  the B r it is h  high  command.
And it  was not ju st  Bennett who was c r i t i c a l .  H is ch ief  adm inistrative
s t a f f  o f f ic e r , Colonel J .R .  Broadbent, described  the B r it is h  o rganisation
29
on 28 January 1942 as 'p u n k '.  The resu lt  was that some B r it is h  observers 
sought every opportunity to fin d  fa u lt  w ith  the A u s tra lia n s . For example, 
General Pownall wrote on 13 February 1942 that 'Not even the A u s tra lia n s ,
from a ll  that they started  so cock-a-hoop and c r it ic a l  of o th ers , put up
30 . '
a good showing in  the e n d ' . A s t a f f  o f f ic e r  from HQ Malaya Command
25 . On 28 January 1942 Bowden wrote to Hodgson, Secretary of the Department 
of External A f f a i r s : 'The trouble in  this  again  is  that [Percival] while 
doubtless very a b le , is  not a fo rceful or resourceful character . . .  when 
faced with  one of the Governor's  agile  argum ents, [he] stammers and 
h e s it a t e s . Resolution or ruthlessness d o n 't  seem to be in  the man. I f  
they were, perhaps our defences would be in  a d iffe r e n t  p o sit io n  today, in  
sp ite  o f the poor and inadequate m aterial the Im perial Government has given 
him to work w i t h ' .  CRS A 981 , Far East 14A .
2 6 . Cable 76 2 , Forde to B ruce , 28 January 1942 , CRS M 100, January 1942.
2 7 . Cable 18A, Bruce to Forde, 29 January 1942 , Zoc.cit..
28 . For example on 4 January 1942 Bennett told Percival that he d id  not 
like  the idea  of h is  force in  Eastern  Johore having its  flank protected  by 
the 3rd In d ian  Corps. Conversation recorded in  War D iary , HQ F E , January 
19 4 2 , WO 1 7 2 /1 6 .  Also  B ennett , op .cit ., p p .9 3 , 9 4 .
29 . Letter from Colonel J .R .  Broadbent, 28 January 1 9 42 , Gavin Long 
Correspondence - Broadbent, AWM.
30 . Quoted in  Bond, op.cit., V o l . I I ,  p . 8 5 . Pownall also  wrote that the 
' RAAF did  not show up w ell . . .  they showed signs of not being  at a ll  
g a l l a n t ',  ibid ., p . 9 7 .
commented that he did  not 'r e a l is e  to the fu l l  extent to which the AIF
had been blowing [their] own trumpets (w ithout ju s t if ic a t io n ) t i l l  they
31
were seen at closer quarters on the I s l a n d ' .
B r it ish  f ile s  contain  many reports of the ill- d is c ip lin e  of some
of the A ustralian s  on Singapore Is la n d . One B r it is h  o f f ic e r  wrote that
the A ustralian s  'were a very poor lo t , except for having  a lot of say for
32
th em selves '. The HQ Malaya Command War D iary  on 11 February reported
200 unarmed A ustralians  attem pting to force their  way onto evacuation
33
c r a ft . The editor  o f the Stratts Tzmes, wrote that 'th ere  were
d e s e r t io n s '. A ustralians  were heard to boast in  Singapore 'th a t  they
had come down the line  because they were fed  up w ith  being  p lastered ! . . .
34
There were cases o f looting  and r a p e '.  An RN o f f ic e r  sa id  that the
'A u str a lia n s  were a ffected  by promises made after  Crete that they would
35
never again  have to f ig h t  w ithout a ir  s u p p o r t '. Devastating  criticism  
came from a B r it is h  an ti- airc raft  major who wrote o f the RAF ground 
s t a f f :  'They were yellow in  the extreme and . . .  l e f t  a lot o f
equipment . . .  in  my op in ion  they were as bad as the worst A u s tr a lia n s ,
36
which is  saying  a good d e a l ' .  Another senior  s t a f f  o f f ic e r  reported 
that he 'saw  five  A u stralian  s o ld ie r s , naked except for a p a ir  of d irty
31 . Comments by Lieut- Colonel F .N . Cobley on notes by P e r c iv a l , Perc ival 
P a p e rs .
32 . Letter  by an o f f ic e r  named Am pthill to his  fam ily , 7 March 19 42 ,
WO 1 0 6 /2 5 5 0  A .
33 . War Diary GHQ Malaya Command, 11 February 1942 , WO 1 7 2 /2 1 .
34 . Notes by Mr G .W . S eabridge , Edito r of the Straits Times, WO 1 0 6 /2 5 5 0  
A , and ADM 2 0 5 /2 2 A .
35 . Notes o f an interview  w ith  Lieut-Commander H .B .C .  G i l l ,  30 A p ril  
1 9 4 2 , loc.cit.
36 . Report by Major G .A . Rowley-Conwy, 30 Heavy AA Battery , 3rd Heavy 
AA Regiment, in  HQ FE War D iary , January 1 9 42 , WO 1 7 2 /1 6 .
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sho rts , no boots or socks , ly ing  and sprawling  in  the gutter o f one
o f the main throughfares leading  west from Singapore on February 10th .
37
They had their  r if le s  and were drinking  from b o t t l e s '.
More responsible  B r it is h  o f f ic e r s , however, such as Lieutenant-
Colonel I .M .  Stew art, of the Argyll and Sutherland H ig h land ers , tried
38
to present a more balanced view . And Percival m  h is  despatch w rote:
i t  would be very wrong to judge the performance 
o f  the A IF  by these str a g g ler s . The action  of 
these men must be judged in  relatio n  to the 
e x is t in g  co n ditio n s . They were not long-service 
so ld iers  and d is c ip lin e  was not deep-rooted. They 
had volunteered for service  and had been sent to 
Malaya to defend the Naval Base . The Naval Base was 
no longer o f  any use but A u s tr a lia , th e ir  homeland, 
was be ing  threatened . Many o f  them belonged to units 
w hich , after  heavy ca su alties  on the m ainland, had been 
reorganized  but had not time to regain  their  fu ll  
fig h t in g  e f f ic ie n c y . They had fought w ell throughout 
a long night again st  heavy odds and were exhausted .
That is  the true p icture  and should be judged on its  
m erits . Active and e ffe c t iv e  measures were quickly  
taken by Headquarters Malaya Command and by Headquarters 
AIF  to deal with the situ atio n  by means of rein forced  
stragglers posts and o f f ic e r s ' patrols  in  the Town 
a r e a .39
General C allaghan , who took over from Bennett a fter  the latter  escaped, 
and Colonel Thyer, had to admit that P e r c iv a l 's  report was 'fa c t u a lly  
c o r r e c t ',  and they were 'g r a t e fu l  to Gen. Perc ival for presentin g  this
37 . Personal observation o f Lieut- Colonel B .H . Ashmore, GS02 Ops and Trg, 
GHQ, Malaya Command, Perc ival Papers , f i le  4 9 . I t  is not quite  clear  how 
Ashmore id e n t if ie d  the so ld iers  as A u s tra lia n s . It  would certa inly  not 
have been from their  c lo th ing ; of w hich , apparently , they had only their 
s h o r t s .
38 . Comments by Lieut- Colonel I .M .  Stew art, WO 1 0 6 /2 5 5 0 A , and ADM 2 0 5 /2 2 A . 
See also  I .M .  Stew art, History of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders 2nd 
Battalion (Nelson, London, 1 9 4 7 ) ,  p . 104 . Major A .P .  Thomas, whom Wavell 
de ta ile d  to report on the campaign, concluded that the A ustralian s  had 
begun the campaign very w e l l , but their  morale and d isc ip lin e  had deter­
iorated  towards the end . He pointed  out that the A ustralian s  in  Singapore 
were the only troops in  the entire  campaign to come under sustained  
a r t il le r y  f i r e . Report 30 March 19 42 , WO 1 0 6 /2 5 7 4  A .
39 . P e r c iv a l 's Despatch , P erc ival Papers Box P23 .
episode in  a way that , w hile  adm itting that something of the sort did
take p la c e , previous c r it ic ism  is  rebuked and the f ig h tin g  reputation
40
o f the A ustralians in  Malaya is  l e f t  u n s u l l ie d 1 .
The trouble was caused by the arr iv a l  on 24 January o f almost
two thousand untrained A u stralian  reinforcem ents, some of whom had not
had seven days o f  serious tra in in g  in  A u s t r a lia , and many had never 
41
fir e d  a r i f l e .  General Sturdee said  later  that , 'Subsequent to the
commencement o f h o s t i l it ie s  events moved so rap idly  and d isastrou sly
that i t  was not p ossible  to create an o rganisation  for tra in in g  the
42
re in fo rce m e n ts '. W hile commanders like  Perc iv al understood this
s itu a tio n  and made allowances for i t ,  i t  d id  offer o^her observers
the opportunity to c r it ic is e  A u s tr a lia .
I t  has already been related  that General Pow nall, W a v e ll 's  C h ie f  of
43
S t a f f ,  was c r it ic a l  o f  the A u s tr a lia n s . A fter  the collapse of ABDA 
Command he became the Army Commander in  Ceylon. When Major-General A .J .  
Boase , the commander of the A ustralian  d iv is io n  in  Ceylon, reported to 
Pow nall, he was warned th a t , due to the m isbehaviour o f  drafts  of the AIF 
who had previously  passed through Colombo, the reputation of the AIF  
among the local population  was at a low ebb . Boase pointed  out that i t  
was un fa ir  to condemn the whole for the misdeeds o f the few . He drew 
attentio n  to 'the  m ischievous rumours' which were be ing  c ircu lated  in  Colombo 
regarding  the behaviour o f the A IF  at the ca p itu latio n  o f Singapore and
40 . Memorandum, Callaghan and Thyer to DMO & P (for C G S), 28 January 
1 9 4 7 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 3 3 A .
41 . Interview  with Major C .B . O 'B r ie n , 2 /1 8  B attalio n  by Captain  G .H . 
N icholson of the M ilitary  H istory  S e ctio n , 23 September 19 45 , AWM 5 5 3 /5 /1 4 .
42 . Notes by CGS (Sturdee) in  Memorandum for the M in ister  by Shedden,
20 February 1947 , CRS A 81 6 , item 3 7 /3 0 1 /3 3 0 .
43 . See p . 11 0 , 111 .
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requested that steps be taken to 'have them stamped out w ithout d e l a y ' .
45
When the AIF l e f t  Ceylon in  August 1942 th e ir  reputation  was very h ig h ,
but the in c id e n t  showed how a l l ie d  cooperation could be a ffe c te d  by
previously  formed views o f  na t io n a l  fo rc e s .
Events in  Malaya also  had an impact in  Java . General L lo y d , the
A u stralian  Deputy Intendant- General on ABDA Command H eadquarters,
r e c a lled  r e c e iv in g  a s ig n al from Singapore that the Empire Star had been
boarded by about 200 A u s t r a lia n s . Lloyd met the sh ip  o f f  B atavia  and
found the fo recastle  h e ld  by the A u s t r a lia n s . The Master o f  the ship
s a id  they had stormed the gangway at the la s t  moment before  departure
from Sin gapore . The men s a id  i t  was 'a  b u g g e r 's  muddle in  S in g ap o re ,
and they had had i t ' . L loyd  arranged for  the men to be taken o f f  to
g ao l, but when B r ig a d ie r  Blackburn  took charge o f  the force landed  from 
46
the Orcades, he o ffe re d  to take the deserters in  h is  fo rc e , hoping  that
47
he could improve th e ir  morale and t r a in in g . Unfortunately  the men proved
48
a bad in fluen ce  in  th e ir  new u n it s .
B e n n e tt 's  co nfident statem ents about h is  own a b il it y  and that o f  
h is  troops resu lted  not only  in  c r it ic ism  of the A u stralian  troo ps , but
44 . L e tter , Boase to S e cre ta r y , Department o f  the Army, 7 A p r il  1 9 4 2 ,
AWM 5 4 9 / 3 / 1 .  A lso  present d uring  the in t e r v ie w  was Admiral S ir  G eoffrey  
Layton , who a ft e r  leaving  Singapore became C-in-C (RN) Ceylon . L ik e  P o w n all, 
Layton too was c r it ic a l  o f  the A u s t r a lia n s , and wrote to the F ir s t  Sea
Lord on 20 March 19 42 : 'th e r e  can be no doubt o f  the b itte rn es s  f e l t  and 
expressed  on the su bject  o f  the A u stralian  troops by many o f  the Naval 
o ff ic e r s  who got away from S in g a p o r e '. ADM 2 0 5 /2 2 A .
45 . See le t t e r s , Boase to Se c re ta r y , Department o f  Army, 12 May 1 9 4 2 ,
2 August 1 9 4 2 , and letters  o f  appreciation  from General P o w n all , A ir  
M arshall D 'A lb ia c  and General Gracey, AWM 5 4 9 / 3 / 1 .
4 6 . See Chapter Two.
4 7 . L e tte r , Blackburn to L avarack , c . 26 February 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 5 7 3 . 
Also  in terview  with B r ig a d ie r  M. A u s t in , 12 June 19 7 9 .
4 8 . Lloyd to  Long, Canberra , 19 July  1 9 4 8 , Gavin Long Correspondence - 
CEM L lo y d , AWM.
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also  cr it ic ism  of h is  own perform ance. As m entioned, Perc ival thought
that from 25 January onwards Bennett was thinking  of a way to escape .
General Callaghan and Colonel Thyer commented later that in  h is  report
P erc iv al 'very  generously glossed  over' two instances where B r it is h
o ffic e r s  were severely  c r it ic a l  o f Bennett. These instances were the
orders to the 45th Indian  Brigade at Muar, and the e ffe c t  of the with-
49
drawal o f  the 27th Brigade on 10 February on Singapore Is la n d .
In  p r iv a te , however, P erc ival expressed  intense d is s a t is fa c t io n
with  Bennett. At Muar he thought Bennett erred  in  ordering  the Indians
50
to hold both sides of the r iv e r . On Singapore Is la n d  he thought Bennett 
'ceased  to take an in ter est  in  the op eratio ns ' and through iss u in g  
confusing  orders to B r ig ad ier  T aylo r , allowed the latter  to withdraw
51
the 22nd Brig ad e , which was a 'd ir e c t  d iso bedien ce ' o f  P e r c iv a l 's  orders .
P erciv al thought that 'th e  A ustralian  Government must be held  responsible
52
for p u ttin g  Gordon Bennett in command of th e ir  t r o o p s '.
General K irb y , the B r it is h  o f f ic ia l  h is t o r ia n , has c r it ic is e d
Bennett for allow ing  the w ithdrawal of the 27th Brigade on S in gapore . He
thought that Bennett p laced  h is  headquarters too far  to the rear and made
53
no attempt to go forward to see for h im s elf .
4 9 . Memorandum by Callaghan and Thyer, 28 January 19 4 7 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 3 3 A .
5 0 . Notes by Percival for O f f i c i a l  H isto ry , P erc ival Papers, Box 21 . See 
also  Major-General S . Woodburn K irb y , The War Against Japan Volume 1. The 
Loss of Singapore (HMSO, London, 1 9 5 7 ) , p . 344 .
5 1 . Notes by P e r c iv a l , P erc ival Papers, Box P 2 0 . See also  Wigmore, op.cit 
p . 337 ; K ir b y , The Loss of Singapore, p . 384 .
52 . Notes by Percival for O f f i c i a l  H isto ry , Perc ival Papers Box 21 .
5 3 . Major-General S . WOodburn K irb y , Singapore: The Chain of Disaster 
(C a s s e ll , London, 1 9 7 1 ) , p . 238 . This c r it ic ism  is  also  mentioned in  
Wigmore, op .cit., p . 32 2 , f n .7 .  Thyer wrote later  about the A ustralian  
o f f i c i a l  h is to r y : 'th e  w atering  down and other m odifications do not worry 
me. The d iscernin g  person w il l  read between the l i n e s '.  L etter , Thyer
to P e r c iv a l , 13 December 1956 , P erc iv al Papers, Box 20 . See also  a paper 
e n t it le d  'T a c t ic a l  Errors in  A IF  Sector S in g a p o r e ', no author, in  CAB 
1 0 6 /1 6 2 .
I t  is not the purpose of this work to try to determine the v a lid ity
of the cr itic ism  of Bennett. N a tu r a lly , a fte r  d e fea t , many observers
are quick to search for scapegoats, but in  the case o f Bennett there
is  the fe e lin g  that his  e a r l ie r  pronouncem ents, and h is  later  c r itic ism
o f everyone except the A u s tr a lia n s , resu lted  in  many B r it is h  o ff ic e r s
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su b jectin g  the conduct of h is  operations to close exam ination.
To these cr iticism s  must be added the matter of B e n n ett 's  escape
from Singapore. The question  was not examined u n t il  the end o f the w ar,
and most of the B r it is h  and A ustralian  o ff ic e r s  w ith  strongly held  views
spent the remainder of the war as Japanese p ris o n e rs . However, Major M.
A u s t in , who was one of the small group o f A ustralian  o ffic e r s  at HQ ABDA
Command, re ca lled  the cold attitude  o f the B r it is h  o ffic e r s  on the head-
55
quarters when i t  was learnt that Bennett had le ft  Singapore. The moral
appears to be that i f  m ilitary  leaders are to indulge in  open critic ism
o f th e ir  a l l i e s ,  their  own conduct must be above reproach. Anything
less is  not only counter p ro du ctive , b u t , when coming from a minor a l ly ,
might damage any chance the minor a lly  has of in flu e n c in g  the major a l ly .
Undoubtedly the A ustralian s  had no more to be ashamed of in  Malaya
than their  a l l i e s ,  for between 12 and 22 per  cent of the a l l ie d  so ld iers
k il le d  in  action  were A u s tr a lia n , and they formed about 13 per cent of the
56
to tal fo rc e . Furtherm ore, the fa l l  of Singapore was due to the B r it ish  
failure  to take the defence of Malaya serio usly  while  A u stralia  had argued 
fo r  increased  a ir  and naval fo rc es . But the defeat  serio usly  damaged the
54 . B e n n ett 's  report was examined in  d e t a il  by the D irectorate  of M ilitary  
Operations at the War O f f ic e , and the errors of fact and in co n sistencies
of argument were ca refu lly  h ig h lig h ted . WO 1 0 6 /2 5 6 9 . See also  WO 10 6 /267 4A  
for the comments of Major H .P .  Thomas who W avell d e ta ile d  to report on 
the campaign.
5 5 . Interviev; w ith  B r ig a d ie r  M. A u s t in , 12 June 1979.
5 6 . The total Empire k i l l e d  varies from 8 ,0 0 0  (K irby , The Loss of 
Singapore, p . 473) to as high  as 1 5 ,0 0 0  quoted by Japanese sources. 1 ,7 8 9  
Australian s  were k i l l e d . For an alysis  o f  the figures see Stanley  L . F a lk , 
Seventy Days to Singapore, (G .P . Putnam 's Sons, New York, 1 9 7 5 ) ,
p p .2 7 4 , 275 .
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Lieutenant- General A .E .  P e r c iv a l , 
GOC Malaya, 1941- 1942.
(AWM Negative N o .7900)
Lieutenant-General S ir  Henry 
Pow nall, C-in-C Far E a s t , 
December 1941-January 1 9 42 , 
Chief of S t a f f  ABDA Command, 
January-February 1 9 4 2 , GOC 
Ceylon , 1942- 1943.
(AWM Negative N o .11284)
Major-General A .J .  Boase, GOC 
AIF  (Ceylon) March-September 
1942 .
(AWM Negative N o .22780)
prestige  o f the A u stralian  armed fo rc e s ,a n d  the Americans in  p a r t ic u la r  tended
to judge the quality  o f  the A ustralian  troops by this fa ilu r e . The
impact of this  attitude  w i l l  be covered in  later  chapters but s u ffic e
to say that i t  contributed  to the dism issal o f  General Rowell in  New Guinea
57
and to the subsequent command c r is e s .
A ustralian  Representation on HQ ABDA Command
Problems o f  a ll ie d  cooperation were a lso  present in  the ABDA Command.
On 3 January 1942 W a v e ll 's  C h ief o f S t a f f ,  Pow nall, cabled Sturdee
requesting  'a  really  good head Q o f f ic e r  to plan  and run [a] large
adm inistrative  la y o u t '.  The o f f ic e r  had to be 'a  th in ker ' and Pownall
58
stressed  that the task 'may concern A u s tra lia  very m a t e r ia l ly '.
Sturdee re p lie d  that he had no-one w ith  previous ' Q ' exp erien ce , but
he suggested Major-General H .C .H .  Robertson: 'There  is  a good deal of
ego in  h is  cosmos but he had always got the b est  o f those working under
him . He would be quite  ruthless in  g ettting  things d o n e '. Sturdee was
no t , however, sure that the government would release  Robertson, who
59
was about to take command of the 1st Cavalry D iv is io n .
On 4 January W avell cabled C urtin  requesting  h is  ideas on A ustralian
60
representation  on the ABDA Headquarters. Presumably the A u stralian
poin t o f  view should have been presented  by the CAS, A ir  Marshal S ir
Charles Bu rnett , at a conference 'to review  the whole command p o s it io n '
61
with W avell and other A l l ie d  Commanders at Batavia  on 10 January .
5 7 . When General MacArthur telephoned C urtin  and urged him to send Blarney 
to New Guinea , he said  that he saw 'a  d up licatio n  o f  what took place  under 
Perc ival in  M a la y a '. Note o f Secraphone Conversation between the Prime 
M in ister  and the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , 1 7 / 9 / 4 2 ,  MP 
1217 , Box 53 2 .
58 . C able , Pownall to Sturdee , 13 January 1 9 42 , War Diary HQ F E , January 
19 4 2 , WO 1 7 2 /1 6 .
59 . C able , Sturdee to Pow nall, 4 January 1 9 4 2 , toe. cit.
6 0 . C ab le , Wavell to C u r tin , 4 January 1942 , AWM 2 4 3 /5 /3 3 .
6 1 . G il l is o n , op.cit., p . 300 .
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However A ir  Commodore H ew itt , an A ustralian  o f f ic e r  who took the minutes
62
o f the m eeting, thought that Burnett seemed 't e r r ib ly  u n in t e r e s t e d ',
and W avell later  claimed that he received  no reply to his  request for
6 3
A ustralian  ideas on th e ir  representatio n . I t  seems that a l l  that
Burnett d iscussed  was the s t a f f in g  o f the adm inistrative  side  o f the
headquarters , and as a result  W avell sent a further request to A u stra lia
64
for s t a f f  o f f ic e r s .
Sturdee d id  not think that i t  was po ssible  to supply the appropriate
o ffic e r s  from A u s t r a lia , and Blarney was requested to select  the o ff ic e r s
. 65
from his  force in  the Middle East and despatch them to B a ta v ia . As
a resu lt  Colonel C .E .M . Lloyd was promoted to B r ig ad ier  and sent to.
66
Java where he arrived  on 28 January . General B r ett , the Deputy
Commander-in-Chief, in s is t e d  on Lloyd being  promoted to temporary Major-
G eneral, and a fte r  an em barrassing argument between W avell and Lavarack ,
the A ustralian  Corps commander, th is  was f in a lly  approved a fte r  Lavarack
67
had referred  to Blarney and Sturdee .
6 2 . Interview  with A ir  Vice-Marshal J .E .  H ew itt , 12 July  19 78 .
6 3 . Bond, op.cit., V o l . I I ,  p . 81 ; Memorandum, H o llis  to C h u r c h ill ,
25 January 19 42 , PREM 3 1 6 6 /5 ;  Cable 0 0 2 7 9 , Wavell to C h u r c h ill , 23 January 
1 9 4 2 , Telegrams Far East.
6 4 . Cable OPX 4 3 , W avell to Sturdee , 12 January 19 42 , AWM 2 4 3 /5 /3 3 .  The 
minutes o f the conference show that Burnett contributed  l it t le  and that 
the s t a f f in g  arrangements 'were approved in  g e n e r a l '.  Notes o f Meeting 
o f  Commanders and S t a f f  of the ABDA Command, 10 and 11 January 1942 ,
WO 1 0 6 /2 5 5 1 .
6 5 . C a b le s , Forde to Blarney, 13 January 1 9 42 , Sturdee to W a v e ll , 13 January 
1942 , W avell to A uchinleck , 11 January 19 42 , AWM 2 4 3 /5 /3 3 .
6 6 . On 16 January 1942 Blarney wrote to Wavell that Lloyd 'i s  very a b le , 
has a broad outlook , and h is  s t a f f  work is  carried  through w ith  the 
g reatest  smoothness and ta c t . He has much experience on the "Q " s i d e ' .  
Blarney Papers DRL 6 6 4 3 , item 10 A [8 ] ,  AWM.
6 7 . L e tte r , Lloyd to Wigmore, 14 July  19 4 8 , Long Correspondence - Lloyd, 
AWM. See c a b les , Sturdee to W av ell , 3 February 19 4 2 , Lavarack to Blarney,
6 February 1 9 42 , W ills  Papers, Folder 8 , AWM.
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In  the meantime, at the request of the government, Blarney gave his
views on the command s itu a tio n  in  the ABDA Command. He pointed  out that
by the time the 6th and 7th D iv isio ns  arrived  A u s t r a l ia 's  commitment would
be 'apparently  greater proportionally  to B r it is h  than i t  has been' in
the Middle E a s t . He thought that the A u stralian  commander should be
given status that would admit him to fu ll  consultation  on a l l  operational
and adm inistrative  p la n s . This was 'p a r t ic u la r ly  important in  view  of
. . .  68
B r it is h  propensity  for d isp ersing  organisations  .
On 14 January the A u stralian  government received  the proposed
organisation  o f W a v e ll 's  HQ. Th£ only senior  p o sit io n  to be f i l l e d  by an
A ustralian  was that o f  Deputy Intendant- General, for which Lloyd was'
69
s e le c te d . Burnett should have already  inform ed the government o f
these p ro p o sals , but perhaps he had om itted to do t h is , for the government
now acted as though it  was hearing  them for  the f ir s t  tim e. At the
Advieory War Council on 20 January C urtin  presented  a note, which had
been prepared by Shedden, statin g  th at :
The appointment o f a Higher Commander in  
the South-West P a c if ic  area and the organisation  
of the s t a f f  o f the Supreme Commander is  another 
s id e l ig h t  on the attitude  o f the United Kingdom 
towards A ustralian  p a rt ic ip a t io n  in  the higher 
d irectio n  of the war in  an area in  which we are 
v it a lly  in ter este d .
The note im plied  that W avell was not n ec essarily  better  q u a l if ie d  than
Blarney for the command, but added that w hile  there could be no question
o f  c r it ic is in g  the appointment,
apparently  no A u stralian  can expect consideration  
for a high command even though A u s tra lia  may supply 
the largest  share o f the f ig h t in g  forces as in  the 
case of Greece and Malaya.
6 8 . C able , GOC 229 , Blarney to C u r tin , 8 January 1942 , Blarney Papers 24A.
6 9 . Cable 5 8 , Dominions Secretary  to C u r tin , 14 January 19 42 , CRS A 8 1 6 , 
item 3 1 /3 0 1 /1 3 6 .  Also AWM 2 4 3 /5 /3 3 .
The fact that the only A u stralian  representative  was to be the deputy
o f  the adm inistrative  branch was considered to be 'u n j u s t i f i a b l e '.  A
'v i t a l  p r in c ip le ' was at stake as much as 'th e  question  o f a share in
the p o l it ic a l  higher d i r e c t i o n '.
The A ustralian  government put these views to B r it a in  in  a cable
despatched on 21 January . The proposals were described  as 'u n a c c e p t a b le ',
and i t  was urged that the GOC AIF should be given  a status that would
ensure that he was fu lly  consulted in  regard to a ll  plans a ffe c t in g  the 
71
A IF .
Wavell pointed  out to C hurchill that he had asked for 'A u s tr a lia n
72
ideas on representatio n ' on 4 January , but had received  no re p ly . ;
C hurchill then directed  W avell to communicate d irec tly  with the
73
A u stralian  government, and on 28 January W avell explained  to Sturdee
that the headquarters o f  the A ustralian  corps would be w ith in  easy reach,
and that Lavarack would be taken into  consultation  whenever necessary .
W avell suggested that the CGS o f  the Land Forces branch could be an
A u s tr a lia n , but he 'would  have to be a man o f wide experience and tact'
as w ell  as capacity , since  work a ffe c ts  B r it is h  and In d ian  troops,
American and D u t c h '. I f  a su itab ly  q u a l if ie d  man was a v a ilab le  W avell
would accept him . W avell made it  quite  clear that there was no p o s s ib il it y
of Blarney becoming h is  deputy, as he had been in  the Middle E a s t . This
74
p o sit io n  was held  by the American General B r ett .
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70 . Note to Advisory War Council Minute 6 8 1 , Melbourne, 20 January 1942 , 
t it le d  General W a v e ll 's  Headquarters and w ritten  on 19 January , MP 12 17 , 
Box 55 3 .
71 . Cable 6 5 , Curtin  to Dominions Secretary , 21 January 1942 , CRS A 816 , 
item  3 1 /3 0 1 /1 3 6 ; PREM 3 1 6 6 /5 .
72 . Cable 0 0 2 7 9 , Wavell to C h u r c h ill , 23 January 1942 , Telegrams Far 
East.
73 . C able , Dominions O ff ic e  to A ustralian  Government, 24 January 1942 , 
PREM 3 1 6 6 /5 .
74 . Cable 0 0 4 6 7 , Wavell to Sturdee , PREM 3 1 6 6 /5 ;  Telegrams Far East.
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The A ustralian  government was s t i l l  not happy, and sought the advice
75
of both the CGS and Blarney in  the Middle E a s t . Both agreed that i t  would
be sa tisfacto ry  i f  the GOC A IF  had d ire c t  access to General W avell and
76
senior members o f his  s t a f f  on a ll  proposals a ffe c t in g  the A IF .
Meanwhile M enzies, who although out o f  the government was s t i l l  a 
member of the Advisory War C o un cil , had suggested to the B r it is h  High 
Commissioner that Blarney should be given command o f a l l  B r it is h  troops 
in  the area . It  would remove 'the  p o s s ib il it y  o f blam ing United Kingdom
generals for reverses and would put the A ustralian s  wholly on th e ir
, 77 , 78
mettle . This was not, however, the view o f  the government, and on
13 February Wavell was informed that A u s tra lia  would be happy w ith  the
79
righ t  of co n su ltatio n .
By this time the question had become academ ic, since W avell now
suggested that the AIF should be diverted  from the N E I. But the in cident
shows the problems o f representation  on a m ulti- national headquarters .
Furthermore, the impact o f A u s t r a l ia 's  complaint can be gauged from the
25 January entry ih  the diary  o f  General Pow nall:
The A u s tra lia n s , as was in e v it a b le , have now started  
to r e g is t e r , saying  they are not adequately represented 
on the s t a ff  h e re . We have got their  C ol. Lloyd to be 
a Major-General . . .  As such he w i l l  have everything  to 
say in  looking a fter  the well- being o f  the A ustralian  
forces . . .  However, t h a t 's  not good enough for them 
apparently and they want more o f a say so . I fancy
75 . Memorandum, Sturdee to Forde, 3 February 1942 , MP 7 2 9 /7 ,  item  2 /4 2 1 /4 4 ;  
ca ble , Curtin  to Blarney, 7 February 19 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 5 5 2 .
76 . Memorandum, Sturdee to Forde, 3 February 19 42 , MP 7 2 9 /7 ,  item 2 /4 2 1 /4 4 ;  
cable 0 0 3 0 , Blarney to C u r tin , 10 February 1942 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 5 5 2 ; MP 7 2 9 /6 ,  
item 2 /4 0 1 /2 2 1 .
77 . Cable 1 3 3 , Cross to Dominions O f f ic e , 12 February 19 42 , PREM 3 1 6 6 /5 .
78 . Ib id ., also War Cabinet Agendum 3 1 /1 9 4 2 , 5 February 19 42 , MP 7 2 9 /7 ,  
item 2 /4 2 /4 4 .
79 . Cable 2 7 , A u stralian  Government to W avell, 13 February 19 42 , PREM
3 1 6 6 /5 .  On receipt of this  C hurchill i n i t ia l l e d  'Good' and ordered 
C r o s s 's  telegram not to be d is tr ib u te d .
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its  really  Blamey trying  to make a job for 
h im self . . .  W ell he c a n 't  be 'd ep u ty ' here . . .
W avell said  when he was f ir s t  appointed  that 
the A ustralians  would be the most d i f f ic u l t  of 
our a l l i e s .  Very l ik e ly , indeed  the telegram 
from Canberra was d is t in c tly  rude .
Pownall sa id  that the Dutch were very good a l l i e s : 'T h e y 'r e  grand,
and what a contrast to the French and the Belgians and the Russians -
80
not to mention the A ustralian s  and the Chinese '.' At least  A u s tra lia  
appeared to have been accepted as an independent a lly  and not as an 
obedient B r it is h  colony.
8 0 . Quoted in  Bond, op.cit. V o l . I I ,  p p .79 , 80 , 81 .
MAP 4
The Boundaries o f the South-West P a c if ic  Area and the Extent o f
the Japanese Advance
From: Reports of General MacArthur,
CHAPTER FOUR
STRATEGY IN THE SWPA,
March 1942-January 1943
So much has been w ritten  about events in  A u s tra lia  i t  would seem 
superfluous to re t e ll  the sto ry . The Am erican, and p a rtic u la r ly  the 
A u s tra lia n , o f f i c i a l  h is to r ie s  provide good o verall accounts, the problems 
faced  by the A ustralian  m ilitary  commanders have been examined in  Crisis of 
Command and B e ll  in  Unequal Allies has dealt w ith  the dispute over a l l ie d  
global p r io r it ie s  as they a ffe c te d  A u s t r a lia . This chapter, th erefo re , 
seeks to concentrate on a number of controversies concerning a l l ie d  strategy  
in  the South-West P a c if ic  Area during 1942.
M acArthur's  Plans for the Defence o f  A u s tra lia
The main h is t o r ic a l  debate about the strategy  employed in  A u s tra lia  
during  1942 has revolved around the la te r  claims o f General Douglas MacArthur 
that the the A ustralian s  had a 'la r g e ly  d e fe a t is t  conception ' o f defending  
th e ir  country from the 'Brisbane  L i n e ' .  The debate began a fte r  M acArthur's  
views were expressed  by h is  P u blic  Relations O f f ic e r  in  a press conference 
in  early  1 9 4 3 , and the argument was kept a liv e  by unsubstantiated  a llegatio n s  
made by a Labor M in iste r , E . J .  Ward, that the previous government had 
approved plans to withdraw behind  a 'Brisbane  L i n e ' .  The A u stralian  
government denied both M acArthur's  and W ard 's  claim s. The events of the 
p e r io d , e sp ec ia lly  M acArthur's  plans for defending  A u stralia  in  A p r il  1 9 42 , 
reveal the over- sim plification  of h is  contention that i t  was he who, a fter  
h is  appointment as the A l l ie d  Commander-in-Chief, decided  to take the 
f ig h t  to the Japanese in  New Guinea , and that i t  was never h is 'in t e n t io n  
to defend A u stralia  on the m ainland of A u s t r a l i a ' .^
1 . M acArthur's  statement of 18 March 1943 is  reproduced in  Notes of 
D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 
Brisbane 25-31 May 1 9 4 3 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 2 . See also  MacArthur, Reminiscences, 
(Fawcett C re st , New York , 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p . 162 . M acArthur's  claims have reappeared 
in  many books, the most recent being  M anchester, American Caesar 
(H utchinson , M elbourne, 1 9 7 8 ) ,  p . 29 6 . For W ard 's  allegatio n s  see E . Sp ratt , 
Eddie Wards Firebrand of East Sydney (R igby , A d e la id e , 1965) .
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When MacArthur arrived  in Melbourne on 21 March the Japanese had 
occupied the main areas o f the Netherlands E ast  In d ies  and had e stab lish ed  
footholds on the north coast of New Guinea . Although the Americans in  
the P h ilip p in e s  were s t i l l  r e s is t in g , the i n i t i a l  objectives  o f the 
Japanese High Command had been achieved . A u s tra lia  stood on the d e fen siv e ,
expecting  an attack any day . What then were the plans which MacArthur
2
described  as 'd e fe a t is t  in  o u tlo o k '?
On 27 February the A u stralian  C h ie fs  o f S t a f f  had completed an
ap p reciatio n , which began by noting  that a fte r  her successes in  the
Netherlands East  In d ie s , Japan was 'now at lib erty  to attempt an invasion
of A u stra lia  should she so d e s i r e '.  A p o ssible  Japanese line  of approach
was through Port Moresby, but the C hiefs  recognised  that there was no
prospect o f  re in fo rcin g  Port Moresby un til  the sea lanes were secure .
The garrison would have to hold out 'and  exact a heavy to ll  from the
3
enemy i f  he should attack i t ' . S im ila r ly , i t  was not p o ssible  to increase 
the Darwin garrison beyond its  e x is t in g  strength o f two brigade groups.
I t  was recognised  that Western A u s t r a l ia 's  garrison  would have to be 
in creased .
The appreciation  was based  on the assumption that only the troops 
ava ilable  in  A u stra lia  could be used . However, i t  was re a lis e d  that two 
A IF  D iv isio n s  and one US D iv is io n  would soon be a rr iv in g  in  A u s t r a lia , 
and when they arrived  the garrisons in  Darwin , Western A u stralia  and 
Tasmania could be increased .
Nevertheless the main worry was the lack of a ir  and naval p ro tectio n , 
and the appreciation  observed that:
2 . M acArthur's  statement of 18 March 1 9 4 2 , see f n . l .
3 . A fter  the war Rowell and Sturdee w rote : 'As the A ustralian  C hiefs  of 
S t a f f  saw the p o sitio n  at this  stage o f  the war (and i t  is  suggested that 
the events of h istory  amply confirm ed their  judgement) the problem o f the 
defence of Moresby was not so much an increase in  its  land g a rr iso n , as 
the pro v isio n  o f adequate naval and a ir  s u p p o r t '. Comments on US War 
H isto ry , V o l . l ,  Chapter 1 , by Lieutenant- General V .A .H .  Sturdee and 
Lieutenant- General S .F .  R o w ell ,early  February 19 48 , AWM.
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I f  there were adequate naval and A ir  Forces for the 
defence of A u s t r a lia , an army of the numbers that 
would be required  could nearly  be met from A u stralia  
i t s e l f  although a great deal o f equipment would be 
required  from abroad. U ntil such time as adequate 
Naval and A ir  Forces are a v a ila b le , i t  is  estim ated 
that i t  would require a minimum of 25 d iv is io n s  to 
defend A u stra lia  against  the scale of attack that is  
p o s s ib le . This would mean that 10 fu lly  equipped 
d iv is io n s  would have to be supplied  by our A l l i e s . 4
Despite his later  claim s, on 11 May MacArthur told Curtin  that the only
thing  he d isagreed  with  about this  appreciation  was the necessity  for
25 d iv is io n s  i f  there was not adequate naval and a ir  power. In  these
circumstances not any strength  of land force would be adequate, and
. 5
therefore both seaborne and land based a ir  forces were v it a l . This
emphasises the problem o f p o l it ic ia n s  not knowing the righ t  questions
to ask , and the C h ie f  of Naval S t a f f ,  Admiral Royle , wrote la t e r : ' I
always resent having  those 25 D iv is io n s  pushed down my throat. The
Defence Committee was asked a s i l l y  q uestio n , i . e .  how many d iv is io n s
would be required  to defend A u stra lia  i f  there were no Naval or A ir
fo rc e s . I agree i t  would have been much better  i f  we had answered in
6
the same way as General M a c A r th u r '.
Yet i f  MacArthur agreed in  general terms with  the ap p reciatio n , 
when i t  was presented  to the Advisory War Council on 5 March the Council 
was not s a t is f ie d . The minute noted that there was 'inadequate  treatment 
in  this appreciation  o f  str a teg ic  p o s s i b i l i t i e s ' .^  The government 
had been attem pting to develop a strategy  covering the whole South
4 . Appreciation  by C hiefs  of S t a f f , 27 February 1942 , CRS A 2 6 7 0 , item 
9 6 /1 9 4 2 .
5 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference M inutes, 11 May 1 9 42 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 11 .
6 . L e tter , Royle to Shedden, 7 November 1 9 44 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 60 5 .
7 . War Cabinet Agendum N o .9 6 /1 9 4 2 ,  5 March 19 4 2 , CRS A 1670 , item 
9 6 /1 9 4 2 . General Gordon Bennett has w r itte n : 'Du ring  early  March 1942 the 
M in ister  for the Army, Frank Forde , asked my opinion on this  m atter, 
expressin g  C a b in e t 's  doubts o f the wisdom of the recommendation. Unhesi- 
tantly  I to ld  him that the Japanese must be fought to the death in  New 
Guinea and must not be perm itted to set foot on A ustralian  s o i l . He 
expressed  great r e l ie f  at hearing  this opinion  w hich , he said  would be 
welcome news for the Cabinet which was greatly  w o r r ie d '. Memoirs, m isc. 
d r a ft , item 3 , p . 5 2 , Bennett Papers, MS 3 0 7 /2 2 , M itchell L ib ra ry .
P a c if ic  area . On 26 February the A ustralian  and New Zealand C hiefs  
o f  S t a f f  and the Commander o f the US Army Forces in  A u stra lia  (Brett) 
had reviewed the s itu a tio n  in  the P a c if ic  and had emphasised the need 
to p lan  an o ffensive  w ith  A u s tra lia  and New Zealand as b ases . They 
recommended the establishm ent o f an 'Anzac Area' w ith  an American 
as Supreme Commander. This was to replace the naval 'Anzac Area ' and 
was to be extended to include  most of the Western P a c i f ic ,  New Guinea, 
Ambon, Timor and the sea to about 500 miles around A u s tra lia . These
proposals were accepted by the Advisory War Council at which two New
. . 8 
Zealand m inisters were p re se n t , and the decisions were transm itted to
9
London and Washington on 4 March. At the same time the A u s tra lia n .
government decided  that i t  would welcome as Supreme Commander, General
B r ett , who had recently  returned to A u stra lia  from the ABDA Command.
In  seeking  support for  the establishm ent o f  an 'Anzac Area '
C urtin  cabled the Dominions Secretary  that 'The Advisory War Council
representing  a ll  p o l it ic a l  p a rties  in  A ustralia  regard the whole
10
matter as one of overrid ing  u r g en cy '. Yet this  was not ju st  a last  
p lea  for help  in  a desperate s itu a t io n . It  is  true that Curtin  po inted  
out that A u stra lia  was threatened , but h is  main argument was that i f  
Japan were to be de feated , then A ustralia  and New Zealand were 'the  
only bases for o ffensive  action by the A llie d  nations against  the 
Japanese from the Anzac A r e a ' . ^
Thus John Dedman, a member o f  the War Cabinet, has proudly po inted
o u t :
8 . The New Zealand m inisters were the Rt. Hon. J .G .  Coates and the 
Hon. D .C . S u lliv a n .
9 . Cable 166 , C urtin  to Secretary  o f  State for Dominion A f f a ir s ,
4 March 1 9 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
1 0 . Cable 168 , Curtin  to Secretary  o f State for Dominions A f f a ir s ,
4 March 1942 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item  1 4 /3 0 1 /2 2 3  A .
138
11. Ibid.
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I t  was the A u stralian  Government which took the 
in it ia t iv e  in  proposing  a strategy for the war 
in  the South P a c if ic ; i t  was not based  on the 
continental defence of A ustralia  and the 
decisions were reached some three weeks before 
General MacArthur arrived  h e r e . 12
Other observers, however, d id  not see i t  quite  the same way. The B r it is h
High Commissioner reported that at the Advisory War Council meetings on
26 and 28 February the New Zealand m inisters had to overcome the
w ariness o f  Evatt  and B easley . N evertheless , 'i n  the end the M inisters
13
swung around and not only adopted but stole  the New Zealand p l a n ' .
On 5 March the A u stralian  DCGS, General Row ell, produced another 
appreciation  which concluded that the Japanese might attack as fo llo w s :
a. Upon Port Moresby in  the Middle o f march;
b . Upon Darwin in  early  A p r il ;
c . Upon New C aledonia  in  the middle o f  A p r il ;
14
d. Upon the east  coast o f  A u s tra lia  in  May.
12 . J . J .  Dedman, 'The Brisbane L i n e ' ,  Australian Outlook, V o l .X V I I ,
N o .2 , August 1968 , p . 14 8 .
13 . Cable 24 8 , Cross to Secretary  o f State for Dom inion's A f f a ir s ,
9 March 1 9 42 , WO 10 6 /35  27 . Cross w rote : 'You  are aware that Evatt and 
Beasley  dominate the Cabinet and i t  appears that these two and to a 
lesser  extent Curtin  began by scouting  the whole id e a . I do not know 
the reason but Evatt and Beasley  are almost certa in ly  frigh tened  o f 
a ir  raids and they may very p o ssibly  have feared  that New Zealand 
was trying  to form some Anzac unbrella  which would in  e f fe c t  give her 
a share o f A u s t r a l ia 's  defence resources . . .  Coates told  me that [the 
Australians] cared nothing for New Caledonia . In  any case New Zealanders 
stuck to th e ir  guns, hard words were exchanged and Coates I gather 
b it t e r ly  c r it ic is e d  A u s t r a l ia 's  lack o f  realism  . . . '  Cross added that 
Admiral Leary o f  the US Navy, General Brett  and the A u stralian  C hiefs  
o f  S t a f f  strongly  supported the New Zealand p la n , and W .M . Hughes urged 
that i t  be accepted.
14 . Probable Immediate Japanese Moves in  the Proposed New Anzac
A rea , 5 March 1942 , CRS A 2 6 8 4 , item  9 0 5 . Also  RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
Unlike Brett  who expected an attack from the north-west, Rowell saw
the main threat as coming the north-east.
In  this  regard Rowell had gauged correctly  the Japanese in ten tio n s ,
for on 2 February the Japanese Im perial General Headquarters had ordered
the capture o f Lae and Salam aua, and, at the proper tim e, Port Moresby.
On 8 March Japanese forces landed at Lae and Salam aua. On 15 March
Im perial General Headquarters debated whether to attack A u s t r a lia . The
resu lt  was a decision  to capture Port Moresby and the southern Solomons,
and then 't o  iso late  A u s tr a lia ' by s e iz in g  F i j i ,  Samoa and New C aledonia .
Japan was now poised  to str ik e  at the islands  to the north-east of
A u s t r a lia , but  events elsewhere were to d ivert  her attentio n  un til  May.
17
The Japanese High Command never really  agreed to invade A u s tr a lia .
The Japanese plan  was n o t , o f course , known at the tim e, and the 
prospect ra ised  by Rowell alarmed the Americans in  A u s tr a lia . Brett 
had already radioed Washington that the successful defence o f  A u s tra lia  
was doubtful unless immediate e ffo rts  were made 't o  formulate and
140
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15 . M iln er , op.cit.,  p . 12 . See also  C able , Brett to War Department,
4 March 1942 , RG 319 , ABC 381 (A u str a lia  1-21-42) National A rchives . A 
memorandum by Brigadier- General F .S .  C larke , US Army to Brett., 15 March 
1 9 4 2 , o utlined  the d ifferenc es  between the A ustralian  and US estim ates.
AWM 6 2 5 /5 / 2 0 .
16 . M iln er , op.cit.,  p . 13 .
1 7 . This issue is  dealt w ith  in  the fo llow ing  sources: M. Fuchida and 
M. Okumiya, Midway, The Battle that Doomed Japan (B a lla n t in e , New York 
1 9 5 5 ) ,  p p .6 0 , 6 3 ; N . Ike ( e d ) , Japan's Decision for War -  Records of 
the 1941 Policy Conference (Stan fo rd , C a l ifo r n ia , 1 9 6 7 ) ; D. Bergam ini, 
Japan's Imperial Conspiracy (Pan , London, 1 9 7 1 ) ; Morton, op .cit.,  p . 214 and 
Appendix B ; T . H a tto r i, Complete History of the Greater East Asian War 
(Tb'kyo, 1 9 5 3 ) ,  m icrofilm  copy in  AWM; D .C .S .  S is so n s , 'A u s t r a lia  and
New Guinea in  Japanese Post-Mortems of the P a c if ic  W a r ' , Australian Army 
Journal, September 1957 ; L .C .F .  Turner , 'The C r is is  o f Japanese Strategy , 
January-June 1 9 4 2 ',  RMC Historical Journal, V o l .l ;  C .A .  W illoughby , 
et.al.  (comp.) Reports of General MacArthur, V o l . I I ,  Japanese Operations 
in the Southwest Pacific Area, Part I (Washington 1966) . Compiled from 
Japanese Dem obilization  Bureaux Records. Hereafter  c ited  as Reports of 
General MacArthur, V o l . I I .
implement d e ta ile d  p l a n s ' . G e n e r a l  Barnes , who was acting  as B r e t t 's
deputy, later  wrote th at 'T h e  entire  s itu a tio n  in  the South West P a c if ic
area had reached the stage where su ccessful defence o f A u stra lia
19
i t s e l f  was q u e s t i o n a b l e . . . '
By this time the United Kingdom Chiefs o f  S t a f f  had produced
another appreciation  which stated  that the immediate object  should be
't o  s t a b il is e  the s itu a tio n  so as to ensure the secu rity  of bases and
20
points v it a l  to our prosecution  o f the w a r ' . The A ustralian  Chiefs
o f S t a f f  thought this assessm ent was too defensive  and recommended
taking  the in it ia t iv e  again st  the Japanese , w ith  sea and a ir  attacks
against th e ir  forces at Rabaul and in  the Netherlands East In d ie s .
They urged the formation o f  an a l l ie d  force o f B r it is h  and US naval
21
units  to conduct an o ffe n s iv e  p o lic y .
In  the l ig h t  of this in form ation , on 18 March the Advisory War
22
Council again  reviewed the defence o f A u s ta lia . They affirm ed  that
Darwin and Port Moresby should be defended to the fu lle s t  p o ssible
e xten t , and that every e f fo r t  should be made to provide forces for
these areas . They also decided  to move troops from V icto ria  to south
Q ueensland , reinforce  Frem antle, and increase  the tempo of b u ild in g
23
up the a ir  fo rce , e sp ec ia lly  in  northern A u s tra lia .
18 . Brett  to AG, War Department, W ashington, 4 March 19 42 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 2 .
19 . J .R .  Barnes, 'Report of O rgan isation  and A c t iv it ie s , U .S . Forces in  
A u s t r a l i a ',  December 7 1941-June 30 1942 , held  CMH, W ashington.
20 . Appreciation  o f  S itu atio n  in  Far East subm itted to HM Government 
in  the United Kingdom by th e ir  M ilitary  A Dvisers . War Cabinet Agendum, 
Supplement N o .l  to Agenda N o .1 4 6 /1 9 4 2 , CRS A 2 6 80 , item  90 4 .
21 . War Cabinet Agendum, Supplement N o .2 , too,cit.
22 . Maj-Gen. Rowell (DCGS) attended this  m eeting as Sturdee was i l l .
He recorded that w ith three K in g 's  Counsels , in  M enzies, Spender and 
Hughes, to contend w ith  ' i t  w a s n 't  roses a ll  the w a y '.  Rowell, Full Circle, 
p . 104 . A ir  Marshal S ir  John McCauley, who as DCAS attended some of
the War Cabinet and Advisory War Council m eetings, reca lled  that i t  
was almost like  a courtroom d isc u ss io n . In terv ie w , 31 August 1979 .
23 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .8 4 2 , 18 March 1 9 42 , CRS A 26 70 , 
item  9 6 /1 9 4 2 .
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C learly  A u s t r a l ia 's  in ten tio n  was to carry the fig h t  to the 
Japanese ju st  as soon as forces became ava ilable  to do i t .  At this  
stag e , however, only the f i r s t  troops o f  the 7th A ustralian  D iv is io n  
had arrived  in  A u s tr a lia . The 41st  US D iv is io n  had not yet a rr iv e d , 
but a further US d iv is io n  had been o ffered  to replace the 9th A ustralian  
D iv is io n  which was to remain in  the Middle E a s t . U ntil these forces 
and American a ir  forces arr ived , A u s tra lia  would have to remain on the 
d e fen siv e . This d id  not mean, as E . J .  Ward and MacArthur later  claim ed, 
that the A u stralian  Army planned to withdraw behind  a Brisbane L in e .
Indeed  on 3 June 1943 General Mackay wrote to General Vasey: 'D id  you 
ever hear o f  the "Brisbane  L in e " t i l l  late ly  . . .  my le tter  to the M in ister  
o f  4 February 1942 has been p u lle d  about by one Eddie Ward and is  now
24
used as a p o l it ic a l  weapon by the government against the o p p o s it io n '.
Mackay described  M acArthur's  statement that there had been a d e fe a t is t
p o licy  in  A u stra lia  u n til  he took over and began to f ig h t  the Japanese in
25 . . . .
the is la n d s , as 'a  piece  of s k i t e '.  The true A ustralian  p o sitio n  is
revealed by a letter  w ritten  by Vasey to an American general, p o ss ib ly  Ju lia n
F . Barnes of the s t a ff  o f  the US Forces in  A u s tr a lia ,o n  20 March 19 4 2 :
I hope you r e a lis ed  from our conversation that 
what we told  you was our present p la n ; but that 
as more troops become a v a ila b le , we sh all  continu­
a lly  revise  i t .  Like your colleague of yesterday 
I feel  that we are only deluding  ourselves i f  we 
make tind count on future plans which we have 
not the means o f  carrying  o u t .^6
On 20 March the UK government advised  that i t  could not disregard
27
other risks  and duties to undertake a naval o ffen s iv e  operation , and
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24 . L e tter , Mackay to Vasey , 3 June 1943 , Vasey Papers 3 /3  N LA . Vasey 
had been M ackay 's ch ief  o f s t a f f  when he was GOC-in-C Home Forces.
25 . Mackay to Gavin Long, 4 June 1 9 4 3 , Gavin Long Notes, AWM 5 7 7 /7 /3 2 .
26 . Letter  Vasey to U .S .  G eneral, 20 March 1 9 4 2 , AWM 2 4 3 /6 /6 0 .
27 . Supplement N o .2 to War C abinet Agendum N o .1 4 6 /1 9 4 2 , CRS A 26 84 , 
item  9 0 4 .
confirmed that A u stra lia  would simply have to hold on u n til  American
support arr ived . On a number o f occasions the government had expressed
it s  w illin g n e ss  to accept an American Supreme Commander in  the area ,
and had pressed  London and Washington to appoint one. On 7 March Earle
Page , the A ustralian  rep resen tativ e , cabled  from London that the B r it is h
and Americans had tentatively  reached agreement to d iv ide  the world
into  areas of strategic  r e s p o n s ib il it y . Two days later  the government
agreed to send Dr Evatt to W ashington . Meanwhile A u s tra lia  held  her breath .
The Americans in  A u s tra lia  now expected an attack in  the Darwin area
28
by three enemy d iv is io n s  before  the end of the month, and the A ustralian
29
C hiefs  of S t a f f  forecast an attack on Port Moresby during the same p erio d .
By the middle of March an a ir  o f panic  or desperation hung over the
government, in cludin g  the Prime M in iste r , and also  over some
30
quarters o f  the A ustralian  p opulatio n . There i s ,  however, no
evidence to suggest that this panic  was shared by the A ustralian
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28 . GHQ, SWPA Report on Organisation  and A c t iv it ie s , USAFIA, 7 December 
1941-June 30 , 1 9 42 , AWM 1 6 /3 / 5 .  As late  as 20 March 1942 Brett b e liev ed  
that the main threat was in the Darwin-Broome area . (Agendum for Consid­
eration  by C h iefs  of S t a f f ,  the Commander of the Anzac Force and the CG 
USAFIA, 20 March 1 9 4 2 , AWM 2 4 3 /6 /1 1 9 .
29 . Probable Immediate Japanese Moves in  the Proposed new Anzac A rea ,
5 March 1942 , CRS 1684 , item 90 5 .
30 . H asluck , Diplomatic Witness, p p .4 3 , 4 4 . Hasluck recorded that S ir  
Owen Dixon described  the M inisters as 'a  pusillanim ous c r e w '. Also  
im pression gained  by B r ig ad ier  J .D .  Rogers, who returned from the Middle 
East in  February 1942 to become M ackay 's C h ie f  In te llig e n c e  O f f ic e r
(25 June 1 9 7 4 ) . Herring had the same im pression and thought Curtin  was 
very frightened  (29 June 1 9 7 4 ) . S ir  K ingsley  Norris did  not have the 
im pression that the despondency was w idespread , although he fe lt  the 
government was frightened  (27 June 1 9 7 4 ) . Brig-Gen. Hurley , an in f lu e n t ia l  
US p o l it ic ia n  then v is it in g  A u s t r a lia , reported to Am erica: 'The people 
do not appear to be aware of the c r it ic a l  s itu atio n  confronting  them. The 
newspapers the day after  the ra id  [on D a rw in ] , and on Saturday , had much 
more news concerning horse racing  than they did  concerning the r a id  on 
Darw in . This is  not a c r it ic ism  of A u s t r a lia . They give about as much 
space in  th e ir  newspapers to racing  as we do to glamour, sex appeal and 
the figures  o f almost naked b e a u t ifu l  women. The point I am trying  to 
convey is  that the serious s itu a tio n  confronting  this great continent of 
A u s tra lia  has not fully  aroused the populace and the m ilitary  e s t a b lis h ­
ments seem to be too complacent and s e l f  a s s u r e d '. (Hurley to M arshall,
21 February 1 9 42 , OPD 381 SWPA, RG 16 5 , N ational Archives (W a s h .) .)
C hiefs  of S t a f f . Nor is  i t  easy to support M acArthur's assertion  that 
the A u stralian  plans were d e fe a t is t . Rather, in  the absence o f outside  
support, and w ith  an almost non-existent navy and a ir fo r c e , i t  is  hard 
to imagine a more o ffensiv e  p la n .
MacArthur put forward h is  strateg ic  views when he met the Advisory 
War Council in  Canberra on 26 March. He doubted whether the Japanese 
could  undertake an invasio n  o f  A u s t r a lia , b e lie v in g  that i t  would be 
a blunder  for them to do so , but he recognised that they 'm ight try 
to  overrun A u s tr a lia  in  order to demonstrate th e ir  su periority  over 
the white r a c e s '.  He thought the main danger was from raids and that 
the Japanese might attempt to secure a ir  bases in  A u s tr a lia . Therefore , 
MacArthur stated  that the 'f i r s t  step was to make A ustralia  s e c u r e '.
A ft e r  this was accom plished A u s tra lia  could be organised  as a base 
for an o ffen s iv e  towards the P h il ip p in e s . The o ffensive  was dependent
prim arily  on the rap id ity  w ith  which US men and equipment could reach
, . 31 
A u s t r a lia .
About this  time General S ir  Thomas Blarney, who in  the emergency had 
been reca lled  from the Middle E a s t , was appointed Commander-in-Chief of 
the A u stralian  Army. He soon e sta b lis h ed  a close working re latio n sh ip  
w ith  MacArthur, and during the next two w eeks, before  th eir  appointments 
as Commander-in-Chief, and Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces, South-West 
P a c if ic  Area re sp ectiv ely , had become o f f i c i a l ,  they turned th e ir  minds 
to the immediate problem o f the defence o f A u s tr a lia . In  h is  memoirs 
Blarney re ca lled  that:
31 . Advisory War Council M inute , 369 , Canberra 26 March 19 42 , CPS A 2684 , 
item 9 6 7 . An American reporter summed up M acArthur's s itu a tio n  another 
way: MacArthur 'a d v is e d  me to remain in  A u s tra lia  for at  least  a month - 
u n til  A p r il  30 . "By that t im e ", he s a id , "e it h e r  I ' l l  h it  the Jap 
up in  New Guinea , or he w i l l  h it  me, or there w il l  be a stalem ate ".
As events turned out MacArthur d id n 't  have anything to h it  the Japs 
w i t h ' .  Clark L ee , They CaZt it Pacific  (V ik in g , New York , 1943) , p . 284 .
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From the outset i t  had been decided  between 
General MacArthur and m yself that as soon as 
possible  we would move to the o ffen sive  
against  Japan as far  north as wr could proceed.
But i t  was e s s e n t ia l  f ir s t  to ensure that the 
defence of v ita l  areas should be secu red . ^2
Thus, on 31 March Blarney presented  proposals to the War C abin et , basing
33
h is  plans upon those already  prepared by Sturdee and Lavarack. These
proposals envisaged  two arm ies, covering eastern  and southern A u s t r a lia ,
a corps in  Western A u s tra lia  and the reinforcem ent o f Darwin w ith  the
34
19th AIF  Brigade now a rr iv in g  m  A u s tr a lia .
M eanwhile, the Jo in t  Plannin g  S t a f f  under the chairmanship of
35
General Barnes (US Army) was exam ining the s itu a t io n . Then, a l i t t l e  
la te r , on 4 A p r il , the A u stralian  Chiefs  o f  S t a f f  and M acArthur's Head­
quarters produced a jo in t  estim ate . They expected  a Japanese attack on
32. Blarney's Memoirs, Chapter 3 , p . 10 .
33 . War Cabinet Agendum, 16 March 1 9 4 2 , Not presented  to C abin et , MP 
7 2 9 /6 ,  item 1 9 /4 0 1 /1 5 1 . L e tte r s , Forde to Blarney, 1 9 , 24 March 1 9 42 ,
MP 7 2 9 /6 ,  item 2 /4 0 1 /7 9 .
34 . War C abinet Minute 205 3 , Melbourne 31 March 19 42 , and attached 
p ap ers , CRS A 2 6 7 0 , item  1 8 6 /1 9 4 2 .
35 . The Jo in t  Planning  S t a f f  consisted  of Barnes (U .S . Army) as Chairman, 
Brig-Gen. Clark (U .S . Arm y), Commander K elly  (USN) , Col.Eubank  ( U SA F ), 
Commander Nichols (RAN), Gp-Capt. Hancock (RAAF), C ol. Hopkins (DM0, LHQ ), 
and Lt-Col. Booker (DD P la n s , LH Q ). They concluded that the scale  o f  
attack was u n likely  to exceed two d iv is io n s  against e ith e r  Darwin or
the north-east coast o f A u s t r a l ia , but that the attack on Darwin could 
take place at any moment and on the north-east coast not before
15 A p r il . They b e lie v ed  that to defend the Brisbane-Melbourne area 
adequately  the area north o f Brisbane should be held  to ensure
a ir  secu r ity . They concluded that Townsville should be developed as 
a fortress area and that the forces there should be increased  to one 
d iv is io n  as soon as p o ss ib le  a fter  the arr ival o f the 41st U .S .  D iv is io n  
in  A u s t r a lia . They also suggested sending an AMF brigade group to the 
Hughenden-Cioncurry area in  case the Japanese landed in  the G ulf o f  
C arpentaria . Second Report o f  Jo in t  Plan ning  S t a f f ,  28 March 1 9 4 2 , AWM 
2 4 2 /6 /1 1 9 .
'A u s t r a l ia 's  supply line  and against  A u s tr a lia  i t s e l f '  in  the very near
futu re . They recognised  that the 'c r i t i c a l  p o in t ' was Port Moresby,
and that i f  s u f f ic ie n t  naval and a ir  forces could be found A u s tra lia
36
could be defended there . Therefo re , as Rowell observed la t e r , 'i n
the jo in t  appreciation  o f 4th A p r il  General MacArthur seems largely
37
to confirm  the A ustralian  appreciation  o f  27th F e b ru a r y '.
With the a rr iv a l  in  A u s tra lia  of the four brigades o f  the A IF  late
in  March, and of the 41st  US D iv is io n  in  early  A p r il , ground forces
were now av a ilable  to b o lste r  the forward defen ces . On 9 A p r il  Blarney
issu ed  further orders for the defence o f  A u s t r a lia . The 7th D iv isio n
(AIF) was located  in  New South Wales and Queensland and the troops
38
in  Western A u s tra lia  were brought up to a fu l l  d iv is io n . In  addition  
US an ti- aircraft  and engineer troops were sent to Darwin, a squadron 
o f  heavy bombers and a US an ti- airc raft  regiment were ordered to 
P erth , a US an ti- aircraft  regiment and an ad d itio n al A ustralian  
in fantry  brigade  went to T o w nsv ille , and the remainder of the US a n t i­
a ir c r a ft  troops were grouped in  Brisban e . The a ir  force concentrated
most of its  s t r ik in g  force in  the Townsville-Cloncurry area , where
39
a ir f ie ld s  were becoming a v a ila b le .
These d isp o sitio n s  were executed w ith  M acArthur's  concurrence, 
but he later  asserted  that 'he had w ished  to locate the American troops 
in  the northern p art  o f  A u s t r a l i a ' . The 41st  D iv is io n  had been located 
in  V ic to ria  and the 32nd, when it  arrived  in  mid May, in  South A u s tra lia .
36 . M iln er , op.cit., p . 25 .
37. L e tter , Rowell to Major-General Orlando Ward, C h ie f  of M ilitary  
H isto ry , US Army, 7 March 1 9 51 , Rowell P apers , F ile  11 , AWM.
38 . Weekly report to PM by CGS for week ending  11 A p r il  19 42 , CRS A 2670 , 
Agenda N o .2 0 1 /1 9 2 . AHQ Operation In stru ctio n  N o .50 , 9 A p ril  1 9 42 , 
signed  by Major-General G .A . Vasey , Deputy CGS, Blarney Papers 12 .
39 . M iln er , op.cit., p . 25 .
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General Blarney and Lieutenant- General Lavarack at Lavarack1s HQ 
at Toowoomba, June 1942 . Lavarack was responsible  for the 
defence of the Northeast coast o f  A u s tr a lia .
(AWM Negative N o .12418)
The M in ister for the Army, 
F .M . E’orde , and General 
Blarney at the 1st Armoured 
D iv isio n  review , Puckupunyal, 
June 1942 .
(AWM Negative N o .12692)
MacArthur claim ed that he had been dissuaded  by the A ustralian  m ilitary
auth o rities  'on  the b asis  that the defence p lan  provided  for the main
concentration further south and that was where the American troops
should be lo c a t e d '. MacArthur s a id  that 'he  was sorry that he had not
been more in s is te n t  on [the] acceptance [of h is  wishes] at the tim e,
but some of these arrangements had been put in  hand before h is  a rr iv a l
40
or shortly  t h e r e a f t e r '. There might w ell  have been an element of 
truth in  M acArthur's cla im s, but he seems to have overlooked the fact  
that  the U .S .  D iv isio ns  were only part- trained , and that accommodation 
and tra in in g  f a c i l it ie s  were more p le n t ifu l  in  southern than northern 
A u s tr a lia .
On 10 A p ril  Blarney issu ed  h is  f i r s t  Operation In struc tio n  to the
GOC of the F ir s t  Army. W hile reco gnising  that the retention  o f the
Newcastle-Melbourne area was v it a l  to the continuance o f the war e f fo r t ,
Blarney d id  n o t , however, think that i t  was l ik e ly  that the enemy
would attack the area on a major scale  because they were occupied in
Burma and the Netherlands E ast  In d ie s , and because o f  the growing
a ir  and naval strength in  A u s t r a lia . He considered  that the enem y's
f ir s t  southward e ffo r t  would be d irected  at capturing Port Moresby,
and this  would be followed by a landing  on the north-east coast of
A u s tra lia  w ith  a view to advancing southwards covered by land-based
a ir c r a ft . I t  followed that Brisbane had to be held  since it s  occupation
by the enemy would give them su itab le  a ir f ie ld s  for land-based a ir c r a ft
to attack Newcastle and Sydney. I t  was im portant to hold  T o w nsville , but
i t  was recognised  that i t  was not p o ssible  to hold  the area between
Brisbane and T ow nsville , although 'a s  our resources increase  i t  is
41
intended  to hold progressively  northwards from B r i s b a n e '.
40 . Notes of D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
P a c if ic  A rea , 20-26 October 1 9 42 , MP 1217, Box 3.
41 . GHQ (A ustralia ) Operation In stru ctio n  N o .l ,  to GOC F ir s t  Army,
10 A p r il  1 9 4 2 , Blarney Papers 12 ; also  AWM 2 4 3 /6 /1 2 1 .
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Meanwhile the A ustralian  government received  advice that the UK 
Chiefs  o f  S t a f f  considered  i t  was 'necessary  to remain s tr a teg ica lly
on [the] d e f e n s i v e '. O ffen siv e  action was to be lim ited  to raids in
, 42
the P a c if ic  and In d ian  Oceans. These views were d iscussed  by the
Advisory  War Council on 16 A p r i l , and C urtin  s a id  that on 20 A p r il  he
would be d iscu ssin g  with MacArthur 'th e  fundamental basis  o f the
s tr a te g ic a l  appreciation  to which i t  should be our objective  to obtain
the assent of the United Kingdom Chiefs  o f S t a f f ,  the Combined C hiefs
43
of S t a f f  and the United States C hiefs  o f  S t a f f ' . As a resu lt  o f
44
h is  d iscussion  with  MacArthur, Curtin  sent a ca b le , w ith  which MacArthur 
agreed , to Evatt in  W ashington , repeating  the argument o f  the UK Chiefs  
o f  S t a f f  that for the p resent the A l l ie s  were forced to remain
45
str a te g ic a lly  on the defensive  in  both the In d ian  and P a c if ic  Oceans.
Throughout the la tte r  h a l f  of A p r il  1942 MacArthur began to receive
in creasing ly  d e fin ite  in te llig e n c e  that the Japanese were about to
46
undertake an important atta c k , probably against  Port Moresby. He ordered 
h is  forces to remain on the d e fen siv e , and on 25 A p r il  h is  headquarters 
issu ed  Operation In structio n  N o .2 d e t a il in g  the role and r e sp o n sib ility  
o f  the A l l ie d  Land Forces. This d irected  that:
a . The A l l ie d  Land Forces, South West P a c if ic  area 
w i l l  prevent any landing  on the North East coast 
o f A u stra lia  or on the South West o f  New Guinea.
b . The A l l ie d  Land Commander responsible  for the 
areas in  the v ic in it y  o f  Port Moresby and along
42 . Cable C hurchill to C u r t in , 6 A p ril  1 9 42 , CRS A 2 6 84 , item 90 4 .
4 3 . Advisory War Council Minute 9 0 5 , 16 A p r il  1942 , CRS A 2 6 7 0 , item 
9 6 /1 4 4 2 .
44 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference M inutes, 20 A p r il  1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1
45 . J . J .  Dedman, 'The  Brisbane L i n e ' ,  p . 154 .
4 6 . 'H o r n e r , Crisis of Command, p p .77-79. See also  Memorandum, 
Brigadier- General C .A . W illo ug h by , G2, to Brigadier- General S . J .  Chamberlin 
G3, 21 A p r il  1942 . The t it le  o f  the memorandum was 'Japanese o ffensive  
expected  end of A p r il /e a r ly  M a y '. Papers o f Charles A . W illoughby , G2 
Admin F i l e ,  US Army M ilitary  H istory  In s t it u t e .
the North East Coast o f A u stralia  to include 
Brisbane w il l  immediately p e rfec t  plans 
for the co-ordination of a l l  the defensive  
forces in  th e ir  respective  a r e a s . 47
I t  can be seen that M acArthur's defensive  p lan  envisaged holdin g  the
area w ith  the troops already deployed. These instructio n s  were based
on 'P la n  A ' for the defence of the north-east coast o f A u stra lia  and
48
Port Moresby, which had been issued  the previous day.
There is  no doubt that MacArthur was far  from s a t is f ie d  that the
forces ava ilab le  to him in  A u s tra lia  were adequate for the defence of
the country, le t  alone for an o ffe n s iv e . He hoped to obtain  more troops
from Am erica, but the Japanese gave him no breathing  space to amass these
ad d it io n a l  fo rc e s . During A p r il  the Japanese continued th e ir  advance
southwards through the Solomons'. P lan  A , issu ed  on 24 A p r il , in d icated
that i t  was l ik e ly  that a Japanese force of three a ir c r a ft  carriers
and fiv e  cruisers  might strike  the north-east coast of A u s tra lia  between
28 A p ril  and 3 May. Naval forces of the SWPA and SOPAC (South P a c if ic
Area) were concentrating  to meet this  th re a t , and land based  a ir c r a ft
49
from Tow nsville  were preparing  to attack the enemy convoy. A few
days later  General M ilfo rd  in  Townsville was warned: 'An early  attack
on Port Moresby is  probable and this  may be follow ed by a landing  on
the northeast coast w ith  a view to a progressive  advance southwards
50
covered by land based  a i r c r a f t ' .
Even i f  i t  was M acArthur's  in ten tio n  to base h is  defence on New 
G uinea , he was not able to rein force  that area su b stan tia lly  before  the
4 7 . GHQ Operation In structio n  N o .2 , 25 A p r il  19 42 , Blarney Papers 12 .
48 . Copy o f extracts from G3 Jo urn al, 25 A p r il  1942 , AWM 2 4 3 /6 /6 1 .
4 9 .  Plan  A , 24 A p r il  19 4 2 , Blarney Papers , 4 3 .5 ,  Part  I .
5 0 . F ir s t  Army Operation In stru ctio n  N o .6 , 4 May 1 9 42 , AWM 2 4 3 /6 /1 3 3 .
Japanese were ready to s t r ik e . Moreover, h is  orders during A p r il
reveal a commitment to defending  A u stra lia  on the A ustralian  m ainland.
In  fa irness  to MacArthur, and to the A ustralians  before him , i t  was not
easy to rein force  Port Moresby, for the a ll ie s  had not secured control
o f  the se a , and the a ir  bases in  Port Moresby were very inadequate.
In  an attempt to r e c tify  th is  s itu a t io n , in  early  A p ril  an A ustralian
lig h t  an ti- airc raft  battery  from the Middle East  arr iv ed . In  late  A p ril
US engineers and anti- aircraft  units were ordered to Moresby, and
also  by late  A p ril  US bombers based in  Townsville were using Moresby
51
to attack L ae , Salamaua and Rabaul.
In  a n tic ip atio n  o f a victory  in  the Coral Sea , on 1 May MacArthur
suggested  to Blarney that there might be a chance o f  taking 'a  lim ited
52
i n i t i a t i v e ' by ra id in g  Lae and Salamaua. But these tentative  moves
hardly  represent a major stra teg ic  in it ia t iv e  on M acArthur's p a r t . Indeed
the A u stralian  o f f ic ia l  h is to r ia n  noted that:
So h esitan t  had General MacArthur and General 
Blarney been to send reinforcem ents to New Guinea 
that on the 10th May, the day on which the 
Japanese planned to land round Port Moresby, the 
defending  garrison  was not m aterially  stronger 
than the one which General Sturdee had e stab lish ed  
there early  in  J a n u a r y .53
It  was not u n til  mid May that the 14th Brigade was ordered to
54
New Guinea and it  was not concentrated in  Port Moresby u n til  late  June.
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5 1 . M iln er , op.cit.,  p . 25 .
5 2 . D. McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area - First Year (A ustralian  War 
Mem orial, Canberra , 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p . 86 quotes MacArthur as suggesting  a 'l im it e d  
o f f e n s i v e '.  The author possesses a photostat of the carbon copy of the 
le tter  sta tin g  'l im it e d  i n i t i a t i v e ' ,  from RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
5 3 . D . McCarthy, op .cit .,  p . 82 .
5 4 . Horner, Crisis of Command, p . 85 . The hesitancy  of Blarney and MacArthur 
to rein force  New Guinea is  ^revealed in  the minutes o f a General S t a f f  Con­
ference at Land Headquarters on 9 May 1942 . General Vasey , the DCGS, told  
the conference that ' I f  the action in  the Coral Sea has been as su ccessful 
as reports ind icate  i t  is  probable that 14 In f  Bde w il l  reinforce  30 In f  
Bde in stead  of re lie v in g  i t ' . AWM 2 1 3 /3 /2 1 .
By then MacArthur was talk in g  not of defending  A u stralia  in  New Guinea ,
but o f using  New Guinea as a springboard for an o ffensive  against the
Japanese . Like the argument over the plans for the defence of A u s t r a lia ,
M acArthur's  plans for operations in  New Guinea in  late 1942 have also
been the source o f considerable  controversy. The truth appears to be
that MacArthur d id  a lter  a l l ie d  strategy  in  the South-West P a c if ic  Area,
but only a fte r  he began to receive  American troops and p la n e s , and after
the successes in  the Coral Sea and at Midway. And as for M acArthur's
statem ent about the Brisbane L in e , Shedden, who was in  an e x cellen t
p o sit io n  to know, has the la s t  word: ' I t  was a flamboyant utterance
55
fo r , as in d ica te d  e a r l ie r , no such plan  e x i s t e d ' .
M acArthur's  In pact  on A u stralian  Strateg ic  Policy
In  Unequal Allies  B e ll  provides a f in e , perhaps the b e s t , analysis
o f  the American reaction  to A ustralian  e ffo rts  to a lter  A l l ie d  global
p r io r it ie s  throughout 1942 . He concludes that 'th e  pragm atic changes
in  Am erica 's  p o l ic ie s  and ob jectives  in  the P a c if ic  resulted  from altered
m ilitary  circum stances in  a l l  theatres o f the w ar , not from p o l it ic a l
56
power exerted  by any power' .
Yet admirable though B e l l 's  account might b e , he makes no real e ffo r t  
to determine why Australia  continued its  e ffo rts  to a lte r  A l l ie d  strategy . 
D id  Curtin  h im self have a comprehensive strateg ic  p la n , or did  he rely 
on the views o f  h is  advisers?  Did  Curtin  react in  a f i t  of pique at 
having  not been consulted , or were his  demands conditioned  solely  by 
concern for the defence o f A ustralia?  And i f  the latter  was the case , 
how was he to determine when A u s tra lia  was secure? Some of these questions
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5 5 . Shedden M anuscript, Book 4 , Box 3 , Chapter 34, p . 5 .
5 6 . B e l l ,  op.cit.,  p . 8 6 .
General MacArthur on 
h is  arr iv a l  at Melbourne 
s ta t io n , 21 March 1942 . 
On the righ t  is  
Lieutenant- General 
George H. Brett .
(AWM Negative N o .11867)
MacArthur and Curtin  conferring  in  Canberra,
26 March 1942 .
(AWM Negative N o .42774)
cannot be answered adeq uately , and B e ll  acknowledges that MacArthur
and the A ustralian  government shared 'common m ilitary  p r io r it ie s  and
57
a s p ir a t io n s ',  but what was M acArthur's real impact on the governm ent's 
conduct? How a lso , d id  MacArthur and the government react to the 
changing str a teg ic  s itu a tio n  as i t  a ffected  A ustralia?
From the f ir s t  day of h is  a rr iv a l  in  M elbourne, General MacArthur
had an im portant impact on the government. For exam ple, the Deputy
Prime M in is te r , F .M . Forde, who met MacArthur at the railway statio n  in
58
Melbourne on 21 March, was tremendously im pressed. Forde reca lled  
that faced by 'th e  greatest  catastrophe that could have happened' the 
country looked to Am erica. The government 'f e l t  that . . .  MacArthur
59
was the man who would in fluen ce  h is  government along the righ t  l i n e s '.
According to Forde, MacArthur told him th at :
although the war clouds are black  I feel 
absolutely  co nfident  that  w ith  the backing  
and cooperation o f the Government and people 
o f my country, and the wholehearted support 
and cooperation o f the Government and the 
people o f A u s t r a lia , in  the very near future 
naval vessels  and aeroplanes , f ig h tin g  personnel 
and weapons o f  war w i l l  be in  A ustralian  
waters . . . 60
On 26 March MacArthur put these views to the Advisory War Council 
in  Canberra. He sa id  that there were two schools o f thought on strategy , 
the European and the P a c i f ic ,  and he urged A u stra lia  to 'stand  firm ly by 
i t s  view that the P a c if ic  is  the predominant t h e a t r e '. The f ir s t  step
was to make A u stra lia  secure , but  a fte r  that was accom plished, A u s tra lia  
would be the base for a counter- offensive towards the P h il ip p in e s , He
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5 9 . Forde interview  w ith  E .D .  and A . P o tts , S t . L u c ia , 19 December 1973 , 
copy in  MacArthur Memorial.
6 0 . L e t t e r , Forde to H etherin gton , 29 September 1970 , Hetherington Papers, 
AWM.
MacArthur and Curtin at the Advisory War C o u n cil , 26 March 1942 . 
On the l e f t ,  Major-General Sutherland . On the r ig h t , Fadden, 
C h ifley  and B easley . MacArthur told the War Council that the 
f ir s t  step 'was to make A u s tra lia  secu re1 .
(AWM Negative N o .136225)
MacArthur with Forde and C h ifle y . 
(AWM Negative N o .42777)
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s a id  that he could ask Curtin  ' to help him to obtain  from the United
61
States whatever assistance  that country can g i v e '.  In  reply Curtin  
assured MacArthur that the A ustralian  g-overnment would give him a l l  
the assistan ce  i t  could , and that they 'would endeavour to in fluence
62
the United States Government to grant General M acArthur's req u irem en ts '.
For the moment, however, E v a tt , who was in  W ashington, was seeking
M acArthur's  assistance  in  supporting  the governm ent's case. Thus on
22 March Evatt  inform ed Curtin  that M acArthur's f ir s t  appreciation  had
reached General M arshall: 'The stronger these representations are
couched the b e tte r , as the p u b lic  would condemn the United  States
63
Government unless MacArthur is  s u f f ic ie n t ly  s u p p o r t e d '. Evatt  follow ed
this  by ad v isin g  on 31 March, that 'c o n f id e n t ia l ly , pressure should be
continued by MacArthur as intense  com petition here from a ll  s o u r c e s '.
He warned against  is s u in g  optim istic  statements from A u stra lia  as these
could be 's e i z e d  upon by other contenders for supplies as a reason
64
for cutting  down ours and in creasin g  t h e i r 's ' .
W hile  the a rr iv a l  o f  MacArthur had a remarkable e f fe c t  on the depressed
65
morale of the government, i t  is  important to observe that he caused
no s u b sta n tia l  a lte ra tio n  in  A u stralian  p o lic y . As re lated , he was not
66
able to change the plans for the defence of A u s tra lia . Nor did  he cause
6 1 . Advisory War Council Minute 8 6 9 , Canberra, 26 March 1 9 42 , CRS A 2684 , 
Minute N o .9 6 7 .
6 2 . D raft  o f Minute 8 6 9 , Advisory War Council M eeting , 26 March 1 9 42 , 
loc.cit.
6 3 . Cable PM2, Evatt to C u r tin , 22 March 1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box 57 1 .
6 4 . Cable PMS 18 , E vatt  to C urtin , 31 March 1942 , MP 1217 , Box 229 .
65 . The US M in ister  in  A u s tra lia  wrote that a fter  M acArthur's a rr iv a l  and 
the return o f the A IF , 'The rebound was almost as sudden as the slump in  
p u b lic  morale' during the precedin g  month. Le tter , Johnson to Roosevelt,
12 October 1942 , quoted in  P .G .  Edwards ( e d ) , Australia Through American 
Eyes 1939-1945 (U niversity  o f Queensland P r ess , S t . L u c ia , 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 50 .
6 6 . See p p .135- 151.
the government to a lter  it s  determ ination to change global strategy  
and increase  the p r io r ity  o f the A u stralian  area. Just  as the Australia-  
New Zealand Conference of late  February showed that the government was 
looking  beyond the mere defence o f continental A u s tra lia  before  MacArthur 
a rr iv e d , so too d id  the decis io n  o f 9 March to despatch Evatt to
67
W ashington and London set the tone for increased  rep resentatio ns .
I t  is  true that Evatt co nsistently  used the argument that i f  reinforcem ents
were not sent A u s tra lia  might f a l l ,  but before  leaving  A u s tra lia  he
68
had mentioned the need to attack . Hasluck noted that the A u stralian
arguments sometimes em phasised the p e r il  to A u s t r a lia , and sometimes
the need to prepare for an o ffe n s iv e : 'They were conducting a debate
. . 69
as w e ll  as forming a p o licy  .
But i f  M acArthur's  a r r iv a l  caused l it t le  change to the d irectio n
of A u stralian  p o l ic y , i t  added confidence to the government and increased
its  capacity  to put it s  case to Am erica. A fter  speaking to E v a tt ,
F ie ld  Marshal D i l l ,  the B r it is h  M ilitary  Representative in  W ashington ,
recorded that 'E v a tt  is  conscious as we are that MacArthur w i l l  be a
suction  pump for reinforcem ents and m ilitary  supplies to A u s tra lia .
I t  is  this  q u ality  rather than h is  generalsh ip  which makes him attractive
70
in  A u stralian  e y e s '.  The f ir s t  part of the statement was absolutely
tru e ; in  early  January Shedden had advised  Curtin  that the US Chiefs
71
could be approached v ia  the American commander in  A u s tra lia . Moreover 
when, on 4 A p r il , Curtin  learnt that h is  government was to have no share
6 7 . E v a t t 's e ffo rts  overseas in  1942 are covered in  Appendix 1.
6 8 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 157 .
6 9 . Ibid. , p . 156 .
70 . Cable JSM 1 3 7 , D i l l  to B r it is h  C h ief of S t a f f ,  24 March 19 4 2 , WO 
1 0 6 /3 4 2 7 .
71 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 9 January 1 9 4 2 , MP 1217 , Box 5 7 3 .
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in  d ecid in g  the p o lic ie s  and plans which MacArthur would be instructed
72 ,
to carry o u t , the Prime M inister re a lis ed  that the only way o f in flu e n c ­
in g  the p o lic ie s  was by using  the channels open to MacArthur. But 
contrary to D i l l 's  a s s er tio n , the A ustralian  government was also  attracted  
by M acArthur's  q u a lit ie s  o f  g en eralsh ip , and there is  no doubt that 
from h is  a rr iv a l  in  A u stra lia  the government looked to him for m ilitary  
a d v ice . An early  exaitple o f this was\the employment o f  the 9th 
A u s tra lia n  D iv is io n .
Follow ing  the decision  to return the 7th and p art  of the 6 th 
D iv is io n s  to A u s t r a lia , the A ustralian  government b e lie v ed  that there 
was an 'u n derstan din g ' that the 9th D iv is io n  would return . However, 
at  the end o f March C h urch ill  advised  Curtin  that i t  would be a 'm istake ' 
to r e c a ll  the d iv is io n . I f  A u stra lia  were heavily  invaded b y , say , 
e ig h t  or ten Japanese d iv is io n s , two B r it is h  d iv is io n s  rounding the
Cape would be diverted  to A u s t r a lia , but  C h urch ill  thought that this
73
ev entuality  was u n lik e ly . Curtin  decided  to seek the views of
74
MacArthur and Blarney, and at the War Cabinet meeting on 31 March
Blarney advised  the re ca ll  o f the D iv is io n  'as  soon as i t  can be replaced
75
m  the Middle East and the necessary shipping  is  a v a i l a b l e '.
On 4 A p r il  MacArthur told Curtin  that i f  the naval and a ir  strength 
asked for in  the C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  appreciation  o f 3 A p ril  were prov ided , 
he thought that the 9th D iv is io n  could be allowed to remain in  the Middle 
E a s t , and that any agreement to its  retention  there should be made co nditio nal
72 . Cable 5 2 2 , Evatt to C urtin , 3 A p ril  1942 , received  4 A p r i l , MP 1217 ,
Box 4 7 4 . E v a t t 's cable , which contained the instructions  to MacArthur, 
stated  that the Combined Chiefs  of S t a f f  would exercise  general ju r is d ic ­
tion  over grand strateg ic  p o licy  and that the US Jo in t  C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  
would exercise  ju r is d ic t io n  over operational strategy .
73 . C able , C h u rch ill  to C u r t in , 30 March 1 9 42 , PREM 3 1 5 1 /1 .
74 . Cable 16 , Curtin  to E v a tt , 1 A p r il  1942 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item  5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
75 . War Cabinet Minute 2 0 5 3 , M elbourne, 31 March 1942 , CRS A 2 6 7 0 , 
item  1 8 6 /1 4 4 2 .
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on the e a r l ie r  po ssible  pro v isio n  o f  the required  naval and a ir  strength .
MacArthur considered  that the present land forces ava ilable  in  A u s tr a lia ,
in c lu d in g  the two promised American d iv is io n s , w ould , a fte r  a very
b r i e f  p erio d  of further t r a in in g , be adequate to deter any major operation
by Japan . The pro v isio n  o f  the naval and a ir  strength requested would
76
enable  h is  forces to be b u i l t  up for an o ffe n s iv e . At a meeting
w ith  C urtin  on 8 A p r il  MacArthur and Blarney agreed that the 9th D iv is io n
77
should return to A u s tra lia  as soon as conditions perm itted . As a resu lt
C urtin  inform ed C h urch ill  that the 9th D iv is io n  could be retain ed  un til
78
i t  could be replaced  in  the Middle E ast . C h urch ill  r e p lie d , thanking
C urtin  and assuring  him that 'you have always been and w il l  be p e rfec tly
79
free to decide the movement of a l l  your t r o o p s '. Thus, as Shedden
observed, C h u rch ill  'b e la te d ly  acknowledged the A ustralian  Government's
80
power to decide the movement of its  own t r o o p s '.
M acArthur's  optimism was probably a resu lt  o f  rece iv in g  the deta ils  
o f h is  d irec tive  as Supreme Commander, SWPA. These in cluded  in structio n s  
to hold  the key m ilitary  region o f  A u s tra lia  as a base for future
81
o ffen s iv e  action again st  Japan , and to prepare to take the o ffe n s iv e . 
Obviously  MacArthur thought that this would mean an increased  flow of 
men and equipm ent. He was soon to be d isappointed .
D. Clayton James has perceptively  observed that during h is  stay 
in  Melbourne 'two contradictory  images of MacArthur em erged '. The more
7 6 . Memorandum, '9 t h  D iv is io n , AIF - Return from Middle E a s t ',  by Shedden
4 A p r il  1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box N o .3 .
77 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference M inutes, 8 A p r il  1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box 1
78 . Cable 2 4 5 , C urtin  to C h u r c h ill , 14 A p r il  19 42 , MP 1217 , Box 4 7 4 , 
also  CRS A 2 6 7 0 , item  2 7 5 /1 9 4 2 .
79 . Cable 36 7 , C h u rch ill  to C u r tin , 15 A p r il  1 9 42 , CRS A 816 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
8 0 . Shedden M anuscript, Book 4 , Box 2 , Chapter 20 , p . 8 .
8 1 . Radio 10 65 , M arshall to MacArthur, 3 A p r il  1942 , OPD Exec 10,
item  7a. RG 16 5 , N ational A rch ives . M acArthur's D irectiv e  is  reproduced 
in  Appendix 9 .
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p u b lic  image was one o f a supremely co nfident general who was about to
lead h is  forces to v icto ry . But in  private  he appeared t ir e d , b it t e r ly
8 2
disappointed  and at times s e ize d  by a mood o f  d esp a ir . A fter  the
war Shedden stated  that there were two major crises in  the re latio n sh ip s
between Curtin  and MacArthur. Shedden claimed that in  both cases he
acted  as a go-between, p uttin g  proposals to each so as to minimise
disagreem ent. The f ir s t  c r is is  was in  A p ril  1942 when MacArthur
discovered  how few forces he had in  A u s t r a lia , 'l o s t  heart and wanted
83
to give h is  job u p '.
M acArthur's  depression was exacerbated  by the delay in  form alising
h is  appointm ent. On 1 A p r il  he complained that w ith  the A u stralian
84
forces he was 'fu n c t io n in g  by coordination and c o o p er a tio n ', and
the rece ip t  o f the d ra ft  d irectiv e  on 4 A p r il  was not followed immediately
by the f in a l  d ir e c t iv e . The delay was caused when the A ustralian  government,
mindful of previous experience in the Middle East and the ABDA Command,
sought and obtained  the r ig h t  o f  the A ustralian  commanders to have
85
unhindered access to t h e ir  own government.
MacArthur continued to fr e t , and f in a lly  on 14 A p r il  requested
Shedden, in  the absence o f  C u r t in , to c a ll  on him urgently at h is
86
headquarters . Shedden recorded that he found MacArthur
82 . Jam es, op.cit., V o l . I I ,  p p .17 1 , 172 .
83 . Extracts from Gavin Long in terview  with  S ir  Frederick Shedden,
31 January 19 4 6 , AWM 5 7 7 /7 /5 2 .  The second c r is is  was in  late  1943 when 
A u s tra lia  decided  that manpower would have to be subtracted  from the 
f ig h tin g  services  and put into  in du stry . This in c id e n t  is  dealt with 
in  Chapter S ix .
84 . L e tter , MacArthur to Douglas M enzies, Secretary , Defence Committee,
1 A p r il  19 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
85 . Cable 31 , C urtin  to E v a tt , 7 A p r il  1 9 4 2 , and Cable 5 3 7 , Evatt to 
C u r t in , 12 A p r il  1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box 5 7 1 .
8 6 . On 10 A p r il  1942 C urtin  had w ritten  to MacArthur: ' i f  I should 
not be read ily  a v a ila b le , Mr Shedden has my fu ll  confidence in  regard 
to a l l  questions o f War P o l i c y '.  MP 1 2 17 , Box 25 9 8 .
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somewhat depressed , as he had been in  A u stra lia  
for some time but had received  no advice of the 
terms of h is  d irectiv e  from the American 
Government. He seemed in  doubt as to the cause 
o f  the uncertainty  o f h is  statu s . He suggested 
th at , i f  i t  were in  any way due to in h ib it io n s  
which might be h eld  by the A ustralian  Government 
regarding  an American o f f ic e r  commanding its  
Forces, he was quite  w il l in g  to abolish  the Supreme 
Command and confine  h is  a c t iv it ie s  to the command 
of the American Forces, w h ils t  at the same time 
rely ing  on co-operation with the A u stralian  Forces 
to conduct the campaign. Having been reassured 
regarding  the A u stralian  Government's warm support 
o f  the p r in c ip le  o f  the Supreme Command, he appeared 
to be much happier at the conclusion o f the in ter v ie w .®7
As a r e s u lt , the next day Curtin  wrote to MacArthur that the 
d irectiv e  had been approved by the Presiden t and that the A ustralian  
government would be ass ig n in g  its  forces to h is  command. He continued :
You have come to A u s tra lia  to lead a crusade, 
the re su lt  o f  which means everything  to the 
future o f  the world  and mankind. At the request 
o f a sovereign State  you are be in g  placed  in 
Supreme Command o f its  Navy, Army and A ir  Force, 
so that w ith  those o f your own great na tio n , they 
may be welded into  a homogerpus force and given 
that u n if ie d  d irectio n  which is  so v it a l  for the 
achievement o f  v ictory .
Your d ir e c t iv e , amongst other th in g s , instructs  
you to prepare to take the o ffe n s iv e . I would 
assure you o f every p o ssible  support that can be 
given you by the Government and people o f  A u stralia  
in  making A u s tra lia  secure as a base for operations, 
in  a s s is t in g  you to marshal the strength required 
to w rest the in it ia t iv e  from the enemy and, in  
jo in in g  w ith  you in  the ultim ate o ffe n s iv e , to brin g  
about the total destruction  of the common fo e .
We hope and pray that your m ilitary  e ffo rts  may be
O O
crowned with  great success .
A ccordingly , at m idnight, Saturday , 18 A p r il  1942 a l l  combat units of
89
the A ustralian  defence forces were assigned  to M acArthur's command.
8 7 . Notes o f  D iscussion  [by Shedden] w ith  General MacArthur, Commander-in- 
C h ie f , Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 14 A p r il  1942 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 3.
8 8 . L e tte r , C urtin  to MacArthur, 15 A p r il  1942 , RG 3 , MacArthur Memorial.
8 9 . L e tte r , C urtin  to MacArthur, 17 A p r il  19 42 , RG 4 , MacArthur Memorial. 
The assigned  forces d id  not include  those serving  in  the European and 
Middle East theatres .
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These developments emphasise again the role played  by Shedden, 
who always seemed pulled  between self- effacem ent and a desire  that h is  
importance should be reccgnised . Thus he later  stressed  that there 
was an
important aspect which should not be overlooked.
I t  is  the part  that has been played  by the Defence 
Department as the agency o f  a ll  h igher  policy  
questions dealt with between the Prime M in ister  and 
General MacArthur . . .  On General M acArthur's 
appointm ent, the Defence Department assumed that 
r e sp o n sib ility  for han dling  a ll  matters on the 
p o licy  level . . .  By reason o f  the fact  that the 
Secretary  of the Defence Department is  also  Secretary  
to the War C abin et , which is  the M in iste r ia l  body 
responsible  for the d irectio n  o f  the A ustralian  War 
E f fo r t , the Defence Department was in  a focal p o sit io n  
in  the machinery of Government to fa c il it a t e  the 
working o f the unique set-up in  the Southwest P a c if ic
A r e a .9 °
The m ainspring of the machinery for the higher d irectio n  o f the war was the 
Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, which co nsisted  of the Prime M in ister ,
MacArthur, and any m inisters or o ffic e r s  whom the Prime M in ister  
91
w ished  to summon. The Defence Department provided  the secretary ,
and this  was nearly  always Shedden h im self . Shedden 's  minutes o f the *
conferences therefore provide a unique and v it a l  view of decision-making 
92
p ro cess . Furthermore, there is  evidence to suggest that these minutes
93
were not made av a ilable  to the o f f i c i a l  h is to r ia n s .
9 0 . L e tte r , Shedden to Brigadier- General C .A . W illoughby, 6 January 1945 , 
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 289 .
9 1 . Changes in  Machinery for H igher D irection  o f  W ar, 14 A p r il  19 42 , 
signed  by C urtin , M ilitary  Board M inutes, m isc. 4 1 /1 9 4 2 .
9 2 . O r ig in a l  and carbon copies o f the minutes are contained in  black  
folders in  the Shedden Papers , MP 1 2 17 , Box 1.
9 3 . The o f f i c i a l  h isto rian s  r e lie d  upon reports o f  the conferences given 
by C urtin  to the Advisory War C o u n cil . When s p e c if ic a lly  asked , Shedden, 
who was Secretary  of the Department o f Defence u n til  1956 , produced 
copies o f the conversations , for example the secraphone conversation o f 
17 September 1942 . Shedden probably  retain ed  the f i le s  w ith  the express 
purpose of in clu d in g  the inform ation in  a four-volume h istory  of A ustralian  
defence p o licy  which Curtin  had requested him to w r it e , and which at 
M enzies ' d irectio n  he subsequently  d id . The m anuscript has not been 
p u b lis h e d .
The f i r s t  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference was held  on 8 A p r i l ,
and i t  was here that MacArthur made his  w ishes known w ith  respect to
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the h igher  d irec tio n  o f the w ar. He was adamant that he should deal
d ire c tly  w ith  Curtin  alone and vice- versa, and as a resu lt  on 14 A p ril
95
Curtin  produced a memorandum form alising  the arrangem ents. Subsequent 
letters  between Blarney and Curtin  made i t  clear that in  his  capacity  
as C-in-C of the A u stralian  M ilitary  Forces Blarney also  would have 
d ire c t  access to the Prime M in ister  on matters of broad m ilitary  p o lic y .
Thus the whole structure for strateg ic  decision-making was 
re v is ed . Whereas previously  the C h iefs  o f  S t a f f  had been the 
governm ent's p r in c ip a l  advisers on strategy , they were now replaced  
by a fo reign  general. Furtherm ore, in d iv id u a lly , i f  not c o lle c t iv e ly , 
the C h iefs  o f S t a f f  previou sly  had been responsible  for the operations 
o f the forces in  defence o f A u s t r a lia . Now this  r e sp o n sib ility  rested  
w ith  MacArthur. I t  is  true that Curtin was s t i l l  able to receive  
advice from the A u stralian  C hiefs  of S t a f f ,  p a rt ic u la r ly  Blarney, 
but  the Prime M in is te r , supported by Shedden, looked to MacArthur as 
the main source of advice .
I t  might be argued that Curtin  had no option but to rely  on 
MacArthur because only the latter  had access to inform ation from the 
Combined C hiefs  o f S t a f f  through the Jo in t  C hiefs  of S t a f f . This 
problem would have been overcome i f  A u s tra lia  had been represented 
on the Combined Chiefs  o f  S t a f f ,  but that did  not prove p o s s ib le .
9 4 . Minutes o f  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Melbourne, 8 A p r il  1942 
p re se n t : C u r t in , MacArthur, Blarney, Admiral Leary , General Brett and 
Shedden, MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1.
9 5 . Changes in  Machinery for Higher D irection  of W ar, 14 A p r il  19 42 , 
signed  by C u r t in , M ilitary  Board M inutes, M isc . 4 1 /1 9 4 2 . An attached 
diagram showing the machinery for h igher d irectio n  is  reproduced in  
Appendix 14 .
9 6 . Ibid  and le t t e r s , Blarney to Shedden, 15 A p ril 1 9 4 2 , Shedden to 
Blarney, 23 A p r il  1942 , C urtin  to Blarney, 25 A p ril  19 42 , Curtin  to Blarney 
28 May 1 9 42 , Curtin  to Blarney, 19 August 1 9 42 , loo.cit. See also  
Blarney Papers 2 3 .7  and MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1598 .
N ev erth eless , i t  is d i f f i c u l t  to see why Blarney, in  a capacity  such
as Chairman of the A u stralian  Chiefs  of S t a f f ,  could not have attended
the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference on a regular b a s i s . Curtin  would
then have had the b e n e fit  o f Blarney's m ilitary  experience in  h is
nego tiatio ns  w ith  MacArthur, rather than having  to rely  solely  on
Shedden. The explanation  may w ell  be that Shedden p referred  Blarney
to be exclu ded , thus strengthening  his  own p o s it io n .
Despite the fact  that the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference normally
co nsisted  only of C u r t in , MacArthur and Shedden, its  composition was
f l e x ib l e . When the conference met on Monday, 20 A p r il , both Blarney
and M acArthur's  C h ief o f S t a f f ,  Major-General Sutherlan d , were included
in  d iscussio n s  to hammer out 'th e  fundamental b a sis  o f the str a teg ica l
ap p reciatio n ' for which they planned to obtain  the assent o f the
a u th o rities  in  Washington and London. In  C u r t in 's  v iew , this  would be
'th e  e s se n t ia l  s ta rtin g  p o in t  from which to b u ild  up the flow of
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reinforcem ents and e q u ip m en t '. The Conference decided  that MacArthur
and the A ustralian  C h iefs  o f  S t a f f  would work out the requirem ents,
and that these would be sent sim ultaneously by the Prime M inster through
Evatt to the P a c if ic  War Council in  W ashington , and by MacArthur to 
98
M arshall.
C learly  there was a mood o f optim ism , for the previous day Evatt 
had advised  Curtin  that MacArthur had the right and duty of demanding 
w hat, in  h is  o p in io n , was necessary to carry out h is  d ir e c t iv e . A ll
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9 7 . Cable PM 4 6 , C urtin  to E va tt , 17 A p ril  1942 , MP 1217 , Box 47 4 .
9 8 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , 20 A p ril  1942 , MP 1217 , Box 1.
he need do was re q u is it io n  for h is  requirem ents: ' I f  this  course is
bo ldly  and co nsistently  p u r s u e d ', the 'claim s w il l  be i r r e s i s t i b l e '.
Curtin  re p lie d  that MacArthur would be making a subm ission sim ultaneously
w ith  the government. He agreed w ith  Evatt that MacArthur would be
're sp o n s ib le  for demanding what he requires . . .  to f u l f i l  the str a teg ica l
100
o bjectives  la id  down in  h is  in s t r u c t io n s '.
By now a l l ie d  cryptanalysts had discovered the outline  o f  the
. 101
Japanese p lan  to se ize  Port Moresby and threaten no rtheast A u s t r a lia ,
but MacArthur was in  a co nfident mood, and on 23 A p ril  he told  the
Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference (which on this occasion included  the
state  prem iers) that 'a  large scale  attack on A u s tra lia  was p o s s ib le ,
but  not p ro b ab le . There might be predatory ra id s , but he d id  not think
. 102
a major attack l i k e l y ' .
The optimism ended on 24 A p r il  w ith  news from Evatt that
America planned to send a total o f only 9 5 ,0 0 0  army and a irforce  personnel
to A u s t r a l ia . F irs t  line  a ir c r a ft  would be lim ited  to 5 0 0 . ' I  have
been a s s u r e d ', added E v a tt , 't h a t  i f  [the] s itu a tio n  should develop
103
against  u s , forces would be greatly  in c r e a s e d '. The next day, at
the request o f the Prime M in iste r , Shedden discussed  E v a t t 's  cable w ith
MacArthur, who was 'b it t e r ly  d isappointed  w ith  the meagre assistance
104 . .
p r o m is e d '. In  h is  view the forces were in s u ff ic ie n t  for the defence
o f  A u s t r a lia . Yet M arshall had requested him to reduce h is  e a r l ie r
162
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9 9 . Cable ES 10 , Evatt to C u rtin , 18 A p r il  1 9 42 , received  19 A p r il ,
CRS A 6 6 3 , item  0 5 6 /1 /1 1 0 .
100 . Cable SW 2 9 , C urtin  to E v a tt , 22 A p r il  1942 , MP 12 17 , Box 474 .
10 1 . S .E .  M orison, Coral Sea3 Midway and Submarine Actions3 May 1942- 
August 1942 (L it t le  Brown, Boston, 1 9 6 7 ) ,  p . 13 . See also  sign als  
Sutherland  to CG US A ir  Forces, 16 A p r il  1942 , and Sutherland to Commanders 
AAF, ALF , ANF, CG USAFIA, 22 A p r il  1942 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 2 .
1 0 2 . Minutes o f Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Melbourne, 23 A p r il  1942 , 
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1 .
10 3 . Cable ES 17 , Evatt to C u r tin , 23 A p r il  1 9 4 2 , received  24 A p r il ,
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 229 and Box 571 .
104 . Cable SW 3 4 , Curtin  to E v a tt , 28 A p r il  1 9 42 , MP 12 17 , Box 57 1 .
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demands. MacArthur stated  that he had no in ten tion  o f  doing so and asked
that Evatt should seek in  Washington inform ation about the programme
for sending  forces to the SWPA. Furthermore he asked Curtin to request from
C h u rch ill  an aircraft carrier, the temporary diversion of the two
. . . . .  10! 
B r it is h  d iv is io n s  rounding the Cape, and a further a llo catio n  o f  sh ipping .
The substance o f M acArthur's observations was embodied in  cables
106
to Evatt and C h urch ill  on 28 A p r il . To Evatt Curtin  added a few
extra  comments:
MacArthur says that i f  Japan is  not attacked 
elsewhere we can certa inly  look for an attack here .
Speaking  from the A ustralian  view point, I think 
that i f  we were thrown back on the defensive  
ag a in st  a heavy attack , the e f fe c t  on p u b lic  morale 
might w ell  be d isa stro u s , i f  i t  became known that 
we d id  not have the forces considered  necessary by 
the Commander-in-Chief for the defence o f the 
Commonwealth.1 0 7
MacArthur also  made strong representations to W ashington , requesting
inform ation on the s ize  o f force to be eventually  a llo cated  to h is  
108
area .
Thus was e sta b lis h ed  the procedure o f  close co llaboratio n  between *
M acArthur and the A ustralian s  over the strateg ic  view to be presented
to London and Washington. I t  brought MacArthur a quick rebuke from 
109
M arsh all , but  MacArthur was less than candid m  his  reply . He sa id  
that C urtin  had asked h is  opinion on many s p e c if ic  questions and he had
105 . Notes o f  D iscussio n  [by Shedden] with General MacArthur, Commander-in- 
C h ie f , Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 25 A p r il  1 9 42 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 3.
10 6 . Ib id .,  Cable SW 34 , C urtin  to E va tt , 28 A p r il , MP 1217 , Box 571 ;
Cable 2 6 7 , Curtin  to C h u r c h ill , 28 A p ril  19 42 , PREM 3 1 5 1 /1 .
10 7 . Cable SW 34 , Curtin  to E va tt , 28 A p r il  19 4 2 , MP 1217 , Box 57 1 .
1 0 8 . Radio AG GHQ 38 4 , MacArthur to M arshall, 1 May 1 9 4 2 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 2 ,  
P t . l .
109 . Radio 8 , M arshall to MacArthur, 30 A p r il  19 42 , loc.cit. The US 
Secretary  o f W ar, Henry Stimson wrote in  h is  diary on 13 May 1942 that 
MacArthur 'i s  . . .  really  egging  the A ustralian s  on to try to make the 
A u s tra lia n  theater the main theater o f the w ar, and to postpone what we 
are trying  to do in regard to f ig h tin g  H it le r  f ir s t  . . .  He has been 
doing i t  in  a very d is lo y a l  w a y '.  Stimson D ia r ie s , Library  o f  Congress.
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had 'no id ea  that i t  was for other purposes than h is  own personnel 
in fo rm a tio n !' MacArthur defended h is  r ig h t  to provide this  inform ation 
and sa id  that he had 'no  idea  o f  b r in g in g  pressure to bear through 
any channels open to the A u stralian  Governm ent'. ^ ^ But there can 
be  no doubt about A ustralian  in ten tio n s ; as Curtin  e x p la in ed , when 
the P a c if ic  War Council 'f a i l e d  to fu n ctio n , we achieved our objective  
by e s t a b lis h in g  a d irect  link  between the A u stralian  Government and 
the C o m m an der- in - C h ief '.^^
112
When the government received  a negative reply from C h u r ch ill ,
MacArthur showed that he had no in ten tio n  o f  q u a lify in g  h is  advice .
For exam ple, on 2 May Shedden d iscussed  C h u r c h il l 's  reply w ith  MacArthur
and recorded that the Commander-in-Chief
seemed somewhat d is illu s io n e d  in  regard to h is  
e a r l ie r  expectations o f support in  the Southwest 
P a c if ic  Area and h is  attitude  could be expressed  
as one o f determ ination to have a 'show-down' w ith 
Washington about the p recise  terms o f  h is  d irective  
and the forces which were to be provided  to enable 
him to f u l f i l  i t .  He em phasized that i t  would be a 
weak course for him to allow the President and 
Mr C h urch ill  to leave him w ith  a d irectiv e  which 
sounded grand buthad no backing  behind  i t .
MacArthur fe lt  'im p elle d ' to ask the government to press for the return
113
o f  the 9th D iv is io n  as early  as- possible .
114
These views were passed  to E va tt , who was now in  London, 
and in  turn he urged MacArthur to argue strongly  w ith  M arshall and
115
refuse  't o  be s a t i s f ie d  w ith  anything short o f ' the necessary force .
1 1 0 . Radio 151 , MacArthur to M arshall, 3 May 1 9 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial
111 . Commonwealth Parliam entary D ebates , House o f Representatives , V o l .179 
p . 35 , 17 July  1944 .
11 2 . Cable 390 , C h urch ill  to C urtin , 30 A p ril  1 9 42 , received  1 May,
PREM 3 1 5 1 /1 .
1 1 3 . Notes of D iscussio n  [by Shedden] w ith  General MacArthur, Commander- 
in - C h ief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 2 May 1 9 42 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 3.
11 4 . Cable PM 5 7 , C urtin  to E v a tt , 6 May 1 9 42 , CRS M 100 , item May 19 42 , 
and MP 12 1 7 , Box 47 1 .
11 5 . Cable E 4 , Evatt to C u r t in , 8 May 1 9 4 2 , received  9 May, too.cit.
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In  the meantime Curtin  had asked MacArthur for more 'p o s it iv e
116
su ggestio ns ' to help E v a tt , and on 10 May MacArthur rep lied  suggesting
that  Evatt concentrate on a general p lan  o f  reinforcem ent which he
117
o utlined  in  the le tte r .
MacArthur continued to in fluence  the government in  its  attempts 
to a lte r  a l l ie d  strategy . On 11 May at the Prime M in is t e r 's  War
118
Conference he spoke o f  the necessity  for increased  naval and a ir  power.
The follow ing  day , w ith  more d e fin ite  news o f the results  o f  the Coral
Sea b a t t l e , MacArthur gave Curtin  a gloomy estim ate o f the general
s tr a teg ic  s itu a tio n  in  the P a c i f ic . He po in ted  out that the Japanese
successes had continued in  Burma and that they were now able to release
the d iv is io n s  that had been occupied in  the P h il ip p in e s . The Americans
there had surrendered on 6 May. MacArthur continued :
Despite the reverse su ffer ed  in  th e ir  recent 
move against  New Guinea the Japanese Navy has not 
been opposed in  force and is  in  a p o sitio n  to under­
take further  o ffens ive  e f fo r t s . The a v a ila b il it y  o f  
these forces makes p o ss ib le  a strong enemy offensive  
e f fo r t  o f  themost dangerous p o s s i b i l i t i e s . The en tire  
h istory  o f  the conduct of the war by the Japanese 
leads to the b e l i e f  that the Japanese w il l  continue th e ir  
o ffensive  actio n .
He b e lie v ed  that the next Japanese o ffe n s iv e  would be in  the South-West
P a c if ic  Area and that this  was where a Second Front should be opened.
He concluded by em phasising the need for haste in  developing a 'd efen sive
b a s t io n ' in  A u s t r a lia . 'We have . . .  in  th is  theatre at the present
time a l l  the elements that have produced d isa ste r  in  the Western P a c if ic
119
since  the beg inn ing  o f the w a r ' .
11 6 . L e tte r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 8 May 1 9 4 2 , RG4, MacArthur Memor
11 7 . L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r tin , 10 May 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 229 .
11 8 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Melbourne, 11 May 1942 , p re se n t : 
MacArthur, C u r t in , Shedden and Suth erlan d . MP 1217 , Box 1.
11 9 . Ibid .
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As a resu lt  o f  M acArthur's  advice , Curtin  again  appealed to
W ashington and London for further  reinforcem ents, but w ithout success .
To E v a tt , Curtin  added that he had found MacArthur to be
in  general agreement with the views we have been 
expressing  since  the outbreak o f the war with 
Japan and a l l  o f  which I have mentioned e a r l ie r .
However I would resummarise them as the b asis  on 
which . . .  we as a government must ceaselessly  
argue u n til  MacArthur is  s a t is f ie d  . . . 1 2 0
During this  perio d  there was one s lig h t  disagreement w ith  MacArthur.
At the Advisory  War Council on 13 May the Chiefs  o f  S t a f f  reported on
the operations in  the Coral S e a , and disappointm ent was expressed
that heavy losses were not in l f ic t e d  on the enemy. I t  was fe l t  that
12
not enough land-based a ir c r a ft  had been concentrated in  the north-east.
When he heard  o f  this c r it ic is m , MacArthur wrote to Curtin  that  he fe lt
'a  sense o f  disappointm ent' w ith  the C oun cil. He thought that i t  had
been 'a  very b r i l l i a n t  e f fo r t  . . .  which undoubtedly saved A u stra lia
from a d e fin ite  and immediate threat . . . ' .  He did  adm it, however, that
122
he was a l i t t l e  d isappointed  w ith  the e ffo r t  of the a ir  fo rce .
The rece ip t  on 28 May o f four important cables from Evatt provides 
further  in s ig h t  in to  the str a teg ic  decision-making process in  A u s tr a lia . 
Evatt  told  C urtin  that he had previously  suspected that the agreed 
strategy  was 'b e a t  H it le r  f i r s t ' , and that now he had discovered to 
h is  su rprise  that there was a 'w r itte n  a g reem en t '. However, as p art  of 
the general strategy  i t  had been decided  that the security  o f A u s tra lia
12 0 . Cable 6 2 ,  Curtin  to E v a tt , 13 May 1942 , MP 1217 , Box 571* CRS M 100 , 
item  May 1 9 4 2 ; CAB 6 6 /2 4  W P(42) 210 and PREM 3 1 5 1 /4 .
12 1 . Advisory War Council 9 3 8 , Canberra, 13 May 1942 , CRS A 2 6 7 0 , item 
2 2 8 /1 9 4 2 . This was the f i r s t  meeting o f the Advisory War Council 
attended by A ir  Vice-Marshal Jones as CAS. Jones reca lled  that Hughes 
wanted to know why the RAAF had taken no p art  in  the b a t t le . Jones
s a id  that he 'fo u n d  Hughes a very sharp-tongued in d iv id u a l , and in it ia l l y
I was no match for h is  overbearing  a tt itu d e . I was much too d if f id e n t  
to these senior  p o l i t i c i a n s '.  Memoirs o f A ir  Marshal S ir  George Jones.
12 2 . L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r tin , 18 May 19 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
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had to be m aintained . Evatt po inted  out that A u s tra lia  had not been 
consulted  and that a strong case could be made against the agreed 
strateg y . Moreover, America and B r it a in  had an o bligatio n  to provide 
MacArthur w ith  the forces to execute that p art  of the grand strategy  
which was o u tlin ed  in  h is  d ir e c t iv e . There was some good news. Evatt
123
had persuaded C hurchill to send three Spitfire  squadrons to A u s tr a lia .
Curtin  re p lie d  to Evatt the fo llow ing  day and expressed  h is  surprise
that ne ith er  Page nor Casey 'h ad  been acquainted  w ith  the decision  to
124
treat  Germany as the primary enem y '. He agreed with  Evatt that they
would have to 's t r iv e  most strenously  to help  MacArthur get the f o r c e s '.^  
On Monday 1 June 1 9 4 2 , Curtin  met MacArthur in  Melbourne to discuss 
E v a t t 's ca b les , but  the f i r s t  item to be d iscussed  was the previous 
n i g h t 's  Japanese submarine ra id  on Sydney Harbour. MacArthur advised  
the release  o f a communique. He then c r it ic is e d  B r ita in  for prom ising 
a id  only i f  A u s tra lia  were heavily  attacked . In  h is  o p in io n , this  
promise 'was an extrem ely weak reed on which to r e ly , as i t  would be 
im possible to come to the assistance  o f A u stra lia  in  s u f f ic ie n t  strength 
and early  enough i f  Japan had a ir  and sea su periority  to carry out 
such an a t t a c k '.  He therefore urged Curtin  to seek the return o f the
123 . Cable ET 30 , Evatt to C u rtin , 28 May 1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box 47 4 , Box 231 , 
Blarney Papers 1 .2  and CRS A 3300 , item 228 . Cable ET 31 of 28 May con­
ta in ed  the Combined Chiefs  of S t a f f  agreement, Cable ET 32 o f 28 May
was a Combined Chiefs  o f S t a f f  Aide-Memoire on Strategy  and Cable ET 33 
quoted a letter  from Ismay to Evatt confirm ing the la t t e r 's  d iscussions 
w ith  C h u r c h ill , too.cit.
124 . Thorne, op.cit., p . 25 6 , has po in ted  out that Page was present at 
a UK Defence Committee meeting in  January 1942 when C hurchill re ferred  
d ire c tly  to the strategy . P a g e 's  Diary in  h is  Papers does not mention 
C h u r c h il l 's  comments on the strategy , bu t  in  h is  entry of 8 March 1942 
Page wrote that C hurchill 'r e a d  long cable from R which showed that R 
was s t i l l  firm ly convinced that major enemy was Germany, that major 
e f fo r t  had to be made against  Germany, but was s t i l l  prepared to d irect  
a very considerable  p art  o f  h is  resources against  f ig h tin g  the J a p s '.
AWM.
125 . Cable PM 76 , Curtin  to E v a tt , 29 May 1 9 42 , CRS A 300 , item 228 , 
Blarney Papers 1 .2 .
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9th D iv is io n  and the a llo c atio n  o f  a ir c r a ft  carriers  to the South-West
_ . , 126 
P a c if ic  A rea .
The next morning Curtin  and Shedden met w ith  Blarney, Royle , the CNS, and
127
Jo n es , the CAS, to d iscuss a report they had prepared the previous day.
Although the service  ch iefs  agreed broadly w ith  the grand strategy ,
they thought that Japan had become 'a  much greater menace than the
framers of the p o licy  appear to c o n s id e r '. Therefore they recommended
an o ffen s iv e  against  Japan ; a fte r  a ll ,tw e lv e  a l l ie d  d iv isio n s  were
contained  in  A u s t r a lia , w hile  the Japanese were almost completely free
128
for operations elsew here. B ritish  and American naval forces needed
129
to be concentrated in  the P a c i f ic . At the conference Curtin  accepted
130
these view s, and Blarney urged the return of the 9th D iv is io n .
At the Advisory War Council on 3 June C urtin  read E v a t t 's  cables, 
the notes o f h is  discussion  with  MacArthur, and the report by the 
A u stralian  service  c h ie fs . The Council recommended that the conclusions 
should be embodied in  a cable to E v a tt , but  that the d raft  should be
126 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Melbourne, 1 June 1942 , p resen t :
C u r tin , MacArthur, Shedden and Sutherland , MP 1217 , Box 1.
12 7 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Melbourne, 2 June 1942 , p re se n t :
C u r tin , Shedden, Blarney, Royle, Jones , Zoc.cit.
12 8 . I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to follow  the Chiefs  o f  S t a f f 's  argument about the 
twelve d iv is io n s . Of the th irteen  d iv is io n s  then in  A u s tra lia , only one 
was described  by Land Headquarters as f i t  for o ffens ive  operations. And
of the 36 brigades  or eq u iv alent  in  A u s tr a lia , only 10 were f i t  for o ffensive  
op eratio n s . O f those, only four were experienced , and three were American 
and they proved in  November 1942 that they were not yet ready for o ffensive  
op eratio n s . Horner, Crisis of Command, p p .302-304.
129 . Report by General Blarney, the C h ief  o f  the Naval S t a f f  and the C hief 
of the A ir  S t a f f  on Cablegrams ET 30 , 31 , 32 and 33 from  the M in ister  for 
E xtern al A f f a i r s , 1 June 1 9 42 , MP 1217 , Box 574 and Blarney Papers 1 .2 .
1 3 0 . In  a letter  to Curtin  on 30 May 1942 Blarney had already stated  that 
i t  was a matter of urgency that a decision  on the 9th D iv is io n  should
be made as there was a need to organise reinforcem ents, MP 1 2 17 , Box 574 .
subm itted to MacArthur: 'The views o f  the A u stralian  Advisers are to
131
be expressed  as those o f  the Governm ent'. The Council accepted that
a large- scale invasion  o f A u s tra lia  was un likely  and urged an early
o ffen s iv e  against  Japan . P lanning  and preparation  would take some months,
132
but  ad d it io n a l  forces should be sent to A u s tr a lia . The fo llow in g
133
day Curtin  sent the d raft  cable to MacArthur for h is  comments.
The decisive  defeat  o f  the Japanese f le e t  at  Midway in  early  June 
had an im portant impact on str a teg ic  plann ing  in  A u s tr a lia . In deed , 
when the results  became known MacArthur r e a lis ed  that h is  dreams o f  
an o ffe n s iv e  could nov; become r e a l it y . Thus on 8 June he urged M arshall
to send him troops trained  in  amphibious operations for an immediate
134 .
o ffe n s iv e , and E v a tt , now m  W ashington , advised  Curtin  that the
135
time was r ig h t  for MacArthur to make personal representations to M arshall.
M acArthur's  optimism was confirm ed when on the morning o f 11 June
he told  C urtin  that 'the  secu rity  o f A u s tra lia  had been assured. I t
would now be merely in terpreted  as a tim id cry for help  i f  we were to
p e r s is t  in  demands for assistance  for the defense o f A u s t r a l i a ' . In
view o f  the changed str a teg ic  s itu a tio n  he advised  that the d raft
telegram  should not be sent and he recommended that Evatt should return 
136
to A u s t r a lia . Later in  the day Curtin  repeated these views to the
Advisory War Council which agreed that they should review  the p o s it io n
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131 . Advisory War Council Minute 9 5 5 , Canberra, 3 June 1942 , CRS A 26 82 , 
V o l .V .
132 . G. Hermon G i l l ,  Royal Australian Navy3 1942-1945 (A ustralian  War 
Mem orial, Canberra, 1 9 6 8 ) , p . 1 0 7 , and le t t e r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 4 June
1 9 4 2 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
13 3 . L e tte r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 4 June 1 9 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
13 4 . Radio AG 9 1 3 , MacArthur to M arshall, 8 June 1942 , RG4, MacArthur 
Mem orial.
13 5 . Cable ES 6 5 , Evatt to C u r t in , 10 June 1942 , MP 12 17 , Box 47 4 .
13 6 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War C onference , Melbourne, 11 June 1942 , p resen t : 
C u r tin , MacArthur, Shedden and Sutherland , MP 1217 , Box 1 . Eleven days 
e a r l ie r , at the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference on 1 Jun e , MacArthur 
had s a id  that Evatt should return . loc.cit.
once they had received  M acArthur's  revised  appreciation .
On 17 June MacArthur addressed the Advisory War Council and 
reaffirm ed  h is  v iew s. In  h is  opinion there had been a complete trans­
formation o f  the war s itu a tio n  as i t  a ffe cte d  A u s t r a lia . In tern a lly  
there had been a tremendous accomplishment, not only in  the s e r v ic e s , 
but in  the general war e f fo r t . A fter  surveying the improvement in  the 
navy , army, a irforce  and p ro d u c tiv ity , MacArthur then turned to the 
e xtern al s itu a t io n . He claim ed that the Battle  o f the Coral Sea had been
the most cru cia l  in c id en t  o f  the war in so fa r  as 
A u stralia  was concerned . . .  A u s tra lia  was in  grave 
danger up to the time of the Coral Sea action .
The resu lts  of that action and successes gained 
at Midway Is la n d  has assured the defensive  
p o s it io n  o f  A u s t r a lia .
From the s tr a teg ica l  p o in t  o f v iew , we should 
take the in it ia t iv e  and not w ait  results in  other 
th eatres . Our aim should be to str ike  at Japanese 
bases in  the isla n d s  to the north and throw the 
enemy bomber line  back 700 m iles.
The greatest weakness of the present set  up is  that 
there is  too much str a teg ic a l  control in  London 
and W ashington . General MacArthur sa id  that i f  the 
d ecisio n  were le f t  to him he would attack now, even 
in  the face o f a ta c tica l  d e fea t , in  order to destroy 
the Japanese psychology o f  in i t ia t iv e .
The remainder o f M acArthur's  speech w as , in  essence , a p lea  for  support
for h is  theory that the Second Front should be in it ia t e d  in  the South-
West P a c if ic  A rea , and i f  given the necessary troops and arms, he
138
would undertake an o ffens ive  to retake Rabaul and New Guinea.
I t  was probably  a fte r  this  meeting that Menzies told  Sutherland , 
who had been p re se n t , that he would like  to 'th ro ttle  MacA' because 
o f h is  exaggerated  pra ise  o f  the government. He agreed that MacArthur 
had s t if fe n e d  morale and had gained  considerable  equipment when people
170
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13 7 . Advisory War Council Minute 9 6 0 , M elbourne, 11 June 1942 , CRS A 2 6 8 2 , 
V o l. V.
13 8 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .9 6 7 , 17 June 1 9 42 , CRS A 2 6 8 2 , V o l .V .
had turned a 'nasty  c o l o u r ',  but he fe lt  that the 'Germany F ir s t ' decision
139
was the r ig h t  o n e .
171
W hile the government must have welcomed M acArthur's  statement 
that A u s tr a lia  was secure , they would not a ffo rd  to t e l l  the p u b l ic . They 
could not allow  the tempo o f  the war e f fo r t  to slacken . On 11 June 
Forde said  that A u s tra lia  was about to enter the worst perio d  o f  the 
140 . 
w ar . On 17 June, in  a national broadcast, C urtin  s a id  that i t  was
141
p o ss ib le  that A u s tra lia  could be lo s t , and on 25 June he again  spoke
142
to the nation  and sa id  that Japan s t i l l  had the in it ia t iv e .
But what o f the decisio n  over the return o f  the 9th D iv isio n ?
Just  as the s itu a tio n  in  the P a c if ic  had seemed to improve, events
elsewhere were causing  A l l ie d  leaders around the world to have grave
fe a r s . The German U-boats in  the A tla n tic  were engaged in  th e ir  most
su ccessfu l b a ttle  so fa r . With the f a l l  of Tobruk (20 June) and Sevastapol
there was concern le st  the Germans would link  up in  the Middle East .
143
General M arshall thought i t  was 'a  very black h o u r ',  and Curtin  was
144
'very  d isapp o inted ' w ith  the unexpected reverses in  the Middle E a s t .
In  these circum stances, on 2 3 June Shedden saw MacArthur and Blarney,
. . 145
and both advised  against the reca ll  o f the 9th D iv is io n  for the p resen t .
139 . Colonel G .H . W ilk in s o n 's  Jo u rn al , quoted in  C. Thorne, 'M acArthur, 
A u s tr a lia  and the B r it is h , 1942- 1943: The Secret Journal o f  M acArthur's 
B r it is h  L ia is o n  O f f ic e r  (Part 1 ) ' ,  Australian Outlook, V o l .2 9 , N o .l ,  A p ril  
19 7 5 . MacArthur later  claim ed that Menzies had sa id  to Sutherland that
the Commander-in-Chief was working in  too much with  the government. Suther­
land had r e p lie d , 'What do you want him to do - fig h t  w ith  them? He 
would work just  as closely  with any other Governm ent'. Notes o f  D iscussions 
[by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , B r isb an e ,
20-26 October 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 2.
14 0 . Sydney Morning Herald, 12 June 1942 .
14 1 . H aslu ck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 1 6 8 .
14 2 . Ibid. , p . 173 .
14 3 . J .  Toland , The Rising Sun (London, 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 348 .
1 4 4 . F .T .  Smith Reports, 1 July  1942 , MS 4 6 7 5 , NLA.
145 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 23 June 1942 , CRS A 81 6 , item 
5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2 .
That same day Curtin  signed  a War Cabinet Agendum with that recommendation,
147
and i t  was endorsed by the War Cabinet (30 June) and the Advisory
148
War Council (1 J u l y ) . During the same p erio d  the B r it is h  government
advised  that the prom ised delivery  of the Spitfire  squadrons would be
149
delayed , and the A u stralian  government very reluctantly  concurred.
Meanwhile M acArthur's s t a f f  had prepared grandiose and fa n c ifu l
plans to capture Rabaul in  two w e e k s .^  ^ F in a lly , on 2 July  the Jo in t
C hiefs  o f S t a f f  issued  a d irectiv e  ordering  o ffensive  operations w ith
the ultim ate ob ject  o f s e iz in g  and occupying the New Britain-New Ireland- 
151
New Guinea area . At the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference on 17 July
MacArthur s a id  that his  own plan  was better  than that r e su lt in g  from.
15 2
the JCS d ir e c t iv e , but he was nevertheless preparing  to advance to
the north coast o f Papua, and on 20 July  he opened h is  headquarters in
153
Brisbane to take charge o f  the o ffe n s iv e .
I t  can be seen that during  h is  f ir s t  four months in  A u s tra lia  
(17 March to 17 July) MacArthur had an important impact on A u stralian  
str a teg ic  decision-m aking. On 20 July  the CGS, General Sturdee , described  
the s it u a t io n :
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14 6 . War C abinet Agendum 2 7 5 /1 9 4 2 , 23 June 1942 , CPS A 2 6 7 0 , item 2 7 5 /1 9 4 2
147 . War Cabinet Minute 2 2 15 , 30 June 1942 , lo c .dt .
1 4 8 . Advisory War Council Minute 9 7 9 , 1 July  1942 , CRS A 2 6 82 , V o l .V .
14 9 . Advisory War Council Minute 9 7 5 , 1 July  19 42 , lo o .d t .
1 5 0 . Morton, op .cit.,  p p .297- 298. One o f  M acArthur's biographers wrote 
th a t : 'For  a w hile  in  June i t  seems that euphoria  was unrestrained  both 
in  Washington and Melbourne probably because o f the Midway triumph and the 
desire  to follow up quickly  before the Japanese recovered th e ir  b a la n c e ' .  
Jam es, op .cit.,  V o l . I I ,  p . 188 .
151 . Morton, op.oit., p . 61 9 .
15 2 . Prime M in is t e r 's  War C onference , Canberra, 17 July  19 4 2 , MP 12 1 7 ,
Box 1 . See also  F .T .  Smith Reports, 17 July  1 9 42 , MS 4675 NLA.
15 3 . Reports of General Mac Arthur, Vol. I , p . 55 . When M acArthur's head­
quarters moved to Brisbane a branch of the Department o f Defence was 
e s ta b lis h e d  at h is  headquarters to act as a l ia is o n  o ff ic e  between Mac­
Arthur  and Shedden. (Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, 17 July  1 9 4 2 , MP 
1 2 1 7 , B o x .l . )  The l ia is o n  o f f ic e r  was Mr A .D .G .  Adam who remained in  
Brisbane u n t il  December 1942 when he was replaced by a c lerk .
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There is  a very close co llaboratio n  between the 
A ustralian  Prime M in ister  and General MacArthur 
on matters of broad str a teg ic  p o licy  a ffe ctin g  
the South West P a c if ic  A rea , and i f  the A ustalian  
Chiefs  of S t a f f  subm itted an appreciation  to 
obtain  A ustralian  War Cabinet agreement, such 
appreciation  w ould , no doubt, be referred  for 
General M acArthur's v iew s, and p ossibly  a rather 
awkward p o sitio n  would a r is e , as two o f  the 
A u stralian  C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  are regarded in  the 
A l l ie d  set up in  this area almost e n tir ely  as 
housekeepers. We naturally  do not wish to take 
any action  which would upset the present harmony 
and cooperation which e x ists  w ith  General M acArthur's 
H eadquarters .1 54
During  these four months there had been l it t le  a ltern ative  but
for the a l l ie s  to remain on the d e fen siv e . In  such a s itu atio n  strategic
d iscu ss io n  revolved around ways to persuade Washington and London to
send a d d it io n a l  fo rces , rather than about the d isp o sitio n  o f  forces
w ith in  the SWPA. But w ith  M acArthur's  d ecis io n  to embark on o ffen s iv e
o p eratio n s , confirm ed by the JCS D irectiv e  o f  2 Ju ly , matters o f
str a teg ic  deployment became im portant, and a question was thereby
raised  as to how much the A ustralian s  should attempt to in fluence  this
aspect o f  strategy . Since MacArthur had become the governm ent's
p r in c ip a l  m ilitary  a d v iser , there was l it t l e  role for the A u stralian
Chiefs  o f  S t a f f .  Curtin  had stated  that 'm ilita ry  matters [were] for
m ilitary  men and neither  the Government nor the Parliam ent [would]
155
override  th e ir  d e c is io n s '.  MacArthur was therefore in  a p o sitio n
o f supreme power, and the only advisers in  a p o s it io n  to present d iffe r e n t  
views to C urtin  were Blarney and Shedden.
The Command Framework
A u s tra lia  could in fluence  a l l ie d  strategy  in  a number o f ways.
At the topmost level the government could  seek to a lter  a l l ie d  global
154 . L e tte r , Sturdee to Smart, 20 July  1 9 4 2 , AWM 4 2 5 /1 1 /1 2 .
155 . Quoted in  Bulletin , 8 A p r il  1942 , p . 6 .
strategy  and p r io r it ie s  by diplom atic approaches in  London and W ashington. 
O ften  these approaches were in  support o f s im ilar  attempts by MacArthur.
At a lower le v e l , the A u stralian  Prime M inister  could attempt to persuade 
MacArthur to follow  a p a rtic u la r  course of actio n . As m entioned,
C u rtin  looked to MacArthur for advice , and i t  was not u n til  later  in  
the war that he attempted to in fluence  MacArthur. F in a lly , at the level 
o f  e x ec u tio n , A u stralian  m ilitary  men could attempt to persuade MacArthur 
and h is  s t a f f  o f the wisdom of a p a r t ic u la r  proposal. But the e f fe c t iv e ­
ness o f  this  line  o f  approach depended to a large degree upon the 
framework o f  command.
On 18 March, the day a fter  he arrived  in  A u s t r a lia , MacArthur was 
inform ed by General M arshall in  Washington that as Supreme Commander he 
would not be e l ig ib le  to re ta in  d irec t  command of any na tio n al fo rce .
I t  was intended  that General Brett  would command the a l l ie d  a ir  fo rces ,
Adm iral Leary would command the naval fo rces , and an A ustralian  o f f ic e r
156
would command the ground fo rces . However, MacArthur planned to keep the
A u s tra lia n  and American ground forces separated  under their  own commanders,
and he foreshadowed the method o f operations which he was to eventually
in s t it u t e  the follow ing  y ear . He planned to create task forces 't o  meet
157
t a c t ic a l  req u irem en ts '. M arshall strongly  opposed the suggestion
for separate commands and advised  MacArthur that since the A ustralians
formed the m ajority  o f h is  land forces an A ustralian  should be given
158
command o f  both American and A ustralian  fo rces . MacArthur agreed, and
General Blarney was appointed Commander of the A l l ie d  Land Forces, but 
the events o f  the follow ing  years showed that MacArthur never 
inten ded  that Blarney should exercise  command over American forces .
156 . S ig n a l  73 9 , M arshall to MacArthur, 18 March 1 9 42 , quoted in  A .D . 
Chandler J r .  ( e d ) , The Papers of Dwight David Eisenhower. The War Years , 
V o l . l ,  (Johns Hopkins, Baltim ore , 1 9 7 2 ) ,  p p .189- 191.
15 7 . S ig n a l  3 , MacArthur to M arshall, 21 March 1942 , OPD Exec 10 , item 7D, 
RG 16 5 , N ational Archives .
15 8 . S ig n a l  8 1 0 , M arshall to MacArthur, 22 March 1942 , OPD Exec item  I ,  
loc.cit.
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MacArthur also  re s is ted  M a rs h a ll 's  e ffo rts  to ensure that General
Headquarters (GHQ) South-West P a c if ic  Area was a truly  a l l ie d  headquarters.
M acArthur 's  d irective  was m odelled upon that issued  for the ABDA Command,
and W a v e ll 's  headquarters had in cluded  B r it is h , Dutch, A ustralian  and
American s t a f f  o ff ic e r s  from three serv ices . But of the eleven senior
p o sitio n s  on M acArthur's headquarters s t a f f , a ll  were f i l l e d  by American
army o f f ic e r s , and o f those, e ig h t  had come out of the P h ilip p in e s  w ith
159
MacArthur. This 'Bataan  Gang' resented  the in trusion  of o u ts id e rs ,
and as one senior  s t a f f  o f f ic e r  noted , they formed 'a n  exclu sive  l i t t l e  
160
c o t e r i e '.  Tho leader o f  the group was the C h ief  of S t a f f ,  Major-
General Richard K . Sutherland , and MacArthur proposed to promote a number
o f  others to f i l l  important p o sitio n s  on his  new headquarters . When
he put this  to W ashington , General M arshall, who had been astonished
that MacArthur had taken most o f h is  s t a f f  from the P h il ip p in e s , leaving
161
no senior  s t a f f  o f f ic e r  w ith  General W a in w n g h t , rep lied  that the
P resid en t  fe lt  't h a t  a number of h igher  p o sitio n s  on your s t a f f  should
162
be occupied by Dutch and p a rtic u la r ly  A ustralian  o f f i c e r s ' .  There
was nothing  in  M acArthur's d irective  s p e c if ic a lly  requiring  him to 
appoint A u stralian  o f f ic e r s , and M a rs h a ll 's  urging had l it t l e  e f fe c t .
He told  M arshall that there were no 'q u a l i f ie d  Dutch o f f ic e r s ' in  
A u s tra lia  and that the A ustralian s  d id  not have enough s t a ff  o ffic e r s
for th e ir  own rap idly  expanding army: 'There  is  no prospect of obtain ing
. . .  . 163
q u a l i f ie d  senior  s t a f f  o ffic e r s  from the A u s t r a l ia n s '.
159 . c .  Lee and R. Henschel, Douglas MacArthur (Henry H o lt , New York,
1 9 5 2 ) ,  p . 166 .
16 0 . Thorpe, East Wind3 Rain, p . 91 .
161 . W. Frye , Marshalls Citizen Soldier (Bobbs- M errill, In d ia n a p o lis , 1 9 4 7 ) , 
p . 307 .
16 2 . Radio , Marshall to MacArthur, 9 A p ril  1 9 42 , quoted in  Chandler, 
o p .c it ., p . 2 32 .
1 6 3 . S ig n a l , MacArthur to M arshall, 15 June 1942 , RG 16 5 , OPD Exec 10 , 
item 7D, National A rchives .
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At th is  early  stage the in fluence  of the brusque , short-tempered,
164
capable but autocratic  Sutherland  can already be detected . General
Blarney commented later  that MacArthur had said  that he wanted an
165
in tegrated  headquarters but that Sutherland was against i t .  There is
no d irect  confirm ation o f  this v iew , but in  later  months and years there
is  ample evidence to show that senior American s t a f f  o ffic er s  opposed
166
an a l l ie d  concept, w hile  MacArthur seemed w il l in g  to tolerate i t .
It  was true that the A ustralian s  were hard-pressed to provide s t a f f  
o ff ic e r s  for th e ir  own army, but  since the A ustralian  government had 
made a p o in t  o f pro v id ing  s t a f f  o ff ic e r s  for W a v e ll 's  command, i t  is  
hard  to b e lieve  that they would not have done so for MacArthur. Moreover, 
there is  no record o f  MacArthur having  asked for senior  A ustralian  s t a f f  
o f f ic e r s .
Nor, i t  seems was MacArthur e n th u s ia stic  about plans that Blarney's 
Land Headquarters (LHQ) should have an a l l ie d  s t a f f . Blarney wrote 
later  that h is  'requests  for  American o ff ic e r s  to esta b lis h  a jo in t
167
s t a f f  were met w ith  face- saving acceptance that was completely i n e f f e c t i v e ' . 
MacArthur re a lis e d  that the senior  A u stralian  s t a f f  o ffic er s  had vastly  
more experience than th e ir  American counterparts, and he warned 
W ashington that the despatch to A u s tr a lia  of poor o ffic er s  would resu lt
176
1 6 4 . M acArthur's  a irforce  commander, General Kenney, wrote that MacArthur 
s a id  to Sutherland , 'The  trouble w ith you, D ick , I am a fr a id , is  you
are a natural-born a u t o c r a t '. G .C . Kenney, General Kenney Reports (New 
York , 1 9 4 9 ) ,  p . 152 . Years later  Kenney commented about Sutherland :
'He was an arrogant, opin ionated  and very ambitious guy . . .  I d o n 't  think 
Sutherland  was ever loyal to MacArthur. He pretended that he was and
I think  MacArthur thought he w as, but I w o u ld n 't  trust h im '. (Interview  
quoted in  James, op.cit., V o l . I I ,  p . 2 0 1 .)  For further comments about 
Sutherland  see the au th o r 's  Crisis of Command, p p .6 5 , 6 6 .
165 . Interview  with General Blarney, 21 July  1 9 47 , Gavin Long N otes, 11 0 , 
AWM.
166 . In  p a rt ic u la r  see Chapter N in e , p . 429 .
167 . L e tte r , Blarney to Shedden, 19 February 1945 , Blarney Papers , 2 3 .1 1  
and MP 12 1 7 , Box 57 0 , F ile  N o .2. This le tter  is  reproduced in  more 
d e t a il  in  Chapter Ten.
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in  a 'b la ck  eye for US when p laced  with experienced  and capable
168
A u s tra lia n  o f f i c e r s '.
Yet despite  M acArthur's  comments, i t  seems that generally  speaking
the Americans had a low opinion  o f  A ustralian  s t a f f  work and on 2 July
MacArthur asked M arshall to send q u a lif ie d  s t a f f  o ffic e r s  for service
169
w ith  the A ustralian  fo rces . These proved to be fine  o f f ic e r s , but
General E ich elb erger  re ca lled  that when he was introduced to h is
A u stralian  Army commander, General Lavarack, the latter  'laugh ed  about
the fact  that General MacArthur had fe lt  i t  necessary to assign  American
s t a f f  o ff ic e r s  to A ustralian  s t a f f . He po in ted  out that the senior
o ffic e r s  were veterans o f  World War I . . .  and that three regular
A u s tra lia n  d iv is io n s  had returned from the Middle East where they had
170
been in  combat against  the Germ ans'.
The only concession to the Australians was the appointment o f a
l ia is o n  o f f ic e r  at GHQ, b u t , in  the early  days at le a s t , the Am ericans,
171
w ith  some ju s t i f ic a t io n , looked upon the o f f ic e r  as an A u stralian  spy.
One American described  GHQ as a dumping ground for poor A ustralian  
172
o f f ic e r s , and the A ustralians  at Land Headquarters d id  not seem to
173
be prepared to use the GHQ s t a f f .  On the other hand the senior s t a f f
16 8 . S ig n al AG 152 , MacArthur to A .G . War, 8 A p r il  1942 , Sutherland Papers, 
Correspondence w ith  War Department, N ational A rchives .
16 9 . Radio , MacArthur to M arsh all , 2 July  1942 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
170 . E ich elb erger  D ic ta t io n s , Book 2 , 11 /1- 19 . From Professor Jay Luvaas. 
By 'r e g u la r ' he was r e fe rr in g  to the volunteer A IF  d iv is io n s .
171 . Interview  with Colonel W .L .  Rau, A ustralian  Senior M ilita r y  L ia iso n  
O f f ic e r , GHQ, 1943- 1944, GHQ, 30 June 1943 , Gavin Long Diary N o .2 , AWM.
The f ir s t  A ustralian  l ia is o n  o f f ic e r  was Colonel J .D .  Rogers, a capable , 
d iplom atic s t a f f  o f f ic e r  who had served as Blarney's ch ie f  in te llig e n c e  
o f f ic e r  in  the Middle East . Gavin Long wrote in  h is  notebook: ' I t  has 
been s a id  that [Rogers] could have contributed  more than he d id  to cooper­
ation between LHQ and M acA 's HQ. " I  see the fine It a l ia n  hand o f  Rogers in  
t h i s " ,  sa id  [MacArthur's p u b lic  relations  o ffic er ]  D i l l e r ' . Gavin Long 
Notebook N 2 7 /3 1 .
172 . Interview  with B r ig a d ie r  L .C . Lucas, Deputy Engineer- in- Chief, 
A u stralian  Army, 20 February 1975 .
17 3 . Interview  with Mrs Beryl Daley , General Kenney 's  wartime secretary ,
24 July  1974 .
o ffic e r s  at GHQ rarely  sought out the Land Headquarters s t a f f . This 
situ atio n  was not helped by the fact that the commanders o f  the A l l ie d  
A ir  and Naval forces were in  the same b u ild in g  as GHQ (the AMP B u ild in g
in  B r is b a n e ) , while  Land Headquarters was some twelve kilom etres
. 174 
away at S t . Lu c ia .
Later there were a few A ustralian s  in  junio r  p o sitio ns  at GHQ, and
an A u stralian  w as, for a w h ile , head o f one of M acArthur's p lann ing  
175
teams, but there was never any attempt to organise an a l l ie d  s t a f f
like  that of Eisenhower or Mountbatten. A u s tra lia  was never represented
176
on the operations s t a f f . Furthermore, i t  should be emphasised that i t
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was not a jo in t  s t a f f ; there was no strong naval representatio n , 
and the American airfo rce  had not yet been separated  from control by 
the army.
Obviously  the A ustralian  representatives on M acArthur's s t a f f  
had l it t l e  hope of in flu e n c in g  h is  strategy . The only p o s s ib il it y  
lay w ith  General Blarney, in  h is  capacity  as Commander o f the A l l ie d  
Land Forces. Blarney's problems w il l  be elaborated  upon sh o rtly , but 
for the moment i t  is in stru ctiv e  to observe the American reaction  to 
Blarney's p o s it io n , and also  to the e ffo rts  of General B rett , the A l l ie d  
A irfo rce  Commander, to integrate  the A ustralian  and American a ir fo rc e s . 
B rett  had organised  a jo in t  a l l ie d  a ir  s t a f f .  His ch ief  o f  s t a f f  
was an A u s tr a lia n , the deputy ch ief  and senior a ir  s t a f f  o f f ic e r  were
174 . Interview  with B r ig a d ie r  J .D .  Rogers, L ia ison  O f f ic e r  at GHQ, 1942 ,
25 June 19 74 .
175 . This o f f ic e r  was B r ig a d ie r  T .W . White who was appointed in  November
1 9 4 3 . L e tte r . MacArthur to Blarney, 20 November 19 43 , RG4, MacArthur 
Mem orial. MacArthur had three plann ing  teams; B lu e , headed by W h ite ,
Red, headed by Colonel Peyton, US Army, and W h ite , headed by Captain 
Tarbuck , USN.
17 6 . Rogers in terview .
1 7 7 . There was a naval l ia is o n  o f f ic e r , i n i t ia l l y  Captain Carson. Later 
there was a naval captain  in  each of the operations and plann ing  s t a f f s , 
but in  each case they were out-numbered by about 7 to 1 by army o f f ic e r s .
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Am ericans, and the other senior positio ns  were d iv ided  roughly equally
between A ustralians  and Am ericans.
In  June 1942 Major-General Robert C . Richardson v is it e d  A u s tra lia
178
to in vestig ate  these m atters, and he discerned  two d istu rbin g  fa c ts .
The f ir s t  was th at , as a resu lt  o f B r e t t 's  o rg a n isa tio n , in  some cases
American a ir  units were commanded by A u stralian s . This was p a rtic u la r ly
g a llin g  to the C h ie f  o f  the US Army A ir  Forces, Lieutenant- General
H .H . A rnold , who complained that 'Our  combat units are not being
employed in  accordance w ith  War Department doctrines and p r in c ip le s  . . .
The A ustralian s  have been operating  our combat units in  accordance
w ith  th e ir  doctrines and no attempt has been made on our p art  to gain  
179
co ntrol.
The other matter was that the American ground troops in  A u s tra lia
were under the command o f  General Blarney. Richardson wrote to Marshall
that 'the  p resent organisation  was an a ffro n t  to na tio n al pride  and
180
to the d ign ity  o f  the American A rm y '. MacArthur was already aware
of this  problem and requested that Richardson remain in  A u s tra lia  to *
command an American corps co nsistin g  o f the 32nd and 41st  US D iv is io n .
Richardson agreed, but nonetheless continued to return to America
181
to report to M arshall.
17 8 . General Eisenhower to Richardson, 16 May 19 42 , RG 165 , OPD Exec 
33 3 , item  17 , N ational Archives .
17 9 . Memorandum for AC o f S from Arnold , 22 July  1 9 42 , RG 165 , OPD 381 , 
A u s tr a lia  5 . 2 3 .4 2 ,  N ational Archives .
18 0 . Memorandum for C o f S from Richardson, 28 July  1 9 4 2 , RG 1 6 5 , OPD 
33 3 , item  1 7 , National Archives .
181 . E ich elb erger  D ic ta t io n s , Book 4 , p .V I I I - 3 6 . E ichelb erger  s a id  
MacArthur told  him that Richardson had agreed to become the corps 
commander, but when he had asked to go on to the US from Noumea he had 
known that he would never return . See also  Radio , M arshall to Richardson 
(in  Noum ea), 7 July  1 9 42 , RG 3 1 9 , F ile  ABC 381 A ustralia  ( 1 .2 3 .4 2 )
and Richardson to WD, 8 July  1942 , RG 16 5 , OPD Exec 1 0 , item 1 6 , National 
A r c h iv e s .
When Richardson returned to Washington i t  was decided  that an
American corps should be set  up in  A u s tr a lia , but  he again refused
to accept command. He po in ted  out that h is  corps would come under the
command o f  an A ustralian  army commander who in  turn was under the command
o f  General Blarney: 'Such  an organization  is  in im ical to the proper
combat development o f American Forces . . .  They breed fr ic t io n  and
resentment because human nature and national pride  are in v o l v e d '. He
continued that American o ff ic e r s  in  A u stra lia  had no confidence in  the
A u stralian  command and s t a f f ,  who were 'c o lo n ia l  o f f ic e r s ' and mostly
no n- p ro fessio nals , and furthermore that as p art  o f  the army o f a great
n a t io n , they fe lt  that they were e n t it le d  to be under American command,
182
and not be incorporated  in  an A ustralian  army for o p e r a t io n s '. In
essence , Richardson b e lie v e d  that the formation o f an American corps
would not remedy the s itu atio n  since the corps commander would be
183
p laced  under a non- professional A ustralian  d r u n k '. With this
he was re fe rr in g  to Blarney. Nevertheless in  h is  report Richardson
s a id  th a t , 'There  was no resentment of the A ustralians  them selves,
184
but merely o f  the system of c o n t r o l '.
R ichardso n 's  p o int  was accepted by the s t a f f  o f  the War Department, 
but they were not in  agreement that i t  was necessarily  v a l id , for they 
were co nfident that MacArthur would be able to handle the s itu a t io n . 
F in a lly , however, i t  was suggested that MacArthur should be advised  that
182 . R ichardso n 's  Report to C h ie f  o f S t a f f ,  9 June 19 42 , RG 165 , OPD
Exec 2 , item I ,  N ational A rc h iv es , and Memorandum for C of S by Richardson,
28 July  19 42 , RG 16 5 , OPD 333 , item 17 .
1 8 3 . Minutes o f Conference , 26 July  1 9 42 , RG 165 , OPD 333 , item  17 ,
N ational A rchives .
18 4 . The AAF in  A u s tra lia  to the Summer o f 1 9 42 , typescript  dated
July  19 44 , compiled by A ss istan t  C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  In te llig e n c e  H is to r ic a l  
D iv is io n , AWM.
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oneway o f overcoming the problem would be to form a task force under
an American commander when combat was imminent, and for the American
corps to be assigned  to the task force . Major-General Handy, an
A ss istan t  C h ie f  o f S t a f f , fe lt  that MacArthur was aware o f American
p o lic y  and was sure that h is  request for a corps commander and s t a f f
was made w ith  such a purpose in  mind, and therefore the establishm ent
185
o f a corps would remedy the s itu a t io n .
MacArthur has often been accused, and w ith ju s t i f ic a t io n , o f
underm ining Blarney's authority  as Commander o f the A l l ie d  Land Forces
186
by removing American combat troops from h is  command in  operations .
I t  is  in te r e s t in g  to no te , therefore , that this  was the approach 
recommended by the Operations and Plans D iv is io n  o f  the War Department. 
M acArthur's  command was not seen as an A l l ie d  one, but as an American 
one w hich , by force of circum stance, was compelled to cooperate w ith  
other foreign  fo rces , or as General Handy commented, 'The A ustralian s  
have 3 5 0 ,0 0 0  troops and a l i t t l e  break for them seems to be n e c e s s a r y '. '
General M arshall was angry that Richardson had refused  the command 
in  A u s tr a lia . E xp la in in g  the decision  to General E ic h elb erg er , who was 
to go to A u s tra lia  in stead  o f  Richardson, Marshall told  him that he
185 . Memorandum, Handy to M arshall, 3 August 1942 and Radio message to 
MacArthur, 3 August 1 9 4 2 , RG 165 , OPD 33 3 , item 17 , National Archives .
The message to MacArthur advised  him that the corps headquarters would
'd o  much to fa c il it a t e  the employment o f  United  States Forces in  A u stralia  
as a national force' . This message was apparently  not sent to MacArthur.
I t  w i l l  be re ca lled  that on 21 March MacArthur had advised  M arshall 
that he intended  to organise  task forces to meet ta c tica l  requirements.
See above p .
18 6 . G. Long, The Final Campaigns (Australian  War Memorial, Canberra , 1 9 6 3 ) , 
p . 5 9 9 , says MacArthur changed the o rg a n iza tio n  by 's t e a lt h ' and 's u b te r ­
f u g e s '.  See also  W illoughby and Cham berlain , MacArthur 1941-1951 (Heinemann, 
Melbourne, 1 9 5 6 ) ,  p . 12 4 ; W. Kreuger, From Down Under to Nippon (Combat 
Forces P r e ss , W ashington , 1 9 5 3 ) ,  p . 10 ; G. Long, MacArthur as Military 
Corrmander (B atsfo rd , London, 1 9 6 9 ) ,  p . 122 ; E .G . Keogh, South West Pacific3 
1941-1945 (Greyflow er, Melbourne, 1 9 6 5 ) ,  p p . 265 , 473 .
1 8 7 . Minutes o f Conference , 26 July  19 4 2 , RG 16 5 , OPD 333 , item 17 ,
N ational A rchives , (W a s h .) .
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had been selected  because i t  was b e lie v ed  that he could get along
w ith  MacArthur. E ichelb erger  re ca lled  that M arshall then
launched into  a tirade  again st  General 
Richardson . . .  With h is  arr iv al back here , 
he at once began to get h im self out o f this 
combat d e ta il  claim ing that he d id  not want 
to fig h t  under the A ustralians  and p a rtic u la r ly  
under General Blarney who had been selected  by 
agreement o f  Americans as C h ief  of the A llie d  
Ground Forces. He ca lled  Blarney the C h ief 
o f  Police  o f M elbourne, A u s t r a l i a .I®8
Apparently  Richardson had complained at length to M arshall about the
189
person al l i f e  of General Blarney.
Probably only Richardson knew the real reason why he refused  the 
. 1 9 0
command in  A u s tr a lia . i t  is  c le a r , however, that he was a fr a id
that h is  career would be harmed by the unsatisfactory  command arrange­
ment which at that time MacArthur seemed happy to perpetuate .
The f ir s t  step to r e c t ify  th is  s itu atio n  took place in  early  July  
when Maj.or-General George C . Kenney was ordered to A u stra lia  to relieve  
B r e tt . Kenney was b r ie fe d  to take 'co rrectiv e  actio n ' to change the 
s itu a t io n  that had caused Richardson to complain that 'no  American 
Commander should be placed  in  the p o s it io n  o f  be ing  dependent on
18 8 . E ich elb erg er  D ic ta t io n s , Book 4 , p p .V I I I- 3 5 , V II I- 3 6 . In  a d d itio n , 
E ich elb erger  reca lled  (p .V III- 3 7 )  th at : 'I n  this  connection, I must say 
that I found Gen. Blarney a very fa ir  commander and I  would have taken 
h is  judgement at any time far  above the three characters who were behind  
me in  the command chain - I re fer  to MacArthur, Krueger and S u t h e r la n d '.
189 . Ib id .,  p .V I I I - 3 7 .
1 9 0 . Richardson later  told MacArthur that he had wanted the Corps 
command but that M arshall had concluded that he was p re ju d iced  a fte r  
commenting on the 'unsoundness ' of the March d irective  to MacArthur. 
L e t t e r , Richardson to MacArthur, 9 August 1942 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial; 
Rad io , M arshall to MacArthur, 30 July  194 2 , M arshall L ib ra ry . R ichard­
s o n 's  s ig n a l  to M arshall, and E ic h e lb e r g e r ' s D ictatio ns  suggest that 
Richardson d id  not want the command. In  June 1945 MacArthur o ffered  
Richardson an army command which he refused . Jay Luvaas ( e d ) , Dear Miss 
Em, General Eichelberger 1s War in the Pacific, 1942-1945 (Greenwood 
P r e s s , W estport, Conn. 1 9 7 2 ) ,  p . 281 .
f o r e ig n e r s '.  This he proceeded to do , forming the 5th US A ir  Force
under h is  own command, and grouping the RAAF units together as the
192
RAAF op eratio nal command.
The replacement of Brett  caused some d isq u iet  in  the Advisory
War C o un cil , and when i t  met on 13 August the question was ra ised
as to whether an o f f ic e r , to whom A ustralian  combat forces had been
a llo c a te d , should be replaced  w ithout consultation  w ith  the government.
There was concern as to whether Blarney might be sim ilarly  replaced
193
and C urtin  prom ised to discuss the matter with MacArthur.
C urtin  must already have been fe e lin g  that he was on unsure ground
w ith  MacArthur. At the end o f June the Advisory War Council had asked
for a weekly statement of operation al a ir c r a ft  ca sualties  in  the South- 
. . 194
West P a c if ic  Area . MacArthur had refused  th is  request, p o in tin g
out that he was responsible  to the C h ie f  o f S t a f f  of the US Army
and was 'n o t  at liberty  to make such operation al reports to other
195
a g e n c ie s '.  He promised to make reports of losses o f  RAAF aeroplanes
i f  d e s ire d .
I t  was now abundantly clear that except for such leverage the 
A u s tra lia n  government could exert  as a resu lt  o f supplying combat 
forces to MacArthur, or any in fluence  that its  resident m inisters might 
have in  Washington or London, the strategy  to be employed for the defence
183
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1 9 1 . 'The AAF in  A u s tra lia  to the Summer of 1942 ' typescript  dated July  
1 9 4 4 , compiled by A ss istan t  C h ie f  o f A ir  S t a f f ,  In te llig e n c e  H is to r ic a l  
D iv is io n , p . 34 , AWM. Kenney wrote later  that M arshall 'had  told me in  
Washington that he d id n 't  think much o f m ixing n a t io n a lit ie s  in  the same 
o r g a n iz a t io n '. Kenney, op.cit., p . 6 3 .
1 9 2 . The problems o f  command in  the RAAF are dealt w ith in  Appendix 3*
19 3 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .1 0 3 2 , Melbourne, 13 August 1942 , CRS 
A 2 6 8 2 , item  V o l .5 .
1 9 4 . L e tte r , Shedden to MacArthur, 30 June 1 9 42 , CPS A 2 6 8 4 , item 1080 , 
p a rt  1 .
1 9 5 . L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r tin , 2 July  1 9 4 2 , Zoc.cit.
o f  A u s tra lia  was out o f  the hands o f that country. The minutes o f
the meeting of the Advisory War Council for 9 July  are illu m in a t in g :
' I t  was decided  that the request for regular reports o f operational
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losses in  the Southwest P a c if ic  Area should not be p r e s s e d '.
Government leaders had  been in  awe of MacArthur since h is  a r r iv a l  
in  A u s tra lia  and they b e lie v ed  that in  m ilitary  matters h is  advice 
should be followed at a l l  tim es.
At the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference in  Brisbane on 18 August 
C urtin  d iscussed  the matter of B r e t t 's  replacement w ith  MacArthur, who 
told  him that both Brett  and Adm iral Leary o f  the A l l ie d  Naval Forces 
had been appointed before  he had arrived  in  A u s tr a lia . He s a id  that 
the appointments o f Blarney, Brett  and Leary had been made by him in  
h is  capacity  as Commander-in-Chief, bu t  that the replacement o f  General 
Brett  had been made by the United States Chiefs  o f S t a f f .  He would 
be glad  to consult w ith the Prime M in ister  on any impending changes 
which might be contem plated. In  the case of General Blarney there could
'be  no question  o f any var iatio n  in  h is  status w ithout p r io r  consultation
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w ith  the government' .
I t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to b e liev e  that MacArthur was being  candid . W hilst
i t  is  true that the order to relieve  Brett  had come from W ashington,
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MacArthur had worked to ensure i t .  Furthermore, the idea  o f forming
a task force so that the command of American troops in  combat would
not remain w ith  General Blarney, was d e fin it e ly  a 'v a r ia t io n ' in  Blarney's
s ta tu s . MacArthur w as , however, careful not to antagonise Curtin  w ith
obvious breaches of this agreement. On 6 September he sent Curtin  a
m essage: 'US Navy Department w ishes to replace Admiral Leary by Admiral
, 199
Carpender. Both are most e x ce lle n t  men. Request your a p p r o v a l '.
1 9 6 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .9 9 3 , Canberra, 9 July 1942 , CRS A 
2 6 8 4 , item 1080 , Part 1.
197 . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, B r isb an e , 18 August
1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1.
1 9 8 . See the auth o r 's  Crisis of Command, p . 116 .
199 . MacArthur to C u r tin , 6 September 19 42 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
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Blarney's dual role as Commander-in-Chief o f  the A ustralian  M ilitary
Forces and Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces , presented  considerable
d i f f i c u l t i e s .  The f ir s t  duty required  h is  presence in  Melbourne, the
second in  Brisbane or New Guinea . Colonel E .G . Keogh has pointed  out
that this  arrangement was at variance w ith  the p r in c ip le s  of command
which  MacArthur had wished  to e s t a b l is h , namely to 'f r e e  the combat
echelons o f  a l l  a d m in istra tiv e , supply and p o l it ic a l  co nsid eratio ns ,
perm ittin g  uninterrupted  concentration on c o m b a t '. ^ ^  Keogh used the
example of the United Kingdom to suggest that A u s tra lia  should have
reta in ed  the M ilitary  Board and appointed a Commander-in-Chief of the 
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Home Forces . But he overlooked the fact  that the UK Army Council
remained responsible  for a number of overseas theatres as w ell  as for
the home th eatre , w hile  by March 1 9 4 2 , w ith  the exception o f  the 9th
D iv is io n  in  the Middle E a s t , a l l  o f A u s t r a l ia 's  forces were concentrated
for the defence o f  A u s tra lia  alone.
Despite  the very fine  work o f  Sturdee and Rowell i n  the f i r s t  months
a fte r  Japan entered  the w ar , in  the opinion  o f  General Berryman and other
senior  generals there was no altern ative  to the appointment o f a Commander
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in- Chief in  the emergency o f  March 1942 . Blarney's s ign als  with the
p r e f ix  'Z '  ensured immediate actio n . In d eed , the expansion and tra in in g
of the A ustralian  Army in mid 1942 was an im pressive fe a t , f a c il it a t e d
by the rap id  decisions  from Land Headquarters.
Eventually  Keogh seemed to concede that th e ir  might have been
m erit in  Blarney's appointment as Commander-in-Chief, for he concluded that
Even i f  the p r e v a ilin g  conditions in  A u stralia  
rendered necessary the replacement of the 
M ilitary  Board w ith  a Commander-in-Chief AMF,
2 0 0 . Keogh, op.cit.,  p p .472- 474.
2 01 . Ib id .,  p p .142-144.
2 0 2 . Berryman in terv ie w , 22 July  1944 .
i t  would have been fa r  better  i f  our Government 
had followed the B r it is h  example and avoided 
getting  the str ings  o f  re sp o n sib ility  crossed 
by allow ing the same o f f ic e r  to undertake the 
duties of operational commander as w e l l .^ 0 3
K eo g h 's  theory is  p e rsu a s iv e , but  he does not sp e ll  out exactly  how 
i t  would have worked. However the follow ing  organisation  might have worked. 
Blarney might have become Commander-in-Chief o f the AMF and been appointed 
Chairman of the C hiefs  of S t a f f  Committee. He would then have become 
C u r t in 's  p r in c ip a l  adviser on defence policy  and would have been present 
for  a l l  d iscussions  between MacArthur and C urtin . Another A u stralian  
army o f f i c e r , perhaps General Lavarack , might have been appointed Commander 
o f  the A l l ie d  Land Forces and as such , commander o f a l l  the A u stralian  
Army operational forces in  the SWPA. T ra in in g  and adm inistrative  units 
might have remained under Blarney's co ntrol, but th is  would not-have meant
that he would have been head o f merely the adm inistrative  side  of the army, 
for  through h is  constant presence at the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference 
he would have retained  some control over o peration s . Under such a 
scheme i t  would not have m attered i f  MacArthur had treated  h is  nominal • 
Land Force commander as a Task Force commander; as C u r t in 's  p r in c ip a l  
ad v iser  and re p re se n ta tiv e , Blarney would s t i l l  have been able to watch 
over A ustralian  in te r e s ts . At a later  stage of the war Blarney could 
have resumed control over the operational forces in  A u stra lia  leaving  
MacArthur w ith  an A u stralian  expeditionary  force .
The d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  in s t it u t in g  such a scheme would have been : 
f i r s t ,  and most im portantly , Shedden would not readily  have given up 
h is  p o s it io n  as p r in c ip a l  adviser  to the Prime M in ister . The government 
was su sp icio us  of the m ilitary  and would probably have accepted 
Sh ed d en 's  advice on this  m atter. Second, there would have been 
p erso n ality  problems w ith  the g en erals ; Blarney had l it t le  confidence 
in  Lavarack , Sturdee lacked active  experience in  the w ar , Bennett was
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2 0 3 . Keogh, op.cit., p . 144 .
not trusted  by Blarney and many other g en erals , Mackay was not equipped 
for the task , Morshead was s t i l l  overseas , and the other generals in  
March 1 9 4 2 , such as Row ell, Vasey and Robertson, were too ju n io r . T h ird , 
MacArthur might have o bjected  to Blarney's presence at the Prime M in is t e r 's  
War Conference , arguing that as A l l ie d  Commander-in-Chief he should be 
C u r t in 's  sole m ilitary  a d v ise r . But since the A ustralian s  formed the 
bulk  o f  h is  army he would have to agree had Curtin  had the courage to 
i n s i s t .  Fourth , Blarney might not have been able to work e f f ic ie n t ly  
and co rd ia lly  w ith  the Prime M in is te r , although this is  u n lik e ly . F i f t h , 
Blarney would not have had absolute  power over a l l  aspects o f the army, 
and he was anxious for as much power as p o s s ib le . On the other hand he 
would have been able to exert  more in fluence  on the government i f  he had 
been C u r t in 's  p r in c ip a l  a d v ise r .
Some of these d i f f ic u l t ie s  could have been overcome i f  the government 
p rev io u sly  had given the C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  a more important role in  
s tr a teg ic  policy- m aking, and i f  the government had looked to the Chairman 
o f  the C h iefs  o f S t a f f  for day to day strateg ic  and defence adv ice , 
rather than to the Secretary  o f the Department of Defence.
But faced  by the d i f f ic u l t ie s  o utlin ed  above i t  is  easy to understand 
why a weak and in experienced  government fa ile d  to in it ia t e  such a scheme. 
Another p o ss ib le  scheme would have been to separate the adm inistrative  
and operational functions o f the army: for exam ple, g iv ing  Blarney command 
o f  the operational side  and leaving  Sturdee as C h ief  of the General 
S t a f f  or nominal Commander-in-Chief. A s im ilar  scheme in  the A ir  Force 
(as described  in  Appendix 3) proved d isa stro u s . Adm ittedly p e rso n a lit ie s  
p layed  a part in  causing the ensuing  ch ao s , but the main problem was 
that the governm ent's p r in c ip a l  adviser  on a ir  m atters, the C h ief of the 
A ir  S t a f f ,  had absolutely  no re s p o n s ib ility  for op eratio n s , w hile  the 
c h ie f  operation al o f f ic e r  had no access to the Prime M in iste r . The 
s itu a t io n  w ith  the navy was s lig h tly  d if fe r e n t , as its  lim ited  s ize
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and ca p a b ility  meant that i t  could never play  any more than a 
supporting ro le .
Thus given  the weakness and inexperience o f the government, Blarney 
re a lis e d  that i f  he was to provide some degree of a check to the almost 
complete power o f MacArthur he needed to f i l l  the only two p o sitio n s  
ava ilab le  to him , namely Commander-in-Chief o f the AMF and Commander, 
A l l ie d  Land Forces. By virtue  of h is  role as Commander-in-Chief, Blarney 
had d irect  access to the Prime M in iste r , even i f  he was not present 
at  the v it a l  d iscussion s  between MacArthur and C urtin . The other ch iefs  
o f  s t a f f  could only present their  views e ith e r  through th e ir  respective  
m inisters or when asked at the Advisory War C o u n cil . By virtue  of h is  
role as Commander, A l l ie d  Land F orces , Blarney had more d ire c t  access to 
M acArthur's  strateg ic  plans than would have been p o ss ib le  had he been 
merely the commander of the A u stralian  Army's operational forces or the 
C h ie f  o f  the General S t a f f .  The importance of Blarney's dual role was 
heightened by the Prime M in is t e r 's  lack of m ilitary  knowledge.
The arrangement worked smoothly and e ffe c t iv e ly  u n t il  M acArthur's 
GHQ moved to B risb an e , forc ing  Blarney to follow  su it  and open Advanced 
Land Headquarters (Landops) in  B r isb an e . Blarney then found h im self in  the 
p o sit io n  o f having  to fly  between h is  operational headquarters in  Brisbane 
and h is  adm inistrative  headquarters in  Melbourne. At this  stage Blarney 
might have considered an attempt to persuade the government to in st itu te  
the o rganisation  described  above, but decided  against i t  because o f the 
d i f f ic u l t ie s  mentioned above. Lavarack was responsible  for the defence 
o f  the east  coast o f  A u s t r a l ia , and Rowell was given command o f a l l  the
forces in  New Guinea. V asey , Blarney's C h ie f  of S t a f f  at Landops, has
. . 204
t e s t i f ie d  that there was not a great deal of day-to-day work there .
Yet he was often p laced  in  the in vid io u s  p o s it io n , in  Blarney's absence,
of having  to argue the A u stralian  case to M acArthur's s t a f f .
204 . V a s ey 's  letters  to h is  w i f e , August-September 1942 , Vasey Papers.
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Blarney's problems in  managing h is  two appointments were in t e n s if ie d
by M acArthur's  concept o f  the role o f the Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces.
From the b eg inn ing  o f operations in  New Guinea i t  was obvious that
MacArthur w ished  to operate as h is  own land forces commander, and that
he intended  that operations should be conducted by task forces operating
under h is  personal co ntrol. Thus, follow ing  the Japanese landings in
Papua,he  suggested on 1 August that the 32nd US D iv is io n  should be
sent to New Guinea to operate d irec tly  under the control o f GHQ. This
move would have led  to an im possible command structure w ith  two separate
superior headquarters in  A u s tra lia  co ntro llin g  separate national forces
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in  one operation al area . Apparently Blarney talked  him out of that
fo lly . A g a in , on 14 Septem ber, MacArthur ordered E ichelb erger  to
prepare to command a task force alongside  that o f  Rowell in  New Guinea,
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but Sutherland  persuaded him to drop the scheme.
However, MacArthur was soon to get h is  own way, for when things
appeared to be going badly  in  New Guinea he persuaded Curtin  to send
Blarney there to act , in  e f f e c t , as a task force commander. This was
against  Blarney's w ishes and resu lted  in  the unfortunate dispute w ith ,
and eventual replacement o f  Lieutenant- General Rowell, the Commander 
207
New Guinea Force. Nor would MacArthur allow Blarney to return to
205 . R o w ell ,Full Circle, p . 1 1 0 . In  a le tter  to Major-General Orlando 
Ward, the US Arm y's C h ief o f M ilitary  H isto ry , on 6 A p r il  1 9 5 1 , Rowell 
wrote that Blarney 'was so concerned at  the p o s s ib il it y  o f the control of 
land operations p assin g  to GHQ that he had come to Brisbane from Melbourne 
to urge that 7th D iv is io n  should be sent to New Guinea together with
my H Q ',  Rowell Pap ers , f i le  11 , AWM.
206 . Luv aas , op.cit.,  p p .27 , 31. Also E ichelb erger  D ictations Book 1 , 
p p .6 6 , 6 8 , 157 and Book 2 , p . 5 9 . Sutherland  opposed the scheme not 
ju st  because i t  would have led to a hopeless command muddle, but  also  
because i t  would have led to E ichelb erger  assuming a more important 
role than his  as M acArthur's C h ief of S t a f f .
20 7 . This su bject  has been covered in  d e t a il  in  the autho r 's  Crisis of 
Command, Chapter 8 .
B r isb an e , even when Lieutenant- General Herring  arrived  to take-over
n  208from Rowell.
W hile there is  no doubt that M acArthur's aim was to become his  
own land forces commander, and to use task forces , Blarney's dual role 
gave MacArthur a ready-made excuse for doing so . For exam ple, even 
before  h is  headquarters opened in  B r isb an e , Blarney had decided  that he 
would not be permanently located  there . .As Sturdee exp lained  on 20 Ju ly : 
'He combines the functions o f operational commander w ith  head o f  the 
housekeeping side  and w il l  therefore spend a considerable  p erio d  of
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time in  Melbourne in  addition  to tra v ellin g  about A ustralia  g e n e r a lly '.
Between 1 August, when h is  headquarters opened in  B r isb an e , and 23
September when he l e f t  to take command in  New Guinea , Blarney spent
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b arely  h a l f  o f h is  time in  B risbane . . This might have been acceptable
la te r  in  the w ar, but during  the South-West P a c if ic  A r e a 's  f ir s t
campaign, w ith  Port Moresby threatened , and with  M acArthur's  s t a f f
'l i k e  a blco.dy barometer in  a cyclone - up and down every two m in u te s ',
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as General Vasey exclaim ed , i t  seems Blarney was in v it in g  trouble
212
by b e in g  away.
Nor was MacArthur completely s a t is f ie d  when Blarney took command in 
New Guinea . MacArthur re a lis e d  that when the 32nd US D iv is io n , which 
had begun to arrive  in  New Guinea in  September, was f in a lly  committed
20 8 . L e tter , Blarney to C u r tin , 8 October 1942 , Blarney Papers 23.8-1,
and le t t e r , MacArthur to C u r t in , 10 October 1942 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
209 . L e tte r , Sturdee to Sm art, 20 July  19 4 2 , AWM 4 2 5 /1 1 /1 2 .
210 . Command-in-Chief' s D iary , Blarney Papers DRL 6 6 4 3 , item 144 . He 
spent 28 o f the 53 days (1 August to 22 September) in  B risban e .
211 . L e tter , Vasey to Row ell, 1 September 19 4 2 , Rowell Papers , AWM.
21 2 . Blarney's absence p laced  h is  DCGS, Vasey , in  an awkward p o s it io n .
On 28 August 1942 he wrote to Rowell that for GHQ this  was th eir  f i r s t  
battle  and they were 'nervous and dw elling  on the receipt  of frequent 
m essag es '. In  another letter  that day he w rote: ' I t  b o ils  down to the 
question  o f who is  commanding the army - MacArthur or TAB' (Rowell 
P a p e r s ) . See also  the au th o r 's  Crisis of Command, C h .7 .
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Lieutenant- General 
Richard K . 
S u th e rla n d , 
M acArthur 's  C h ief  
of S t a f f ,  awarding 
the S ilv e r  Star to 
an American Red 
Cross war corres­
p ondent, Richard 
Day, October
19 4 4 . Sutherland 
was 'b rusq u e , 
short-tem pered, 
capable but 
a u t o c r a t i c '.
(AWM Negative 
N o .17704)
General Blarney, 
B r ig ad ier  M .A . 
Fergusson and 
Major-General 
H .C .H .  Robertson 
at the sa lu tin g  
b a s e , 1st 
Armoured D iv is io n  
review , June 1942, 
As C-in-C Blarney 
faced an immense 
and com plicated 
t a s k . Robertson 
had o ffe re d  him­
s e lf  as C-in-C.
(AWM Negative 
N o .25454)
to b a t t le , Blarney would, in  a f fe c t , assume h is  p o s it io n  as Commander
o f the A l l ie d  Land Forces. On 19 October MacArthur commented to h is
B r it is h  l ia is o n  o f f ic e r , W ilk in s o n ,t h a t  i t  'w ould  not do to leave
[Blarney] in  Supreme Command'. W ilk inson  suggested thatanother American
commander would 'have to be put in  over' Blarney. MacArthur was not
sure how that 'should  be handled ' but added that he 'co u ld  handle
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Blarney'. S ig n if ic a n t ly , on 6 November MacArthur moved h is  own
advanced headquarters to Port Moresby. I t  is  .not su r p r is in g , therefore ,
that before  leaving  for New Guinea MacArthur told  Shedden that ' i t
would be necessary  for General Blarney sooner or later to make a decis io n
as to whether he was going forward in  command o f  the advanced forces
in  any o ffen s iv e  operation s , or was rem aining in  A u stralia  to command
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the forces le f t  there for the defence o f  the b a s e '.  And this  was to be
one of M acArthur's  constant themes for the next two and a h a l f  y ears .
Any d iscussio n  of Blarney's command problems must take in to  account
h is  p erso n ality  and h is  reputation  in  the eyes o f the government, the
p u b l ic , the army and MacArthur. General Berryman is  probably righ t
when he asserted  that when Blarney journeyed to New Guinea he was f ig h tin g
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fo r  h is  m ilitary  l i f e .
From the time when he returned to A ustralia  from the Middle East
in  March 1942 Blarney would have been aware of c r it ic ism , in  some quarters ,
o f  h is  s u it a b i l i t y . There had been the so- called 'R evo lt  o f the 
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G e n e r a ls ', and Generals Robertson, Lavarack and Bennett had a l l
2 1 3 . W ilk inson  D ia ry , 19 October 1 9 42 , C h u rch ill  C o llege , Cam bridge.
2 1 4 . Notes o f D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
P a c if ic  A rea , B r isb an e , 20-26 October 1 9 42 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2.
2 1 5 . Interview  w ith  Lieutenant- General S ir  Frank Berryman, 26 June 1974 .
21 6 . J .  Hetherington , Blarney} Controversial Soldier (A ustralian  War 
M em orial, Canberra, 1 9 7 4 ) ,  p p .210- 14. See also  Stuart Sayers, Ned 
Herring3 A Life of Sir Edmund Herring (Hyland House, Melbourne, 1 9 8 0 ) , 
p p .195- 199 .
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Major-General G .A . Vasey , DCGS at 
Landops. In  h is  opinion  GHQ was
1 lik e  a bloody barometer in  a 
cyclone - up and down every two 
m in u tes ' .
(AWM Negative N o .52620)
Blarney w ith  another of h is  r iv als  - Lieutenant-General 
H . Gordon Bennett, GOC of the 3rd Corps, Perth , 9 June
1 9 43 . On the righ t is  B r igadier  O .V . Hoad, Commander 
of the Western A ustralian  Line of Communication Area .
(AWM Negative N o .52312)
coveted h is  p o s it io n . But for a w hile  Blarney's p o sit io n  seemed
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secure . A fter  the war MacArthur described  Blarney as 'a  veteran so ld ier
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o f  h ig h est  q u a l i t y ' , and before  the operations in  New Guinea he
was lav ish  in  h is  p r a is e . The topic was raised  at the Prime M in is t e r 's
War Conference in  Canberra on 17 July  1942 . Shedden 's  notes recorded:
The Prime M inister showed General MacArthur an 
extract  from a letter  by Mr Wasserman [the ch ief  
o f the US lend- lease m ission] in  which he had 
passed  c r it ic a l  comments about General Blarney, 
both personally  and p r o fe s s io n a lly . The Commander- 
in- Chief s a id  that he viewed the remarks of 
Mr Wasserman as a cowardly attack . He added 
that he was quite  s a t is f ie d  w ith  General Blarney as 
Commander of the A l l ie d  Land Forces, and he 
considered  him to be the best  o f  a l l  the A ustralian  
G enerals . He was above the average m ilitary  
a b il it y  o f  G enerals . In  h is  considered  p ro fess io nal 
o p in io n , General Blarney was a first- class Army 
Commander.
General MacArthur added that as Commander-in-Chief 
he was not concerned w ith  any personal id io syn crasies  
which General Blarney might p o ssess . He judged him by 
r e s u lt s , and he considered  that he had e ffec ted  great 
improvements in  the A u stralian  Army since h is  return 
to A u s t r a lia . Furtherm ore, he had the confidence 
and respect o f  the United States Army S t a f f .
General MacArthur sa id  that he had heard much loose 
talk  from some people about General Blarney and he 
regretted  to say that much o f i t  had orig in ated  
from o ffic e r s  in  the A u stralian  Army. Other 
A ustralian  o ff ic e r s  coveted the post o f  Commander-in- 
C h ief  and had made representations against  General 
Blarney. He had also  received  anonymous letters  on
the s u b je c t .219
A fte r  the co nference , Curtin  co n fid e n tia lly  told  newspapermen that 
MacArthur had commended Blarney: 'He p ra ised  h is  organisation  o f the 
evacuation  o f  Greece as one of the most outstanding  events of the war, 
greater even than Dunkirk where the evacuating  troops had the protection
21 7 . H etherin gto n , op.cit . ,  p p .210-14. Also tran scrip t  o f interview  
w ith  F .M . Forde, 4 March 1971 , TRC 1 2 1 /8 ,  NLA; in terview  with Colonel
E . Mander-Jones, 21 August 19 74 .
21 8 . D . MacArthur, Reminiscences (Fawcett, Greenwich, C o n n ., 1 9 6 4 ) ,  p . 163 .
219 . Minutes o f  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Canberra, 17 July  
1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1.
o f  almost unlim ited  a e r o p la n e s '. Curtin  continued that Blarney's
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priv ate  l i fe  had nothing to do with h is  m ilitary  o f f i c e . 'He sa id
when Blarney was appointed the Government was seeking  a m ilitary  leader
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not a Sunday School t e a c h e r '. To Kenney, who arrived  in  Brisbane
in  August, Blarney seemed 'a  rather s o lid  c it ize n  and a good rock to
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clin g  to in  time o f  t r o u b le ! ' On 22 September, the day before
Blarney flew  to Port Moresby to relieve  Rowell, MacArthur described  
him as po ssessing  a 's e n s u a l , s lo th fu l  and doubtful character but
a tough commander l ik e ly  to shine like  a power-light in  an emergency.
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The best  o f  the local bunch . . . '  Looking back over these early
months, Blarney observed later  that a good re latio n sh ip  was e sta b lis h ed
223
w ith  MacArthur 'w hich  ripened into  a deep regard and f r ie n d s h ip '.
Despite  these comments, there is  p le n t ifu l  evidence that as the
c r is is  in  New Guinea deepened, Blarney's p o sit io n  became in creasingly
p re c a r io u s . On M acArthur's p a r t , Blarney could provide a convenient
scapegoat i f  Port Moresby f e l l .  A fter  a l l ,  MacArthur knew that i f
224
he su ffer ed  another defeat  h is  own p o sit io n  would be unsteady,
hence the reports to Washington o f  the poor fig h tin g  q u ality  o f the
225
A u s tr a lia n s . MacArthur also  advised  M arshall that Blarney's 'en t ire
2 2 0 . F .T .  Smith Reports, N o .13 , 23 July  1942 .
22 1 . Kenney, op.cit.,  p . 49 .
22 2 . W ilk inso n  Diary quoted in  C. Thorne, 'M acArthur, and A u stra lia  
and the B r it is h  1942- 1943: The Secret Journal o f  M acArthur's B r it is h  
L ia is o n  O f f ic e r  (Part I I ) ' ,  Australian Outlook, August 1975 , V o l .20 ,
No. 2 .
223 . Blarney's Memoirs.
224 . For exam ple, Sutherland later  told Kenney that ' i f  anything went 
w rong, General MacArthur would be sent hom e '. Kenney, op.cit.,  p . 12 4 . On 
15 September M arshall ordered General Arnold to v is i t  the P a c if ic  and 
report whether M acArthur's and Adm iral Ghorm ley's claims for more r e in fo r ­
cements were true. F .C .  Pogue, George C. Marshall: Ordeal and Hope 1939- 
1942 (V ik in g , New York , 1 9 6 6 ) ,  p . 388 . Arnold d id  not report p a rtic u la r ly  w ell 
o f  MacArthur. James, op.cit., V o l .l ,  p p . 210- 212. On 21 August MacArthur 
w rote : 'To  make something out of nothing seems to be my m ilitary  fate
in  the tw ilig h t  o f  my se r v ic e . I have led  one lost  cause and am trying  
not to have i t  t w o '. James, op.cit., V o l . I I ,  p . 19 3 .
22 5 . See the au th o r 's  Crisis of Command, C h .7 .
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methods and conception d i f f e r  so m aterially  from ours that h is
226
actions during  my absence would be u n p r e d ic ta b le '. Perhaps i t  was
th is  message which promoted W illiam  Frye, in  Marshall: Citizen Soldier,
to w rite  that Blarney was a commander 'i n  whose capacity  the Americans
227
found themselves able to place  less than complete f a i t h ' .
Nor were a ll  the p o l it ic ia n s  happy. The Advisory War Council on
17 September attempted to determine the re sp o n sib ility  for the
d e ter io ra tin g  s itu atio n  in  New Guinea , and i t  must have been obvious
228
to Blarney, who was p re se n t , that some members were blam ing him .
That evening  MacArthur told Curtin  that Blarney should proceed to New
Guinea 't o  save h im s elf ' and 'to  meet h is  re sp o n sib ility  to the
229
A u s tra lia n  p u b l i c ' .
Aware o f  the governm ent's decreasing  confidence in  h is  a b i l it y ,
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Blarney 'r a is e d  no q u e s t io n '. W illiam  Dunstan, the General Manager
o f the Melbourne Herald,wrote soon afterwards th a t , at two background
conferences for senior newspapermen, Curtin  had d iscussed  Blarney's
p o s it io n  'more or less freely  - o f f  the record , o f  c o u r s e '.
They are not s a t is f ie d  w ith him . . .  H is every 
move is  watched . . .  He was sent to New Guinea 
for no other reason than to give him one f in a l  
chance . . .  To this  extent we must sympathise w ith  
him . . .  He has had to submit to the MacArthur 
h o lin e s s . Just  how much we know of what he has 
su ffer ed  under the set-up. Granted he is  GOC 
Land Forces, ju st  how much does i t  mean i f  he took 
strong d irective  over US Forces? Would he have to 
go cap in  hand to MacArthur.
2 2 6 . Radio MacArthur to M arshall, 22 September 1 9 42 , RG 165 , OPD Exec . 
10 , item 2 3 6 , National Archives .
22 7 . Quoted in  H etherin gton , op,cit,, p . 144 .
2 2 8 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .1 0 6 7 , Canberra, 17 September 1942 , 
CRS A 2 6 8 2 , item , V o l .V . For further d e ta ils  and evidence see the 
a u th o r 's  Crisis of Command, p p .1 6 3 , 164 .
229 . Notes of Secraphone Conversation between the Prime M in ister  and 
the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 17 September 19 42 ,
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 53 2 .
230 . 'C- in- C's Press C o n fe r e n c e ', P erth , 9 July  19 45 , Blarney Papers 
1 3 8 .3 .
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Dunstan continued that there had been a canvass of names to f in d  a 
replacem ent . 2 3
But i f  some observers could accuse Blarney o f  a lack o f moral
232
courage in  not ch allen ging  the government at this  tim e, others
might have seen i t  as the pragm atic approach of an experienced so ld ier
who was convinced that he was the only man for the job . By strong
and e ffe c t iv e  action  in  New Guinea , helped  by the fru its  o f  R o w ell 's
ca re fu l  p la n n in g , Blarney re- established  h is  reputation  to a p o in t  in
December 1942 where he was able to su ccessfully  challenge MacArthur
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over the employment of an American regim ent. And i f  the Advisory
War Council had it s  doubts about Blarney on 17 Septem ber, on later
occasions he le f t  them in  no doubt. A ir  Marshal S ir  George Jon es ,
who was present at one m eeting , reca lled  that the Prime M in ister
c r it ic is e d  Blarney at length over a minor adm inistrative  m atter. When
Curtin  paused Blarney s a id , thumping the ta b le :
Prime M in iste r , I want you to know that I 
have no ambitions in  th is  w ar. I f  you d o n 't  
lik e  what I have been doing you damn w ell 
get somebody e ls e .
What was an attempt to censure Blarney turned in to  almost a censure o f 
234
the government.
Throughout the war Curtin  m aintained  h is  loyalty  to Blarney,
prom pting Blarney to w rite  later  that he had 'no need to bother about
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rear  arm our'. But the events o f  September 1942 show that Blarney's
2 3 1 . L e t t e r , Dunstan to R o w ell , 29 September 1942 , Rowell Papers.
23 2 . In terv iew  w ith  Lieutenant- General S ir  Sydney R ow ell, 26 June 1974 .
A lso  le t t e r s , Rowell to Clowes, 22 September 1942 and Rowell to W. Dunstan, 
24 September 1 9 42 , Rowell Papers.
2 3 3 . L e tte r s , Blarney to MacArthur, 27 December 1942 , MacArthur to Blarney,
28 December 19 42 , Blarney Papers 4 3 .6 3 1 .
2 34 . Memoirs of A ir  Marshal S ir  George Jon es . Jones reca lled  that when­
ever Hughes spoke sharply to Blarney, the la tte r  would snap back at him , 
and Hughes would re co il  in to  h is  sh e ll  and sa y , ' I  was only ask ing ,
G e n e r a l '.
2 3 5 . Blarney Memoirs.
a b il it y  to in fluence  a l l ie d  strategy  through h is  dual p o sitio ns  
of power rested  on a frag ile  structure of prestige  and perform ance, 
and the various perceptions of these by other key actors in  the drama.
S tra te g ic  Assessment in  the Papuan Campaign
During the latter  h a l f  o f 1942 Australian strateg ic  thinking  was 
determ ined by the grim fig h t in g  in  the Papuan campaign. In d eed , unlike  
la te r  cam paigns, the government closely  sc ru tin ise d  and at times sought 
to in fluen ce  the conduct of the campaign. There were a number of 
reaso ns ; the b a ttle s  were close and v it a l  to A u s t r a l ia , and the 
p o l it ic ia n s  were inexperienced  and tended to p a n ic . But the main 
reason for the in ter est  was that i t  soon became obvious that the 
campaign had been shaped by inaccurate  strateg ic  assessm ents. Faced 
w ith  the p o s s ib il it y  of d e fe a t , p o lit ic ia n s  were anxious to protect 
them selves. I t  is  now clear  that both MacArthur and Blarney made v it a l  
s tr a te g ic  m isc a lcu la tio n s , at  the expense o f the lives  of many so ld iers  
and the careers of subordinate commanders, but n e ith er  would admit 
i t .  And the re su ltin g  unfavourable stra teg ic  s itu a tio n  caused the 
government to renew its  demands upon Roosevelt and C h u rc h ill .
Blarney's m iscalculation  w i l l  be dealt  w ith  first.- At the end 
o f  September 1942 Shedden made a d e ta ile d  study o f A ustralian  p o licy  
towards the defence of Port Moresby since the outbreak of war w ith  
Japan . He concluded that the governm ent's m ilitary  advisers had fu lly  
r e a lis e d  the importance of Port Moresby, and up to the Coral Sea battle  
had correctly  forecast  Japanese in tentions  that the most probable 
form of attack would be a seaborne o n e .
But he found that the army had been remiss in  a number of respects. 
Despite reservations expressed  in  January by the War Cabinet about the 
s u it a b il it y  o f Major-General Morris to command the force in  Port Moresby,
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Axes of Advance , Papuan Campaign.
From: Reports of General MacArthur3 
V o l . l ,  p . 76 .
the army had p e rs is ted  w ith  him u n til  Ju ly . The troops at Port
Moresby were poorly tr a in e d , p a rtic u la r ly  in  respect of jungle w arfare ,
and l i t t l e  attempt was made to cater for other than a seaborne attack .
The main c r it ic is m , however, revolved around Blarney's d ecisio n
to send a m il it ia  rather than an AIF  brigade to Port Moresby in  May
236
1 9 42 . This error was compounded the same month by the decis ion
to send an AMF (m ilit ia ) brigade to Milne Bay. Shedden noted that on
19 May the Advisory War Council had expressed  the view that w ell- trained
and experienced  troops should be sent to Port Moresby, but  that the
CGS had s a id  that the 7th A IF  D iv is io n  had to be kept in tact  for
t r a in in g  for overseas operations contemplated la te r . Shedden observed
that  'though this may have f it t e d  in  w ith  pro jected  o ffens ive  p la n s ,
237
the security  o f such a v it a l  place  should have had p r i o r i t y ' .
MacArthur supported this view , and later  claim ed that he had asked
Blarney to send h is  best  troops to New Guinea . He did  not think that
2 38
the m il it ia  were w ell  enough tra in e d . General Rowell reca lled
that the d ecis io n  not to send the A IF  made h is  'headquarters weep
. 2 3 9  . . . .
at the time , and Gavin Long wrote m  h is  diary  that 'th e  decision
240
to keep the b est  troops to last  was " c r i m i n a l " ' .
Shedden came to the conclusion that the reason Blarney d id  not send 
the A IF  to Port Moresby was that he and the A u stralian  Chiefs o f  S t a f f  
had decided  that two AMF brigades would be s u ff ic ie n t  to repel a sea ­
borne atta c k , and that there was no chance of an overland advance on
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23 6 . For evidence that i t  was Blarney's d e c is io n , see Rowell, Full Circle, 
p . 5 3 .
23 7 . 'The  Defence of Port M o r e s b y ', by F .G . Shedden, 30 September 19 42 ,
MP 12 17 , Box 5 8 7 .
2 38 . Notes of D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
P a c if ic  A rea , B r isb a n e , 20-26 October 1942 .
23 9 . Rowell interv iew .
2 4 0 . Gavin Long Diary N o .8 , Sydney, August 19 4 2 , p . 76 , AWM.
the town. Shedden stated  that i t  was 'probably  not an u n fa ir  surmise
that the Owen Stanley  Range and the d i f f ic u l t ie s  of communications on
the southern side  induced a "M aginot L in e " complex that there was an
241
e a s ily  d e fen sib le  b a rr ie r  to a Japanese advance beyond Kokoda1 .
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A fte r  review ing  Shedden 's  p aper , Rowell sa id  that he fu lly  agreed.
MacArthur and h is  s t a f f  were also gu ilty  o f  discounting  the 
p o s s ib i l it y  o f  the overland approach. In  May 1942 M acArthur's  code­
breakers decyphered a Japanese message that th e ir  next operation would 
be over the Owen Stanley  Range. This message, which one senior code­
breaker ca lled  'one o f the three most important to be decoded in  the
243
w ar ' , was the b asis  o f  a forecast in  the GHQ Intsum of 2 3 May
244
1 9 4 2 , but  i t  was disregarded  by M acArthur's in te llig e n ce  s t a f f .
Again  on 17 July  i t  was noted that the Japanese had a force ready for 
245
the o p eratio n , but even after  the Japanese landed at Buna on 22 July
and advanced towards Kokoda M acArthur's s t a f f  in s is t e d  that they were
not p lann ing  to attack Port Moresby. I t  was not u n til  the end of
A ugust, w ith  the loss o f the Gap in  the Owen Sta n ley s , that GHQ thought
that they might be wrong about the advance on Moresby, and even then
246
they expected  only ra id in g  p a r t ie s . Yet on 30 July  the senior
in te ll ig e n c e  o f f ic e r  o f the F ir s t  A ustralian  Army had forecast a Japanese
247
advance on Port Moresby, and this  had been drawn to the attention  o f GHQ.
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241 . 'The  Defence of Port M o resb y ', op.cit.
242 . Memorandum by Shedden, 3 October 1 9 42 , Zoc.cit.
243 . C . B l a ir ,  J r . ,  SiZent Victory: the US Submarine War Against Japan 
(Bantam, New York, 1 9 7 5 ) ,  p . 60 6 .
2 4 4 . GHQ Intsum  2 3 /2 4  May 1 9 4 2 , RG 4 0 5 , G3 Jo u rn al , National Records 
C enter, S u it la n d , Maryland.
24 5 . G2 Inform ation B u lle t in , 17 July  1 9 4 2 , RG 4 0 7 , G3 Jo u rn al , 16-20 
July  1 9 42 , N ational Records C enter .
24 6 . G2 Inform ation  B u l le t in , 6-7 September 1942 , Zoc.cit.
2 4 7 . Horner, Crisis of Command, p . 104 .
MacArthur was guilty  o f  not merely overlooking  the p o s s ib il it y  
o f  a Japanese advance over the Owen Stanleys, but of generally  under­
estim atin g  the Japanese. He later  wrote that in  an tic ip atio n  o f the 
Japanese attack in  New G uinea , he 'moved headquarters forward to Brisbane 
and then to Port Moresby. I f  I could secure Moresby, I would force
the enemy to fig h t  on ground o f my se lectio n  - across the b a rr ie r  o f
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the Owen Stanley  R an g e '. Apart from h is  apparently  faulty  memory
o f  the date of h is  move to Port Moresby, this statement is  a d isto rtio n
o f what actually  happened. As A .J .  Sweeting noted , 'the  truth surely
is  that the early  conduct o f  the Papua operations was d ictated  by the
enemy w ith  the A l l ie d  forces under General MacArthur responding some-
249
times b e la t e d ly , to known enemy p l a n s ' .
M acArthur's  claims that he wanted the Japanese to attack across 
the mountains do not correspond w ith  h is  orders for the capture o f  
Buna; i f  the Japanese were to be in  s u f f ic ie n t  strength to attack 
Port Moresby i t  should have been obvious that they would be in  s u f f ic ie n t  
strength  to protect  Buna from a landward ass a u lt . The answer is  that . 
MacArthur refused  to b e liev e  that the Japanese were in  s u ff ic ie n t  strength 
e ith e r  to attack Port Moresby or even to hold  Buna. Thus M acArthur's 
haphazard  reinforcem ent o f New Guinea was no more than the strengthening  
o f  a defensive  b a s t io n , which he thought was un likely  to be attacked 
h eav ily  by the Japanese .
Despite the rapid  Japanese advance in land  to secure the important 
a i r f i e l d  at  Kokoda, and despite  appeals from Morris in  New Guinea 
for a ir  support, MacArthur remained unconvinced that this  Japanese
24 8 . MacArthur, op.cit.,  p . 154 . He did  not move h is  HQ to Port Moresby 
u n t il  6 November 1942 ; the Japanese f i r s t  landed in  Papua in  late  
July  19 42 . W illoughby and Cham berlain 's  MacArthur: 1941-51 makes
the same error by im p lic atio n .
24 9 . A .J .  Sw eeting , Review o f MacArthur, Reminiscences 3 in  Stand To,
V o l .10 , N o .2 , March-December 1965 .
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attack marked a new o ffe n s iv e . Since the American success at  Midway, 
MacArthur had been determined to advance h is  a ir  bases into  New Guinea , 
but he was not yet ready to move. There was some ju s t if ic a t io n  for 
this  a t t it u d e . The o r ig in a l  p lan  had been that a fter  the landing  by 
South P a c if ic  forces at Guadalcanal on 7 August, MacArthur would occupy 
the Buna area . The Japanese had beaten him to i t ,  but he fe lt  that the 
landing  o f  the marines on Guadalcanal might cause the Japanese to w ith ­
draw troops from New G uinea , thus allow ing  him to continue h is  plans
250
for an amphibious advance along the north coast o f Papua. I t  is
true that the amphibious forces were not yet a v a ila b le , but M acArthur's 
reluctance to be forced to conform to the Japanese movement can be 
understood.
I t  was not u n t il  the Japanese landed at Milne Bay on the night 
o f  25-26 August that MacArthur decided  to take the Japanese threat 
se r io u s ly . Thus a fter  a conference at GHQ on the evening  o f 26 August,
General Vasey wrote that M acArthur's in ten tio n  was to send ad d itio n al
. . .  . . , 251
troops to Milne Bay and to fig h t  i t  out m  New Guinea .
These str a teg ic  m iscalculations must be borne in  mind when exam ining
reactions of the A u stralian  government during  the canpaign . On 5 August
W .M . Hughes, the leader o f  the United A u s tra lia  Party and a member of
the Advisory War C o u n c il , released  a statement that A u stra lia  would
250. Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Canberra , 17 July  1942 , 
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1.
251 . L e tte r , Vasey (DCGS) to Blarney, 26 August 1 9 42 , Vasey Papers 2 / 9 .  
Also letter  Vasey to Rowell, 28 August 1 9 4 2 , Rowell Papers. Blarney 
too seems to have fa ile d  to grasp the necessity  for a major e f fo r t  in  
New G uinea . On 20 August he described  the troops in  New Guinea to 
General Lavarack as 'a  task f o r c e '.  Lavarack wrote in  h is  diary  that i t  
'looks more like  an all- in  campaign to me' .  War D iary , GOC F ir s t  Army, 
AWM 1 / 3 / 1 .  On the other hand , at a co n fid e n tia l  press conference on
29 September C urtin  s a id  that ' I t  was Blarney who had been in s is te n t  
throughout that the A l l ie s  were under-estim ating Jap s t r e n g t h '.
F .T .  Smith Report N o .2 7 , 29 September 1942 .
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su ffer  the same fate as Malaya unless an o ffensive  strategy  were adopted
and Buna and Gona were retaken w ithout delay . He continued :
There has been a lamentable lack o f  v is io n , o f  
in i t i a t i v e , o f  coordination o f  control by our 
m ilitary  leaders . They have fa ile d  to anticip ate  
the enem y's movements . . .  Unless we are to w ait  
like  cattle  in  the p ith in g  pen for the death 
stro ke , we must go out and sweep the enemy from 
his vantage g r o u n d . 252
The next day C urtin  re p lie d  p u b l ic ly , p o in ting  out that the Advisory
War Council had had numerous consultations w ith  the service  c h ie fs , and
also Blarney and MacArthur, and that Hughes had had many opportunities
to indicate  h is  proposals in  the C oun cil. Meanwhile, at the Council
m eeting, Curtin  assured the members that 'a  satisfacto ry  defensive
po sitio n  had been e s ta b lis h e d ' and he 'd i d  not believ e  in  c a stig atin g
253
[the] m ilitary  commanders over the operations in  Gona and B u n a '.
At the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference on 10 August the service
advisers continued to be o p tim is tic . Blarney s a id  that the fig h t in g
near Kokoda 'was not o f  great im portance' and Royle sa id  that the
, 2 5 4
naval p o sitio n  was not un satisfacto ry  .
A week later  Curtin  met MacArthur in  Brisbane and was again  given 
optim istic  advice about New Guinea. Despite the fact that  MacArthur 
informed Curtin  that he had received  news o f the naval d isa ste r  at Savo 
Is la n d , near G uadalcan al, in clu d in g  the loss o f the Canberra, he had no 
hesitatio n  in  assuring  the Prime M in ister  that the Japanese 'c o u ld  not 
attack Port Moresby w ith  any strength o f  land forces over the mountain 
r a n g e '. Indeed the Japanese at Buna and Gona 'were hostages to fo r t u n e '.
252 . Statement attached to Advisory War Council Minute N o .10 1 3 , CRS A 
2 6 8 2 , item V o l .V . See also  the Age, 6 August 19 42 . For an explanation  
o f H ughes 's  statement see L .F .  F it zh a r d in g e , The Little Digger, 1914-1952 
(Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1 9 7 9 ) , p . 65 9 .
253 . Advisory War Council Minute N o .1 0 13 , CRS A 2 6 8 2 , item  V o l .V .
254 . Minutes o f  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, M elbourne, 10 August 
19 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 1 . Present were C u r tin , Forde, E va tt , Drakeford , 
Blarney, Royle, Jo nes , Shedden and the s ix  state  prem iers.
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MacArthur s a id  that he was plann ing  an o ffensive  operation in  New Guinea
w ith  two US D iv is io ns  and the 7th A ustralian  D iv isio n  under h is  command.
MacArthur was p a rtic u la r ly  upset by the comments o f  Hughes, and
sought and received  C u r t in 's  assurance that he s t i l l  retain ed  the
256
confidence o f the government. He thought that i f  he 'was to become
the su bject  o f local p o l it ic a l  controversy' then the Presiden t  might
257
in s is t  not only on a change in  personnel but in  the 'form  of command'. 
C urtin  inform ed MacArthur that he would take up w ith  C h u rch ill
the question  o f  the tran sfer  o f naval forces from, the In d ian  Ocean
258 259
to  the P a c i f i c ,  and he d id  so in  a cable sent on 25 August. But
before  a reply had been received  the b attle  for Milne Bay had begun
260
and M acArthur's  headquarters was beginning  to display  symptoms o f  anxiety .
On 28 August he warned Marshall that the s itu atio n  might become c r it ic a l
261
unless he was provided  w ith  naval support.
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loc. cit.
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During a speech to a secret  sess io n  o f  Parliam ent on 3 September Curtin  
appealed to members to control c r it ic is m : ' I f  i t  were ev ident that the 
High Command were b lun dering  along , i t  would be the duty and o bligatio n
o f  the Government to intervene in  the interests  o f  national se cu rity . Some 
recent cr iticism s were made on what were only phases o f the main events. 
F in a l ly , unless p u b lic  c r it ic ism  is  w ell  based on v it a l  factors i t  can 
only place a d ist in g u ish e d  American s o ld ie r , who has come here to help 
u s , in  a most in v id io u s  p o s it io n . I f  this is  carried  to any great lengths 
on unsubstantial grounds, I forecast a grave reaction  on American co­
operation in  this  t h e a t r e '.  Notes of Prime M in is t e r 's  Speech - Secret 
S e s s io n , 3 September 1 9 4 2 , MP 12 17 , Box 611 .
25 8 . Minutes o f  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, B risban e , 17 August 1942 , 
MP 1 2 17 , Box 1.
259 . C able , Curtin  to C h u r c h ill , 25 August 19 42 , RG4, MacArthur Mem orial.
2 6 0 . For examples o f m anifestations of this anxiety in  the form of 
messages sent to New Guinea see the au th o r 's  Crisis of Command, p p .136- 144.
2 6 1 . Rad io , MacArthur to M arshall, 28 August 1942 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
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Meanwhile General Suth erlan d , in  Brisbane , was in  constant touch
262
w ith  Shedden, in  Canberra, by secraphone. On the evening o f 28 August
Sutherland  said  that MacArthur would like  the Prime M inister to make
supporting  representations to W ashington , and after  a d iscussion  between
263
Curtin  and Shedden i t  was agreed to send a message the fo llow ing  day.
The next day , in  secraphone conversations between Shedden and Sutherland ,
264
MacArthur and C urtin  coordinated  th e ir  messages to W ashington.
MacArthur warned M arshall that  the fa ilu re  to review the str a teg ic
s itu a tio n  would have a 'd isa s tro u s  outcom e':
Unless a d d itio n al Naval fo rces , e ith e r  American 
or B r it is h , are concentrated in  the P a c if ic  and 
unless steps are taken to match the heavy a ir  and 
ground forces the enemy is  assem bling to launch,
I p re d ict  the development w ith in  a reasonable 
perio d  o f time o f  a s itu a tio n  sim ilar  to those 
which produced the d isasters  that have successively  
overwhelmed our forces in  the P a c if ic  since the 
b eg inn ing  of the w a r . 265
C u r t in 's  long message to R oosevelt, sent on 31 August, requested
a d d itio n a l  naval and a ir  fo rc es , and included  a copy o f  h is  e a r l ie r
266
request to C h u r c h ill . Bruce in  London was urged to press the case •
267
w ith  the B r it is h  government, and a copy o f  the message to Roosevelt
268
was sent to C h u rch ill .
262 . Memorandum by Shedden, 28 August 19 42 , MP 12 17 , Box 532 .
2 6 3 . Memorandum by Shedden, 29 August 1 9 42 , loc.cit. Also Summary of 
Secraphone Conversation w ith  Major-General Sutherlan d , Saturday evenin g ,
29 August 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 57 9 .
264 . Memorandum by Shedden, 30 August 19 4 2 , MP 1217 , Box 532 .
265 . Radio C-382, MacArthur to M arshall, 30 August 1 9 42 , RG 16 5 , OPD 
Exec 10 , item  23a , N ational A rch iv es . MacArthur was also  very c r it ic a l  
of the performance o f  the A u s tr a lia n s , thus e sta b lis h in g  a p o ssible  
scapegoat i f  things went b a d ly .
26 6 . Cable , Curtin  to A u stralian  Legation W ashington , 31 August 1942 ,
CRS A 1 3 0 0 , item  232 . Also  RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
267 . C ab le , C urtin  to Bruce, 31 August 1942 , RG4, MacArthur Mem orial.
26 8 . C able , C urtin  to C h u r c h ill , 31 August 19 4 2 , loc.cit.
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Although the rep lies  from Washington and London were not
269
encouraging , the Jo in t  Chiefs  took MacArthur s requests ser io u sly .
Admiral C ru tc h le y 's  Task Force 44 was ordered to return to M acArthur's
command, an add itio nal d iv is io n  was sent to the P a c i f ic ,  Adm iral King
ordered Nim itz to release a Marine Regiment to MacArthur, and Arnold
began searching  for more aero p lan es . 2 ^  For the moment, however,
271
MacArthur would have to get along with  what he had . But he d id  not
let  M arshall forget h is  p l ig h t , and on 6 September warned that ' i f
272
New Guinea goes the resu lt  w il l  be d isa stro u s . This is  u r g e n t '.
Meanwhile Blarney had been considering  the situ atio n  w ith  regard
to land fo rces , and , a fte r  d iscussio n  w ith  MacArthur, on 2 September
he advised  that there were in s u f f ic ie n t  forces for the defence o f 
273
A u s tr a lia . He re iterated  h is  views at a conference w ith  the Prime
M in ister  on 7 September. Three more US d iv is io n s  should be sent to 
A u s t r a lia . I t  was not p r a c t ic a b le , for the moment, to re ca ll  the 9th
274
D iv is io n , but  i t  could not be a long-term commitment to the Middle E ast .
269 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 184 .
27 0 . Memorandum, M arshall to Roosevelt, 2 September 19 42 , RG 16 5 , OPD 
Exec 1 0 , item 23a . Also Pogue, op.cit., p . 386 , M iln e r , op. cit, p . 105 .
271 . In  the words of General A rnold , both he and M arshall had to be 
determ ined not to 'v a c il la t e  w ith  every new demand upon us from every 
p oint  in  the com pass '. W .F .  Craven and J . L .  Cate ( e d s ) , The Army Air 
Forces in World War I I ,  V o l .4 (U niversity  o f Chicago P r ess , 1 9 5 0 ) ,  p . 92 .
272 . Radio C 436 , MacArthur to M arshall, 6 September 1942 , RG 1 6 5 , OPD 
Exec 10 , item  22a .
27 3 . L e tte r , Blarney to Forde, 2 September 19 42 , CRS A 816 , item 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 3 ,  
f i le  N o .2. This letter  was in  response to a le tter  from Forde on
27 August, loc.cit.
21 A. Minutes o f  Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Canberra, 7 September 
1 9 42 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1 . That same day Curtin  read a minute from the CGS* 
N orthcott, to Forde, claim ing  that a decision  over the 9th D iv is io n  
was a matter o f  urgency. M inute, Northcott to Forde, 4 September 1942 
and le t t e r , Shedden to F .R . S in c l a ir , Secretary , Department o f the Army,
9 September 1942 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 57 4 .
These views formed the b asis  o f  a long cable to Roosevelt on 10 September,
but the P resid en t  r e p lie d  on 16 September that A u s tra lia  had s u f f ic ie n t  
276
fo rces . Curtin  was 'profoundly  d istu rbed ' but  'n o t  su rp rised ' by
277
these negative  r e p l ie s . He therefore recommended to the War Cabinet
that the C hiefs  o f S t a f f  should prepare an appreciation  which would then
278
be subm itted to MacArthur for h is  v iew s.
Throughout September 1942 MacArthur and h is  s t a f f  o s c illa te d
w ild ly  between moods o f  optimism and pessim ism . At the same time Blarney
and the A u s ta lia n  commanders remained buoyant, b u t , frightened  by
p u b lic  o p in io n , some members o f  the Advisory War Council sank stead ily
279
in to  a condition  o f  a n x ie ty , indeed alm ost p a n ic . These moods have
280
been charted in  d e ta il  in  Crisis of Command, and they climaxed 
w ith  M acArthur's secraphone conversation w ith  Curtin  on the n ight of
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275
275 . Cable 13 8 , C urtin  to Roosevelt, 11 September 1942 , RG4, MacArthur 
Mem orial, CRS A 3300 , item 2 3 2 , and Cable 8 3 47 , Curtin  to Bruce , 11 September, 
CRS M 100 , item  September 1942 . The cable was approved by War Cabinet
Minute 2356 o f  8 September (CRS A 2 6 73 , V o l .V I I )  and Advisory War Council 
Minute 1053 o f  9 September (CRS A 2682 , V o l .V ) .
27 6 . C able , A u stralian  Legation  Washington to C urtin , 16 September 1942 ,
RG4, MacArthur Memorail. This embodied a letter  from Roosevelt to Curtin  
o f  15 September 1942 , CRS A 3300 , item 232 .
277 . F .T .  Smith Reports N o .26 , 21 September 1942 .
2 7 8 . War Cabinet Minute 23 83 , Canberra, 21 September 1942 , CRS A 26 7 3 ,
V o l .V I I .  The War Cabinet agreed to C u r t in 's  recommendation.
279 . One symptom of this  anxiety  was a suggestion that MacArthur should 
appear before a secret  session  o f  Parliam ent to exp la in  the s itu a t io n , 
and indeed MacArthur o ffered  to do so . Shedden advised  against i t  and 
C u r tin , S c u ll in  and Shedden decided  that n e ith er  MacArthur nor Blarney 
should come to Canberra for a secret  session  as the p u b lic  would think 
that things were going b a d ly . Memorandum, Shedden to C urtin , 12 September 
1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 5 3 7 .
28 0 . See Chapters 7 and 8 o f  the auth o r 's  Crisis of Command,
Lieutenant- General S .F .  Rowell, 
GOC New Guinea F o rc e ,in  
September 1 9 42 , shortly  before 
he was re liev ed  o f command.
(AWM Negative N o .26982)
Forde, MacArthur, Blarney and Kenney at Port Moresby,
2 October 1942 .
(AWM Negative N o .13425)
17 September when he requested him to send Blarney to New Guinea, 
trigg ering  the unfortunate command cr is is  between Blarney and Rowell.
Had d iffe r e n t  p e rso n a lit ie s  been involved , a modus vivendi might 
have been e sta b lis h ed  in  Port Moresby, but this  does not detract from 
the fact that since he was inexperienced  in  m ilitary  matters Curtin  
fe lt  unable to challenge MacArthur, even when h is  senior A u stralian  
adviser  o ffe re d  a contrary view .
On 30 September the C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  presented  th eir  ap p reciatio n , 
but  they observed that they had been hampered by lack o f  inform ation .
They had not even been fu lly  aware of M acArthur's p la n s . N evertheless , 
they recommended that because o f  the shortage o f reinforcem ents the 9th 
D iv is io n  should return to A u s t r a lia . They questioned  the worth o f  
co ntinuing  the Empire A ir  T ra in in g  Scheme, and thought that the main 
o bjective  in  the SWPA should be to continue attempts to drive the Japanese 
from New Guinea; this strategy  would be the b est  way o f  p rotecting
282
A u s t r a lia , and would secure bases for further o ffensive  operations.
When Curtin  sought M acArthur's  advice on the ap p reciatio n , the
Commander-in-Chief urged 'most earnestly  that the time has come for
283
the 9th D iv is io n  to be returned to A u s t r a l i a ' . The question  was
284
then considered by the War Cabinet on 14 October, and by the Advisory
28 1 . Notes of Secraphone Conversations between the Prime M in ister  and the 
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , 17 September 19 42 , MP 1217 ,
Box 53 2 . I t  has not been previously  revealed  that during  the conversation 
MacArthur mentioned twice that 'we should make our fig h t  in  New G u i n e a ', 
lending  support to an e a r l ie r  contention that i t  was not u n til  a fter
the magnitude o f the Japanese threat was recognised that MacArthur 
decided  to move in  force to New Guinea . See also  MP 1 2 17 , Box 266 .
282 . Defence of A u s t r a lia , Appreciation  by Chiefs  o f S t a f f ,  30 September 
1 9 4 2 , CRS A 2 6 70 , item  4 0 4 /1 9 4 2 . Also RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
283 . L e tter , MacArthur to C u r tin , 6 October 1942 , MP 12 17 , Box 6 1 1 ,
Box 5 74 , and RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
28 4 . War Cabinet Minute 2 4 28 , Canberra, 14 October 1 9 4 2 , CRS A 26 70 , 
Agendum N o .4 0 4 /1 9 4 2 .
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War Council the next day, and i t  was agreed that the government should
2 85
request the early  return o f  the d iv is io n .
Another question  which the War Cabinet had put to the C hiefs  o f
S t a f f  was the nature o f the reply to be forwarded to the messages
from C hurchill and Roosevelt, but the C hiefs  had omitted to deal w ith  i t .
Therefore on 2 October Shedden presented  h is  own views to the Prime M in ister :
Since we cannot a lter  the b asic  strategy  that was la id  
down when Mr C h urch ill and the President agreed that 
Germany should be defeated  f i r s t , I think that , having 
pressed  our views to the po int  o f the recent answers, 
i t  is  better  to accept the decisions  w ith  good grace 
and expression  o f  agreement. I f  we do not, we w il l  only 
be described  as stubborn and the rep lies  from Mr C hurchill 
and the Presiden t  w il l  be interpreted  as rebuffs  instead  
o f  conclusions w ith  which you fin d  y o urself  in  agreement 
after  your c o n su lta tio n s .2 86
Curtin  was persuaded by th is  approach, and at a secret session  o f
Parliam ent on 8 October sa id  that Churchill and Roosevelt had assured
A u s tra lia  that they would m aintain a defensive  p o sit io n  in  the P a c i f ic ,
w ith  lim ited  o ffen s iv e  o b jec tiv e s . Since B r it a in , America and Russia
possessed  the predom inant resources in  manpower and production they
287
had 'the  greatest voice in  the determ ination o f  s t r a t e g y '.
288
This view was confirmed by the War Cabinet on 14 October, and 
therefore in  cables to Roosevelt and C h urch ill  on 17 October Curtin  
sa id  that he deeply appreciated  the P r e s id e n t 's  assurance that commitments 
o f  forces , supplies and equipment to the SWPA would be f u l f i l l e d .  He 
then included  the main p art  o f the C h iefs  o f  S t a f f  appreciation  which
285 . Advisory War Council Minute 1 0 8 7 , Canberra , 15 October 19 42 , CRS 
A 2 6 7 0 , Agendum N o .4 8 /1 9 4 2 . The decision  was r a t i f ie d  by War Cabinet 
Minute 2446 , Canberra, 15 October 19 42 , CRS A 26 71 , V o l .X I I .
286 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 2 October 1 9 42 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 51 1 .
287 . 'Review  by the Prime M in ister  follow ing  the exchange o f views with 
Mr C hurchill and P resid en t  Roosevelt regarding  global strategy  and the 
needs o f the Southwest P a c if ic  A r e a ' , dated 7 October and presented
8 October 1942 , XbXcf.
288 . War Cabinet Minute 2 4 2 8 , Canberra, 14 October 1 9 42 , CRS A 2 6 73 ,
V o l .V I I .  For the cabinet meeting Shedden had prepared 'N ot es on War 
Cabinet Agendum N o .4 0 4 /1 9 4 2  o f  14 October 1 9 4 2 , which repeated the views 
expressed  in  h is  memorandum o f 2 October, MP 12 17 , Box 57 4 .
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stressed  that increasing  manpower d i f f ic u l t ie s  made i t  im perative
289
that the 9th D iv is io n  should be returned .
The arguments in  telegram  form between London, Washington and
Canberra during October, November and December culm inating in  the
decision  to return the 9th D iv is io n  have been adequately re lated  in
290
the A u stralian  o f f ic ia l  h is to r y . But ona aspect , not mentioned
elsew here, is  o f in t e r e s t . On 1 November Roosevelt rep lied  to Curtin  
that the common cause could b est  be served by leaving  the 9th D iv is io n  
in  the Middle E a s t . However, he s a id  that he was prepared to 'o f f e r
a means to am eliorate ' A u s t r a l ia 's  p o s it io n , by despatching an American
. . . 291
d iv is io n  from H a w a ii. Shedden immediately used the secraphone to.
ca ll  Sutherland  who, a fter  d iscussion  w ith  MacArthur, strongly  recommended
pressing  for the return of the 9th D iv is io n . He informed Shedden
that they had received  advice some five  or s ix  days e a r l ie r  that an
American d iv is io n  had already l e f t  H a w a ii . With C u r t in 's  requests
being  re jected  in  Washington and London, in  M acArthur's  view 'the  p o sitio n
could be described  as throwing the b a l l  over Mr C u r t in 's  head between
292
Mr C h u rch ill  and President R o o s e v e lt '.
The Papuan campaign was not yet o ver , o f  course , and during
October MacArthur d isplayed  symptoms of anxiety  s im ilar  to those already
293
noticed  in  August and September. The main cause of h is  worry were
28 9 . Cable 4 6 1 , Curtin  to C h urch ill and Cables 151 and 1 5 2 , Curtin  
to A u stralian  Leg atio n , 17 October 1942 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 57 4 .
290 . H asluck , The Government and the People 1942-1945, p p .19 1 , 1 9 2 , 196-204. 
Copies o f  the cables and associated  documents can be found in  MP 1217 ,
Box 5 7 4 , CRS A 81 6 , items 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 2  and 5 2 /3 0 2 /1 4 3 ,  CRS M100, October, 
November, December 1 9 4 2 , AWM 4 2 5 /2 /2 2  and Blarney Papers 3 1 .4  and DRL 6 6 4 3 , 
item 77 .
291 . Cable , Roosevelt to C u rtin , 1 November, transm itted through US Navy,
MP 12 17 , Box 57 4 .
2 9 2 . Notes o f Secraphone Conversation [by Shedden] w ith  Major-General 
Sutherland , C h ie f  of S t a f f  to the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  
Area , 2 November 1 9 4 2 , loc.cit.
293 . Crisis of Command, p p .20 5 , 206 .
the naval and land  b attles  around and on G uadalcanal, and these were
294
causing equal concern to Roosevelt and the Jo in t  Chiefs  o f S t a f f .
The A ustralian  government was also  w o rr ied : as Hasluck observed, 'the
War Cabinet was expressing  deep concern . . .  having responded rap idly
295
in  the way i t  usually  d id  to bad n e w s '. But apart from the request
for the 9th D iv is io n , there was l it t le  more that could be done. The
immediate danger to Port Moresby had eased  and the government had
reaffirm ed  its  fa ith  in  MacArthur.
In  these circum stances, on 20 October Shedden trav elled  north
296
to Brisbane for a series  o f d iscussions  w ith  MacArthur. With regard
to the operations in  New G uinea , MacArthur s a id  that he was d is s a t is f ie d  
w ith  the rate of progress ag ain st  the Jap an ese , and the absence o f 
vigorous o ffen s iv e  a c tio n . W ith the exception  o f  Blarney, he thought 
that the A u s tra lia n  army was very weak in  le ad ersh ip . There was a lack 
of o ffen s iv e  s p ir it  and the permanent o ff ic e r s  were too greatly  concerned 
about their  future careers and d eco ratio ns .
Nevertheless MacArthur s a id  that he was already planning  to advance 
on Salamaua and Lae . But this could not take place  u n til  the b attles  
in  the Solomons had been resolved , and the s itu a tio n  there was 'most 
grav e ' .
Then, as he had done during  h is  d iscussions  w ith  Curtin  in  August, 
MacArthur turned to the p o l it ic a l  c r it ic is m  of h is  operations . He 
thought that 'H u g h e s 's  p ub lic  utterances were utterly  unscrupulous' 
and that 'from  h is  secret in te llig e n c e  sources , he knew that the enemy
294 . Ibid.
295 . H aslu ck , The Government and the People 1942-1945, p . 193 .
296 . The account o f these d iscussion s  is  based  on Notes of D iscussions 
[by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , B r isb an e , 
20-26 October 1942 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 2.
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Curtin  talk ing  to Lieutenant-General Bennett, 
GOC of the 3rd Corps and Major-General H .W . 
L loyd , GOC of the 2nd D iv is io n ,b e fo r e  an AIF  
parade in  P erth , 3 November 1942 .
(AWM Negative N o .28729)
Curtin  insp ecting  troops who took part  in 
the A IF  march, Perth , 3 November 1942 . 
This is  one o f the few occasions when 
C urtin  had d irect  contact with troops.
(AWM Negative N o .28738)
l
had p r o f it e d 1 . He claim ed that the Japanese had turned back before
reaching  Port Moresby because p u b lic ity  in  A u s tra lia  had warned them
297
of the a l l ie d  stren gth . MacArthur s a id  that Fadden and Spender
had assured him of support, but  that Menzies had been o ffended  when
he had told him that i t  would be a good thing  for the a l l ie d  cause i f
Curtin  were in  the place o f C h u rch ill  or R oosevelt. MacArthur thought
that the non-government members were d isp leased  w ith  m ilitary  successes
as fa ilu re  would embarass the government and the high command. They
considered  that the defeat  o f the government was even o f  more importance
298
than the de feat  of the Japanese .
MacArthur was p a rtic u la r ly  c r it ic a l  o f  the newspaper c h ie f , S ir  Keith
299
Murdoch, whom he described  as 'a n  A u stralian  Q u i s l i n g '.  He s a id
that 'he  had p o s it iv e  inform ation that S ir  Keith  Murdoch had issued  
in stru ctio n s  for m ilitary  achievements to be w ritten  do w n '. Furthermore, 
reports had been made to London that MacArthur was 'a n t i - B r i t i s h '.3^  
MacArthur urged, th ere fo re , that 'the  fu l l  rigours o f the censorship  
should be imposed on' Murdoch.
210
29 7 . M acArthur's  contention that he intended  to lure the Japanese over 
the mountains and defeat  them at Port Moresby has already been mentioned.
The facts do not support the wisdom of this  contention . Curtin  later  p u b lic ly  
c r it ic is e d  Hughes using  terms s im ilar  to those used by MacArthur.
F it zh a r d in g e , op.cit., p . 6 6 0 .
298 . On 23 September MacArthur had w ritten  to Curtin  to complain about 
Hughes, saying  that i t  had nothing to do w ith  p o l i t i c s , p e rso n a lit ie s  or 
freedom of in form ation , but was a matter o f  costing  the liv es  of Austra­
lian s  and Am ericans, RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
299 . MacArthur had e a r lie r  told Curtin  that h is  censors had suppressed an 
a rtic le  by Murdoch. He sa id  that 'No in te llig e n c e  report by an enemy agent 
could be so- full and complete' as M urdoch's a r t ic le . Ibid. For further 
comments by MacArthur about Murdoch see Thorne, 'M acArthur, A u s tra lia
and the B r it is h , p art  1 ' .
300 . On 14 Septem ber, soon a fte r  returning  to A u s tra lia  from England ,
S ir  Earle Page sent a cable to Bruce : 'Before  I le f t  England the King 
asked me i f  I had heard that MacArthur was un friendly  to the B r it is h  and 
seemed d isturbed  about i t .  I f in d  that MacArthur is  very f r i e n d l y ' .
C able , Page to Bruce , 14 September 19 4 2 , CRS M 100, item September 1942 .
The d iscussio n  then turned to the machinery for higher d irectio n  
in  the South-West P a c if ic  Area . MacArthur sa id  that A u s tra lia  'h ad  
surrendered part o f  its  sovereignty  in  regard to defence , on the under­
standing  that adequate forces would be a llo tte d  for the defence o f  the 
a re a , but these had not been forthcoming to the extent which might 
have been e x p e c t e d '. Furthermore, the o r ig in a l  idea  had been that 
there would be u n if ie d  d irec tio n  of operations in  the South-West P a c i f ic ,  
but w ith  the extension  o f  the South P a c if ic  Area westward to include 
the Solomons, that had not been achieved . I t  is  in te r e st in g  to observe
that these points were in cluded  in  a review to Parliam ent by the Prime
. . . 301
M in ister  m  early  December.
The c h ie f  su b ject  which Curtin  had requested Shedden to d iscuss
w ith  MacArthur was the re latio n sh ip  o f  h is  operation al plans to the
302
use o f  the m il it ia  outside  o f  A u s tr a lia . A few days e a r lie r  the
War Cabinet had d iscussed  an appreciation  from the C hiefs  o f  S t a f f ,
warning that owing to dangerously depleted strengths in  A u s tra lia  i t
. . . 303
was not p o ssible  to send further ad ditio n al forces to New Guinea .
MacArthur sa id  that i t  was nothing to do w ith  him , but as an observer
he sa id  't h a t  there was one serious flaw in  the Governm ent's p o lic y  -
fa ilu re  to amalgamate the AIF and the AMF by some formula w hich , while
not g iv ing  any cred it  to the O p p o s it io n , would enable the Government
to get out o f what he fe lt  would become an in creasin g ly  d i f f i c u l t
301 . Review o f  War S itu a tio n  by the Prime M in ister  in  the House o f 
Representatives , 10 December 1 9 4 2 , MP 1217 , Box 6 1 1 .
302 . Shedden M anuscript, Book 4 , Box 3 , Chapter 33 , p . l .  Soon a fte r  
MacArthur arrived  in  A u stra lia  h is  ch ie f  of in t e ll ig e n c e , Brigadier-  
General W illoug hby , advised  that although Labor opposed amending the 
Defence A ct , Curtin  was in  favour of i t .  Indeed  he sa id  that i f  he 
d id  not get h is  way he would cross the floor and set up a National 
Government. W illoughby s a id  that Curtin  would probably accept any sugges­
tion  from MacArthur. Memorandum, W illoughby to Sutherland and Cham berlin ,
5 A p ril  19 42 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 2  Part  1 .
303 . War Cabinet Minute 2 4 28 , Canberra, 14 October 1 9 42 , CRS A 2 6 73 ,
V o l .X I I .
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p o s i t i o n '.  Such a step would be important in  in flu e n c in g  American
p u b lic  o p in ion . He 'hoped that the Prime M in ister  would fin d  a way
304
to act and would act q u i c k l y ' .
MacArthur exp lained  th at , in any o ffen s iv e  operations 
outside A u s t r a l ia , he probably would not require more 
than three A u stralian  D iv is io n s . He hoped also  to have 
three American d iv is io n s , o f which two were in 
A u stra lia  and another had been diverted  to the South 
P a c if ic  Area . . .  Though the 6th , 7th and 9th AIF 
D iv is io n s  might be ava ilab le  to him for service  
outside  A u s t r a l ia , he d id  not consider that i t  would 
be sound in  p r in c ip le  to rely  on this as the main 
argument for not amending the Defence Act to provide 
for the C it iz e n  M ilitary  Forces being  ava ilable  
for service  outside  A u s t r a lia . The campaign in  Papua 
had in d icated  its  exhausting  na tu re , and the need for 
the retention  o f d iv is io n s  to provide for rest and
r e c u p e r a t io n .305
Shedden 's  m eticulous notes of the conference provide excellent
support to the contention put forward in  recent years that MacArthur
306
'p r e c ip ita te d  the move' to change the Defence A ct . Rather than
a shrewd p o l it ic a l  move to win the e lec tio n  in  late 1 9 43 , as suggested
by H asluck , C u r t in 's  reaction  appears to have been based on 'a  web
307
of m ilitary  and diplom atic c o n s id e r a t io n s '. Thus as the campaign in
Papua moved towards a su c c e s s fu l , but bloody , clim ax, Curtin sought to
provide ad d itio n a l  A ustralian  troops. A fter  a l l ,  A u stra lia  had a duty
to an a l l y : 'Because of the debt o f  gratitude  owed to the U S ',
A ustralian  troops were required  to accompany the Americans in  th e ir  north-
308
ward advance and to protect th e ir  bases from attac k . This reason
304. MacArthur showed a keen awareness o f C u r t in 's  p o l it ic a l  p o sit io n  and 
the p o s s ib il it y  o f  damaging a l l ie d  r e la t io n s . Thus he sa id  that he hoped 
that the government would not approach him for an o p in io n , as he could not 
go back on views which he had expressed  during  World War I and a fte r  on 
the necessity  for power to send American troops overseas in  defence of 
USA, and the need for the Army to be homogeneously organised  for this 
purp o se .
305. Notes o f  D iscussion  [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
P a c if ic  Ar.ea, B risb an e , 20-26 October 1 9 4 2 , MP 1217 , Box 2 .
306 . Peter Love, 'C u r t in , MacArthur and C o n scrip tio n , 1 9 42- 4 3 ',
Historical Studies, Volume 17 , N o .6 9 , October 1977 .
307 . ibid.
308 . !bid.
w as, o f  course, only a small p art  o f  the to tal m otivation , for i t  
was in  A u s t r a l ia 's  natio nal in ter est  to take part  in  the coming 
cam paigns. For diplom atic reasons i t  was important that A u s tra lia  
should be  seen to be p u ll in g  its  w eight. It  i s ,  th e re fo re , d i f f i c u l t  
to determine what Curtin  considered  to be the most urgent and com pelling 
m otive. N onetheless, the decision  reveals how much Curtin  had come 
to rely  upon advice from MacArthur.
M eanwhile, in early  November MacArthur had e sta b lis h ed  h is  advanced 
headquarters in  Port Moresby, and therefore the governm ent's p r in c ip a l  
m ilitary  advisers were no longer a v a ila b le . Blarney, who had been in  New
Guinea since  23 Septem ber, tr ie d  to keep in  touch by frequent letters
. . 309
to C urtin  em phasising the cost in  manpower of the Papua campaign.
Although the casualties  continued to mount, the government retain ed
it s  fa ith  in  MacArthur and Blarney, and made no further attempt to
in fluence  the conduct o f the campaign.
The end o f  a year is  an opportunity  for taking  stock , and at
Christmas 1942 Curtin  took note of those to whom he had been most
in debted . P o l i t ic a l l y , i t  was towards the Treasurer , J .B .  C h ifle y ;
for the d irectio n  o f o p eratio n s , i t  was MacArthur and Blarney; for
m unitions, i t  was the D irector- G eneral,Essington  Lew is ; for works,
i t  was the Director- General of A l l ie d  Works, E .G .  Theodore; and for
defence p o licy  i t  was Shedden. Curtin  told  Shedden that 'b u t  for the
r , . . 3 1 0
assistance  secured from [himj personally  he could not have ca rried  o n ' .
N evertheless , there is  no doubt that the most important in fluence  on
C u r t in 's  strateg ic  thinking  during the year had been that of General
MacArthur.
309 . See MP 12 17 , Box 5 3 2 .
31 0 . Shedden 's  D iary , 22 December 1 9 4 2 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 16 . On 19 December 1942 
Menzies wrote to Shedden: 'As the Christmas season come round, I am 
naturally  thinking  of the state of a f fa ir s  in A u stra lia  - and that 
in ev itably  leads me to w rite  to you to thank you for your m agnificent 
services . . . '  MP 12 17 , Box 6 7 .
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ALLIED INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION IN THE SWPA
Early  Developments in  A u stralia
Before the Second World War A ustralian  cooperation with a l l ie d  
in tellig e n ce  was an extremely uncom plicated procedure. With few in te llig e n c e  
gathering fa c i l i t ie s  o f their  own the A u stralian  services r e lie d  almost 
exclu sively  on inform ation received  from B r it is h  sources, and in  turn the 
B r it ish  passed  on what they thought the A ustralian s  needed to know .^ Few 
serving o ffic e r s  were interested  in  in t e l l ig e n c e ; the in tellig en ce  
services were therefore o f  low q u ality  and d id  not attract  high calibre  
o f f ic e r s .
Even a fte r  the outbreak o f war the development o f  e ffec tiv e
in tellig e n ce  gathering  organisations were h esitan t  and slow. I t  was
recognised that the most important means o f gathering  inform ation about
2
the enemy would be by intercepting  and decyphering his s ig n a ls . But 
the A ustralian  services and the government seemed un w illin g  to develop 
a crypotographic organisation  which might duplicate  that of the B r it ish  
Government Code and Cypher School (G C C S), and even a nucleus organisation
3
required B r it is h  advice and a ss ista n ce . With problems enough in  Europe
4
the B r it ish  gave low p r io r ity  to developing  an A ustralian  organisation .
1. B .N . Prim rose, A ustralian  Naval P o lic y , 1919- 1942: a Case Study 
in  Empire R e latio n s , P h .D  T h es is , ANU, September 1 9 74 , p p .16 1 , 162 .
2. For example the B r it is h  Commander-in-Chief, China S ta tio n , cabled 
the Admiralty on 14 June 1 9 41 : 'Alm ost our only means at present of 
gauging extent and success of Japanese espionage is  derived  from Special 
In tellig en ce  s o u r c e s '. WO 1 9 3 /9 2 0 .
3. Memorandum, 'Cryptographic Organisation  in  A u s t r a l i a ',  CNS to CGS 
and CAS, 12 December 1939 ; Memorandum, CGS to CNS, 16 December 1939 ; 
Memorandum, CAS to CNS, 21 December 19 39 ; Defence Committee Minute 
N o .1 0 /1 9 4 0 , 15 February 1 9 40 , (CRS A 8 1 6 , item 4 3 /3 0 2 /1 8 ) ;  Cable 88,
Menzies to Dominions Secretary , 11 A p ril  1 9 40 , MP 1 1 8 5 /8 , item 1 9 3 7 /2 /4 1 5 .
4 . The B r it is h  did  not respond to the A ustralian  cable until
15 October 1940 . CRS A 816 , item 4 3 /3 0 2 /1 8 .
N everth eless , despite this  discouraging  atmosphere, both the
army and navy had begun e ffo rts  of their  own. In  September 1939 a
sig n als  detachment from the 3rd D iv is io n  (m ilit ia ) in  Melbourne was
d e ta ile d  to in tercept enemy w ire le ss  tran sm issio n s .^  Sometime later
another organisation  was set up at the Sydney University  to work on 
6
Japanese codes.
The main work, however, was carried  out by the navy. In  early
1940 an A ustralian  o f f ic e r  in  the Royal Navy, Paymaster Commander R .E .
Nave, returned to A u s tra lia  on sick  leave from the B r it is h  Far East
Combined Bureau (FECB) in  Singapore . Since 1925 Nave had been involved
ir\ breaking  Japanese codes , and between 1937 and 19 39 , when based
at Hong Kong, he had su ccessfu lly  read the messages of the Japanese
Navy operating  around the China coast. Between 1921 and 19 23 , when
an o f f ic e r  in  the RAN, Nave had been attached to the B r it is h  Embassy
in  Tokyo to learn Japanese . The B r it is h  naval attache in  Tokyo had been
Captain C o lv in , who was now the A ustralian  CNS. Colvin  was therefore
aware o f  N ave 's  capacity , and he arranged for  Nave to set up a small
7
A ustralian  cryptographic o rg a n isa tio n .
Thus towards the end o f 1940 Nave e stab lish ed  a Special In te llig e n c e  
section  to obtain  inform ation by radio  d irectio n - fin d in g , t r a f f ic  analysis  
and cr y p ta n a ly s is . Radio intercept  stations  had already been estab lish ed  
at Darwin (Coonaw ara), Melbourne and Canberra (Harm an), and the section 
concentrated on Japanese t r a f f ic  in  the Mandated Is la n d s . Cooperation
5 . Memorandum, Major-General C .H . Sim pson, S ign al O fficer- in- Chief, 
to CGS, 1 A p ril  1944 , MP 7 2 4 /8 ,  item 3 7 /4 3 /1 8 1 .  This un it  was located 
at Park Orchard , near Ringwood on the o utskirts  o f Melbourne.
6 . This group included  Captain A .P .  Treweek and Professor T .G . Room, 
Professor o f  Mathematics.
7 . Interview  with  Captain R .E .  Nave, 25 January 1 9 79 , Memorandum,
Naval S t a f f  to Mr Douglas M enzies , Secretary  of the Defence Committee,
12 November 1941 , Prepared by Paymaster Commander Nave, CRS A 816 , item 
4 3 /3 0 2 /1 8 .
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was estab lish ed  w ith  the FECB and Dutch au th o rities  in  the Netherlands 
East In d ie s . These units were now having  some success w ith the Japanese
consular, d iplom atic , four figure  naval and merchant ship  codes and
, 8 
cyphers.
In  early  1941 Nave d iscussed  w ith  the group at Sydney U niversity  
the p o s s ib il it y  o f their  working full-time on Japanese consular and 
diplom atic t r a f f i c ,  and by mid 1941 the personnel at Sydney U niversity  
had been transferred  to what Nave loosely  described  as the Sp ecial
9
In tellig e n c e  Bureau. N ave 's  s t a f f  now included  Paymaster Lieutenants 
K .G . M iller  and A .B . Jamieson from the RAN, and Major A .P .  Treweek, 
Professors T .G . Room and A .D . T re n d a ll , Mr R .J .  Lyons and Lieutenant I .H .  
Lon gfield  Lloyd from the A ustralian  A r m y .^
With this lim ited  s t a f f  the A ustralian  cryptographic organisation  
could do l it t l e  more than supplement the work of the FECB in  Singapore 
and the GCCS at Bletchley  Park in  England , but the A ustralian  o rganisation  
was able to break the code used by the Japanese m ission in  A u s tr a lia , 
and the key was sent to Bletchley  and Washington. The Australians 
had some important successes. In September they intercepted  a message 
in stru ctin g  the Japanese Consul-General to fin d  another neutral country 
to look after  It a l ia n  i n t e r e s t s ,"^  and they detected on 4 December 1941 
that the Japanese s t a f f  had been ordered to burn a ll  their  codes and 
12cyphers.
8 . Memorandum for D iscussion  at Singapore , prepared by Commander J .B .  
Newman, D irector o f  Naval Communications, early  October 1940 , Comments 
by Nave, Notes by Newman, and Memorandum, Newman to Nave, 19 March 1941 ,
MP 1 1 8 5 /8  item 1 9 3 7 /2 /4 1 5 .
9 . Memorandum, Naval S t a f f  to Mr Douglas M enzies, 12 November 19 41 ,
CRS A 816 , item 4 3 /3 0 2 /1 8 .  The SIB  was e sta b lis h ed  in  Monterey House,
Domain Road, Melbourne. I t  was responsible  through Newman, the
Director o f  Naval Communications, to the CNS.
1 0 . Defence Committee M inute , 1 6 9 /1 9 4 1 , 28 November 1941 . Nave in terv iew , 
Room was Professor of Mathematics and T re n d a ll , Professor o f Greek at 
Sydney U n iversity .
11 . Nave interview .
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12. Ibid.
217
This inform ation merely added to the wealth of in tellig e n ce  then
becoming ava ilable  about Japanese in te n t io n s . American successes in
breaking  the Japanese diplom atic cyphers and the naval codes have been
13
catalogued m  numerous books in  recent y ears . But i t  is  not generally
re a lis ed  that in  the perio d  before Pearl Harbour the B r it is h  had
as much, i f  not more, success than the Americans w ith  the Japanese naval 
14
codes. I t  was the B r it is h  who in  1940 su pplied  the US N avy 's  crypto­
graphic organisation  at M anila w ith  the key to the important JN25 co de , ^
16
and the Japanese moves into  the South China Sea were clo sely  monitored.
In tellig e n c e  cooperation between the B r it is h  and Americans improved
during 19 41 , but the Dominions O ffic e  fe lt  constrained  to warn the
A ustralians  that :
Inform ation from most secret sources should not 
be passed  d irec t  to United States observers but 
w il l  be exchanged through the Far East Combined 
Bureau at Singapore.
One reputable authority  has claimed that the B r it is h  knew when
the Japanese fle et  for Pearl Harbour changed course the day before the
13 . See D. Kahn, The Code-Breakers, The Story of Secret Writing 
(W eidenfeld  and N ico lso n , London, 1 9 6 7 ) ;  R. C lark , The Man Who Broke 
Purple (L ittle  Brown, Boston, 1 9 7 7 ) ; Lad is las  Farago , The Broken Seal,
The Story of 'Operation Magic' and the Pearl Harbor Disaster (Barker, 
London, 1 9 6 7 ) ;  Roberta W o h lstetter , Pearl Harbor, Warning and Decision 
(Stanfo rd , C a lifo r n ia , 1 9 6 2 ) ;  C . B l a ir , J r . ,  Silent Victory, The US 
Submarine War Against Japan (Bantam, New York , 1 9 7 5 ) ;  E . Van Der Rhoer, 
Deadly Magic. A Personal Account of Communications Intelligence in World 
War I I  in the Pacific  (Charles S c r ib n e r 's , New York , 1 9 7 8 ) ; W .J .  Holmes, 
Double-Edged Secrets, U.S. Naval Intelligence Operations in the Pacific 
During World War I I  (Naval In st itu te  P r ess , A nn ap o lis , Maryland, 1 9 7 9 ) .
14 . F .H . H in sle y , et .a l., British Intelligence in the Second World War, 
V o l .I  (HMSO, London, 1 9 7 9 ) ,  p p .5 2 , 5 3 .
15 . Nave in terview . Also  Constantine F itzg ib b o n , Secret Intelligence 
in the Twentieth Century (Panther Granada, London, 1 9 7 8 ) ,  p . 229 .
16 . See for example the Combined Operational In te llig e n c e  Centre Weekly 
In tellig en c e  Summaries for June-December 1 9 41 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 .
17 . Cable 6 1 0 , Dominions O ffic e  to A u s t r a l ia , 2 September 1 9 4 1 , and 
cable 6 1 1 , A u s tra lia  to Dominions O f f i c e , 18 September 1941 , AWM 4 2 5 /1 1 /1 4 .
attack , and the Americans were warned. I t  is  not known how much
of this inform ation reached A u s t r a lia , but there can be no doubt that
in  early  December 1941 A ustralian  au th o rities  expected a Japanese attack 
19
any day. I t  should be noted, however, that most o f  the inform ation
was gained from in tercepting  Japanese naval s ig n a ls . There had been
20
l it t l e  success with the army cyphers.
Thus by the outbreak o f  war in  the P a c if ic  the A ustralians had
developed some lim ited  expertise  in  what was known as sp ecia l  in t e ll ig e n c e .
Meanwhile, in  the Middle East  a Sp e c ia l  W ireless  Section Type B had
been raised  by the 1st A u stralian  Corps. Under the command o f Captain
J .W . Ryan, the section  served w ith  'g re a t  d i s t i n c t i o n ',  s p e c ia lis in g
21
in  t r a f f ic  a n a ly s is . One o f f ic e r  who performed w ell was Lieutenant 
A .W . Sandford , and he was to play  a prominent role later  in  the w ar.
A ustralian  in tellig e n ce  cooperation was not just  in  the f ie ld  o f 
communications in t e ll ig e n c e . In  mid 1940 the War O ffic e  suggested that 
a sp ecia l branch should be set up in  A u s tr a lia :
a . To in it ia t e  defensive  action  against  enemy F ifth  
Column and para  m ilitary  a c t iv it ie s , and
b . To in it ia t e  o ffensive  action by organising  our 
own F ifth  Column and para  m ilitary  a c t iv it ie s  in  
te rr ito r ie s  e ith er  lik e ly  to be occupied by the 
enemy or which are suspected .
22
The latter  group would carry out r a id s , dem olitions and sabotage.
As a r e s u lt , in  November 19 40 , N o .104 M ilitary  M ission commanded by
18 . F itzg ib b o n , op.cit., p . 2 5 5 . F itzg ibbo n  quotes Lord Cavendish- 
Bentinck , the Chairman o f  the B r it is h  Jo in t  In te llig e n c e  Committee.
19 . Examples o f  the accumulating evidence are given in  the autho r 's  
chapter 'A u str a lia n  Estim ates o f the Japanese Threat, 1 9 05- 1 941 ',
in  P .A . Towle, Estimating Foreign Military Power (Croom Helm, London,
1 9 8 1 ) , forthcom ing.
2 0 . Cable 20067 , GS01 (Int) Singapore to War O f f ic e , 19 June 19 4 1 ,
WO 1 0 6 /2 4 8 2 .
21 . Memorandum, Simpson to CGS, 1 A p ril  1 9 44 , MP 7 2 9 /8 ,  item 3 7 /4 3 /1 8 1 .
22 . War O ffic e  telegram  quoted in  Cable 34 , Secretary  o f  State to 
B r it is h  High Commissioner, 22 January 1 9 4 1 , CRS A 1608 , item G /3 9 /2 / 1 .
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Lieutenant- Colonel J .C .  Mawhood arrived  in  A u s t r a l ia . The A u s tr a lia n
24
government had not been co n su lted , b u t  p a rt  o f  the m issio n , led  by 
Captains Calvert and Spencer-Chapman, su cce ss fu lly  trained  A u s tr a lia n
25
independent com panies, or commandos, fo r  g u e r il la  or irreg u lar  w a r fa r e .
M eanwhile , Mawhood, a man o f  great am bition and strong p e r s u a s io n , 
even foZie de grandeur, had hoped to set  up an MI5-type o rg a n isa tio n  in
A u s t r a l ia , but Sturdee , the CGS, thought that he was 't o t a lly  u n f it t e d  for
. , . . . . 26 
any employment in  connection w ith  se cu rity  or in t e ll ig e n c e . S tu r d e e ,
t h e re fo re , arranged for the War O ff ic e  to r e c a ll  Mawhood to E n g lan d ,
27
but the Prime M in is te r , M e n zies , in ter v en e d . He thought that Sturdee
had been u n fa ir  to Mawhood, and for a w h ile  Mawhood was reta in ed  to
28
advise  on the establishm ent o f an A u s tr a lia n  Security  S erv ic e .
The Navy also  had it s  own ir r e g u la r  o rg a n isa tio n , for on the
outbreak o f  war the D irecto r  o f  Naval In t e l l ig e n c e , Commander R .B .M . Long,
had given  Lieutenant-Commander E .A .  F e ld t  the task o f org a n ising  the
29 .
coastwatcher o rg a n isa tio n . This o rg a n isa tio n  was to prove o f  value 
not only to A u s t r a l ia , but a lso  to the Am ericans, and i t  fig u red  
prom inently  in  a l l ie d  in t e ll ig e n c e  cooperation la te r  in  the w ar .
2 3 . L . Wigm ore, The Japanese Thrust (A u str a lia n  War Mem orial, C anberra , 
1 9 5 7 ) ,  p . 8 3 ; F . Spencer Chapman, The Jungle is Neutral (Reprint S o c ie t y , 
London, 1 9 4 9 ) ,  p . 19 .
24 . L e t t e r , S ir  G eoffrey  W hiskard  to Fadden , 27 January 1 9 4 1 , CRS A 1 6 0 8 , 
item  G / 3 9 / 2 / 1 .
25 . Wigmore, op.cit.,  p . 8 4 . Spencer Chapman, op.cit. ,  p p .2 0 , 21 .
2 6 . Lieutenant- Colonel C .A .K .  Cohen, to Gavin Long in  Long Notes N o .9 0 ,
AWM. Cohen re c a lled  that Sturdee s a id : 'A f t e r  Mawhood had been t a lk in g  to 
me for h a l f  an hour , I had to p inch  m yself to wake m yself up ' . See also  
cable 2 2 , Bruce to Prime M in is t e r , 30 August 1941 , CRS A 16 08 , item  G / 3 9 / 2 / 1 .
27 . Ib id .,  and War Cabinet Minute 1 2 2 7 , Sydney, 18 July  1 9 41 , CRS A 2 6 7 3 , 
V o l .7 .
2 8 . Cable 4 8 9 9 , Fadden to B r u ce , 1 September 1941 and C able , C u r tin  to 
Dominions S ecretary , 23 February 1 9 4 3 , Zoc.cit See also  War C ab in et  Minute 
1 2 3 7 , M elbourne, 22 Ju ly  1 9 4 1 , CRS A 2 6 7 3 , V o l .7 A . For an account o f  the 
S ecurity  Service  see C .D .  Coulthard- Clark , 'A u s t r a l ia 's  Wartime S ecu r ity  
S e r v ic e ' in  Defence Force Journal, M ay/June 1979 .
2 9 . G. Hermon G i l l ,  RoyaZ AustraZian Navy 1939-1942, (A ustralian  War 
M em orial, C anberra , 1 9 5 7 ) ,  p . 7 3 .
23
Commander R .B .M, Long RAN 
Director o f  Naval 
In t e ll ig e n c e , 1939- 1945.
(AWM Negative N o .107006)
Major-General C .H . Simpson, 
A ustralian  S ign al Officer-  
in- Chief, 1942- 1945.
(AWM Negative N o .91084)
Sp ecia l  In tellig en c e  after  Pearl Harbour
The Japanese v icto ries  in  early  1942 threw the a l l ie d  in tellig e n c e  
organisation  in  the P a c if ic  into  turm oil. In  January the cryptographic
section  o f  the FECB had to leave Singapore for Colombo, later  moving
....................  30
to K il in d in i  in  East A fr ic a , and f in a lly  to New D e lh i . The follow ing
month the US N avy 's  'C a s t ' code-breaking unit at Corregidor moved by
submarine f ir s t  to Java and then to A u s t r a lia . This organisation  o f
some seventy-five men, under the command o f Lieutenant-Commander Rudolph
F abian , was p artic u la r ly  important because i t  possessed  the Purple machine
which could read the Japanese diplom atic  code, as w ell as the s lig h tly
31
sim pler Fed machine. F a b ia n 's  un it  was esta b lis h ed  on the middle floor
o f  the Monterey B u ild in g  in  M elbourne, and lia is o n  was soon organised
with N ave 's  SIB  on the top floor and the Directorate  o f Naval Communica-
32
tions on the ground flo o r .
When MacArthur arrived  in  A u stra lia  in  March 1942 the in tellig e n c e
organisation  underwent a further change, for accompanying him was
Lieutenant-Colone1 J .R .  Sherr and a few members o f  the 2nd S ignal Service
Company, which had provided the arm y's s ign al in te llig e n ce  service  in
33
the P h il ip p in e s . I t  did  not take MacArthur long to realise  that one 
o f h is  most pressing  requirements was the development o f e ffec tiv e  sign als  
in t e ll ig e n c e . Thus, on 1 A p r il , ten days after  arriv in g  in  Melbourne, 
he radioed W ashington :
30 . Cable 6 2 0 0 9 , Chiefs  o f  S t a f f  to W av ell , 4 January 1942 , N o .1 0 6 /3 2 9 8 . 
The B r it is h  wanted the FECB to come to A u s tra lia  but Newman said  that 
f a c i l it ie s  were not a v a ila b le . See also  Cable F4, Dominions Secretary
to Prime M in iste r , 7 August 1942 , CRS A 816 , 1 9 /3 0 4 /3 3 0 .
31 . Kahn, op.cit.,  p . 10 .
32. B l a ir , op.cit. ,  p p .2 1 8 , 219 ; Nave in terview .
33 . G .R . Thompson and D .R . H a r r is , The Signal Corps: The Outcome 
(OCMH, W ashington, 1 9 6 6 ) , p . 340 . S ig n a l , Brett  to M arshall, 19 March
1 9 4 2 , OPD Exec 10 , item 11 , RG 16 5 , N ational A rc h iv es , l is t s  the o ffic e r s  
evacuated w ith  MacArthur. Most o f the 2nd S ig n al Service Company were 
k i l l e d  or captured.
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In v estig atio n  d iscloses  that a central a ll ie d  
s ig n a l  in te llig e n c e  section  is  required  for the 
interception  and cryptanalyzing  o f  Japanese 
in t e ll ig e n c e . The time delay and transm ission 
u ncertain ties  in c id e n t  to sending  in tercepted  
m aterial to Washington and elsewhere dictate  that 
th is  work be handled lo c a lly . A ll ie d  forces here 
are o rg a n izing  such a bureau .
He went on to request that trained  s t a f f  should be sent to A u stralia
to supplement the 'few  in d iv id u a ls  that I have brought from the
P h il ip p in e s ' .
On 15 A p r il  1942 , a fter  d iscussions  between M acArthur's C h ief
S ign als  O f f ic e r , Brigadier- General S .B .  A k in , and the A ustralian  S ign al
O fficer- in- C hief, Major-General C .H . Simpson, a combined a l l ie d
o rg a n isa tio n , the Central Bureau, was e stab lish ed  in  Melbourne. I t
operated under the d irectio n  o f  General A k in , w ith  Colonel Sherr as the
nominal executive  o f f ic e r . The necessary cryptanalysts requested
by MacArthur le ft  America the fo llow ing  day on the last scheduled
35
clipper  f l ig h t  to H aw a ii.
The A ustralian  Army component o f  Central Bureau came from the
A ustralian  Sp ecial W ireless Group, the sections o f  which had seen
considerable  service  in  the Middle East and Singapore , and also included
some B r it is h  personnel who had escaped from Singapore. The RAAF
component consisted  of personnel assigned  from V ic to ria  Barracks , Melbourne.
There were three assistan t  d ire c to rs , Lieutenant-Colonel Abraham Sinkov
of the American Army, M ajor, later  Lieutenant- Colonel, A .W . Sandford ,
36
and Wing-Commander Roy Booth o f  the RAAF.
34 . Radio 1 2 2 4 , MacArthur to the Adjutant- General, 1 A p ril 19 42 , OPD 
Exec 10 item 7D, RG 16 5 , N ational Archives .
35. C .A . W illoughby (Comp), Operations of the Military Intelligence 
Section, GHQS SWPA/FEC/SCAP (GHQ, Far East  Command, Tokyo, 1 9 4 8 ) ,
Copy held  in  CMH, Washington.
36 . Ibid . Sinkov had jo ined  the legendary Colonel Friedman o f  the 
American Army S ig n al In te llig e n c e  Service  during  the early  1930s , 
and therefore had considerable cryptanalysis  experience .
222
The navy had much less involvement in  the Central Bureau, but 
a small section  of the RAN's S IB , headed by Nave and Professor Room, 
jo ined  and provided  valuable  experience w ith  Japanese naval codes.
However the remainder o f  the S IB , led by Professor  T re n d a ll , remained
37
under A u stralian  control, and concentrated on diplom atic in t e ll ig e n c e . 
Furthermore, Fabian  d id  not jo in  M acArthur's o rg a n isa tio n , and although 
he passed some inform ation to the Central Bureau, h is  main rec ip ien t  
was Admiral King in  Washington. This w as, of course, a bone o f contention 
w ith  M acArthur's  C h ief  o f  In t e ll ig e n c e , General W illoughby , who wrote 
later  that :
The Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise  in  
mystery, excluding  other s e rv ice s , and r ig id ly  
ce n tra lizin g  the whole e n te r p r is e . At this date ,
[8 May 1945] for exam ple, this same system is  s t i l l  
in  vogue: as far as SWPA is  concerned, the crypto­
analysis  is  made in  M elbourne, forwarded v ia  7th 
F leet  D . N . I . ;  the Melbourne statio n  is  under d irect  
orders o f W ashington, is  not bound by any local 
r e s p o n s ib il it ie s , forwards what they s e le c t , and when 
i t  su its  them. The p o s s ib il it y  o f  erroneous or 
incomplete se lectio n  is  as ev ident now as i t  was in
1941 . The only excuse the Navy has is  that its  
f ie ld  is  prim arily  naval in ter ce p ts , but there is  a lot 
o f Army t r a f f ic  or other in c id e n ta l  t r a f f i c .  This 
co lla ter a l  t r a f f ic  is  not always understood or 
correctly  in terpreted  by the Navy, in  my o p i n i o n . 38
The co llectio n  o f in te llig e n c e  is does not y ie ld  co nsistent r e s u lt s , and
a fr u it fu l  source one month might become barren and useless the next . In
the P a c if ic  war this was p a rtic u la r ly  so during 1942 , when the Japanese
changed their  codes several tim es. On the other hand good in tellig en ce
39
is  most v ita l  during  the defensive  phase o f w ar, and in  1942 the a ll ie s
37 . Nave in terview . Nave was emphatic that he was not under command of 
Central Bureau , but was employed as an adviser .
38 . A f f id a v it  by Major-General C .A . W illoughby , dated 8 May 1945 , in  
U .S . Congress, Hearings before  the Jo in t  Committee on the Inv estig atio n  
o f  the Pearl Harbor A ttack , Peart Harbor Attack (USGPO, W ashington , 1 9 4 6 ) ,  
Part 35 , p . 87 .
39 . In a report w ritten  at the end of the w ar, Captain W .J .  Holmes,
Deputy Commander of the Jo in t  In te llig e n c e  Centre in  Hawaii wrote: 'I n  
the defensive  stages o f the w ar , radio  in te llig e n c e  was not only the most 
important source o f  in te llig e n c e  in  the Central P a c if ic , i t  was p ra c tic a lly  
the only s o u r c e '. Report 8 December 1945 , SRH-020, RG 4 5 7 , National 
A rc h iv e s .
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were on the de fen siv e . During this  p erio d  the most important source
o f  in tellig e n c e  came from decoding Japanese naval messages, and from
40
t r a f f ic  an a ly s is . This in te llig e n c e  was responsible  for the successes
41
at Coral Sea and Midway, and had an important impact on the operations
42 . 43
in  the Solomons and at Milne Bay.
Although M acArthur's s t a f f  had d i f f ic u l t y  decoding Japanese Army
m essages, naval in tellig e n c e  was the most im portant, because in  the
early  stages of the war the Japanese forces in  the SWPA were under naval
command. Yet for a while  MacArthur, lik e  many other commanders, was
44
loath to trust radio  in tellig e n c e  com pletely. H is re jec tio n  o f the
in tellig e n ce  that the Japanese intended  to se ize  Port Moresby by an
45
overland operation was almost d isa stro u s . And at times MacArthur
fe lt  that he knew b etter  than the reports . As one of h is  in tellig e n ce
o ffic e r s  wrote, 'More than one in te llig e n c e  o f f i c e r 's  career was b lig h ted
46
by w ritin g  accurate but unpalatable r e p o r t s '.
40 . See Holmes, Double-Edged Secrets, for the best  account o f the i n t e l l i ­
gence problems in  the P a c if ic  W ar.
41 . Ibid . See also  the a u th o r 's  a r t ic le , 'S p e c ia l  In tellig e n c e  in  the 
South-West P a c if ic  Area in  World War I I ' ,  Australian Outlook, December 
1978 , for the inform ation ava ilable  to MacArthur. For the use of i n t e l l i ­
gence during the Coral Sea b attles  see J .B .  Lundstrom, The First South 
Pacific Campaign: Pacific Fleet Strategy, December 1941-June 1942 
(Naval In stitu te  P ress , A nnapolis , M aryland, 1 9 7 6 ) .
42 . For the role of in te llig e n ce  in  the Solomons see The Role of Radio 
Intelligence: The American Japanese Naval War, V o l . i l l ,  The Solomon 
Islands Campaign, SRH-012, RG 45 7 , N ational Archives .
43 . Some of the decoded messages a ffe c t in g  the operations at Milne Bay 
are reproduced in  the auth o r 's  a r t ic l e , 'S p e c ia l  In te llig e n c e  in  the 
South-West P a c if ic  Area in  World War I I ' .
44 . On 29 December 1941 General M arsh all , the US C hief o f S t a f f , personally  
telephoned one o f h is  s t a f f  o ff ic e r s  to make sure that he stressed  to the 
commanders that M agic, the name o f  the in tercept  inform ation , was not 
'm erely "auth entic  and from a r e lia b le  s o u r c e " , but  was actual t r u t h '.
R .S . C l in e , Washington Command Post3 The Operations Division (OCMH, 
Washington, 1 9 5 1 ) , p . 340 .
45 . See the auth o r 's  'S p e c ia l  In te llig e n c e  in  the South-West P a c if ic  Area 
in  World War I I ' .
4 6 . E .R . Thorpe, East Wind> Rain (Gambit, Boston, 1 9 6 9 ) ,  p . 55 .
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In  September 1942 the Central Bureau followed M acArthur's head­
quarters (GHQ SWPA) to Brisbane where i t  was set up at 21 Henry S treet , 
A scot , near the racecourse. Here i t  d id  valuable  work during the early  
campaigns again st  the Japanese . N evertheless , the main breaks were 
s t i l l  made by naval in t e ll ig e n c e , and the inform ation was probably
47
fed to MacArthur by the Combined O perational In te llig e n c e  Centre (C O IC ) .
48
This naval in tercept m aterial was given the t it le  of U ltra . MacArthur 
was also  receiv ing  Magic inform ation which was the result  o f the decryp­
tion o f coded messages between Japanese diplom atic and consulate o ffic e r s
abroad and their  home government. This v it a l  source provided MacArthur
49
with the advice that the Japanese did  not in ten d  to invade A u s t r a lia .
I t  is  obvious that Blarney, as Commander of the A l l ie d  Land Forces,
was receiv ing  Magic inform ation , for in  h is  papers there is  a South-West
P a c if ic  Naval Force memorandum e n t it le d  'Memorandum for the Adm iral'
and dated 28 November 1942 , which d e ta ils  Tokyo 's  appraisal o f  the
50
general war s it u a t io n . Ev iden tly  this 'w id e ' c ircu latio n  o f  Magic
47 . A good summary o f  the naval in te llig e n ce  av a ilable  during this  perio d  
can be found in  the A dm iralty 's  'O p eratio nal In te llig e n c e  Centre Sp ecial  
In tellig e n c e  Sum m aries ', ADM 2 2 3 /2 2 .
4 8 . This m aterial should not be confused w ith  that obtained by the B r it is h  
GCCS and which was also  given the t it le  o f  U ltra .
4 9 . See for example the American in tercept  o f the Japanese message from 
Madrid to Tokyo of 16 Ju ly , decoded 20 J u ly , stating  that the strength of 
the defence in  A u stralia  would soon render landings 'ab so lu tely  im p o s s ib le '. 
SRH-012, V o l . I l l ,  Annex N o .17 9 , RG 45 7 , N ational A rchives .
At the Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference on 17 August 1942 MacArthur 
told Curtin  th at : 'Most secret inform ation had also  been received  that 
Japan was not responding to German pressure for an attack on Russia 
through S i b e r i a '.  MP 12 17 , Box l .F o r  these messages see Collection of 
Japanese Diplomatic Messages 1938-1942, SRH-018, RG 45 7 , National A rch ives . 
The intercept of the Japanese report of the d iscussions  between the 
Japanese Foreign M in ister  and the German Ambassador to Tokyo on 18 A p r il
1942 in d icated  that there was no plan  to invade A u s tr a lia , SRS 57 5 ,
Magic Summary, 18 A p ril  19 4 2 , RG 4 5 7 , National Archives .
5 0 . 'Memorandum for the A d m ir a l ', Personal and Most S ecret , 28 November
19 42 . Blarney Papers 59 .
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caused d isq u iet  in  a number of c ir c le s , and after  the issue from Land
Headquarters o f  'S p e c ia l  In te llig e n c e  P recis  N o .4 ' o f 21 December 19 4 2 ,
Admiral Carpender, the Commander of the A l l ie d  Naval Forces, wrote
to MacArthur com plaining o f the c irc u la tio n  o f  the m aterial . He
e xp lained  that the contents w ere:
undeniably in ter estin g  reading  but would seem 
to have l it t l e  d irect  re la tio n  to the command 
o f  the war by the Armed Services . . .  For the 
s tr ic t ly  naval po in t  o f view Japanese diplom atic 
code despatches are f r u it fu l  sources o f  inform ation 
concerning prospective  movements of enemy shipping  
p a r tic u la r ly  along the A s ia t ic  co ast . Data from this  
source p ertinent  to the conduct o f  naval warfare in  
this  area is  now supplied  to th is  command from the 
Navy Department; and I assume that the War Department 
keeps you sim ilarly  informed on matters re la t in g  to 
m ilitary  operations and other subjects o f  possibly  
w ider import to the general str a teg ic  concept o f 
o p e ratio n s .
51
Carpender suggested that MacArthur should report the matter to W ashington.
MacArthur rep lied  on 1 January 1 9 4 3 , p o in tin g  out that since 'the  source
of the subject  inform ation [was] under the d ire c t  control of the Commander
Southwest P a c if ic  Force, [Carpender] ’3 then the la tte r  should h im self
take a c tio n . For h is  p a r t , MacArthur had decreed that Magic should be
52
shown to no-one other than h im self and Sutherland . MacArthur then
reminded Carpender:
that the Naval In te llig e n c e  Unit under your command 
has incorporated an A ustralian  sectio n . I t  is 
probably  th at , in  accordance w ith  the practice  that 
has been observed in  s im ilar  jo in t  o rg a n iza tio n s , the 
A ustralian  section makes reports through its  own 
channels in  addition  to the one furnish ed  you 
through L ie u t . Commander Fabian . I t  has been my 
observation that the A ustralian  agencies normally 
dissem inate inform ation to echelons that have no
51 . Memorandum, Carpender to MacArthur, 28 December 1942 , RG 4 , 
MacArthur Memorial.
5 2 . Memorandum, MacArthur to Carpender, 1 January 1 9 4 3 , Zoc.cit. 
Captain J .R .  F ife  o f Carpender1s s t a f f  was d e ta ile d  to take Magic to 
MacArthur who by th is  time was in  Port Moresby. A fter  F ife  had shown 
the Magic to MacArthur he ostentatiously  burnt i t  in  a bucket next to 
General W illo u g h b y 's  desk . W illo u g h b y 's  complaints about the navy 
can w ell be understood. B l a i r ,  op.cit.,  p . 304 .
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immediate use th erefo r , and which cannot act 
in  the prem ises. This has been in  the p ast  the 
subject  of communications between General Headquarters 
and the Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces. I am of the 
opinion that e ffe c t iv e  resu lts  w i l l  be obtained  only by 
your re ta in in g  complete control o f  your in tellig en ce  
u n it , preventing  any dissem ination  o f  inform ation 
except in  su itable  form that w i l l  protect the source , 
and then only when data is  o f  immediate importance 
and capable o f being  acted  upon by the s p e c if ic  
agency co ncerned .53
Carpender was naturally  somewhat disconcerted  by this  le t t e r , and 
rep lied  that the Central Bureau had obtained  and dissem inated Magic
54
type inform ation and the c ircu la tio n  was therefore beyond h is  co ntrol.
On M acArthur's beh alf  Sutherland wrote on 19 January 1943 that 'The 
Central Bureau is  not charged w ith  cryptanalysis  o f diplom atic t r a f f i c .
I t  has never been engaged in  such a c t iv it y . No agency o f General 
Headquarters has been so e n g a g e d '. Sutherland also  informed Carpender 
that since returning  from Port Moresby MacArthur had not received  any 
diplom atic t r a f f i c . Furthermore, he b e liev ed  that the A ustralian  i n t e l l i ­
gence unit operating  under Fabian had been tran sferred  to the A ustralian
55
Army in  Melbourne and was no longer p art  of the SWPA. In  this  respect
Sutherland was wrong, for the RAN's  SIB  had never been p art  of F a b ia n 's
u n it , and indeed the important Diplom atic Section  under Trendall was
56 , ,
responsible  d irectly  to the Department o f Defence. N evertheless , Magic 
was no longer handled by the COIC , and therefore Blarney had to receive
a ll  his  Magic inform ation d irec tly  from the A ss istan t  Chief o f S t a f f
57
G2 at GHQ (W illo u g h b y ). I t  is  d i f f i c u l t  to ascertain  whether Sutherland
5 3 . Memorandum, MacArthur to Carpender, 1 January 1943 , RG 4 , MacArthur 
M em orial.
54 . Memorandum, Carpender to MacArthur, 6 January 1943 , Zoc.cit.
5 5 . Memorandum, Sutherland to Carpender, 19 January , 1943 , Zoc.cit.
5 6 . Nave in terv iew . In  a memorandum to General Sutherland  on 11 January 
1943 General Akin sa id  that the D iplom atic Section  was 'under the 
d irectio n  of the C h ie f  of In te llig e n c e  o f  the A ustralian  Department
o f the Army1 (Sutherland Papers , A ll ie d  Naval F o rc e s ), but N ave 's  
account is  probably co rrect.
5 7 . Memorandum, Sutherland to Blarney, 6 February 1943 , RG 4 , MacArthur 
Mem orial.
was com pletely candid  about the Central Bureau never engaging  in  crypt­
a n a ly s is  o f d ip lo m atic  t r a f f i c .  By mid 1942 the Central Bureau was 
probably  r e c e iv in g  some U ltra  inform ation from New D elh i and B le tch ley  
Park and th is  may have been diplom atic in form ation . Furtherm ore, 
i t  is  ce rta in  th a t  MacArthur was determined to have h is  own access 
to such t r a f f i c .  On 31 December 1942 he told  M arshall that  since  
h is  in ter ce p t  o rg a n isa tio n  was becoming better  o rganised  the time had 
come to in te r c e p t  and decode 'Japanese  t r a f f ic  o f  the g reater  E ast  
A sia  A d m in istratio n  and o th er  correspondence o f  the h ig h e st  p lane  o f  
diplom atic  and m ilit a r y  a g e n c i e s '. He intended  to set  up a com pletely
separate  agency under h is  own S ign als  O f f ic e r , Sooey , and i t  was to
58
report d ir e c t ly  to him .
I t  appears th at  when the navy ceased p ass in g  in form ation  to MacArthur
i t  was because o f  an in s tr u c t io n  from US Naval H eadq uarters , w hich  had
become w o rried  about the 'A rm y 's  m ishandling o f rad io  in ter ce p t
59
i n t e l l i g e n c e '.  The r e s u lt  was that the Central Bureau was reo rga n ised
as the GHQ agency to control operation ally  a l l  intercept, and direction-
fin d in g  un its  in  the  SWPA. The only exception was the naval in te r c e p t
o r g a n is a t io n , w hich  was regarded as d is t in c t  from the land  and a i r
a g e n c ie s . This  p la n  had  been suggested as early  as August 1942 by
60
Blarney. A pparently  M arshall was able to send im m ediately the men and 
m achines requested  by MacArthur on 31 December, fo r  on 30 January  1943
58 . R a d io , C 1 3 8 4 , M acArthur to M arshall, 31 December 1 9 4 2 , OPD Exec 1 0 , 
item  2 3 a , RG 1 6 5 , N a tio n a l  Archives (W ashington).
5 9 . MIS Memorandum, 2 February 1 9 4 3 , OPD Exec 1 1 , item  1 , loc. cit.
6 0 . L e t t e r , Blarney to M acArthur, 26 August 1 9 4 2 , RG 4 ,  MacArthur 
Mem orial.
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the new organisation  for the Central Bureau was in s t itu te d  w ith  Sandford
61
confirmed as Executive  O f f ic e r .
The problem o f co ntro lling  sp ecia l in t e ll ig e n c e , or ' Y ' in te llig e n c e
as i t  was ca lled  at the tim e, has already been m entioned, so i t  is
worthwhile recounting an example o f one o f the problem s. On 23 November
1942 the Headquarters F ir s t  A u stralian  Army Weekly In tellig e n c e  Summary
N o .29 included  the follow ing  statem ent:
W ireless  intercepts  reveal that Japanese Commanders 
at Rabaul and Kavieng have been continually  c a llin g  
for a ir c r a ft  reinforcem ents.
This document had a c ircu la tio n  o f  forty copies w hich , when i t  was
d iscovered , caused apoplexy at GHQ SWPA. On 3 December 1942 Sutherland
wrote to Blarney in  New Guinea.
I t  has given the C-in-C great concern since 
in te llig e n c e  of this nature is  o f great 
strategic  importance and experience has shown 
us that any enemy knowledge of its  usefulness 
to us w il l  resu lt  in  changes term inating such 
u s e fu ln e s s.^2
6 3
Blarney apologised  immediately for  the e rro r , and directed  h is  own
Chief o f S t a f f ,  General Berryman, at Advanced Land Headquarters (LHQ)
in  B risb an e , to ensure that the 'source  of inform ation such as this  should
64
[not] be revealed to any authority  below Adv L H Q '.
When Berryman in vestig ated  the lapse in  security  he discovered 
that the source of leakage was the A ssistan t  C h ief  of S t a f f  (Operations)
61 . L e tte r , MacArthur to Blarney, 20 January 1 9 4 3 , Zoc.cit. MacArthur 
w rote : 'The Bureau, of course, has been in  existence  for a number of 
months but i t  is  only recently  that i t  has been fe lt  that s u ff ic ie n t ly  
d eta iled  and extended experience has been gained  to perm it of a decision  
regarding  the necessary o rg a n iza tio n , m ission and c o n t r o l '.
62 . Letter , Sutherland to Blarney, 3 December 1 9 42 , Zoc.cit.
6 3 . L e tte r , Blarney to Su th erlan d , 5 December 1 9 4 2 , Zoc.cit.
64 . L etter , Blarney to Berryman, 5 December 1 9 4 2 , Blarney Papers 59 .
at M acArthur's  Headquarters. GHQ had bypassed LHQ and had sent the
inform ation d ire c tly  to HQ 1st US Corps, which had prepared a 'Summary
of Enemy S itu a t io n ' and had forwarded i t  to F irs t  Army. Berryman
reported these facts  to Blarney on 9 December 1942 w ith  the inform ation
that the F ir s t  Army had been ordered to delete  the paragraph in  question
65
from every copy o f the summary. This report would have reached Blarney
at the time when he was already rubbing sa lt  into  M acArthur's wounds
66
follow ing  the fa ilu r e  o f US troops at Buna.
Other In te llig e n c e  A c t iv it ie s
W hile S p ecia l  In te llig e n c e  was being  o rganised , MacArthur and
Blarney were also  concerned w ith  other areas of in tellig e n ce  a c t iv it y ,
and in  July  1942 the A l l ie d  In te llig e n c e  Bureau (AIB) was establish ed
to coordinate the various units which had been formed in  A u s tra lia  during
67
the early  months o f the year . The role of the AIB was to 'o b ta in  and
report inform ation . . .  to weaken the enemy by sabotage and destruction of
morale and to lend aid  and assistance  to local e ffo rts  to the same end
. 68
in  enemy occupied t e r r i t o r i e s '.  Colonel C .G . Roberts, the A ustralian
Director o f M ilita r y  In te llig e n c e , was appointed Controller and the AIB was
. . .  . 6 9
d iv ided  into  four sectio n s .
6 5 . L e tter , Berryman to Blarney, 9 December 19 42 , loc, cit. Berryman wrote 
in  his  d ia r y : ' I  d iscussed  matter w ith  Chamberlin on b a sis  of "people  in  
glass houses should not throw sto n e s ". He w i l l  f i x  i t  at h is  e n d '.  
Berryman D ia ry , 7 December 1942 .
66. See Chapter Seven.
6 7 . D irectiv e  dated 6 July  19 42 , signed by Major-General R .K . Sutherland , 
MP 1 2 5 4 /2 4 , item DNI P /D . For the correspondence leading  up to the 
formation of the AIB see the Blarney Papers 5 6 .3 .
68. Ibid.
6 9 . C .A . W illoughby (Comp), Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau3 
GHQ SWPA, (GHQ, Far East Command, Tokyo, 1 9 4 8 ) , C h . I I .  A popular h istory  
o f  the AIB is  A lliso n  In d , Spy Ring Pacific  (W eidenfeld  and N icolson , 
London, 1 9 5 8 ) ;  also  published  as Allied Intelligence Bureau (David McKay, 
New York, 1 9 5 8 ) . My account re lie s  on the Willoughby monograph.
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Section  A was responsible  for gain ing  inform ation and conducting 
sabotage from behind  enemy lin es  and was known as Special Operations 
A u s tra lia  (SOA) or the In ter- A llied  Services Department ( I S D ) . The 
d irecto r  was Lieutenant- Colonel G .E .  Mott, who had been sent by the 
War O ffic e  in  London to e sta b lis h  a branch of B r it a in 's  Sp ecial Operations 
Executive (S O E ) .
Section  B was responsible  for 'se c re t  i n t e l l ig e n c e ',  and was known
as Secret In te llig e n c e  A u s tra lia  ( S I A ) . In  fact  i t  was a branch of
the B r it is h  Secret In te llig e n c e  Service  (S IS ) and was under the command
of Captain  R. K e n d a ll , RNR, who reported d irec tly  to London. The un it
70
was concerned w ith  espionage and subversion in  Japanese held  areas .
Section  C was formed from the old  coastwatchers organisation  and 
was responsible  for  gain ing  inform ation from coastwatchers, n a tiv e s , 
and c i v i l ia n s . The o f f ic e r  in  charge was Lieutenant-Commander E .A .  F e ld t , 
who had previously  been responsible  for the coastwatchers, but the unit  
was now expanded and d iv id ed  in to  three sub- units covering the North
71
East Area (N E A ), the P h ilip p in e s  and the Netherlands East In d ies  (N E I ) .
Section  D was a propaganda un it  operating  under the t it le  of the 
Far East L ia iso n  O ffic e  (FELO) and commanded by Commander J .C .R .  Proud, 
RANVR.
The D irectors of each section  were under the general supervision
of the Controller of the A IB , who in  turn was responsible  to General
72
Willoughby at M acArthur's Headquarters. However, the organisation  d id  not 
work as w ell  as was hoped. The FELO involved a l l ie d  p o l it ic a l  propaganda
70 . Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau.
71 . Ibid.
72 . For a chart o f the organisation  o f the AIB in  July  1942 , see 
Appendix 16 .
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which was beyond the re s p o n s ib ility  of M acArthur's  headquarters.
Furthermore, the Dutch sought a separate o rganisation  to gain  p o l it ic a l
and economic in te llig e n ce  from th e ir  former t e r r it o r ie s .
But the main trouble was w ith  the In ter- A llied  Services Department
(I S D ) , which found i t s e l f  in  c o n flic t  w ith  Section  C , e sp ec ia lly  in  the
North East Area . O ften  ISD  agents operated w ithout the knowledge of
lo cal a l l ie d  commanders, who could otherwise have made valuable  use of
ISD  in t e ll ig e n c e . The fundamental problem  was that Colonel Mott thought
that h is  f i r s t  p r io r ity  was to carry out sabotage and g u e r illa  type
a c t iv it ie s , w hile  W illoughby and Roberts b e lie v ed  h is  f ir s t  resp o n sib ility
73
was to seek in t e ll ig e n c e .
As a r e s u lt , in  early  1943 the irr eg u la r  units  were reorganised
74
on a regional rather than a fun ctio n al b a s is . The three sub-sections
o f the old Section  C became sections in  th e ir  own rig h t  w ith  Feldt
reta in in g  command o f the North East Sectio n . Lieutenant- Colonel A .W . Ind
o f the American Army became the commander o f  the P h ilip p in e s  Regional
Section  and Commander G .B . Salm of the Netherlands Navy became the
commander o f  the NEI S e c tio n , soon to be known as the Netherlands Forces
75
In tellig e n c e  S e ctio n , D iv is io n  I I I  (NEFIS I I I ) .
The ISD  now changed its  name and became the Services Reconnaissance
Department (SRD) with the task o f  conducting sp ecia l  operations outside
the SWPA. The new commander was Lieutenant- Colonel P . J .F .  Chapman-Walker
from the B r it is h  SOE. Units o f  the SRD could s t i l l  operate in  the SWPA,
but only w ith  Blarney's approval in  the North East A rea , and w ith  Dutch
76
approval in  the In d i e s .
73 . L etter , Mott to Blarney, 16 January 1 9 43 , Blarney Papers 5 6 .3 .
74 . For a chart of the organisation  in  A p r il  1 9 43 , see Appendix 17 .
7 5 .  Operations of the Allied. Intelligence Bureau, C h . i v .
76 . Ibid.
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The FELO was removed from the A IB 's  control and its  p o l it ic a l  p o licy
became the re sp o n sib ility  of the M in ister  of External A ffa ir s  advised
by a P o l i t ic a l  Warfare Committee w ith  B r it is h , American and Netherlands
rep resentativ es . The actual operation of the FELO was controlled
77
d irectly  by General Blarney.
I t  is  beyond the scope o f this work to recount the operations of
the various elements o f  the A IB , and indeed some exp lo its  have been
to ld  elsew here. The fine  work of the coastwatchers in  the Solomons
campaign has been described  by E . A . Feldt  in  The Coastwatchers, Malcolm
78
Wright in  I f  I  Die and by W alter Lord in  Lonely Vigil. Ronald M cKie, 
in  The Heroes, gives an excellent  account o f operations Jaywick and
79
Rimau, the two raids by SRD p arties  again st  Singapore in  1943 and 1944 .
Colonel A lliso n  In d , in  Spy Ring Pacific, provides a popular h istory  of
the A IB , in clu d ing  the work in  the P h il ip p in e s , an area which is  covered
80
in  a number o f p u b lic a t io n s . As noted e a r l ie r , the FELO le ft  the
control of the AIB> but continued  to work in  close cooperation
with AIB p a r t ie s . The work o f  the FELO is  described  by H .N . Walker
81
in  an Army Journal a r t ic le . The problems faced  by one SRD
82
party in  Borneo are told  by Tom Harrison  in  World Within. And
77 . The main documents are in  CRS A 81 6 , item  1 9 /3 0 4 /3 2 7 .  See also  
Memorandum, W illoughby to Sutherland , 7 February 1 9 44 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 2  Pt 1 
Notes o f  D iscussio n  with Wing Commander C .C . B e l l , 24 September 1 9 4 3 , by
S .M . Bruce, CRS M 10 0 , item February 1943 ; Report on A c t iv it ie s  o f F e lo , 
W ills  Papers Folder 4 ,  AWM; L e tte r s , MacArthur to C u r t in , 31 August and
18 September 1942 and Curtin  to MacArthur, 12 September 1942 , MP 12 17 ,
Box 289 ; and FO 371 3 5 8 7 8 /7 1 .
78 . E . A . F e ld t , The Coastwatchers (Oxford U niversity  P r ess , London, 1946) 
W . Lord , Lonely Vigil, Coastwatchers of the Solomons (V ik in g , New York , 
1 9 7 7 ) ;  Malcolm W righ t , If I  Die (Lansdowne, M elbourne, 1 9 6 5 ) . See also
M. Murray, A Coastwatcher's Story (R igby , A d e la id e , 1 9 6 7 ) .
79 . R. M cKie, The Heroes (Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1 9 6 0 ) .
80 . For an A ustralian  account see R . Blow , 'W ith  the F il ip in o  G u e r i l l a s ',
Australian Army Journal, December 1965 .
81 . H .N . W alker , 'P sycholo gical Warfare in  the South-West P a c i f i c ' ,
Army Journal, March 1974.
82 . Tom H arriso n , World Within3 A Borneo Story (C resset , London, 1 9 5 9 ) .
the very f in e  performances o f  the AIB  p a r t ie s  in  New G uin ea , New B r it a in  
and B o u g a in v ille  in  the la st  years of the w ar , have been  covered in  the
A u s tra lia n  Army o f f i c i a l  h is t o r ie s .
These accounts taken together go only  a sm all way towards p rov iding  
a h is to ry  o f the A IB . Furtherm ore, the AIB  and C entral Bureau were 
not the only  organisations  in v o lv in g  a l l i e d  in t e ll ig e n c e  cooperation 
e s t a b lis h e d  during  the f i r s t  year o f the SWPA. There was the A l l ie d  
T ran slato r  and In terp reter  Section  (ATIS) under the command o f  Colonel 
S idney  F . M ashbir o f  the US Army, which worked m ainly on captured
83
docum ents, d e r iv in g  d e ta ils  o f  orders o f  b a t t le s  and operations p la n s .
The A l l ie d  Geographic Sectio n  (AGS) under C olonel W .V . Jardine- Blake
84
(AIF) prepared  maps, guidebooks and te r r a in  p r o f i l e s .  Another a l l ie d  
group was Se ctio n  22 which  was respon sible  for radar and radio  counter­
m easures. At times i t  operated b eh ind  enemy l i n e s , and lik e  AGS and
85
A T IS , i t  was responsible  d ire c tly  to GHQ.
F in a l l y , the Combined O perational In t e ll ig e n c e  Centre (COIC) should
be m entioned . This was a jo in t  serv ice  o rg a n isa tio n  set  up in  A u s tra lia
before  the Japanese attack to provide co ordinated  in t e ll ig e n c e  to
A u s tra lia n  commanders responsible  for the defence  o f  A u s t r a l ia . I t
was r e ta in ed  and used by GHQ, although General W illoughby  thought that
86
i t  m erely dup licated  the work o f  h is  G2 (In t e ll ig e n c e ) S e c tio n .
Although there appeared to be sound o p eratio n al reasons for 
reo rg a n isin g  the AIB on regional rather  than fu n c tio n a l  l in e s , the 
outcome was that the Americans gained  complete control over the areas
83 . S .F .  M ash b ir , I  Was an American Spy (V an tage , New York , 1 9 5 3 ) .
8 4 . C .A .  W illoughby  (Com p), A Brief History of the G2 Section, GHQ,
SWPA and Affiliated Units (GHQ Far E ast  Command, Tokyo, 1 9 4 8 ) ,  p . 5 9 .
The f i r s t  commander was an A u s tra lia n  in t e ll ig e n c e  o f f i c e r , Lieutenant-  
Colonel E .  Mander-Jones, but  a fte r  a few months he was succeeded by the 
then Major B la k e . Blarney Papers 5 6 .7 .
8 5 . War D iary  GHQ SWPA, AMF D et. Sect  2 2 , August 1 9 4 5 , AWM 1 / 1 / 7 .  For a
diagram  of the a l l ie d  in t e ll ig e n c e  o rg a n isa tio n  in  May 1943 see Appendix 18 .
8 6 .  A Brief History of the G2 Section, p . 7 5 .
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which in terested  them, and ceased to worry about those areas in  which 
they had l i t t l e  in te r e s t . Thus the P h ilip p in e  Regional S ectio n , from 
May 1943 under the command o f Colonel Courtney W hitney , gradually  d r ifte d  
away from the control o f the A IB , and in  June 1944 this  was confirmed 
when the PRS became the P h ilip p in es  Special Section  operating  d irec tly  
under the op eratio n s , not the in t e l l ig e n c e , branch of GHQ. Furthermore 
the PRS procured its  equipment from American sources, and the AIB from 
A ustralian  sources. Since the A u stralian  Army was already dependent 
on American sources for much of its  transport and equipment, the AIB 
continued to have d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  this  respect.
The p o l it ic a l  and strateg ic  importance o f  the American control over 
sp ecia l operations was not lost  on the B r it is h  government and the d irectors
of the SOE in  London, who feared  that the Americans would lim it  the
role o f the SRD, thereby reducing B r it a in 's  p o l it ic a l  in fluence  in  the
P a c if ic  theatre . Representing the views o f  the SOE, the A ustralian  High
Commissioner in  London, Bruce, cabled Curtin  in  March 1 9 44 , ra is in g  the
p o s s ib il it y  that M ountbatten' s South East  A sia  Command might be 'v ir t u a lly
elim inated  from the main campaign against  Jap an 1 . Therefore i t  was
obviously  'more than ever important to make the most o f  such re la tiv ely
slig h t  B r it is h  Commonwealth representation as w il l  r e m a in '. He urged
87
operations again st  the China coast. Seven months later  he cabled
that sp ecia l  operations against  the NEI and B r it is h  Borneo were 'v ir t u a lly
p araly sed ' due to a lack o f  transportation , w hile  the Americans were
p rov iding  ample for the P h il ip p in e s . To remedy this  s itu atio n  SOE
88
in  London was approaching the Adm iralty .
However, by the end of 1944 the Americans had realised  the value of 
e ffe c t iv e  AIB operations in  Borneo and the N E I,,and the new Controller o f  the
87 . Cable 48A , Bruce to C urtin , 24 March 1 9 44 , CRS M 100 , item March 1944 .
88. Cable 144A , Bruce to C u rtin , 23 October 1 9 44 , CRS M 10 0 , item 
October 1944 . Curtin  rep lied  on 1 November: 'You are authorized  to 
cooperate w ith SOE and to support the proposals they are subm itting 
to the Adm iralty . Cable 16 6 , Blarney Papers 5 6 .4 .
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B r ig a d ie r  J .D .  Rogers, 
D irecto r  o f  M ilitary  
In t e l l ig e n c e ,
1942- 1945.
(AWM Negative N o .22096)
B r ig a d ie r  K .A .  W i l l s ,  
Deputy D irector  o f 
M ilita r y  In t e ll ig e n c e , 
1942- 1944, C ontroller 
o f  the A l l ie d  In te llig e n c e  
Bureau, 1944- 1945.
(AWM Negative N o .22922)
A IB , B rig ad ier  K .A . W i l l s , secured increased  control over the various
89
elements o f h is  o rg a n isa tio n . By this tim e, o f course, both the 
Americans and the A ustralians  had an improved capacity  to provide lo g is t ic  
support.
In  the area of psycholo gical warfare the Americans also  sought
to separate th e ir  operations from those o f the A u s tra lia n s . Thus in
June 1944 the Psychological Warfare Branch was e sta b lis h ed  under the
command of Brigadier- General Bonner F e lle r s , for operations in  the 
. . .  90
P h il ip p in e s . The FELO remained responsible  for psychological and
propaganda operations in  the A u stralian  area . In  add ition  a few FELO
o ffic e r s  a ss isted  the Pscyhological Warfare Branch in  the P h il ip p in e s ,
91
but General Willoughby was never happy w ith  this  arrangement.
Cooperation in  Sp ecia l  In te llig e n c e
For p o l it ic a l  purposes i t  was important to the Americans that 
they alone should be seen as responsible  for operations in  the P h il ip p in e s . 
But in  the less v is ib le  and s tr a teg ica lly  v ita l  area o f  top-level 
intelligence- gathering  and assessm ent, the Americans were anxious for 
A ustralian  p a r t ic ip a t io n . The teams were w ell- trained  and to separate 
the a l l ie d  components would have been d isr u p tiv e . With respect to the ATIS 
and the AGS this  was never serio usly  contem plated, but the Central Bureau 
was another m atter.
MacArthur and h is  headquarters were always extremely sensitive  
to critic ism  o f th e ir  in te llig e n ce  estim ates and o f  the inform ation 
presented in  their  communiques. For example, M acArthur's  communique 
dealing  with the a l l ie d  successes in  the Bismarck Sea in  March 1943 was
89 . Operations of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, C h .v i l .
9 0 . A Brief History of the G2 Section, p . 5 7 .
91 . Ibid. On 7 November 1944 General Berryman wrote in  h is  d ia r y :
' G2 is  taking  strong exception to Felo having  reps in  the P . I ' .  Berryman 
D ia r y .
235
d iffe r e n t  from the inform ation received  in  Washington and London.
Consequently MacArthur sought to r e s t r ic t  the flow o f  in te llig e n ce  to
Washington and London, and when this  was not p o ssible  he was anxious
that the A u s tra lia n s , who might inform  London, should have no independent
means of gathering  in te llig e n c e  which might vary from that acceptable
93
to GHQ.
From the outset the American Army and A ir  Force provided  about h a lf
of the s t a f f  o f the Central Bureau, w ith  the A ustralian  Army and A ir
94
Force each prov iding  a q u arter . This was a p e rfec tly  acceptable
arrangement because the Americans d id  not have enough p ersonnel, and the
A ustralian s  were gain ing  excellen t  exp erien ce . Indeed  most o f  the f ie ld
work was conducted by A ustralian  se ctio n s . However, by early  1944 the
p o s s ib il it y  was raised  o f  an independent A u stralian  strategic  role in
. 95
operations north from Darw in , and senior  A ustralian  commanders became 
concerned that i f  the new command was separated  from the SWPA they would 
lose access to SWPA Central Bureau m aterial.
As the year progressed  i t  also  became c lear  that the Americans 
intended to tran sfer  the Central Bureau, w ith  a l l  o f  its  IBM m achines, 
to M an ila , once the city  was secured , and that the A ustralian s  would be
9 2 . For a discussion  of the re su lt in g  argument see Jam es, op.cit. V o l . I I ,  
p p .296-303.
93 . The head of the B r it is h  m ission in  A u s tra lia  reported : 'S it u a t io n  
between Advanced A ll ie d  Land Headquarters and GHQ over d irec t  exchange 
of in tellig e n c e  between former and overseas HQ has always been most 
d e l i c a t e '.  C able , B r it is h  to War O f f i c e , 29 March 1 9 4 3 , WO 1 0 6 /3 4 1 6 .
On 6 November 1944 General Berryman prepared a memorandum showing the 
instances where A ustralian  in te llig e n ce  had d isagreed  w ith  W illo u g h b y 's  
estim ates . He added: ' I t  is  subm itted that we cannot behave like  
d ishonest tradesmen and keep two sets o f books, but that i t  is  our duty 
to inform  our Commander o f  what we b e lieve  to be the truth assessed  from 
time to time as fresh  evidence comes to h a n d '.  Blarney Papers 5 4 .1 .
9 4 . War Cabinet Agendum 2 0 5 /4 5 ,  dated 15 May 1 9 4 5 , MP 7 2 9 /8 ,  item 
4 1 /4 3 1 /8 .
9 5 . This topic is  dealt w ith  in  Chapters E ig h t  and N ine .
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le f t  w ithout machine resources. These fears were expressed by the
A ustralian  D irector o f  M ilitary  In t e ll ig e n c e , B r ig ad ier  Rogers, and
by Colonel Sandford , at a series  o f  important in te llig e n c e  conferences
96
in  London in  September 1944 .
By this time the Central Bureau had expanded co nsiderably . In
1943 i t  had a strength o f over 1 ,0 0 0  men and women; by May 19 45 ,
when its  advanced headquarters moved to San M iguel (Manila) the strength 
97
was over 4 ,0 0 0 .  The A ustralians  continued to try to provide about
h a l f  the total strength in  an e f fo r t  to ensure that i f  the A ustralian
98
component was separated i t  could form a v iable  o rganisatio n .
Furthermore, N o .l  Sp ecia l  W ireless  Group from the Canadian Army was
99
sent to A u s tra lia  to a s s is t  w ith  in tercep tio n .
When the plan  to move elements o f  the C entral Bureau to M anila 
was f ir s t  r a is e d , Blarney was opposed to the A ustralian  in tercept  s t a f f  
follow ing  the Americans northwards since  he fe lt  that the A ustralian  
Army would lose its  in tercept ca pa city . However, a fter  an appeal from 
the Americans he changed h is  mind. N evertheless , Rogers fe lt  moved to 
comment that ' i t  was high  time that the Americans provided  th e ir  own 
se ctio n s , both sig n als  and in te llig e n c e  p erson nel, to care for th e ir  
own requirem ents' . The A ustralian  s t a f f  in  M anila  d id , however, enable
9 6 . Minutes o f  Jo in t  In te llig e n c e  Sub-Committee, Conference on Coordin­
ation  o f  In te llig e n c e  in  the Far E a s t , 8-14 September 1944 , Blarney Papers 
5 4 .2 .  See also J .D .  Rogers, Say Not the Struggle, unpublished m anuscript. 
Further inform ation on the conference was provided  by A ir  Vice-Marshal 
J .E .  Hew itt who as Director o f  A l l ie d  A ir  In t e ll ig e n c e , SWPA, also 
attended . Interview  3 July  1978 .
9 7 . Operations of the Military Intelligence Section, p p .77 and 78 .
98 . Le tter , Rogers to Berryman, 12 July  1 9 4 4 , Berryman Papers. Also  
Berryman D ia ry , 15 July  1944 .
9 9 . S ign al O fficer- in - C h ie f 's  Report N o .2 , 23 January 1 9 4 5 , Blarney 
Papers DRL 6 6 4 , item 6 0 . See also  C .P .  Stacey , Arms^Men and Governments3 
The War Policies of Canada 1939-1945 (Department o f  National Defence, 
Ottawa, 1 9 7 0 ) , p . 158 . D etails  o f  the p lanning  leading  to the request 
for the Canadian Group can be found in  Blarney Papers 5 6 .8 .
10 0 . L etter , Rogers to Blarney, 14 August 1 9 4 4 , Blarney Papers 5 6 .8 .
the A ustralian  High Command to keep up to date w ith  the la te st  US
in te llig e n c e  developments. In  June 1945 Colonel Sandford wrote to
Blarney from the P h il ip p in e s :
Through fortunate combination o f  breaking  and 
capture , i t  should be p o ssible  for us to read 
a ll  High Command communications in  and out of 
Tokyo for the perio d  1 July  '4 5  to 31 December 
'4 5 .1 0 1
The main protection  for the A ustralians  against  the restr icted  
d is tr ib u t io n  o f in te llig e n ce  by the Am ericans, was the control over 
sp e c ia l  in te llig e n ce  in s t itu te d  by Washington in  accordance w ith  agreements 
w ith  the B r it is h . A N ational Security  Agency report has revealed  that 
u n til  these controls were in s t it u t e d , 'th ere  was no arrangement for 
passing  the in te llig e n ce  to commanders in  the f ie l d  promptly and in  
a manner which would ensure s e c u r ity1 .
I t  took q uite  some time for the appropriate controls to be introduced 
in  the South-West P a c i f ic . Following the Pearl Harbour fia sco  Mr A lfre d  
McCormack had been appointed as Sp ecia l  A ss ista n t  to the Secretary o f War 
w ith  the task o f in v e stig a tin g  how b est  to use the in te llig e n ce  m aterial.
As a r e s u lt , and a fter  some h e s ita t io n , S p ecia l  Branch, M ilitary  
In te llig e n c e  Service  (MIS) had been set up in  early  spring  19 42 . This 
branch ,w ith  Colonel (la te r  Brigadier- General) Carter W. Clarke as Chief 
and Colonel McCormack as Deputy C h ie f , 'was charged with  in tellig en ce  
e xp lo itatio n  of in tercept m aterial and exercised  a lim ited  amount of 
guidance over the US Army S ig n al Corps in  its  a c t iv it ie s  of in terceptio n , 
t r a f f ic  a n a ly s is , cryptography and com m unications'. MIS was attached to , 
but was not p art  o f the War Department General S t a f f ,  and came under the
103
control of the A ss istan t  C hief o f S t a f f  G 2 , Major-General George V . Strong.
101 . Top Secret U ltra  le t t e r , Sandford to Blarney, 30 June 1945 , Blarney 
Papers 5 6 .
102 . 'Use of (CX MSS Ultra) by the United States War Department (1 9 3 9 - 1 9 4 5 ) ', 
SRH-005, RG 4 5 1 , National A rchives .
10 3 . Ibid. For a d e ta ile d  account o f M IS , see History of the Special Branch3 
MIS, SRH-035, RG 4 5 7 , N ational A rchives .
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One d i f f ic u lt y  was that the navy continued to t e ll  the army what i t
thought the army needed to know. The paucity  o f naval inform ation of
value to the army in  the Weekly Memoranda produced by MIS was testimony
104
to the u n satisfactory  nature o f  the arrangem ent. On the other hand,
the strength o f  MIS was that i t  had access not only to its  own in terc e p ts ,
but a lso  to the B r it is h  U ltra .
The procedures for dissem inating  in te llig e n c e  from what General
Strong ca lled  'o u r  most secret and in  many ways our most re lia b le  
105
s o u r c e s ', had not yet been developed to anything like  the e f f ic ie n t  
system used by the B r it is h  for U ltra . T h erefo re , in  an e ffo r t  to 
improve the s it u a t io n , the Jo in t  Security  Control was set up in  
Washington in  early  1943 w ith  the fo llow ing  aim s:
a . To prevent inform ation o f  m ilitary  value from 
fa l l in g  into  the hands o f  the enemy.
b . Timing the implementation o f  these portions of 
cover and deception plans which must be performed 
by m ilitary  and non-military agencies in  the
Uni te d S tate s .1 0 6
Then in  August 1943 Colonel C lark e , who was now also  head o f  the Jo in t
Security  Control, v is it e d  MacArthur in  Brisbane to exp lain  a new plan  to
ensure a more e ffe c t iv e  use and flow  o f  in t e ll ig e n c e . I t  is  s ig n if ic a n t
that over a year elapsed  from the time o f  the establishm ent of the MIS
before the B r it is h  were w il l in g  to co-operate completely w ith  the Americans
107
and plans were s u ff ic ie n t ly  developed to warrant a trip  to the SWPA. In 
a le tter  preceding  C la r k e 's  v i s i t ,  General Strong explained  to MacArthur 
th a t :
104 . Memoranda for A C  of S , 1 9 4 2 , OPD Exec 1 1 , item 3 , RG 16 5 , National 
Archives (W ash in g to n ).
105 . Memorandum, Strong to M arsh all , 4 Ju ly  1 9 4 2 , OPD Exec 1 0 , item 7C, 
loo.ait .
1 0 6 . JSC (8-4-42) S I ,  CCS 33 4 , RG 2 1 8 , N atio n al Archives (W ashington).
Jo in t  Security  Control was analagous to the London C ontrolling  S e ctio n , 
which was responsible  for the coordination  and control of deception 
against  Germany.
107 . 'Use of (CX/MSS ULTRA) by the U nited  States War Departm ent'. This 
part  of the report is  partly  censored and has been p ieced  together by 
other referen ces .
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The plan  for achieving  th is  o b jective  [more 
e ffe c t iv e  use o f  B r it is h  and American Ultra] 
is  based  on our own experience in  the War Deaprtment 
and the European theater and upon the very successful 
system used by the B r it is h . The p lan  ca lls  for a co­
o rdinating  center in  Washington w ith  representatives 
throughout the w orld , in clu d ing  o ffic e r s  assigned 
to the s t a f f  o f  each f ie l d  commander concerned. For 
reasons which Colonel Clarke w il l  exp lain  i t  is  
b e liev ed  e sse n t ia l  that each o f  these o ffic e r s  be 
trained  in  the work here and should function in  the 
theaters as representatives o f the in tellig e n ce
center h e r e . 108
MacArthur naturally  had to ag ree , but  in  c h aracteristic  fashion  he
r e s is ted  (unsuccessfully ) M a rs h a ll 's  demands that the 'S p e c ia l  Security
109
O f f ic e r s ' had to remain under the control of the War Department.
As the time for the invasio n  o f Europe drew nearer B r it is h  I n t e l l i ­
gence became determined to ensure a uniform  p o licy  in  the handling  of 
U ltra , p a rt ic u la r ly  for the invasion  forces who were to rely  on i t  so 
much, but also  in  the other theatres o f  w ar . T herefo re , on 23 May 1944 
M arshall sent MacArthur a copy of the regulations  for handling  U ltra ,
which by now was the term for  both B r it is h  and American intercept 
110
m aterial . MacArthur re p lie d  on 2 June 1 9 4 4 :
I am in  complete accord w ith  the security  measures 
in d ic a te d . Most o f  them are now in  e ffe c t  here 
and the proposed refinem ents w i l l  be inaugurated 
im m ediately. I would welcome the assignment of 
s p ecia lly  selected  and trained  personnel for security  
m iss io n s .
However, as usual, and again  w ithout su ccess , he objected  to the War 
Department control of the security  p e r s o n n e l , ^  and the A ustralian
108 . L e tte r , Strong to MacArthur, 21 August 1 9 4 3 , RG 4 , MacArthur Memorial 
and Sutherland  Papers, Correspondence w ith  War Department, N ational Archives .
10 9 . L e tter s , MacArthur to M arshall, 4 August 1943 ; M arshall to MacArthur,
5 August 1943 ; MacArthur to M arsh all , 2 September 1943 , loo,cit. I t  
might be observed that M acArthur's in sisten ce  on the perfectio n  o f h is  own 
in t e l l ig e n c e , and h is  re fusal to co-operate w ith  other agencies contributed  
to h is  eventual dism issal in  1951 .
110 . L e tte r , M arshall to MacArthur, 23 May 1944 w ith  enclosures , SRH-034,
RG 45 71 , N ational A rchives . The regulations  covered five  typed pages of 
foolscap . A copy is  in  Blarney Papers 59 .
111 . L e tter , MacArthur to M arshall, 2 June 19 44 , RG 4 , MacArthur Memorial.
commanders were not issued  w ith  a copy of the regulations u n til
„  ^ . 112 
September.
Meanwhile the B r it is h  and the A ustralian s  had been attem pting to 
increase the in terflo w  of in te llig e n ce  between the Central Bureau and organ­
isa tio n s  in  B r it a in  and In d ia . In  March 1943 Lieutenant- Colonel Sandford 
le ft  for USA and B r ita in  for a d d itio nal tra in in g  in  handling  U ltra , and 
w h ils t  in  England v is ite d  B letchley  Park . Probably he returned v ia  
In d ia  and v is it e d  General A u c h in le c k 's  'Y ' o rga n isa tio n , because that 
month (July) A uchinleck , the Commander-in-Chief in  In d ia , suggested 
to MacArthur that there should be closer links  between the SWPA and the 
In d ian  'Y '  o rga n isa tio n . He proposed to send Lieutenant- Colonel G .E .
A ldridge  to B r isb an e , and in  return MacArthur proposed to send Colonel 
113
Sherr to In d ia . Unfortunately  in  October, w h ils t  on the way to In d ia
114
and C hin a , Sherr was k i l l e d  in  a plane crash . As m entioned,
Sandford  returned to England in  September 19 44 , and i t  might be con­
jectured  that he persuaded the B r it is h  to increase their  in te llig e n c e  
network to include  A u s tr a lia .
In  November 1944 B r it is h  in te llig e n c e  e stab lish ed  a S p ecia l  L ia iso n
U nit (SLU) in  B risb an e , and the Security  L ia is o n  O f f ic e r  was Squadron
115
Leader S .F .  B u rley . In  view  of the stream lined and tightened
procedures now developing in  the Central Bureau, as a resu lt  o f  the 
acceptance o f  the B r it is h  reg u latio ns , i t  might have seemed superfluous
11 2 . L e tter , Northcott to Morshead, 5 September 1944 , Morshead Papers 
101/ 8 .
113 . S ig n a ls , Auchinleck to MacArthur, 29 Ju ly ; MacArthur to A uchinleck ,
3 August; MacArthur to Auchinleck , 17 August; Auchinleck to MacArthur,
21 August; Auchinleck to MacArthur, 24 August; Auchinleck to MacArthur,
? October; MacArthur to A uchinleck , 2? October 1943 . Sutherland Papers, 
M iscellaneous 2 , National A rchives .
114 . Thompson and H a r r is , op.cit.,  p . 340 claim  that Sherr was k i l l e d  in  
September 1942 , but footnote 113 in d icates  that i t  was probably September 
19 43 .
115 . An account o f the SLUs in  A u s tra lia  is  given in  S .F .  Bu rley , The
Silent Guardians of Ultra, unpublished m anuscript.
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to set up an SLU in  the SWPA, but the in teg ratio n  o f  the SWPA into  the
B r it is h  U ltra system coincided  w ith  the rap idly  expanding role o f the
US Army in  the area , and also  the increased  B r it is h  concern to regain
some in fluence  in  the A ustralian  area . About this  time the headquarters
o f  the Central Bureau moved to H o lla n d ia , and then in  October 1944 to
Leyte , and there may have been some concern that the A u stralian  forces
would have less access to Central Bureau m aterial. A fter  a l l ,  although
the Central Bureau was an a l l ie d  agency i t  came under M acArthur's  d irect
co ntro l. The SLUs d id  not. The p ro v isio n  of the SLU (SLU 9) therefore
gave the A ustralian  forces greater independence from the American
monopoly o f secret inform ation . For exam ple, SLU 9 could pass inform ation
d ire c tly  to RAAF Command which previou sly  would have had to receive
in te llig e n c e  from Kenney 's  A l l ie d  A ir  Force Headquarters. Furthermore,
as M acArthur's command became more wide-spread the RAF S L U 's  encoding
fa c i l i t ie s  enabled  current in te llig e n c e  to be rapidly  dissem inated .
N evertheless , the bulk o f  the in te llig e n c e  came from the Central Bureau
at Ascot, which looked upon SLU 9 on the top floor  o f  the A ustralian
116
Mutual Providence b u ild in g  in  Brisbane as an amateur o rg a n isa tio n .
This was somewhat u n fa ir  to SLU 9 ,  for Brisbane was the only point  
in  the SWPA where both the approved American and B r it is h  cryptographic 
systems for p assing  Ultra were h e ld . The role of SLU 9 , which operated 
in  conjunction w ith  the American Sp e c ia l  Security  O f f ic e , was not to
in tercept and decrypt enemy s ig n a ls , but  to pass Ultra in tellig e n ce  to
. . 117
its  recip ien ts  m  the most secure manner.
116 . L e tter , F light- Lieutenant N .E . Reynolds to Group-Captain Winterbotham , 
29 June 1 9 42 . O r ig in a l  loaned to author by Winterbotham .
11 7 . Report o f  Sp ecial  Security  Representative , Headquarters Armed 
Forces, P a c i f ic . SRH-032, RG 4 5 7 , N ational A rch ives . See also  H istory  
o f the Operations of Sp ecial  Security  O ffic e r s  attached to F ie ld  
Command, SRH-033, loo.oit.
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Before long SLU 9 had set  up an expanded network to cover the
A ustralian  operations . There were SLU detachments w ith  A ir  Commodore
S c h er g er 's  1st Tactic al A ir  Force and General Blarney's Advanced Land
Headquarters (which passed  inform ation to M orshead 's 1st A u stralian
Corps) at M o ro ta i, w ith  General Stu rd ee 's  1st  A u stralian  Army at Lae ,
and w ith  A ir  Commodore C h arlesw o rth 's Northwest Area RAAF at Darwin.
When the 1st TAF moved to Labuan in  July  1945 i t  was accompanied by its
SLU , and when the dropping o f the atomic bomb s ig n a lle d  the end o f  the
118
war another SLU was preparing  to move to M an ila . These SLUs proved
to be very valuable  to the A ustralian  forces in  th e ir  operations in
Borneo, New Guinea , New B r ita in  and B o ugain ville  during 1945 .
The d ire c t  access by A u stralian  o ff ic e r s  to the worldwide U ltra
sources meant that A ustralian  autho rities  could now use this  inform ation
to help determine n atio nal p o licy  and ensure in ternal se cu rity . On
17 January 1945 i t  was agreed that the A ustralian  Director- General of
119
Security  should receive inform ation from U ltra  sources. Perhaps
this  move had developed out of a le tter  w ritten  by Blarney to the Acting
M in ister  for the Army, Senator J .M . F raser , on 6 January 1945 . Blarney
had explained  that there had been a number o f  reports of security  breaks ,
in c lu d in g  a rep o rt :
from H arbin  on 24th November, 1944 [which] gave 
d e ta ils  concerning General M acArthur's  plans 
for certain  operations in  the P h il ip p in e s .
The source o f  this  report was given as the Soviet 
Ambassador in  A u s tr a lia .
118 . L e tte r , Reynolds to Winterbotham , 29 June 1972 .
11 9 . L e tte r , Blarney to Director-General o f S e c u r ity , 25 January 1 9 45 , 
Blarney Papers 59 .
12 0 . L e tte r , Blarney to F raser , 6 January 1 9 4 5 , Blarney Papers 59 . The 
le tter  provided  other examples o f inform ation provided  by the Soviet 
Ambassador. Presumably the Soviet  Ambassador had passed  this  inform ation 
back to the USSR where i t  had been p icked  up by Japanese agents based  in  
Harbin (M an ch uria ). From there the inform ation would have been sent in  
cypher to Tokyo, and this  t r a f f ic  was read by American cryptanalysts . I t  
is  in ter estin g  to note that the Royal Commission into Intelligence and 
Security, Fourth Report, V o l . l ,  p . 21 states that 'th e  Petrov Commission 
came to the conclusion that from 1943 up to the time o f  P e tro v 's  d e fectio n , 
USSR in te llig e n ce  agents had been operating  in  A u s t r a l i a ' .
Good in te llig e n c e  is  one of the most important elements of strategic  
decision- m aking. During the Second World War A u s tra lia  advanced from a p o s i­
tion  o f be ing  almost to tally  dependent upon B r it is h  in te llig e n c e  to a point  
where she had r e la t iv e ly  large and e ffe c t iv e  in te llig e n c e  organisations 
cooperating clo sely  w ith sim ilar American and B r it ish  o rganisatio ns .
This was a substantial achievement which was to have important repercussions 
for the fu tu re . I t  should be remembered that the A IB , AGS, ATIS and 
CB were a l l  b u ilt  upon A ustralian  Army foun dations , and although GHQ had 
the re sp o n sib ility  for their overall co ntrol, the A ustralian s  provided
the major part of their personnel, and cared for most of their domestic 
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needs . During the war the in creasingly  accurate and voluminous
in te llig e n c e  enabled the government and its  advisers to make strategic  
decisio ns  with confidence and p re c is io n . I f  the strategic  decisions  of
1941 and 1942 were based on inexact knowledge, by mid 1943 the government 
could be sure that not only was A u stralia  secure , but that the chances of 
a major m ilitary  reverse had been su b stantia lly  decreased .
A u s t r a l ia 's  experience with in te llig e n ce  in the P a c if ic  in  the 
Second World War emphasises the important role which a minor country 
can play in  a co a lit io n  war. The minor country may be able  to provide 
unique expertise  and may be important by v irtu e  of its  geographic 
lo c atio n . Results in  in tellig e n c e  are not related  d irec tly  to the 
m agnitude, but rather to the quality  of the e f fo r t . In  this respect a 
minor country may be able to achieve na tio n al o bjectives  through special 
operations even when it lacks the resources for more conventional methods. 
Furthermore, s k il fu l  in tellig e n c e  co-operation may result in the minor 
country receiv ing  more valuable  in te llig e n ce  m aterial than it  could hope
244
12 1 . L e tter , Rogers to Directors of M ilita r y  In te llig e n c e  in London, 
In d ia , the M iddle East , Ottawa and W ellin g to n , 10 May 1 9 43 , War Diary  
Adv HQ AMF, G Int Sect, AWM 1 / 2 / 2 .
to obtain  if  it did not co-operate w ith  other in te llig e n ce  o rg a n isa tio n s . 
It  may w ell be that present day a ll ie d  in te llig e n ce  co-operation has 
proved to be the most lasting  and important legacy of A u s t r a l ia ’ s 
experience of c o a lit io n  warfare in  the Second World War. And the 
consequent development of the A u stralian  in tellig e n ce  services streng­
thened the n a t io n 's  capacity  for making independent judgments on foreign  
policy  after  the war.
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CHAPTER S IX
STRATEGY IN THE SWPA 
January-December 1943
Strateg ic  Plan ning  in  January 1943
When, on 8 January 1 9 43 , MacArthur iss u e d  a communique announcing 
the v ir tu a l  term ination o f h o s t i l it ie s  in  P a p u a ,^  the A u stralian  and
American commanders in  New Guinea were asto nish ed , and not a l it t le
2
angry. Some observers have attrib uted  this  premature announcement of
3
the 'a n n ih ila t io n  o f  the Japanese Papuan army' to M acArthur's  desire
to beat  Halsey  and the Marines in  turning  'i n  the f ir s t  important land
victory  o f the P a c if ic  W a r ' , thus im proving h is  p restige  in  Washington.
But i t  was not just  a matter o f p r e s t ig e , for the US Jo in t  C hiefs  o f
S t a f f  were leaving  Washington for the Casablanca conference, and on
8 January they in structed  MacArthur to submit d e ta ile d  plans for
carrying  out their  d irective  of 2 J u ly , ( i . e .  to capture R a b a u l), and
5
authorised  him to discuss  these plans w ith  H alsey .
MacArthur w as, th erefo re , aware o f the forthcoming Casablanca 
conference and he knew that the P a c if ic  strategy  was to be a p o in t  of 
d isc u ss io n . He fe lt  that i t  was necessary to return to Brisbane to 
supervise the preparation  o f  these plans and to muster the support 
o f the A u stralian  government. He could only leave Port Moresby i f  
the campaign w as , as he announced in  h is  communique on 8 January , 'i n
1 .  Reports of General MacArthur, V o l .l ,  p . 9 8 .
2 . Lu v aas , op.cit.,  p p .6 2 , 6 4 . R .L .  E ic h elb erg e r , Jungle Road to Tokyo 
(Odhams, London, 1 9 5 1 ) ,  p p .7 6 , 77 .
3 .  Reports of General MacArthur, V o l . l ,  p . 9 8 .
4 . W illoughby and Cham berlain , op.cit.,  p .88.
5 . John M iller  J r . ,  Cartwheel: The Reduction of Rabaul (OCMH, 
W ashington , 1 9 5 9 ) ,  p p .11 , 12 .
its  f in a l  p h a s e ',  and accordingly  he returned to Brisbane the next
7
morning. He was immediately followed by Blarney, who had no in ten tio n
o f allow ing  MacArthur to confer w ith  Curtin  w ithout being  able to
8
present  h is  own poin t  o f  view . Thus while  Generals E ichelb erger  and
H erring  struggled  to 'mop up' the rem aining 4 ,5 0 0  fie rc e ly  determined
9
Japanese defenders at Sanananda, MacArthur, Blarney, Curtin  and Shedden
turned th e ir  attentio n  to the plans for the ensuing  y ear , and on
10 January MacArthur sent a long sig n al to Marshall p o in ting  out that
he had in s u f f ic ie n t  forces to beg in  an o ffe n s iv e . H is only ava ilab le
troops were A ustralian  m il it ia  which was 'n o t  o f  s u f f ic ie n t  q uality
10
for employment m  the o f f e n s i v e '.
Blarney met Curtin  and Shedden in  Canberra on 14 January , and the 
Prime M in ister  began by stating  that u n til  greater forces were ava ilable  
he thought that the only a ltern ative  was a 'h o ld in g  strategy in  the 
P a c i f i c ' .  He asked Blarney his opinion as to what was the capacity  
for further a c t io n . Blarney s a id  that there was l it t le  to fear in  
northwest A u s tr a lia  but that there were in s u f f ic ie n t  a l l ie d  resources 
to undertake an o ffensive  against  Timor. The next operation contemplated 
was against  L ae , in  New Guinea, which was the centre o f a Japanese 
defensive  l in e . 'D ir e c t  action was not contemplated against  Salam aua, 
as this  centre could be starved out once Lae was c a p t u r e d '. Blarney 
suggested  that MacArthur should v is i t  Washington to convey from f i r s t ­
hand experience the results o f the operations in  New Guinea and the
6 . Communique for 8 January 1 9 43 , in  Reports of General MacArthur, 
V o l . l ,  p . 9 8 .
7 . James, op .cit ., V o l .I L ,  p . 271 . For a further d iscussion  o f this 
in c id e n t  see Horner, op.cit .,  p . 257 .
8 . Horner, op.cit.,  p . 25 7 .
9 .  Ib id .,  p . 25 2 , f n .3 8 .
10 . S ig n al Q 6 9 2 4 , MacArthur to M arshall, 10 January 19 4 3 , Sutherland 
P apers , Correspondence with  War Department.
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needs o f  the South-West P a c if ic  Area . Curtin  pointed  out that
p o l it ic a l ly  this would be an unwise step , and Blarney agreed. Curtin
then turned to matters of command, and he asked Blarney who he would
recommend as h is  successor should he become i l l  or a casualty . Blarney
re p lie d  that he d id  not consider Lavarack 'possessed  a ll  the attributes
of a f i r s t  class Commander', and he thought that Lieutenant-General
S ir  L e slie  Morshead possessed  'th e  b est  q u a lif ic a t io n s  and personal
attrib u tes  for this p o s t ' . ^
A fter  this  conference Shedden flew  to Brisbane  where he spent from
16 to 20 January d iscussing  the recent campaign and the current plans
12
w ith  General MacArthur. Shedden began by asking  why the campaign
had apparently  taken so long. MacArthur re p lie d  by c r it ic is in g  the
A ustralian  commanders, 'he  regretted  to state  that h is  criticism s of
slowness in  e x p lo it in g  advantages and follow ing  up opportunities
ap p lied  to a ll  A u stralian  commanders in cludin g  General Blarney'.
MacArthur s a id  that he had asked Blarney three times to remove General
Clow es, but  that Blarney had 's a i d  that this o f f ic e r  had important
in flu en ces  behind  h i m ' . There was no mention by MacArthur that the
Commander and senior o ffic e r s  o f the 32nd US D iv isio n  had been rep laced ,
nor d id  he suggest the p o s s ib il it y  that he h im self might have erred  in
13
not sending troops to New Guinea e a r l ie r  than he d id . But he did  
acknowledge that 'o f  the nine campaigns in  which he had fought, he 
had not seen one where the conditions were more pun ish ing  on the 
so ld ier  than this  o n e '.
11 . Minutes o f Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Canberra, 14 January 
194 3 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 1 . A reasonably d e ta iled  account o f  the meeting is  
a lso  given in  F .T .  Smith Reports, N o .4 5 , 15 January 1 9 43 , NLA.
12 . The follow ing  account is  from Notes on D iscussions [by Shedden] 
w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , B r isb an e , 16-20 January 
1 9 43 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2 .
13 . These issues  are covered in  Horner, Crisis of Command.
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MacArthur expanded on h is  general cr it ic ism  of the A ustralian
commanders, and observed that 'Blarney had had quite  an easy time in  New
G u i n e a '. Overlooking the fact  that Blarney d id  v is i t  Buna and Sanananda,
MacArthur s a id  that he had w ished to v is i t  the b attle  area but had not
14
been able to do so because Blarney had remained at Port Moresby.
He described  Blarney 'a s  a good, courageous Commander in  the f i e l d , but 
not a very sound t a c t i c i a n ' , and pointed  out that he d id  'not  command 
the fu l le s t  support o f a l l ' in  the A u stralian  Army and that he had 
p o l it ic a l  am bitions. He had expected Blarney to remain to f in is h  the 
campaign and he had le f t  New Guinea early  to allow  Blarney to have 'the  
f in a l  scene to h i m s e l f '.  But 'th e  urge to get back was too great for 
General Blarney'. MacArthur concluded by statin g  that Blarney should 
become Commander-in-Chief o f  the Home Defence Forces in  A u s t r a lia , and 
that Morshead should command the A u stralian  p art  o f an A l l ie d  Expeditionary  
Force. I t  was important that in  h is  capacity  as Commander o f the 
A l l ie d  Land Forces Blarney should be e n t ir e ly  under and a v a ilab le  to 
MacArthur. I f  this clashed w ith  Blarney's r e s p o n s ib il it ie s  for the 
adm inistration  o f the A ustralian  Army, then he would have to vacate the 
post  of Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces.
The d iscu ssio n  then turned to the future operations in  the South- 
West P a c if ic  A rea . MacArthur exp lained  that he had inform ed the Jo in t  
C h ie fs  o f S t a f f  that i f  he were to achieve the second phase o f h is  
d ir e c t iv e , the capture o f  the Solomons and northeast coast of New Guinea, 
he would need more p la n e s , ships and troops. He s a id  that the P a c if ic  
War Council in  W ashington , and the A u stralian  m ilitary  representatives 
in  Washington and London, had achieved n o th ing , and he thought that the
14 . Blarney v is it e d  Buna and Sanananda on 5 and 6 January 1943 . At no 
stage d id  MacArthur v is it  the b a ttle  fro n t , although in  later  years 
he tried  to create the im pression that he had been there . E ichelb erger  
D ic ta t io n s , Book 2 , p .V - 79 .
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only way to secure assistan ce  was to arouse American p u b lic  o p in ion .
He d id  not think that i t  would be worthwhile for him to v i s i t  Washington.
Shedden s a id  that i f  MacArthur could provide the facts and fig u r e s ,
he would d ra ft  a cable for Curtin  to send to Roosevelt. Eventually
i t  was agreed that C u r t in 's  cable would quote a press statement from
MacArthur that the outstanding  lesson of the operation was airpow er,
and that  i f  s u f f ic ie n t  planes were provided  they could strike  the
15
Japanese 'a  mortal b l o w '.
There were a number of other important m atters. Honours for
American o ff ic e r s  were d isc u ss ed , there was an assessment o f  various
A u s tr a lia n  o f f ic e r s , MacArthur was c r i t ic i a l  o f some non-government
members o f  the Advisory War C o un cil, he welcomed C u r t in 's  e ffo r ts  to
16
amend the Defence A ct , and he expressed the view that he wanted only
the three AIF  d iv is io n s  for combat; the m il it ia  was f i t  for home
defence and garrison  duties on ly . The case o f General Rowell was d iscussed ,
MacArthur was c r it ic a l  o f  Eisenhower, Shedden le ft  a note about
communiques, and MacArthur s a id  that he would control the a c t iv it ie s  of
17
the United Kingdom lia is o n  o f f ic e r s . MacArthur in d icated  that the
15 . C able , Curtin  to A ustralian  M ission W ashington , 19 January 1943 ,
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 2037 .
1 6 . MacArthur s a id  that 'i n  h is  own o p in io n , the Prime M inister  had not 
moved a day too soon, as he was aware from reports from America that
a campaign was be ing  in s id io u s ly  b u il t  up in  the United States on this 
matter . . .  General MacArthur stated  in  the s tr ic te s t  confidence that 
he had received  an en tir e ly  r e lia b le  report that Admiral Leahy, Personal 
A ss istan t  to the P resid en t , had sa id  that i f  A u s tra lia  did  not remove 
the lim its on the use o f its  forces in  the Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , he 
would urge the Presiden t to w ithhold  Lease-Lend assistance  to the Common­
w ealth ' . Notes on D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, 
Southwest P a c if ic  Area , B r isb an e , 16-20 January 1 9 43 , MP 12 17 , Box 2 .
17 . MacArthur sa id  that he would control the a c t iv it ie s  of the United 
Kingdom Army and A ir  L ia is o n  o ffic e r s  w ith  the utmost care as he 
feared that they might be p r e ju d ic ia l  to the interests  o f the Southwest 
P a c if ic  A rea . Ibid . For a d iscussio n  of the controversy over the UK 
l ia is o n  o ff ic e r s  see Appendix 6 .
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Japanese were becoming in terested  in  Merauke which he was not able 
to occupy in  fo rc e , and he eirphasised that he did  not have the resources 
to retake Timor.
Shedden had enquired  about Timor as a resu lt  o f  questions asked
in  the Advisory War Council about the b u ild  up o f  Japanese forces in
18
th is  a r e a . Indeed certa in  members o f the Advisory War Council appeared 
to have a fix a t io n  about Timor, and in  December they had in structed
the C hiefs  o f S t a f f  to prepare an appreciation  for the capture of the
19 2C
is la n d . The Chiefs  had claim ed that they had in s u f f ic ie n t  in form ation ,
and Blarney thought that the in struc tio n  from the Advisory War Council 
21
was 'i m b e c i l i t y '.  Nevertheless the continuing  fear o f  a threat from 
the northwest was to be im portant for the government in  the follow ing  
m onths.
As agreed during the d isc u ss io n s , on 19 January Curtin  telegrammed
Roosevelt and C h u rch ill  at Casablanca , quoting M acArthur's  statem ent,
22
and appealing  for an a d d itio n al 2,000 a ir c r a ft  for o ffensive  a c tio n .
23
A few days la t e r , ag a in st  th e .ad v ice  o f  Shedden, in  an A u s tra lia  Day
18 . Advisory War Council M eeting , 12 January 1 9 43 , CRS A 2 6 82 , V o l .V I .
19 . Advisory War Council M eeting, 8 December 19 42 , too.cit*
20 . A ppreciation  by C hiefs  o f  S t a f f ,  December 1942 , Blarney Papers,
DRL 6 6 4 3 , item 2 0 . L e tter , Northcott to Blarney, 9 December 1942 , North­
cott P ap ers , ML MSS 1 4 3 1 /1 4 . CRS A 2671 , item 2 2 /1 9 4 3 .
21 . Blarney wrote in  red p e n c il  across the front o f the terms o f  reference 
su pp lied  by the Advisory War C ouncil: 'Many years o f tra in in g  have 
produced in  me a d is l ik e  for pro fan ity  in  w r it in g . This alone prevents
me from g iv ing  my complete opinion on this  i m b e c i l i t y '. Blarney Papers 
DRL 6 6 4 3 , item  20 .
22 . Cable N o .1 0 , C urtin  to A ustralian  M ission Washington, 19 January 
1943 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2037 and CRS A 2 6 79 , item 9 /1 9 4 3 . Also Curtin  to 
R oosevelt, 19 January 1 9 43 , Map Room, Box 12 , Folder 2B, Roosevelt L ib ra ry .
2 3 . Memorandum by Shedden, 25 January 1 9 4 3 , MP 1217 , Box 6 1 1 . Shedden 
sa id  that the speech would antagonise Roosevelt and C h urch ill without 
gain ing  an ything . Curtin  agreed that this  might be the case but s t i l l  
went ahead.
bro adcast , Curtin  appealed d ire c tly  to the American p eo p le , descib ing
24
A u s tra lia  as the 'bulwark of c iv il is a t io n  south of the E q u a t o r '.
The broadcast drew some c r it ic is m , and one reporter wrote that 'the
sp ectacle ' o f Curtin  appealing  to the American people 'was rather
25
p a t h e t i c ' . But MacArthur told  Curtin  that the speech 'was m agnificent 
measured by any standard o f  strateg y , courage, p atrio tism  or commonsense 
He prom ised to radio Washington at once to support the Prime M in is t e r 's
4- 26argument.
There is  no eVidence that these representations had much in fluence
on the Casablanca conference, where Admiral K ing  was arguing vigorously
27
in  favour o f  the P a c if ic  W ar. On 29 January the A u stralian  government 
was informed that while  the P a c if ic  War was reduced to f i f t h  on the 
l i s t  o f  p r io r it ie s , a fter  the A t la n t ic , R ussia , the M editerranean
and the United Kingdom, the d irec tiv e  o f  2 July  1942 to capture Rabaul
28
remained unchanged.
The d iscussion s  between Shedden and MacArthur in  Brisbane in  
January 1943 throw valuable l ig h t  on th e ir  role in  A u stralian  strategic ' 
p la n n in g . On 27 January 1943 Curtin  wrote to Shedden thanking him
29
for the 'h ig h ly  in form ative ' and valuable  notes o f  the conferences.
24 . Broadcast by Prime M in iste r , 26 January 19 43 , Blarney Papers 12 .
25 . Message by Dickson Brown to News Chronicle, London, quoted in  
te lep rinter  message, Deputy C h ie f  P u b lic ity  Censor, B risb an e , to C h ief  
P u b lic ity  Censor, Canberra, 27 January 1943 , MP 12 17 , Box 61 1 .
26 . Message, MacArthur to C urtin , 27 January 1 9 4 3 , toe,cit.
27 . Morton, op.cit . ,  p . 383 .
28 . Cable Z 9 ,  C hurchill to C urtin , 29 January 19 43 , Cable Z 10 ,
Attlee  to C u r tin , 29 January 1943 , Cable 154 , Dominions Secretary  to 
C u r t in , 29 January 1943 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 575 .
29 . L e t t e r , Curtin  to Shedden, 27 January 1 9 4 3 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2.
The next day Shedden made some attempt to an ticipate  for the Prime
M in ister  the course of events in  the coming months:
Now that the immediate thre;at to A u s tra lia  
had passed  by the destruction  of the Japanese 
forces in  Papua, I detect an anxiety on the part  
o f General MacArthur to free h im self o f  the 
restra ints  and lim itatio ns  placed  on him by 
operating  h is  Headquarters in  the country o f  a 
sovereign sta te . I anticip ate  th at , at the 
f i r s t  opportunity , he w i l l  set up h is  Head­
quarters outside the A u stralian  m ainland, and 
organise an expeditionary  force which i t  w i l l  
be h is  aim to make predom inantly American and 
that Commanders o f  the N aval, Land and A ir  
Forces w i l l  be a l l  American o f f i c e r s . 30
In  a separate paper Shedden also  took the opportunity o f  g iving
h is  im pression o f  MacArthur:
I always fin d  General M acArthur's  p erso n ality  an 
in te r e st in g  study and he really  has to be closely  
stu died  to be properly  understood. Some peo p le , who 
should know b e t t e r , dism iss him rather cheaply 
because of a certa in  demonstrative manner and h is  
verbo sity .
His demonstrative manner is  due to h is  
m ercurial temperament. He has great enthusiasm  
for h is  work, bu t  becomes depressed at the 
p o l it ic a l  fru stratio ns  w hich , in  h is  view , 
shape world strateg y , to the detriment o f  the 
Southwest P a c if ic  A rea . His verbosity  is  probably 
largely  due to the fact  that he keeps so 
e xclu siv e ly  to h im self and h is  s t a f f .  This 
probably  leads to a tendency to introspectio n  
and a desire  to pour out h is  thoughts and 
feelin gs  on anyone in terested  in  h is  problems 
and view s. Another resu lt  o f  this introspectio n  
is  a tendency to suspect motives on occasions 
w ithout sound grounds for them, w ith  the 
consequence th at , by dw elling  on them, he may 
b u ild  up a view which is  e n tir e ly  contrary to the 
known fa c t s .
Anyone who has had close re latio n s  w ith 
General MacArthur cannot come away w ithout any other 
im pression than that he has been in  the presence 
of a great m asterful p e r s o n a lity . He has a broad and 
cultured  mind and a fin d  command of E n g lis h . He 
might be described  as an American conservative 
who has fa it h fu lly  m aintained the standards o f h is
253
30 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 28 January 1943 , Zoc.eit.
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B r it is h  ancestors . He views w ith  great d isfavour 
the in flu ence  which foreign  people have had in  
America on B r it is h  standards . He is  a great 
s t ic k le r  for the status o f h is  p o s it io n .
I rank General M acArthur's  expositio ns  o f 
strategy  as equal to those o f  Admiral S ir  Herbert 
Richmond, who is  the greatest l iv in g  w riter  on 
Naval h istory  and strategy , and to Lord Hankey, 
who, as Secretary  o f the Committee o f Im perial 
Defence, demonstrated the possession  o f a great 
s tr a teg ic a l  mind. General MacArthur has a profound 
knowledge of m ilitary  art and h is to ry , is  a 
shrewd judge of men, and, what is  e s s e n t ia l  for a 
. su ccessful Commander, great personal courage and 
lead ersh ip , as was exem p lified  during the campaign 
in  the P h il ip p in e s . Though h is  Army was mainly 
P h il ip p in o , i t  o ffered  a stoat resistance  to the 
Japanese and this Army was e n tir e ly  General 
M acArthur's  creation .
At 6 3 , he has shown that h is  mind has not lost 
it s  r e s ilien cy  and that he has not been b lin d ly  
wedded to orthodoxy in  the art  o f w ar, by demonstrat­
in g  in  the New Guinea campaign how e ffe c t iv e ly  land 
and a ir  forces can be used in  cooperation , and how 
a ir  transport can be used when movement by land 
and sea is  im possible .
General MacArthur is  very proud o f  h is  post 
as Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , by 
reason o f  the unity  o f N aval, M ilitary  and A ir  
control that is  vested  in  him , and also because 
o f  the fact that he is  a foreigner  commanding on the 
s o i l  o f  a sovereign State A l l ie d  Forces; o f which 
the main p art  belong to the Government of the country 
in  which he is  lo cated . He is  extremely so lic ito u s  
for the correctness o f  h is  re latio n s  with the 
A u stralian  Government, to whom he feels  greatly  
indebted  for the set-up under which he works.
Shedden also  noted M acArthur's  impact on decision-making in  
A u s t r a l ia :
A u s tra lia  is  very fortunate to have such an 
o f f ic e r  responsible  for operations in  the South­
west P a c if ic  A rea . General MacArthur says that , 
should he commit a grave error in  the conduct o f 
o p eratio n s , he w i l l  be the f ir s t  to detect i t  and 
e ffa ce  h im self from the scene. The Government 
need have no fear o f  having  to take d is ta s te fu l  
action w ith  h is  own Government, as he would not let
31 . I t  should be added that the v a lid ity  of the assertion  that M acArthur's 
force o ffe re d  stout resistance  is  open to challenge.
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the need a r is e . His in flu e n ce , counsel and advice 
are having  e ffe c ts  over the whole f ie ld  of 
Service  adm inistration  in  A u s tr a lia , and i t  is  
o f great advantage to the Government that such a 
person should be ava ilable  in  addition  to the 
Government's own a d v ise rs . He w i l l  certainly  
be missed when he moves h is  Headquarters away 
from the m ainland and our main contact w ith  the 
higher d irec tio n  o f  the war w il l  again  be confined  
to the Governm ent's representatives in  London and 
W a sh in g to n .32
Thus Shedden stressed  M acArthur's  important role in  advising  the govern­
ment in  matters beyond those o f  strategy .
MacArthur s im ilarly  had a high  opinion  o f  Shedden, and on
5 February wrote to C u rtin :
As the f ir s t  great phase o f  our campaign to 
p rotect A u s tra lia  from invasion  draws to a 
c lo s e , I cannot absta in  from expressing  
my appreciation  o f  the splendid  contribution  
to our success by the Secretary  o f the Defence 
C o u n c il , Mr Shedden. W hile not in  any sense 
serving  under my command, h is  duties have 
been so id e n t i f ie d  therewith that I feel
I owe him a deep o b lig a tio n  for the superior 
manner in  which he has b e n e f ic ia l ly  in fluenced  
many momentous problems and m aterially  co ntri­
buted  to th e ir  su ccessful conclusion . Unfortun­
ately  I have not the power to decorate c iv il ia n s  
or I would u n h esitatin g ly  cite  him for an 
appropriate reward. I hope you w il l  not regard 
me as presum ptuous, although I realise  I go 
beyond my normal l im ita t io n s , i f  I recommend 
him to your co nsid eration  for such reco gnitio n .
He belongs to that great class of c iv il  servants 
who work in  comparative obscurity  but whose value
cannot be over- estim ated.33
32 . V is i t  to B r isb an e , 16th to 20th January 1943 , Im pressions o f 
General MacArthur, Notes by Shedden, MP 1 2 17 , Box 2 0 37 .
33 . L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r tin , 5 February 1943 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial. 
There was a sequel to this correspondence, for on 9 February Curtin  pro­
mised MacArthur that he would do h is  'b e s t  to give e f fe c t  to the views
you have so considerably  and d e lig h tfu lly  e x p r e s s e d '. Shedden also wrote 
on 15 February to thank MacArthur: ' I  am very deeply gratefu l for your 
thou ghtfulness , the more so as I have done a thousandfold more in  the 
cause of Empire and A ustralian  D efence, but i t  has not evoked any p a r a lle l  
expression  o f  commendation from the A ustralian  Service  L e a d e r s '.
On 3 June 1943 in  a le tter  to MacArthur Shedden referred  to h is  
knighthood as a resu lt  o f 'your sp lendid  recom m endation', but MacArthur 
p o in ted  o u t , on 4 Jun e , that he had been c a re fu l , in  h is  le tter  o f 5 
February, not to state which award he recommended since that was a matter 
for the A u stralian  government. These letters  are in  the Sutherland 
Papers , Correspondence w ith  A u stralian  government.
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As a resu lt  o f this le tter  Shedden was knighted  some months 
la te r .
Changing the A l l ie d  Command Structure
During h is  discussions  w ith  Shedden MacArthur had sa id  that
Lieutenant- General W alter Krueger would soon be a rr iv in g  in  A u s tra lia
to command the S ix th  US Army and he hoped that ad d itio n al US d iv is io n s
would be sent to A u s tr a lia . In  C u r t in 's  view , the arr iv a l  o f Krueger
seemed to in d icate  that the US Jo in t  Chiefs  o f S t a f f  had decided
34
to send su b stan tia l  reinforcem ents to the SWPA, but the appointment 
was based  on quite  d iffe r e n t  co nsid erations .
During the Papuan campaign i t  had become in creasingly  clear  that 
MacArthur was determined that h is  operations should be co ntrolled  by 
task force commanders, rather than by Blarney as Commander, A l l ie d  Land 
F o rc e s . Indeed MacArthur told Shedden in  January that Blarney was 
unable to perform  adequately h is  duties as Commander ALF as w ell  
as those o f  C-in-C of the AMF. Thus on 11 January 1943 MacArthur asked- 
M arshall to send Krueger 't o  give the US Army the next ranking o f f ic e r
below General Blarney in  the A l l ie d  Land Forces which is  not now the
35
case and is  most n e c e s s a r y '. Soon after  K ru eger 's  a rr iv al MacArthur 
formed Alamo Force to conduct the operations of the S ixth  Army. There 
were not yet enough troops to form a US Army in  A u s tr a lia , but Krueger, 
who also  commanded Alamo Force, 'r e a l is e d  that this  arrangement would
34 . F .T .  Smith Reports, 11 February 1943 , N o .44 . On 8 February 1943 
MacArthur wrote to Curtin  that the action of sending  Krueger in d icated  
'a  growing fe e lin g  o f the importance o f  the Southwest P a c if ic  Area '
and was an in d icatio n  that more reinforcem ents could be expected . Blarney 
Papers 5 . 0 .
35 . S ig n a l , MacArthur to M arsh all , 11 January 1943 , RG4, MacArthur 
Memorial.
obviate p lac in g  S ixth  Army under the operational control of the A l l ie d
, 36 
Land Forces .
There is  other evidence to support this view . General Dewing,
the B r it is h  Army representative  in  A u s tra lia , wrote that MacArthur
was 'w orking  stead ily  to exclude the A ustralians  from any e ffe c t iv e
hand in  the control o f  land or a ir  operations or credit  in  them,
37
except as a minor element in  a US sh o w '. K ru eg er 's  deputy C h ie f  of
S t a f f  commented later  that Alamo Force was created 't o  keep the control
38 . .
of S ixth  Army units away from General Blarney . In  the opinion of
General E ic h elb erg er , Krueger was sent to A u stralia  because the
Americans were disadvantaged by the high  rank and experience o f many
of the A ustralian  o f f ic e r s : ' Whether W a lte r ' s rank w i l l  help  solve
the problem  only time can t e l l  . . .  I t  reminds me o f the poker games
in  Shanghai . . .  where the cuspidor was put on the centre of the table
39
because no one dared look away to s p i t ' .
Throughout 1943 i t  became in creasingly  obvious that MacArthur 
was edging  Blarney out of h is  p o sitio n  as commander o f the land forces . 
Indeed  General Dewing reported  that an 'e n t ir e ly  independent but 
re lia b le  source close to MacArthur' had informed him that the in ten tio n  
was that Krueger would replace Blarney as Commander o f the A l l ie d  Land 
Forces . Dewing told the War O f f ic e  that he d id  'n o t  know whether 
Blarney [was] aware of this  but judge him astute enough to have made [a]
36 . Krueger, op.cit., p . 10 . In  a letter  to General Orlando Ward, the 
US Army's C h ie f  of M ilitary  H isto ry , on 12 September 1 9 5 1 , Krueger 
attested  to the great problems he faced as a commander w ith  the dual 
r e s p o n s ib il it ie s  for Alamo Force and 6th Army. RG 319 , Records o f  the 
O f f ic e  of the C h ief  o f M ilitary  H isto ry , National Archives.
37 . Dewing to W ilk in so n , 10 February 19 43 , quoted in  Thorne, op.cit., 
p . 263 .
38 . Interview  tapes, Papers o f  General George H . Decker, US M ilitary  
H istory  In s t it u t e , C a rly le , Penn sylvania .
39. Luv aas , op.cit., p . 6 7 .
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shrewd g u e s s '. Dewing thought that A u s tra lia  could not r e s is t  such a
40
change. This was not, o f course, M acArthur's p la n . Rather MacArthur
became h is  own land force commander and exercised  command through
task fo rces , and Blarney was w ell  aware of this scheme. On 15 February
1943 he wrote to MacArthur that he would like  to examine the composition
o f the task forces; he was 'i n  general agreement w ith  the p o in t  o f
view that General Sutherland suggested in  regard to th e ir  re latio n sh ip
41
to Headquarters and details  of command'.
Colonel Keogh has w ritten  that in  forming Alamo Force to avoid
p la c in g  any large body of American troops under Blarney's command,
MacArthur needed 't o  be congratulated  for h is  s k i l l  in  e x tr ic a tin g
h im s elf , h is  own Government and the A ustralian  Government from an
42
em barassing s i t u a t i o n '.  This may w e ll  have been the case , for
towards the end of 194 3 Curtin  stated  that he intended to discuss
43
Blarney's role when MacArthur returned from New Guinea. Perhaps
Shedden advised  Curtin  that the formation o f  Alamo Force made a change
to the organisation  less urgent. Such a change, coming at the same time •
44
as an upheaval in  the command o f the RAAF, might have been d i f f ic u l t
4 0 . Cable 8 , Dewing to VCIGS , 3 March 194 3 , WO 1 0 6 /3 4 1 6 .
4 1 . L e tter , Blarney to MacArthur, 15 February 1943 , AWM 5 1 5 /5 / 5 .  'It is 
in te r e s t in g  to note Blarney's comments in  a le tter  to Shedden on 11 March
1943 dealing  with the suggestion to appoint an A ir  O f f ic e r  Commanding 
for the RAAF: 'Such  a ir  forces as may be a llo tte d  to the S .W .P .A .  are 
somewhat in  the nature of task forces and the operational command o f these 
forces w i l l  be exercised  by an R .A .A .F .  Commander under the Commander, 
A l l ie d  A ir  Forces. Such a p o sitio n  may also  arise  in  re latio n  to the 
A l l ie d  Land Forces at various times and there may be an interchange of 
command as between Australian  and American Commanders both in A ir  and Land 
F o r c e s '. Blarney Papers 2 3 .4 .
42 . Keogh, op.cit., p . 473 .
4 3 . Memorandum by Shedden, 19 November 1942 and le t t e r , Curtin  to the 
M in ister  for A ir , 24 December 1 9 4 2 , CRS A 81 6 , item  3 1 /3 0 1 /1 9 6 A .
44 . See Appendix 3 .
to in s t it u t e , for Blarney was ad v ising  the government that the resu lts
achieved  in  Papua 'would have been quite  im possible had he not been '
~ 45
C-m-C.
But i f  Keogh is  righ t  in  h is  suggestion that MacArthur needed to
be congratulated  for h is  s k i l l ,  he overlooks another aspect of M acArthur's
m otivation . Keogh claim ed that i f  the Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces ,
had not had the ad d itio n a l  re sp o n sib ility  of adm inistering  the A u stralian
Army, then 'the  subsequent command arrangement would have adhered more
46
clo sely  to the o r ig in a l  p l a n ' . What Keogh fa ile d  to r e a lis e  was that 
whether the nominal Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces, had other respon si­
b i l i t i e s  or not, MacArthur had no in ten tio n  of allow ing  him to operate 
as such . Blarney's 'two h a ts ' provided  a convenient excuse for M acArthur's  
rearrangement of h is  fo rc es ; they were not the real cause o f  the change. 
There is  no doubt that M acArthur's  new system worked, although
Krueger doubted whether i t  would have done so i f  the land forces had
47
been faced  w ith  d e fea t . N evertheless , M acArthur's  method of achieving
i t  w as , in  the words o f Gavin Long, 'by  stealth  and by the employment
48
o f  subterfuges that were u n d ig n if ie d , and at times a b s u r d '. These 
subterfuges revealed  a lack o f consideration  by MacArthur towards a 
subordinate  who, to d ate , had shown outstanding  lo y alty . Indeed on
17 May 1 9 4 3 , M acArthur's  C h ie f  P u blic  Relations O f f ic e r , Colonel L .A . 
D i l l e r , wrote to MacArthur from Melbourne: ' I  found no question  from
4 5 . War Ctibinet Agendum 1 0 7 /1 9 4 3 , Sup 1 , 15 April 1943 , CRS A 8 1 6 , item 
3 1 /3 0 1 /1 9 6 A .
4 6 . Keogh, op .cit ., p . 474 . Keogh claimed that the A ustralian  Army 
should have had an operational commander under M acArthur's command w hile  
re ta in in g  the M ilitary  Board. He makes no mention o f the fact  that a 
s im ilar  system operating  in  the RAAF was a complete fa ilu re  and was 
detrim ental to the e ffec tiv en ess  of that serv ice .
4 7 . L e tte r , Krueger to General Orlando W ard, 12 September 19 5 1 , RG 319 , 
N ational A rchives .
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4 8 . Long, The Final Campaigns, p . 599 .
any source of General Blarney's loyalty  and f i d e l t y ' .  F .M . Forde 
commented later  that Blarney 'worked very hard in  order to give s a t i s ­
faction  to General Douglas MacArthur and to render a maximum of assis- 
, 50
tance . Yet i t  was to be almost two more years before  Blarney lodged
a formal complaint w ith  Curtin  over M acArthur's degradation of the role
51
o f  Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces.
Securing  A dd itio n al Forces for the SWPA
Although M acArthur's decision  to elim inate  Blarney from the chain
of commamd was to have an important impact on A u s t r a l ia 's  a b il it y  to
in fluen ce  a l l ie d  s t r a t e g y ,in  early  1943 Curtin  was concerned w ith  what
he considered  to be more cru cia l  m atters. At the Advisory War Council
meeting on 2 February i t  was agreed that there would be no p r o f it  in
ch allenging  the Casablanca d e c is io n . Curtin  prom ised, however, to consult
MacArthur as to whether the forces in  the SWPA would be s u ff ic ie n t
to achieve the ob jectives  la id  down, and i f  n o t , whether add itio nal
forces were req uired . He would report to Roosevelt and C h urch ill in
the l ig h t  of M acArthur's  reply . During the meeting m isgivings were
again expressed  about a Japanese threat from the Northwest. Both the
CNS and the CAS s a id  that they were not w o rried , but Curtin  s a id  he
52
would speak to MacArthur.
49 . L e tte r , D il le r  to MacArthur, 17 May 19 43 , RG4, MacArthur Memorial. In 
an e ig h t  page le tter  D i l le r  described  the problems of dealing  w ith  the 
Press in  Melbourne. He concluded: 'Melbourne seethes w ith in trig ue  . . .  
and certain  people in  Melbourne seem to have almost immediate inform ation 
about happenings at headquarters . V ic io u s , scandalous, gossip  is  prevalent 
in  M elbourne. S ir  Guy Royle [the CNS] appears to be im plicated  in  the 
antagonism  [towards Americans] very s t r o n g l y '.
5 0 . T ranscript  of interview  w ith  F .M . Forde, 4 March 1 9 7 1 , NLA TRC 1 2 1 /8 .
5 1 . See Chapter Ten. For a diagram of the command organisation  in  
July  1943 see Appendix 15 .
5 2 . Advisory War Council M eeting , Minutes 1 1 2 9 , 1131 , 1 1 32 , Canberra,
2 February 19 4 3 , CRS A 2 6 8 2 , V o l .V I .
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Lieutenant- General W alter Krueger, CG Sixth  US Army, 
and Lieutenant- General S ir  John Lavarack , GOC F irs t  
Army, photographed in  A p ril  1943 . Krueger also  
commanded Alamo Force. Krueger knew 'th a t  this 
arrangement would obviate  p lac in g  S ixth  Army under 
the operational control of CG A ll ie d  Land F o r c e s '.
(AWM Negative N o .50475)
A Japanese ship on f ir e  during the Battle  of the 
Bismarck Sea . The engine of the Beaufort is  in  
the foreground.
(AWM Negative N o .127965)
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Meanwhile the strateg ic  s itu atio n  continued to improve. The 
A u stralian s  thought that the a r r iv a l  o f the Sixth  US Army would mean
that an a d d itio n al force o f  three d iv isio n s  would be sent from Am erica,
and the Australian  CNS advised  that by June 1943 there would be a powerful
54
American fle e t  in  the P a c i f ic . In  a d d it io n ,th e  7th Amphibious Force
under Adm iral Barbey, and the 2nd Engineer Sp ecia l  Brig ad e , were assigned
55
to M acArthur's  command. By the end o f  February the Japanese thrust
56
towards Wau had been soundly defeated , and the Japanese on Guadalcanal
had been e lim inated . F in a lly  in  early  March a Japanese convoy attem pting
to rein force  Lae was v ir tu a lly  a n n ih ila ted  by A l l ie d  a ir c r a ft  in  the
57
Battle  of the Bismarck Sea . Furthermore, a l l ie d  in te llig e n c e  was 
now becoming in creasing ly  accurate . I t  had contributed  the Bismarck Sea
53
5 3 . At the Advisory War Council on 9 February 1 9 43 , Curtin  s a id  that 
MacArthur had advised  him o f the a rr iv al  o f the Sixth  Army and i t  was an 
'e x c e lle n t  in d ica tio n  of th e ir  in ten tio n  to increase the forces assigned  
h e r e '.  The CGS then sa id  i t  would probably  resu lt  in  an a llo catio n  of 
an a d d it io n a l  corps of 3 d iv is io n s . CRS A 2 6 8 2 , V o l .V I .  This was a 
reasonable assumption since  the Australian  Army had received  a request 
for accommodation for up to 3 d iv is io n s . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  
War Conference, Canberra, 12 February 1943 , MP 12 17 , Box 4 .
5 4 . Advisory War Council Minute 1129 , 2 February 19 43 , loc,cit,
5 5 . The Reports of General MacArthur, V o l .l ,  p . 105 . The t it le  of 
B a rbey 's  command was later  changed to 7th Amphibious F le et . For an 
account o f the f le e t  see D .E .  Barbey , MacArthur's Amphibious Fleet,
(Naval In s t it u t e , A nn apolis , 1 9 6 9 ) .
5 6 . The GHQ Communique of 12 February 1943 said  the enemy had been 
'd e c is iv e ly  d e fe a t e d '. MP 12 1 7 , Box 53 0 .
5 7 . W hile  there is  no doubting the enormous victory  in  the Bismarck Sea , 
thereewas a long and b it t e r  argument over the exact number of Japanese 
ships sunk. See Jam es, op .cit,,  V o l . I I ,  C h .7 ,  p art  1. and Craven and 
C ate , op .cit.,  p p .129-150.
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success , and the b attle  i t s e l f  provided  further valuable 
in fo rm atio n .
N atu rally , MacArthur was not pleased  w ith  the Casablanca decision  
to give the P a c if ic  f i f t h  p r io r it y , and on 29 January he po in ted  out
60
to M arshall that he would have in s u f f ic ie n t  strength  to capture Rabaul.
M eanwhile, as they prepared their  p la n s , i t  became clear to MacArthur
and h is  s t a f f  that the capture of Rabaul could secure for the A ll ie s
'im p o rtan t , bu t  not decis ive  ad v a n ta g e s '. Plans w ere , th erefo re , begun
61
(but not passed  to Washington) for the advance to the P h il ip p in e s .
M acArthur's  Elkton p lans  for the capture o f Rabaul were d iscussed
during  February, and Elkton I I  o f 28 February stated  that he would need
. . . . . .  62
an ad d it io n a l  five  d iv is io n s  and almost 2 ,0 0 0  more a ir c r a ft . Since
there were also  problems of coordination with the South P a c if ic  A rea ,
6 3
the JCS c a lled  a P a c if ic  Conference in  W ashington , and on 12 March 
M acArthur's  c h ie f  o f s t a f f ,  Major-General R .K . Sutherlan d , presented  
the Elkton I I  plan  to the conference. That evening  Sutherland radioed
5 8 . In  a le tte r  to General Mackay on 27 February 1943 Blarney s a id  that 
intercept  inform ation had warned the A ll ie s  of the Japanese attempts
to rein force  Lae and Madang between 5 and 12 March: 'Every e f fo r t  w il l  
be  made by our own airforce  to deal w ith  the enemy as he approaches, 
and HQ SWPA is  very co nfident of causing a very great amount of damage, 
and p o ss ib ly  preventing  the enemy from achieving  h is  o b j e c t ' . Blarney 
Papers 1 7 0 .3 .
5 9 . A group of Japanese survivors from the battle  were ambushed on 
Goodenough Isla n d  by A u stralian  so ld iers  and the Japanese Army L is t
and D irectory  for  1942-1943 was captured. The Reports of General MacArthur> 
V o l . l ,  p . I l l ,  and D . D exter , The New Guinea Offensives (A ustralian  War 
Mem orial, C anberra , 1 9 6 1 ) ,  p . 10.
6 0 . G. Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943-1945 (A ustralian  War Memorial, 
Canberra , 1 9 5 7 ) ,  p . 20 .
6 1 . M il le r , op .cit.,  p . 10 .
6 2 . The Elkton Plan  of 28 February 1943 is  reproduced as Appendix I 
in  Morton, op.cit.
6 3 . On 15 February 1943 MacArthur asked M arshall for perm ission to
send his c h ie f  of s t a f f  and several other o ffic e r s  to Washington to exp lain  
h is  plans for the advance towards Rabaul. (Sutherland Papers, Correspon­
dence with War Departm ent). The JCS approved, but arranged a conference 
which was to include  representatives from H a ls e y 's  and N im it z 's  areas .
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MacArthur that there was almost no chance of the SWPA receiv ing
reinforcem ents. Only two or three d iv is io n s  and a few more planes could 
64
be sent .
On 8 February C urtin  had asked for M acArthur's observations on
6
the forces required  to f u l f i l l  h is  d ir e c t iv e , but had received  no reply .
Then after  b e in g  informed by MacArthur on 1 March that he had sent
Suth erlan d , Kenney and Cham berlin to Washington to present h is  v iew s ,
sin ce  he was 'o p erating  in  an atmosphere of such uncertainty  as to
66
jeopardise  plans and e f f o r t ' , Curtin  had asked i f  there was any way
in  which he could 'a s s i s t  the attainm ent o f  the objectives which the
• • u ^ • • • 67 ’ ■m ission had in  view .
Now, faced w ith  what appeared to be the in transigence  of the JC S ,
MacArthur sought C u r t in 's  h e lp , and the build-up o f  Japanese strength
in  the isla nd s  northwest o f A u stralia  enabled  him to stress the need
for adequate forces to ensure the defence of A u s tr a lia . Thus when Curtin
spoke to MacArthur by secraphone on 16 March a fte r  a heavy a ir  ra id
6 8
on Darwin the previous day, the la tte r  emphasised the threat to 
A u s t r a lia . Forgetting  that the JCS had ca lled  h is  representatives to 
Washington to d iscuss the Elkton p la n , and that he had sent them with 
the s p e c if ic  purpose o f  'e x p la in in g  the fu l l  d eta ils  of my suggested
6 4 . M il le r , op.cit . ,  p p .1 3 , 14 .
65 . L e t t e r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 8 February 19 43 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 57 5 .
66. L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r tin , 1 March 1943 , MP 1217 , Box 579 .
6 7 . L e tte r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 4 March 1943 , Sutherland  Papers , 
Correspondence with A ustralian  Government. See also  Prime M in is t e r 's  
War Conference Minute 79 , Canberra , 17 March 19 43 , MP 12 17 , Box 53 2 .
68. At the War Cabinet Meeting in  Canberra on 16 March 1943 there was 
a d iscussio n  regarding  the Japanese a ir  r a id  on Darwin the previous 
day. Curtin  le f t  the m eeting to speak to MacArthur by secraphone, and 
then returned to give the l a t t e r 's  v iew s. War Cabinet Minute 2690 ,
CRS A 2 6 7 3 , V o l .X I I I .
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plans for phase two and three o f the advance to R a b a u l ', MacArthur
told  Curtin  that  he had sent them to obtain  1 ,0 0 0  to 1 ,5 0 0  planes and
a corps of troops not for an o ffensive  again st  Rabaul, but to defend
what was already h e ld . MacArthur sa id  that the Japanese would be able
70
to 'launch  a major attack ' in  from two to four months.
I t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to b e lie v e  that MacArthur was completely candid
with C urtin . A fter  a l l ,  in  January both Blarney and MacArthur had
inform ed Curtin  that they considered that there was nothing to fear
71
from the Japanese in  northwest A u s tr a lia . Now, on 17 March, Blarney
reaffirm ed  that he was 'not  disturbed  regarding  the p o s s ib il it y  o f  heavy
Japanese attacks in  the immediate f u t u r e '. The only worry was a po ssible
72
Japanese occupation o f  Merauke. Although MacArthur issued  plans
on 22 March for the reinforcem ent o f Merauke and the Horn Island-Cape
York area , in  A p r il  the plans were amended so that the reinforcem ents
73
should not be deployed but should be ready to move at short n o tice .
6 9 . S ign al X 447 , MacArthur to M arsh all , 15 February 1943 , Sutherland 
Pap ers , Correspondence w ith  War Department.
70 . The notes of the secraphone conversation o f  16 March 1943 are held  
in  MP 12 1 7 , Box 5 2 4 , F i l e ,  Operations at Darwin 1943 . An extract  of
the notes appears in  Advisory War Council Minute 11 53 , Canberra, 18 March
19 4 3 , CRS A 2 6 8 2 , V o l .V I .
71. Minutes o f Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Canberra, 14 January
19 43 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 1 , and Notes of D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander- 
in- Chief Southwest P a c if ic  Area , B r isb an e , 16th to 20th January 1943 ,
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 2.
72 . Minutes o f Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Canberra, 17 March 1 9 43 ,
MP 12 1 7 , Box 4 .
73 . Long, The Six Years War, p . 290 . This p la n , known as the Moultrie 
Plan was issued  as GHQ Operation In struc tio n  N o .32 on 12 A p ril  19 43 ,
AWM 5 1 9 /6 / 5 9 ,  Part 1.
The Japanese build-up in  the islands  was in  fa c t  a defensive  measure
74
which M acArthur's  in te llig e n c e  should have been able to detect.
Furthermore the increased  success o f US submarines operating  out of
Fremantle would have made a Japanese move ag a in st  northwest A ustralia
75
in cre a sin g ly  d i f f i c u l t .  As m entioned, MacArthur was already making
secret  plans for the advance to the P h il ip p in e s .
M eanwhile, having received  no answer from Roosevelt and C h u r ch ill ,
C urtin  reminded MacArthur that he had not r e p lie d  to h is  letter  of
4 March, when he had o ffered  to a s s is t  him in  h is  attempts to gain
76
in creased  resources . MacArthur rep lied  immediately that the fa ilu r e
o f Roosevelt and C hurchill to reply to C u r t in 's  appeal o f  19 January was
'a n  asto nish ing  developm ent '. MacArthur therefore suggested that
'b e n e f it  might resu lt  through independent action  on the p art  of the
77
Prime M in ister  and at worst no harm would be d o n e '. Bruce in  London
had already  warned Curtin  that despite  the fine  words from Casablanca,
78
the b a s ic  idea  was s t i l l  'H i t l e r  must f i r s t  be d e f e a t e d ', and on 18
265
74 . In  a ll  the correspondence between MacArthur and Marshall there is  
no evidence that MacArthur was really  a fr a id  o f a Japanese advance
from the area northwest o f A u s t r a lia . In  h is  correspondence w ith  M arshall, 
the p o s s ib il it y  is  mentioned only once in  a s ig n a l  sent on 25 March. 
(Sutherland  Papers , Correspondence with War Departm ent.) On 12 March 1 9 43 , 
a fte r  a m eeting w ith  the A u stralian  M inister  in  W ashington , the US 
Secretary  of W ar, Henry Stim son, wrote in  h is  d ia r y : 'He and I also  
d iscussed  the a lleg ed  threat of the Japanese to North A u s tr a lia . I 
told  him that I had not taken i t  very serio usly  because a ll  the other 
news had convinced me that the Japanese could not sustain  any such attack 
and I gave him some of the instancesw hich  went to prove my views correct.
He sa id  he was much e n c o u r a g e d '. Papers o f  Henry L . Stim son, Library  
o f  Congress.
75 . B l a ir , Silent Victory: The US Submarine War Against Japan, C h .18 .
76 . T elep rin ter  message, Shedden to MacArthur, 17 March 1 9 43 , Sutherland 
Pap ers , Correspondence with  A u stralian  Government.
77 . T elep rin ter  message, MacArthur to C u rtin , 17 March 1943 , MP 1 2 17 ,
Box 289 , F i l e ,  Messages from MacArthur.
78 . Cable 31 , Bruce to C u r tin , 10 February 1 9 4 3 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 5 7 5 .
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March Curtin  made renewed representations to Roosevelt and C h u r c h ill .
No doubt Curtin  had been anxious for proof that the P a c if ic  theatre
had not been forgo tten , but  he had not been w il l in g  to act w ithout
MacArthur' s agreem ent.
The events o f  early  1943 demonstrate how much Curtin  had come to
rely  on M acArthur's  stra teg ic  advice . Indeed General Dewing thought
that MacArthur so dominated Curtin  that i t  was un likely  that the A ustralian
Prime M in ister  would ever 'sta n d  up against MacArthur in  in sistence
on the rights o f , or even a fa ir  deal for the A ustralian  services in
80
the t h e a t r e '. At one interview  MacArthur told  Dewing that Curtin
81
was completely in  h is  hands 'o n  a l l  m ilitary  q u e s t io n s '.
For the moment, however, C u r t in 's  natural desire  to ensure the 
safety  o f  A u s tra lia  was complementary to M acArthur's plans for an advance 
to the P h il ip p in e s . C u r t in 's  forceful arguments in  cables to Roosevelt, 
C h u rch ill  and Bruce during March and A p ril  1943 have been carefully  
recounted in  the A ustralian  o f f i c i a l  h is to ry , where Hasluck has percep­
t iv e ly  noted that the claims for ad d itio n a l  p lanes to enable MacArthur
to conduct a lim ited  o ffe n s iv e , marked 'th e  end o f representations based
82
largely  on the fear  for the security  o f the A u stralian  m a in la n d '.
W hile Curtin  was making these rep resentatio ns , p lanning  continued 
in  Washington and on 28 March the JCS issued  their  d irective  for o ffensive  
operations in  the South and Southwest P a c i f ic . The Jo in t  Chiefs  were
7 9 . Cable Johcu 6 0 , Curtin  to C h u r ch ill , and cable 4 9 , Curtin  to A ustralian  
M in is te r , W ashington , 18 March 1 9 4 3 , CRS A 2679 , item 9 /1 9 4 3 .
80 . Report by Major-General R .H . Dewing, 20 A p ril  1943 , WO 1 0 6 /4 8 3 9 .
8 1 . Reported by Major-General R .H . Dewing to S .M . Bruce , 30 June 19 4 3 ,
CRS M 100 , June 1 9 43 .
8 2 . H asluck , The Government and the Rzople, 1942-1945, p . 212 . Copies o f 
the cables can be read in  the Sutherland  Papers , Correspondence with  
A u s tra lia n  Government, in  CRS M 100, March 1 9 4 3 , in  PREM 3 , 1 4 2 /7 ,  and
in  Roosevelt Papers , Map Room Box 1 2 , Roosevelt L ib ra ry .
unable to supply a l l  the forces required  by MacArthur i f  he were to
take Rabaul, and the aim was m odified  to that o f  containing  the Japanese
forces by m aintaining  the in i t i a t i v e , and prep aring  for the ultim ate
se izu re  of the Bismarck A rch ip elago . This was to be achieved by
e s t a b lis h in g  a ir f ie ld s  on K ir iw in a  and Woodlark Is la n d s , s e iz in g  both
sid es  of the V it ia z  S t r a it s , and advancing through the Solomons to southern
83
B o u g a in v ille . The operations o f  H a ls e y 's  South P a c if ic  Forces were
to be under M acArthur's  general d ir e c t io n . The Jo in t  Chiefs agreed to
supply MacArthur w ith  two more d iv is io n s  o f  ground troops, 524 ad ditio nal
84
combat planes and 336 non-combat p la n e s .
MacArthur had therefore achieved  support for a lim ited  o ffe n s iv e ,
but w ith  the advance to the P h ilip p in e s  in  mind he was s t i l l  not s a t is f ie d
and sought to apply ad d itio n a l  pressure to the US government. Thus on
1 A p ril  he advised  C urtin  that Dr E va tt , who was about to depart for
Am erica, should seek to obtain  a ir c r a ft  to allow  the RAAF to expand to
72 squadrons. He suggested that these a ir c r a ft  could come from the
B r it is h  a llo c atio n  o f  US a ir c r a ft , and w ould , th ere fo re , be ad d itio n al
85
to the a ir c r a ft  already provided  to the US A irfo rce  in  the SWPA.
On 6 A p ril  MacArthur n o t if ie d  Shedden o f a statem ent which he planned
86
to release  on 9 A p r il , the anniversary  o f  the f a l l  of Bataan . At the 
same tim e, he sent Shedden another statem ent which he requested Curtin  
to issue  as a comment on the o r ig in a l  statem ent. The second statement 
urged that the war in  the P a c if ic  should be considered  as the second 
front . . .  'L e t  us hope i t  w i l l  not become the front where we lo st  the
83 . The D irective  is  reproduced as Appendix 10 .
8 4 . L e tter , Curtin  to E v a tt , 1 A p ril  19 43 , CRS A 2684 , item 1 5 0 0 , Part  2.
8 5 . Ibid.
86. Le tter , MacArthur to Shedden, 6 A p ril  1 9 4 3 , RG 10 , MacArthur 
M em orial.
267
w a r 1 . Curtin  duly released  this as requested , and added a further 
comment:
Others have decreed that Germany must be 
beaten f i r s t .  We must therefore exert  
every endeavour and receive every assistance  
to ensure that the P a c if ic  does not also  
become the Lost F ro n t.88
Blarney's support was also  e n l is t e d , and on Anzac Day (25 A pril) he
broadcast to America appealing  for 'a  reasonable a llo catio n  o f  force . . .
I f  five  percent o f  the output of America and B r ita in  is  made e ffe c t iv e
89
in  this  reg io n , we can atta c k . I f  we attack we w i l l  w in 1 .
Meanwhile, in  W ashington , Evatt was p u ttin g  the A ustralian  case
for both the rapid  delivery  o f  prom ised aeroplan es , and for a su bstantial
90
increase  in  the strength  o f  the RAAF. But Evatt achieved l i t t l e
real su ccess . Although 132 a ir c r a ft  were made av a ilable  to A u s tra lia
91
most were o f types then b e in g  superseded. He won few friends in
92
Washington and had no impact on the Trident Conference in  May.
Early  in  May C h urch ill  and the B r it is h  C hiefs  o f  S t a f f  arrived  
in  Washington for the T rident Conference w ith  Roosevelt and the US Jo int  
C h ie fs . W ith  E va tt , by co inciden ce , in  W ashington , Curtin  saw the 
opportunity  o f subm itting 'a  new appreciation  o f  the A ustralian  p o s i t i o n ',  
bu t  MacArthur advised  him a g a in st  i t ,  arguing  that i t  'm ight p o ssibly  
arouse harmful resentm ent, e sp ec ia lly  from the London [representatives]
8 7 . Telep rin ter  message, Shedden to MacArthur, 7 A p ril  1943 , RG4, 
MacArthur Memorial.
88. Prime M in is t e r 's  Press Release , 8 A p r il  1943 , MP 12 17 , Box 2037 .
89 . Broadcast by Blarney, 25 A p ril  194 3 , marked 'BC [Broadcast] to America 
Blarney Papers 1 3 6 .6 1 .
9 0 . C ab le , Evatt to C u r t in , 14 A p r il  1 9 43 , CRS A 2684 , item 1500 Part  2.
9 1 . H asluck , The Government and the People 1942-1945, p . 214 .
9 2 . The success or otherwise of Dr E v a t t 's  m ission is  dealt  w ith  in  
Appendix 2.
9 3 . Advisory War Council Minute 1 1 8 8 , M elbourne, 13 May 1 9 43 , CRS A 
2 6 8 2 /X R , V o l .V I .
Dr H .V . Evatt about to broadcast during the annual 
rededication  ceremony at the Anzac Gardens on the 
B r it is h  Empire B u ild in g  at the R ockefeller Centre , 
New York , 10 June 1 9 4 3 . With Dr Evatt is 
Mrs Roosevelt.
(AWM Negative N o .42501)
S ir  Owen D ixon , the A ustralian  
M in ister  to the USA, 1942- 1944. 
The 'd ip lom atic  side  was not 
so s ig n if ic a n t  as in  pre-war 
tim es ' .
(AWM Negative N o .12151)
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who, r ig h tly  or w rongly , are unquestionably assuming the prerogative
o f  speaking for the B r it is h  Empire and who have gone to Washington with
a completely-thought-out and c r y s ta llis e d  plan  in  w h ic h , so far  as the
94
Empire is  concerned, a l l  decisions  have been m ade '.
The events in  Washington in  early  1943 culm inating in  the Trident
Conference which began on 12 May, demonstrate the d if f ic u lt y  faced  by
A u s tr a lia  in  seeking  to a lte r  a l l ie d  strategy . The A u stralian  M in ister
to the USA, S ir  Owen D ixon , exp lained  the s itu atio n  to the Advisory War
Council on 13 May when he stated  that the 'd ip lom atic  side  was not as
s ig n if ic a n t  as in  pre-war t im e s ', and that the 'se rv ic es  were resentfu l
o f  c iv il ia n  in t e r f e r e n c e '.  The decisions  were made by the Combined Chiefs
95
o f  S t a f f .  'The P a c if ic  War Council was not an e ffe c t iv e  b o d y '.
The head o f  the A ustralian  M ilitary  M ission in  W ashington , General
S tu r d ee , achieved l it t le  more than D ixon , and follow ing  the Trident
Conference he wrote to Blarney:
Evatt has also  taken up the general question o f  
Dominion p a r t ic ip a t io n  in  p lann in g  w ith  l it t le  
or no resu lt  so far  as I am aw are. Future operations 
are d ivulged  only to those who must know in  order 
to function  thereon. Now take the Washington 
Conference ju st  f in is h e d , the only p a rtic ip a tio n  of 
Dominion Service  Representatives was attendance at a 
Meeting of B r it is h  COS (London) at  which 'a ls o  
p resent ' were B r it is h  COS (Washington) and Dominion 
R epresentativ es . At this m eeting two possible  
altern ative  areas of attack were surveyed but no 
conclusions or recommended p lan  were even in d ic a te d .
A fter  some d i f f ic u lt y  I managed to arrange a h a lf  
hour interview  each w ith  Brooke and Ismay. This 
d if f ic u lt y  was not that they d id  not want to see me, 
but meetings went on day and n igh t  and i t  was hard to
94 . L etter , MacArthur to C u r tin , 13 May 194 3 , quoted in  Hasluck , JTie 
Government and the People 1942-1945, p . 214 .
9 5 . Advisory War Council Minute 1 1 8 7 , M elbourne, 13 May 1 9 43 , CRS A 
2 6 8 2 /X R , V o l .V I .  The P a c if ic  War Council in  London had even less in fluence  
than that in  W ashington , and C hurchill commented to Ismay on the matter
o f the next meeting of the C o u n cil : 'There  is  nothing to discuss at 
p re se n t , the s itu a tio n  having  greatly  changed. This dog has gone to sleep  
and had better  be l e f t  ly ing  s t i l l  for the moment'. M inute , C hurchill 
to Ism ay, 13 March 1 9 43 , PREM 3 1 6 7 /3 .
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f i t  i t  in . During these interview s I 
exp lained  the A u stralian  p o sitio n  so far 
as the A u stralian  Army was concerned, but 
beyond atmosphere and assurances that they 
were continuously  w atching A u s t r a l ia 's
96
in terests  and s e c u r ity , I got very l i t t l e .
MacArthur also  saw no value in  re ly ing  on the A ustralian  m ilitary
m issions overseas .
He looked on them largely  as 'w indow- dressing'
and as a usefu l source of inform ation when i t
su ited  the Combined C hiefs  o f S t a f f ,  but  he did
not think they were ever consulted on major matters . . .
he d id  not think they had done any good, or had
exercised  an io ta  o f in flu e n c e . I f  they had an
attempt would have been made to squelch them and
the A u stralian  Government would have heard a complaint
from them long a g o .97
I t  seems that Curtin  agreed w ith  this  assessm ent, for at the end o f
the year he complained that he had 'never  seen any reports on the
background o f higher strategy ' although o ff ic e r s  had been sent whose
'rank  and status would give them [entry] to the h ighest  c ircles
.  98
d ealin g  w ith  such matters .
MacArthur had judged the mood in  Washington n ic e ly , for w ithout
ad d itio n a l  urging  from A u s t r a lia , C h u rch ill  informed the press on
25 May that the war would be waged w ith  equal force on the European
99
and P a c if ic  fro n ts . This comment by C hurchill was a s lig h t  exaggeration ,
9 6 . L e tter , Sturdee to Blarney, 28 May 1 9 43 , Blarney Papers 6 . 1 .  On 2 
March 1944 Lieutenant- Colonel J .G .N .  W ilton on the army s t a ff  at Washington 
wrote to General Berryman: 'Sometimes I feel  quite  sorry for the Americans 
w ith  a l l  us foreigners here try ing  to get something out of th em .. .  our 
representative  here has no p art  in  p lann ing  the w ar, there is  no reason 
why he should ever be consulted  by the CCS and a ll  A ustralian  forces
are in  the SWPA, and MacArthur has a d irec tive  from the CCS, so that 
the p lann ing  as regards the employment o f the AMF is  a matter for d irect  
settlem ent between MacArthur and L H Q '. AWM 2 2 5 /1 /1 6 .
9 7 . Notes o f  D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  the Commander-in-Chief, South­
west P a c if ic  A rea , B r isb a n e , 25th to 31st  May 19 43 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2.
9 8 . L e tte r , Curtin  to Blarney, 20 December 19 43 , MP 7 2 9 /6 ,  item  6 9 /4 0 1 /7 4 .  
Lieutenant- Colonel W ilton  in  Washington observed that the appointment o f  a 
lieutenant- general was 'apparently  purely  one of p restige  and that he has 
d if f ic u lt y  in  occupying h is  t im e '. L e tte r , W ilton  to Berryman, 2 March
1 9 4 4 , AWM 2 3 5 /1 /1 6 .
9 9 . Washington Post, 26 May 19 43 .
for although the A ll ie s  had agreed to provide s u ff ic ie n t  resources to 
the P a c if ic  and Far East to enable commanders to m aintain  and extend
'un rem itting  p ressu re ' again st  Japan , the b a s ic  p o licy  o f d efeating
100 . . .
Germany f i r s t  s t i l l  rem ained. N onetheless, the Trident decis io n
d id  in d icate  a change in em phasis, and apparently  C hurchill made h is
comment to underline  this change w hile  at the same time reassuring  the
. . 101
American p u b lic  that B r it a in  would p u ll  its  w eight in  the P a c i f ic .
When he v is it e d  MacArthur in  Brisbane at the end o f  May Shedden 
d iscussed  C h u r c h il l 's  announcement, and the Commander-in-Chief noted 
that C h u r c h il l 's  assurance had s t i l l  to be implemented, but  i t  represented 
'a  b ig  advance to have i t  sa id  p u b l i c l y '.  MacArthur thought 't h a t  the 
recent p u b lic  statements o f  both [him self and Curtin] in fluen ced  
American p u b lic  opinion to a degree which could not be i g n o r e d ', and 
he observed that the Washington communique was 'c o lo u r le s s ' and d id  
not give C urtin  the cr ed it  he deserved for h is  representatio ns .
Shedden and MacArthur then prepared a statem ent to be released  
by C urtin :
A u stra lia  has every reason for s a t is fa c tio n  
w ith  the decis ion  . . .  that  the war in  the 
P a c if ic  w i l l  be prosecuted w ith  the same 
vigour as the war in  Europe . . .
The d iscussions of the last  three months 
have now brought to A u s tra lia  one o f  the 
greatest  successes of the war.
A u stra lia  had sought to arouse p u b lic  opinion  to the dangers of allow ing
Japan to acquire an in v in c ib le  defensive  p o s it io n , and the Washington
discussio n s  'h a d  absolutely  and completely supported the contentions
102
o f  the A ustralian  Governm ent'. This statement formed the b asis  of
10 0 . Morton, op.cit., p . 4 5 8 .
10 1 . Thorne, op.cit., p . 289 . This was the theme of C h u r c h il l 's  address 
to the US Congress on 19 May 1 9 4 3 . MP 1217 , Box 64 8 .
10 2 . Notes o f D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith Commander-in-Chief Southwest 
P a c if ic  A re a , B r isb an e , 25th to 21st  May 1 9 43 , MP 1217, Box 2 .
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the announcements by Curtin  during  early  June, but  the o f f i c i a l  h is to r ia n  
has observed that i t  was 'extrem ely  doubtful whether the inform ation
103
before  C urtin  ju s t i f ie d  him in  phrasing  the statement in  such a w a y ' .
I t  should be remembered, however, that the statement had been carefully  
prepared  by Shedden and MacArthur, and they were anxious to ensure 
that the Combined C hiefs  continued to provide support to the SWPA.
M acArthur's  attempt to give cred it  to Curtin  must be seen as 
fla tte ry  and encouragement to the Prime M in ister . For h is  p a r t , Curtin  
found i t  p o l it ic a l ly  usefu l to receive credit  for in flu e n c in g  a l l ie d  
strategy  to A u s t r a l ia 's  advantage. Once again , for d iffe r e n t  ends ,
C urtin  and MacArthur found common cause in  mutual support.
M acArthur's  Role in  Formulating A u stralian  National Policy
Throughout the f ir s t  s ix  months o f  1943 Curtin  actively  supported 
M acArthur's  claims for  greater reinforcem ent for the South-West P a c if ic  
Area and for the defence o f  A u s tr a lia . Curtin  had backed h is  support by
amending the Defence (C it ize n  M ilita r y  Forces) B i l l  to allow  m ilitiam en
to serve in  most o f M acArthur's  command, and by June 1943 over 6 8 0 ,0 0 0
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A ustralian s  were m  uniform . However Curtin  was now faced  w ith  a
most important independent stra teg ic  decis io n .
I t  has already  been related  that A u s tra lia  had very l it t l e  in fluence  
over a l l ie d  strategy  - e ith e r  in  the balancin g  of global strategy , 
or in  the d irectio n  of a l l ie d  strategy  in  M acArthur's command. The 
only way A u s tra lia  could p o s it iv e ly  in fluence  a l l ie d  strategy  was by 
denial or supply o f  resources ranging from fig h tin g  troops to food.
Thus, i f  the A ustralian  government sought to ease the burden on its
10 3 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 2 1 7 . I t  was 
not u n til  5 June 1943 that the A u stralian  government received  o f f i c i a l  
inform ation on the Trident d e c is io n s . Cable Z 6 5 , Dominions O ffic e  to 
A ustralian  Government, 5 June 19 4 3 , MP 1217 , Box 64 8 .
104 . B u t lin  and Schedv in , op .cit .,  C h .14 . See also  Minute o f Defence 
Committee, 13 September 1943 , CRS A 26 7 1 , item 3 8 9 /1 9 4 3 .
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people by reducing  supplies to MacArthur, the latter  would be forced
to cu rta il  h is  advance to the P h ilip p in e s ; there would be no guarantee
that the s h o r tfa ll  would be provided  from other sources. Balancing
the A ustralian  war e f fo r t  therefore involved decisions  of a s trateg ic
nature and required  firm  leadership  from the A ustralian  Prime M in iste r .
Although the 3rd A u stralian  D ivision  was grin ding  slowly towards
Salamaua in  a series  o f  exacting  and grim b a t t le s , in  other respects
the f i r s t  s ix  months of 1943 was a period  or preparation  for further
e ffo rts  ag a in st  the Japanese . Meanwhile the heavy ca su alties  from enemy
action  and d isease  during the Papuan campaign had caused the government
in  early  1943 to begin  an exam ination o f the manpower necessary to
m aintain  the army. At the same time the government had begun to view
. . 105
w ith  concern the surplus production of weapons and ammunition.
On 13 A p ril  Blarney, who quite  early  in  the campaign had been concerned
at p o ss ib le  manpower sh o rtag es , presented  a report stating  that
to provide an o ffen s iv e  force of three d iv is io n s  and to m aintain home
s e c u r ity , A u s tra lia  would require  nine in fantry  d iv is io n s , two armoured
d iv is io n s , one armoured brigade  and one army tank b r ig a d e . I f  further
manpower could not be released  from in d u stry , 'th en  the force being
prepared for o ffen s iv e  operations should be reduced by an in fantry
d i v i s i o n '.  In  view of the a ltered  strategic  s it u a t io n , Blarney considered
that i t  was no w  'a  ju s t if ia b le  and indeed an unavoidable r is k ' to reduce
107
the forces m  the areas remote from the enemy. In  essence Blarney
had raised  the question of whether or not A u s tr a lia  was to reduce its  
share in  o ffens ive  operations against  Japan .
105 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 294 .
10 6 . L e tte r , Blarney to CGS, 3 January 1 9 4 3 , AWM 7 2 1 /1 2 /2 4 .
10 7 . War Cabinet Agendum 1 0 6 /1 9 4 3 , Supplement 1 , 13 A p ril  1 9 4 3 , CRS A 
2 6 7 1 , item 1 0 6 /1 9 4 3 , Supplement 1 . The Agendum was presented  at the War 
Cabinet M eeting of 14 A p r i l , but deferred  to a later  date .
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On 30 A p ril  the War Cabinet referred  the report to the Defence
Committee to review  the exact strengths of the three services which
could be m aintained i f  10 ,000  persons per month were a v a ila b le , and
recommended that C u r t in  should take up w ith MacArthur the question  of
10 8
whether the o ffensive  force should be reduced by one d iv is io n . The
Defence Committee reported that the e x is t in g  programme had to 'be
reviewed in  the l ig h t  o f policy  decisions  based upon an autho ritative
and comprehensive review o f the e x is t in g  str a teg ica l  s i t u a t i o n '. This
109
could only be provided  by General MacArthur.
Already i t  was apparent th at , as the o f f i c i a l  economic h is to r ia n
110
w rote , 'the  structure o f  command o f  the d irect  war e ffo r t  was in  d is a r r a y '.
The War Cabinet was unable to balance the demands of the m ilitary  for
an in creased  role in  o ffen s iv e  operations again st  the r a t io n a lis ts
who saw A u s t r a l ia 's  most important duty as the supply o f food and war
equipm ent. Moreover, i f  A u s t r a l ia 's  contribution  to the war was not
reduced there would be a further decline  in  c iv i l ia n  liv in g  standards .
The problem  was further  com plicated by c o n fl ic t in g , and at times
incompetent and dishonest advice from the departments in volved .
Both the economic and p o l it ic a l  o f f i c i a l  h isto rian s  have used harsh
words. Hasluck wrote that 'th e  central feature o f the whole manpower
s itu a tio n  [was] a constant uncertainty  in  the Prime M in ister  and the War
Cabinet regarding  the exact nature of the A ustralian  war e f f o r t ' . There
was an 'absence of c le a r , firm , exact and prompt determ inations on
po licy  by those responsible  for the h igher  d irection  o f the war in
112
A u s t r a l i a ' . B u tlin  and Schedvin were even more c r it ic a l . To them the
10 8 . War Cabinet Minute 28 1 0 , 30 A p ril  1943 , CRS A 2 6 73 , V o l .X I I I .
1 0 9 . Recommendations of Defence Committee, 6 May 1943 , CRS A 26 7 1 , 
item 1 0 6 /1 9 4 3 , Supplement 1.
110 . B u tlin  and Schedv in , op.cit., p . 382 .
111 . See ibid  for a descrip tio n  of the Department of M unitions ' 'clumsy 
attempt to cook the b o o k s ' .
112 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945> p . 297 .
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story was 'one of unrelieved  confusion , o f  m isinform ation and incomplete
inform ation , o f petty  squabbles between M unitions and the Array and
between Munitions and the Manpower D ire cto rate , and o f  lack of leadership
113
from the Prime M in ister  and the War C a b i n e t '. The Defence Committee
was c r it ic is e d  for p ro c rastin atio n  in  'a  straightforw ard  case of self-
114
i n t e r e s t ',  but B u tlin  and Schedvin reserved their  main cr it ic ism
for the re latio n sh ip  between MacArthur and C urtin :
In creasin g ly  during 1943 General Blarney, 
and through him the C h iefs  o f  S t a f f ,  were 
bypassed in  the formation o f  h igh  level 
m ilitary  p o l ic y . The rapport that had 
developed between Curtin  and MacArthur 
had it s  advantages, but  Blarney and the 
Defence Committee were usually  uncertain  
about what had been decided  and were not 
fu lly  aware of the im plications  for 
A ustralian  defence p o lic y . To be su re ,
Blarney and h is  s t a f f  showed a lack of 
im agination and in it ia t iv e  in  over-coming 
the communications b lockage , but  an important 
p art  o f  the problem which could not readily  be 
resolved  was M acArthur's  domination of C urtin .
At one stage the Prime M in ister  tr ie d  to saddle Blarney w ith  the
r e s p o n s ib ility  for res tricting  the more extravagant American demands
for s u p p lie s , equipment and w orks. On 12 February 1943 Curtin told
Blarney that A u s tra lia  had 'reached  the maximum of her manpower, m aterial
and f in a n c ia l  r e s o u r c e s '. He s a id  that American 'standards of expenditure
were h igher than those o f  the A u stralian  Services and this  dulled
the in centiv e  to economy on the part  of the l a t t e r ' . Curtin  thought
that MacArthur was keen to help the A u stralian  government but the
extravagance was caused by subordinate o f f ic e r s . He suggested that
116
'Blarney could drop a few h in ts ' to MacArthur.
11 3 . B u t lin  and Schedvin^ op.cit.,  p . 393 .
114 . Ib id .,  p . 345.
115 . Ibid. , p .3 8 2 .
11 6 . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Canberra, 12 February 
19 43 , MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 4 .
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During this period  General Dewing observed that the A ustralians
were now coming to re a lis e  how completely the control of equipment
and the employment o f A u s t r a l ia 's  defence forces were in  M acArthur's
hands. W ith respect to 'r e la t iv e  weight in  council of the foreign
commanders and the domestic governm ent ', he drew a p a r a lle l  between
117
the role of the a l l ie s  in  French North A fr ic a  at that tim e.
Oh 10 May Blarney reported that he had been less su ccessful in  
remedying the problem than he had hoped. He complained that GHQ had 
'is s u e d  d irectiv es  applicable  not only to themselves but also  to the 
A ustralian  Forces concerning adm inistrative  p o l i c y ' . Thus the US Forces 
were in  a p o sit io n  'dom inant in  respect to the A u stralian  F o r c e s '. He 
continued:
I do not think i t  is  e ith e r  p racticable  or 
desirable  to attempt to dictate  to the US Forces 
in  regard to the questions in  d isc u ss io n . I t  
seems to me that the Government should accept the 
consequences of events which were probably in  any case 
in ev itab le  and which very large arose from conditions 
which were in it ia t e d  or accepted by the Government.
I do not think  that anything could resu lt  from any other 
a t t it u d e , but  disturbance o f amicable relatio n s  w ith  
an A l l ie d  power which has come to our ass istan ce .
I would suggest, too, that the A u stralian  Government 
i t s e l f  is  not in  a p o sit io n  to exercise  any fully  
e ffe c t iv e  d irectio n  or control over the US Forces, 
except perhaps by a d enial  of th e ir  requests which 
would v ir tu a lly  be a d enial  to the C-in-C, SWPA, o f  
the means to implement h is  str a teg ic a l  p o lic y . A 
fo r t io r i  the Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces, a 
subordinate o f the Government/ does not possess 
any real authority  to do this  in  respect to a 
superior command . . .  the idea  that the existence  
of an A u stralian  Commander of A l l ie d  Land Forces 
can achieve the Governm ent's wishes is  somewhat 
illu s o ry  . . .
I feel  that the approach to C-in-C, SWPA 
on this  su bject  should be by the Prime M in ister  
and not by me. ^ 8
117 . Report by Major-General R .H . Dewing, 20 A p r il  19 43 , WO 1 0 6 /4 8 3 9 .
118 . L e tte r , Blarney to Forde, 10 May 194 3 , MP 12 17 , Box 291 .
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However, w hile  Blarney r e a lis ed  that i t  was a matter for the Prime M in iste r ,
he d id  not give up h is  attempts to r e s tr ic t  the use by the Americans of
A u stralian  manpower, and on 2 June 1943 he told  Curtin  that i f  the
s itu a tio n  continued i t  would 'v ir t u a lly  remove A u stralian  forces from
active  operations and resu lt  in  A ustralian  personnel be ing  employed
119
to render service  to the US F o r c e s '.
This w as, o f  course, only p art  o f the problem , for as Hasluck
observed , there was 'no  sign  o f a single  mind r is in g  above the d eta il
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to consider the whole p ro b le m '. N evertheless , at the end o f May
Shedden tr ie d  to summarise the s itu a t io n . He concluded:
(i) It  is evident from the manpower s itu atio n  that 
the A u stralian  war e f fo r t  has reached 
saturation  p o in t .
( i i )  There is  urgent need for the review  of its  
nature , extent and b alan ce , in  the l ig h t  of 
the present str a teg ica l  s itu atio n  and plans 
for future operations in  the Southwest P a c if ic  
Area . . .
( i i i )  A dd itio n al commitments can only be undertaken at 
the expense of some other o b lig a tio n  . . .
(iv) The requirements of the United States Forces 
require close coordination with those o f  the 
A u stralian  Forces so that the total p o sitio n  may 
be seen and plans prepared to ensure that the 
requirements o f  the Commander-in-Chief w i l l  be 
met in  accordance with h is  operational needs .
I t  is  e sse n t ia l  that demands for m unitions 
should be subm itted through the A u stralian  
Service  Department concerned.
(v) . . .  In  order to ensure the preservation  of
balance in  the Commonwealth's war e f fo r t , i t  is  
d esired  to d iscuss w ith  the Commander-in-Chief 
whether i t  is  p o ssible  to devise measures in  
respect of American proposals which w i l l  give 
the A u stralian  Government a . . .  degree of 
reassurance in  regard to the control o f  this 
aspect o f  the A ustralian  war e ffo r t  . . .  [in view 
of] the very large expenditure in v o lv e d . 121
119 . L etter , Blarney to C u r tin , 2 June 1943 , MP 1217 , Box 306 .
120 . H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, p . 296 .
121 . Memorandum prepared by Shedden, 30 May 1 9 43 , attached to Notes of 
D iscussions [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  Area , 
Brisbane 25th to 31st May 1943 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 2 .
Shedden d iscussed  this memorandum with  MacArthur, when he v is it e d  him
in  Brisbane in  late May, and MacArthur urged that the A IF  Corps should
be kept to a strength  of three d iv is io n s : 'Anything  less would be
incom patible w ith  A u s t r a l ia 's  status and destiny  as a P a c if ic  Power
and would not guarantee her the same voice in  the Peace C o un cils , to
which  she should otherwise be e n t i t l e d ' . Here MacArthur struck a
sym pathetic chord , for A u stralian  leaders were to express such a view
on a number o f occasions during the follow ing  year . MacArthur promised
to present C urtin  w ith  a s trateg ic  appreciation  which might make i t
122
p o ss ib le  for the demands for local defence to be reduced.
Obviously  Shedden was becoming concerned at the in a c t iv ity  o f the
government, for a few days later  (4 June) he wrote to MacArthur urging
him to ind icate  in  h is  strateg ic  ap preciation  that the improvement
in  the secu rity  o f A u s tra lia  might allow  a 'r e la t iv e ly  small reduction
to be made to the great number of men in  the land f o r c e s '.  To do so
would furnish  'Mr Curtin  a remedy for some of h is  problems which at
123
present otherwise appear i n s o l u b l e '.
The d iscussion s  between Shedden and MacArthur during May culm inating
in  the le tter  o f 4 Ju n e , emphasise again  the importance of Shedden 's
r o le , and support h is  proud claim  that 'a l l  higher p o licy  questions
124
dealt  w ith ' between Curtin  and MacArthur passed  through h is  hands.
Indeed in  February Curtin  had told  Shedden that he was 'h is  righ t  and
125
le ft  hand and head t o o ',  and on 9 May he said  that ' i f  the Government 
were su ccessful [in the next elections] a large share of the cred it  
would go to [Shedden who] had done most of the work on
12 2 . Notes of D iscussio ns  [by Shedden] w ith  Commander-in-Chief, South­
west P a c if ic  Area , B r isb an e , 25th to 31st May 1 9 43 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2 .
12 3 . L e tte r , Shedden to MacArthur, 4 June 1 9 4 3 , RG 31 6 , Box 71 , N ational 
A r c h iv e s .
124 . L e tter , Shedden to Brigadier- General C .A . W illoug hby , 6 January
1 9 45 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 2068 .
125 . Sh edden 's  D iary , 25 February 1 9 4 3 , MP 1217 , Box 16 .
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the h igh er  war p o lic y  . But i f  Shedden wants to claim  that he had
279
126
an im portant impact on h igh er  p o lic y , he must also be prepared to 
share some of the blame for any shortcomings in  that p o lic y .
When MacArthur met Curtin  in  Sydney on 7 June 1 9 4 3 , he began 
by assuring  the Prime M in ister  that 'th e  threat of invasio n  to A u s tra lia  
had been rem oved '. There was, however, a risk  of marauding raids 
which might cause considerable  damage and l o s s . MacArthur then o utlined  
h is  an tic ip a te d  operations for the advance to Rabaul. Following the 
capture o f Rabaul he planned to expel the Japanese from the whole of 
New Guinea before  moving in to  the P h ilip p in e s  and then attacking  Formosa. 
He added that these were h is  own ideas and that he was not aware of 
the in ten tio ns  o f the Combined C hiefs  o f  S t a f f .
During the d iscussio n  MacArthur dealt  w ith  the problem of b alancin g
A u s t r a l ia 's  war e f f o r t . He opposed Blarney's idea  that the American
forces should provide many o f th e ir  own serv ice s , but he r e a lis ed
that A u s tra lia  could not continue to provide troops, m unitions, a ir c r a ft
and food . The minutes o f  the conference recorded that:
General MacArthur urged the Prime M in ister  that 
the A IF  Corps o f three d iv is io n s  should be 
kept up to strength in d e f in it e ly , even at the 
expense o f other form ations. A fter  the 
capture of R abaul, an e n tir e ly  new str a teg ic a l  
s itu a tio n  would a r is e , as the Japanese would be 
forced back to Truk. A u s tra lia  would no longer 
become the zone of op eratio ns , though the United 
Nations might s t i l l  wish to continue to use i t  as 
a main b ase . At that stage A u s tra lia  should resume 
a more reasonable and ratio nal basis  o f  national 
a c t iv it y , more clo sely  harmonised w ith  its  normal 
structure and post-war aims. I t  was important 
that the N ational e ffo r t  must not be so devoted to 
war as to result  in  the Commonwealth being  le ft  
behind  in  the post-war s itu a t io n .
The f in a l  phase for the defeat  of Japan 
would be longer and i t  would require greater stamina 
and resources to last  the d ista n ce . A ustralia  
should contribute  land and a ir  expeditionary  
forces to go forward with the other troops in
126 . Sh edden 's  D iary , 9 May 1 9 4 3 , Zoc.cit.
Curtin  meets MacArthur at Sydney a ir p o rt , 7 June 1943 . 
MacArthur assured the Prime M inister  that 'the  threat 
of invasion  to A u s tra lia  had been rem oved '.
(AWM Negative N o .52514)
Advisory War Council M eeting , Melbourne,
10 November 1943 . L e ft  to r ig h t , J .A .  Beasley ,
II.V . E v a tt , F .M . Forde , John C u r tin , S ir  
Frederick Shedden and J .R .  C h ifle y .
(AWM Negative N o .139924)
the United  N ations , but at the same time the 
Commonwealth should be put in  a p o sitio n  of 
security  for the post war world s itu a t io n .
Thus MacArthur suggested that A u s tra lia  should provide a maximum
of m ilitary  e f fo r t  u n til  Rabaul was captured. Then the A u stralian
m ilitary  commitment could be reduced to a land and a ir  expeditionary
fo rce , enablin g  resources to be devoted to food production . In  view
o f the improved strateg ic  s itu atio n  Curtin  was anxious to reduce the
strength  of the land forces in  A u s ta lia . MacArthur was not happy
for the force in  northern A u stra lia  to be reduced but he fe lt  that
128
there was a large number o f non-combat troops in  A u s tr a lia . It
can be seen th erefo re , that MacArthur went beyond advising  Curtin  on
str a teg ic  p o licy  for the SWPA Command, and o ffered  d irect  comment on
balan cin g  the A ustralian  war e f fo r t .
In  h is  memoirs Shedden put a s lig h tly  d iffe r e n t  emphasis on
th is  m eeting to that described  in  h is  m inutes. In  h is  opinion
M acArthur's  advice 'was most h e lp fu l , even though as Commander-in-Chief,
he could have been unduly d em an d in g '. He thought MacArthur was
sym pathetic to A u s t r a l ia 's  p o s it io n . When Curtin d e lica te ly  enquired
whether supplies to the US Forces could be reduced, MacArthur referred
to the added burden th is  would apply to the inadequate trans- Pacific
sh ip p in g . However, MacArthur acknowledged that the utlim ate decision
129
would remain w ith  the A u s tra lia n  government.
Three days a fter  the conference Curtin  released  the follow ing  
statem ent:
The conclusions of P resident Roosevelt and the 
B r it is h  Prime M in ister  for the prosecution  of 
the war in  the P a c if ic  w ith  the same v igor as the
12 7 . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference, Sydney, 7 June 1 9 4 3 , 
Presen t , C u r tin , MacArthur, Shedden, MP 1217 , Box 2.
128 . Ibid.
129 . Shedden M anuscript, Book 4 , Box 4 , Chapter 5 6 , p . 4.
280
281
war in  Europe have ominous portents for the 
discom fiture o f  the Japanese .
The ho ld in g  war imposed on us under circum­
stances o f great d i f f ic u lt y  has been an 
o b lig a tio n  under global strategy  which has been 
d ischarged . As in  the case of B r it a in , we had 
a close c a ll  at one stag e . The Battle  o f the 
Coral Sea was a deliverance  and the return o f  the 
A IF  enabled  us to stop the Japanese advance in  
New Guinea just  in  time.
I do not think the enemy can now invade 
this  country. We have proved th a t ,w ith  the 
resources we have h ad , together w ith  the command 
o f  the sea esta b lis h ed  by the g allan t  United 
States Navy by d ecisive  v ic to ries  at Midway 
Is la n d  and the Solomon Is la n d s . We are not yet 
immune from marauding raids which may cause much 
damage and lo s s . I b e l ie v e , however, that we 
can hold A u s tra lia  as a base from which to launch 
both lim ited  and major o ffe n s iv e s  against 
Japan . This conception must be the pattern  to 
govern the nature and extent o f A u s t r a l ia 's  war 
e f f o r t , as p art  o f the p lan  o f  the United Nations 
in  the P a c if ic .
My d iscussions  w ith  General MacArthur were 
marked by the greatest  degree o f c o r d ia lit y , 
as has always been the case . This country 
can fe e l  very g ra te fu l  to General MacArthur, 
who came here at a cr u c ia l  tim e, and who has 
applied  h im self in  such a d ist in g u ish e d  way to 
ensuring  the security  o f A u s tra lia  as a base 
in  order that the cause of the United  Nations 
in  the P a c if ic  would not f a i l . 130
C u r t in 's  statement must be seen as a further  and pow erful debating
p o in t  in  the continuing  d iscussions over the balance o f the A ustralian
war e f fo r t . MacArthur had been keen for A u s tra lia  to provide the maximum
number o f  troops and su p p lie s , and had therefore been un w illing  to
admit to C urtin  that A u s tra lia  was now safe  from the threat o f in v asio n .
Shedden had persuaded MacArthur that the country was unable to sustain
it s  current war e f f o r t , and that for  Curtin  to a lte r  the d irectio n  of
the economy, M acArthur's autho ritative  support was needed. But MacArthur
went beyond a mere statement that A u s tr a lia  was secure and sought to
determine the balance o f  the war e f fo r t  during  the coming months.
130 . S tra te g ic a l  S itu a tio n  in  Southwest P a c if ic  Area - Prime M in is t e r 's  
Statement of 10th Jun e , Advisory War Council Minute 12 04 , 16 June 1943 , 
CRS A 2 6 8 2 , V o l .V I I .
MacArthur might have suspected that such a reorganisation  would 
take time to be determ ined and executed, and meanwhile he would have 
the fu ll  use o f A u stralian  resources. For the present these resources 
were v it a l . Now, a fter  five  months o f re lativ e  in a ctio n , re lieved  
only by the g ru ellin g  and bloody battles  of the 3rd A ustralian  D iv isio n  
on the approaches to Salam aua, and the success of the a ir fo rc e ,
MacArthur was about to embark on a new series  of o ffensive  operations 
in  which A ustralians  were to play  a major p a rt .
Blarney's In fluen ce  on Strategy
From as early  as October 1942 General Blarney had sought to
in flu ence  the strateg ic  d irectio n  of the operations in  New Guinea in  
131
194 3 . At that time h is  plans for landing  troops in  the Markham
Valley  had been prem ature, but  throughout 1943 he made a number of
s ig n if ic a n t  attempts to guide a l l ie d  strategy  along what he considered
to be lo g ic al l in e s .
As m entioned, in  February 1943 MacArthur had prepared the Elkton .
p lans for the capture of Rabaul. I t  is  d i f f ic u l t  to determine whether
Blarney had much impact on the form ulation of these p la n s , but  certa in
facts are known. The f i r s t  p la n , Elkton I ,  envisaged a two pronged
advance on Rabaul, w ith  SWPA forces moving along the north coast of
New Guinea to the western end of New B r it ia n , and H a ls e y 's  South P a c if ic
forces advancing northwards through the Solomons. The unoccupied
islands  of K ir iw in a  and Woodlark were to be captured to provide air
132
b ases . Blarney was h ighly  c r it ic a l  o f  this scheme which he thought
'e n t ir e ly  su ited  to the enem y's p l a n s ';  the Japanese would be able
131. On 18 October 1942 Blarney wrote to MacArthur and mentioned plans 
for landing  A ustralian  troops in  the Markham Valley  to capture Lae . 
Blarney Papers 4 3 .6 1 1 .
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132 . Morton, op. exit. , p . 389 .
to operate on in ter io r  l in e s . He advocated the elim ination  of the 
Woodlark-Kiriwina phase and a major attack on the Lae-Huon Peninsula  
area . From there, Gasmata on the south coast of New B r ita in  or Cape 
Gloucester at the western end , could be s e iz e d , using forces otherwise 
earmarked for Woodlark and K ir iw in a . Blarney also  advocated the by­
passing  o f Salamaua although prelim inary  operations again st  i t  might
induce the Japanese to send in  reinforcem ents, thus denuding other
133
a r e a s .
Apparently , MacArthur did  not completely agree w ith  Blarney, for
the Elkton I I  p lan  of 28 February d e ta ile d  most of the features of
Elkton  I .  However the Woodlark- Kiriwina phase was dropped and the new
plan  emphasised that the Huon Peninsula  was to be secured before  the
134
attack through the Solomons. But Blarney's minor success ( i f  indeed
the changes were due to him) was sh o rtliv ed . At the P a c if ic  Conference
in  March th e .Jo in t  Chiefs lim ited  M acArthur's objective  to advancing
to the Huon P en in sula , western New B r it a in  and southern B o u g a in v ille .
135
The capture of Woodlark and K ir iw in a  was again  included  in  the p la n .
A fter  d iscussions  w ith  Admiral H alsey , on 26 A p ril  MacArthur
issued  Elkton I I I .  I t  was now planned that Halsey would begin  landing
on New Georgia at the same time as MacArthur moved into  Woodlark and
K ir iw in a . For plann ing  purposes i t  was stated  that the operations,
codenamed Cartw heel, would begin  about 1 June. The attack on Lae was
136
to take place two months la t e r .
Blarney's advice had therefore gone largely  unheeded, and the orders 
issued  by GHQ on 6 May 1943 made i t  c lear  that he was responsible
133 . L e tter , Blarney to MacArthur, 15 February 19 43 , and 'A ltern ativ e  
Proposal for O ffen sive  O p e r a t io n s ', 22 February 1943 , AWM 5 1 5 /5 / 5 .
13 4 . Elkton  I I ,  Appendix I to Morton, op.cit.
13 5 . Jo in t  Chiefs  of S t a f f  D ir e c t iv e , 28 March 1943 , Appendix K , ibid.
13 6 . Ib id .,  p p .25-27.
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for the New Guinea Force operations only . Supported by a l l ie d  a ir  
and naval forces. New Guinea Force was ordered to:
(1) By airborne and overland operations through 
the Markham Valley  and shore-to-shore 
operations westward along the north coast 
o f New Guinea, se ize  Lae and Salamaua and 
secure in  the Huon Peninsula-Markham Valley  
area , airdromes required for subsequent 
o p e ra tio n s .
(2) By sim ilar  operation s , se ize  the north coast 
o f  New Guinea to include Madang; defend Madang 
in  order to protect the northwest flank of 
subsequent operations to the e a s tw a r d .^ 7
I t  soon became apparent to Blarney and h is  planners that a further
operation  would be needed. Since the maximum range of the landing
c r a ft  carrying  troops for the assault  on Lae was six ty  m iles , i t  was
necessary to e stab lish  a shore base w ith in  that d ista n ce , and Blarney
suggested Nassau Bay. Furthermore, its  capture would ease the supply
d if f ic u l t ie s  for the 3rd A u stralian  D iv is io n  advancing overland from
Wau to Salam aua. MacArthur readily  agreed to this  p la n , which would
138
involve the use o f an American regim ent, and i t  was to take place 
on 30 Jun e , the same date as not only the landings on K ir iw in a  and 
W oodlark, but  also  H a ls e y 's  landing  on New Georgia in  the Solomons.
MacArthur had a further reason to welcome the Nassau Bay operation .
During June Admiral King had become in creasing ly  d is s a t is f ie d  w ith  the
apparent lack o f o ffensive  a c t iv it y ; i f  MacArthur would not advance
139
the navy would do so in  the Central P a c i f i c .  Thus MacArthur made
the most o f the landings in  h is  area - Woodlark, K ir iw in a  and Nassau Bay. 
At least  the American troops at Nassau Bay soon saw a c tio n , but the
137 . GHQ W arning In stru ctio n  N o .2 , 6 May 1 9 43 , AWM 5 8 9 /3 /1 1 .
13 8 . Commander A l l ie d  Land Forces Report on New Guinea operations ,
23 January 1943-13 September 1943 , 16 March 19 44 , AWM 5 1 9 /6 /5 8 .
13 9 . M a tlo ff , Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfarej  1943-1945, 
p p .18 6 , 1 8 7 .
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Australians  were p a rtic u la r ly  caustic  about the Woodlark-Kiriwina
140
o peration . A fter  a l l ,  the Americans o f Alamo Force who stormed
ashore at the end of late  June were not only met by th e ir  own advance
p a rty , which had been there since 23 June, but  also  by small detachments
o f A ustralians  who had been there much longer . In deed , i t  took the
141
Japanese some time to discover that the isla n d s  had been captured.
C ertain ly  the occupation o f the islands  enabled  amphibious warfare
doctrine and equipment to be te sted , but as Samuel Morrison observed:
'K ir iw in a  and Woodlark never p a id  d ividends on the investment of e ffo r t
and m a te r ia l ' .  ^ '
Blarney and the A ustralian s  could perm it themselves a wry observation
about the Kiriwina-Woodlark lan d in g s , but for the moment Blarney's
attention  was on the Salamaua operation . In  February he had recommended
143
that Salamaua should not be captured before  the f a l l  o f Lae , and
M acArthur's  p la n , Elkton I I I  had envisaged  the capture of Salamaua s ix
weeks after  that of Lae. Blarney later  summarised h is  p la n :
I f ,  th erefo re , the enem y's attentio n  could be 
concentrated on the operations for the capture 
of Salamaua there was every chance that he would 
drain  h is  strength from Lae by r e in fo rc in g  h is
140 . L etter , Northcott to General Smart, 28 July  19 43 , WO 1 0 6 /3 4 8 1 . Blarney 
wrote in  h is  memoirs that the capture of Woodlark 'was h a ile d  as a fine  
operation of war by the news hungry. I t  w as , in  fa c t , one of the jokes
o f the w ar. There were no Japanese on the is la n d  and i t  was and had 
been occupied by a very small body of A ustralian  troops for some tim e.
It  had the e f f e c t , however, of holding  up m aterial and vessels  urgently  
required  for the follow ing  operations ag a in st  L a e ' .
141 . M a tlo ff , op.cit.,  p . 193 ; Dexter, op .cit.,  p . 223 .
142 . Samuel E . M orison, Breaking the Bismarck’s Barrier> 22 July 1942- 
1 May 1944 (L i t t l e , Brown and C o .,  Boston , 1 9 6 8 ) ,  p . 134 .
143 . 'A ltern ativ e  Proposal for O ffen siv e  O p e r a t io n s ', 22 February 1943 ,
AWM 5 1 5 /5 / 5 .
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forces south o f  Salamaua and that any 
discovery o f further preparations on our 
part  might lead him to b elieve  that we 
we were preparing  for heavier  action 
against the la tte r  a r e a . 1^4
This was the plan  which Blarney ca refu lly  described  to Lieutenant-
General E .F .  Herring who, as Commander New Guinea Force, was to act as
h is  deputy during the p lanning  o f the coming operations . This was
despite the fact that Blarney had been s p e c if ic a lly  charged w ith  the
re sp o n sib ility  for the op eratio n s . Clearly  Herring  was warned not to
capture Salamaua; as he later  w rote , Blarney 'wanted the operation
against  Salamaua to serve as a cloak for our operations again st  Lae ,
145
and to act as a magnet drawing reinforcem ents from Lae to that a r e a '»
But i t  d id  not work that sim ply . A fter  the rece ip t  of a letter
from H e r r in g 's  acting  ch ie f  of s t a f f ,  General Berryman, Blarney wrote
146
to Herring  stressing  that Salamaua was not to be taken before Lae.
Herring  rep lied  that he had no in ten tio n  of d iv erting  from h is  o r ig in a l
plan  and that the poor wording of Berrym an's letter  had given the wrong 
147
im pression . Nevertheless Berryman had detected  that something
was am iss, and indeed General S a v ig e , commanding the 3rd D iv is io n
advancing on Salamaua, wrote later that he 'knew nothing about the use
148
o f Salamaua as a magnet to draw Japan forces from L a e '.  On the contrary,
Savige thought that his  m ission was to attack Salamaua, or as Herring  put
144 . Commander A l l ie d  Land Forces Report on New Guinea operations , 23 
January 1943 to 13 September 1 9 43 , 16 March 1944 , AWM 5 1 9 /6 /5 8 .
145 . Report on O perations , New Guinea , 22 January-8 October 1943 , by 
Lieutenant- General E .F .  H err ing , 17 January 1944 , AWM 5 8 9 /7 / 1 .  Herring  
received  these in structio n s  on 17 May 1943 .
146 . L e tte r , Blarney to H e rr in g , 15 June 19 43 , AWM 5 9 1 /7 /2 1 .
1 4 7 .Le tter , Herring  to Blarney, 18 June 1943 , Blarney Papers 1 7 0 .2 .
148 . Comments on O f f i c i a l  H isto ry , by Lieutenant- General S ir  Stanley  
S av ig e , Savige Papers , AWM.
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i t ,  'there  are in d icatio ns  that he rather went h is  own sweet w a y '.
Then on 5 July  MacArthur in structed  Herring  that he wanted Salamaua
taken 'as  early  as p o s s i b l e a n d  o ffered  H erring  the use o f the 162nd
US Regiment to a s s is t  w ith  its  capture. H erring  re a lis ed  that in  any
event he could not capture Salamaua for some time and he wrote to Blarney
150
requesting  him to speak to MacArthur. On 15 July  Blarney tr ie d  to
151
persuade MacArthur that Salamaua should not be captured , but obviously
he was not happy with  M acA rthur 's reactio n , for on 28 July  he again
152
ra ised  the m atter. This time he was more su ccessful and i t  was
agreed that the attack would not 'be  pressed  to f in a l it y  unless a
favourable opportunity occurs to capture Salamaua but to be so conducted
153
as not to p r e ju d ic e , delay or d iv ert  troops from the Lae operation .
Obviously  a fter  the Nassau Bay landing  MacArthur, and many oth ers ,
had become carried  away with  the p o s s ib il it y  o f capturing Salamaua
q u ic k ly . Indeed General Kenney claimed that Blarney would not use extra
troops to attack Salamaua as i t  would involve the 7th and 9th D iv is io n s ,
154
and then American troops would take over at Lae . This was d e fin it e ly
not the case . F in a lly , a fr a id  that things might get out of hand , Blarney's 
ch ie f  of s t a f f ,  Berryman, who was acting  as H e r r in g 's  ch ief  o f  s t a f f ,
149 . Dexter, op.cit. , p p .73 , 137 . L etter , H erring  to D exter , 21 January 
1952 , Gavin Long Correspondence - H erring .
150 . Ibid., and le t t e r , Herring  to Blarney, 6 July  1 9 43 , Blarney Papers 1 7 0 .2 .
151 . Notes of Conference, GHQ, 1700 h r s , 15 July  19 43 , Blarney Papers 4 3 .6 3 2 .
152 . Berryman D iary , 28 July  1943 , Berryman Papers.
153 . L e tte r , Blarney to H errin g , 30 July  19 4 3 , Blarney Papers 1 7 0 .2 .
154 . Kenney, op.oit.,  p . 25 6 .
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Lieutenant- General W alter 
Krueger greeting  General 
MacArthur at M ilne Bay 
w hile  d irec tin g  the 
landings at K iriw in a  
and W oodlark, but the 
operation  'never p a id  
dividends on the 
investment o f e f fo r t  and 
m a t e r ia l ' .
(AWM Negative N o .15248)
Lieutenant- General Herring  and General MacArthur 
in  Port Moresby, July  1943 . MacArthur told 
H erring  to take Salamaua 'as  early  as p o s s i b l e '.
(AWM Negative N o .15194)
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v is ite d  Savige on 19 August to ensure that Salamaua was not captured
155
before the Lae operation .
After  the success o f the Lae operation  in  early  September MacArthur
was quick to accept cred it  for the e ffe c t iv e  role of the troops before
Salam aua. Indeed his  Reports imply that i t  was h is  idea  to delay 
156
the capture. But Berryman saw things d iffe r e n tly  and on 4 September
1943 he wrote in  his  d iary :
The landing  was a surprise  and e ffe c te d  w ithout 
opposition - a v in d icatio n  of C-in-C [Blarney] 
and my judgment in  adhering to p lan  to bypass 
Salamaua. H erring  and [Fifth  U .S .  A ir  Force] 
wanted to a lter  p lan  and take out Salamaua - 
that would have ruined  surprise  and sp o ilt  the 
manoeuvre. I was su rprised  at H erring  a fter  
having agreed to our p la n , b e in g  so e a s ily  
swayed from i t  by 5 AF.157
Blarney summed up the in c id e n t  another way: 'The  greatest pressure was
put on me to force the Salamaua p o sit io n  but I was lucky enough to
158
stic k  to my plan  to bypass Salamaua b e fo r e ' the capture of Lae . In
this case he can properly  claim  to have had an important in fluence  on 
a l l ie d  strategy .
155 . Comments on Official History, Savige Pap ers . On 29 July  1943 
Herring  wrote to Sav ig e : 'your role is  s t i l l  f ir s t  of a ll  to drive the 
enemy north of the Francisco  R iver . The capture o f Salamaua is  of course 
devoutly to be w ished but no attempt upon i t  is  to be allowed to in terfere  
w ith  the major operation be ing  p l a n n e d '. Savige claim ed that he showed 
th is  letter  to h is  two senior s t a f f  o f f ic e r s , but no one at HQ 3 D iv isio n  
re a lis ed  that Salamaua was not to be captured before the fa l l  of Lae .
On 15 July  1943 Herring  had s ig n a lle d  S a v ig e : 'You  can and I know you 
w il l  drive the enemy over the Francisco  R i v e r ' . NGF War D iary , A p r il  1943 , 
AWM 1 /5 / 5 1 .  On 20 September 1943 Berryman wrote in  h is  d iary : ' I  am 
wondering i f  Herring  is  tired  or too e a s ily  in flu e n ce d . Examples causing 
me to doubt are : (i) 24 July  he pressed  me to support the view that we 
should capture S a l . before  the Lae op . . . '
15 6 . Reports of General MacArthur, V o l . I ,  p . 121 .
157 . Berryman D iary , 4 September 1 9 43 .
158 . Le tter , Blarney to General Sturdee , 16 September 1 9 43 , Blarney Papers 
6 .1.
The p lann ing  for the Lae operation throughout June, July  and
August 1943 brought to l ig h t  a number of fundamental d ifferen ces  between
the American and A ustralian  modes of o peration . These d ifferen ces
are d iscussed  in  the chapter dealing  w ith  problems o f  b a t t le f ie ld
cooperation , but American d isq u iet  over A u stralian  p lanning  was the
s ta r tin g  poin t  for another disagreem ent over strategy .
P art  of Blarney's in structio n s  had been to 's e iz e  the north coast
159
of New Guinea to include M a d a n g '. In  accordance with A ustralian
p ractice  Blarney had merely given orders for the Lae phase o f  the operation ,
b e lie v in g  that there was l it t l e  po in t  in  p lann ing  for an assault  on
Madang u n t il  the Japanese reaction  to the Lae o ffensive  could be
determ ined. GHQ b e lie v ed  that a p lan  should be prepared to allow  the
'tim ely  concentration o f troops and s u p p lie s ' and on 15 August ordered
160
Blarney to prepare a p lan  for the se izu re  o f Madang.
Blarney immediately put h is  C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  Berryman, to work to
161
prepare an ap p reciatio n , but  in  the meantime MacArthur wrote to Blarney
p o in tin g  out that the New Guinea Force orders 'rem ain s ile n t  as to the
co nsolidation  o f the Huon Penin sula  in clu d in g  the seizure  o f  F in s c h h a fe n '.
He therefore ordered Blarney to produce an outline  plan  'a t  the e a r lie s t
162
practicab le  d a t e '.
The A ustralian s  s t i l l  f a ile d  to prepare a plan  for the capture o f 
Madang, but  Berryman argued in  his  appreciation  that the A ustralian s  
should strike  northwest from Lae up the Markham Valley  and into  the 
Ramu V a lle y . The coastwise operation to secure Finschhafen would be
159 . GHQ Warning In structio n  N o .2 , 6 May 1 9 43 , AWM 5 8 9 /3 /1 1 .
16 0 . Memorandum, Sutherland  to Blarney, 15 August 1943 , AWM 5 8 9 /3 / 9 .
161 . Berryman D iary , 31 August 1 9 43 , Berryman Papers.
16 2 . L e tte r , MacArthur to Blarney, 30 August 1943 , AWM 4 2 3 /1 1 /2 0 9 ,  also  
Blarney Papers 4 3 .6 3 2 .
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determined by events at Lae . To attack Madang without securing  the
western end of New B r ita in  or interm ediate  points at S io  or Saidor
would be hazardous. He concluded:
I t  is  not p rac ticable  to prepare a d e ta ile d  plan  
for operations beyond the capture of Lae and the 
Markham Valley  at this  stage . . .  The region 
Madang-Finschhafen-Cape Gloucester is  the centre 
of the enem y's present l in e . I t  would be over 
optim istic  to an ticip ate  that he w i l l  not react 
vigorously  to the attack in  Lae and the Markham 
V alley  which threatens the very centre o f  h is  
p o s it io n . I f  he does so react any d eta iled  plan  
would have to be recast . -^3
On 31 August Blarney forwarded th is  appreciation  to MacArthur w ith
a covering letter  urging  'a  most ca re fu l co nsideration  of the re lativ e
m erits of the seizure  of the areas covering  both sides of the V it ia z
S tra its  before pushing  forward the operations up the coast of New G u in ea1.
Once that was achieved a l l ie d  forces could move e ith e r  northwest or 
164
northeast. Blarney's proposals were carefully examined by MacArthur's
operations s t a f f , who had to agree that 'The conclusions expressed  m erit
careful c o n s id e r a t io n '. Furthermore, Blarney's plan  appeared to be the
165
only one so far  proposed which could be executed  in  1943 . On
1 September Blarney tr ie d  to persuade MacArthur, and the Commander of
the A l l ie d  Naval Forces, Adm iral C arp ender ,to  accept h is  p la n , and i t
166
was agreed to decide the matter at a conference on 3 September.
Blarney was confident that his  views would be accepted and wrote
to General H err in g : ' I  think I have somewhat shaken the b e l ie f  in  the
16 7
idea  that we had to continue along the New Guinea c o a s t ' .
16 3. Operations for the Capture of Madang, 31 August 1943 , Berryman Papers, 
S t a f f  A p p reciatio n : Lae.
164 . Le tter , Blarney to MacArthur, 31 August 1 9 43 , Berryman Papers . Extracts 
o f this le tte r , and of the Appreciation  can be found in  AWM 5 9 9 /3 / 3 .
16 5 . Memorandum, Brigadier- General S . J .  Chamberlin to Major-General 
R .K . Sutherland , 3 September 19 43 , AWM 5 9 4 / 3 / 3 .
1 6 6 . Berryman D iary , 1 September 1943 .
1 6 7 . L etter , Blarney to H err in g , 1 September 1943 , Blarney Papers, 1 7 0 .2 .
At e ig h t  o 'c lo c k  on the evening o f 3 September 1943 the 7th Amphibious
Fleet  carrying  troops of the 9th D iv is io n  was steaming along the Papuan
168
coast bound for the dawn landing  at Lae. At the Markham River the
24th B attalio n  was preparing  to attack Markham Point  as a curtain- raiser
• , 169
to the airborne assault  on Nadzab . In  Port Moresby Generals MacArthur,
Sutherland , Cham berlin , Kenney, W hitehead, Blarney and Berryman, Admiral
Carpender and Captain Steinhagen (U SN ), were meeting to discuss the
operations to follow  the capture of Lae.
Blarney began by em phasising the views expressed  in  h is  ap p reciatio n .
Kenney followed by supporting Blarney. Indeed he went further and suggested
an airborne advance 200 m iles up the Ramu V a lle y . Admiral Carpender
was s t i l l  keen to advance along the New Guinea coast before an attack
on Cape G loucester , although i t  would not be necessary to go as far  as
Madang. General MacArthur appeared to support Carpender, but a fter
further d iscussio n  he was eventually  persuaded to accept Blarney's view .
Thus i t  was agreed that an a ir f i e l d  would be secured at Dumpu in  the
Ramu Valley  by 1 November, p ro v id in g  Kenney with  a base to give a ir  cover
for sim ultaneous operations again st  Saidor and Cape Gloucester probably
T  T V  W  1 7 0on 1 December.
Blarney then attempted to push h is  luck , and suggested that the 6 th
A ustralian  D iv is io n  (of two brigades) should take over the American role
171
and attack Cape Gloucester. Chamberlin pointed  out that w ith  the
7th and 9th D iv isio n s  Blarney might not have s u ff ic ie n t  troops to conduct
the operations at Lae, Dumpu and Finschhafen, but Blarney proposed to use
the 4th , 6th and 7th m il it ia  brigades i f  necessary . The Americans opposed
168 . Dexter, op.cit.,  p p .32 8 , 329 .
16 9 . Ib id .,  p p .341-343.
17 0 . Memorandum for f i l e ,  by General Cham berlin , no date , AWM 5 9 4 /3 / 3 /
and Notes o f Conference on 'Dayton ' at Adv GHQ, 2000 h r s , 3 September 1943 .
171 . Memorandum for f i l e ,  AWM 5 9 4 /3 / 3 .
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this  plan  since to use the brigades would str ip  Port Moresby, Milne
172
Bay and Oro Bay of garrison troops. Blarney suggested that American
173
troops could relieve  the A ustralian s  in  base areas , but  MacArthur,
o f  course , had no in ten tio n  of allow ing the A ustralians  to execute
a l l  h is  o ffensive  operations and he said  that there would be no change
to the decision  that Alamo Force would conduct the operations again st  western 
174
New B r it a in . General Berryman concluded h is  notes o f  the conference
w ith  the comment that 'G en eral M acArthur‘then gave us a lecture on a
175
naval strategy  for the P a c i f i c ' .
I t  can be observed that throughout 1943 Blarney was not only 
responsible  for the ta c t ic a l  and strategic  d irec tio n  o f the A ustralian  
fo rc es , but on a number o f occasions was able to a lter  the strategy  
la id  down by GHQ. The conference on 3 September described  above w as, 
however, the la st  occasion on which he attempted to act as the A l l ie d  
Land Forces Commander. There can be no doubt that Blarney's in fluence  
can be attrib u ted  d ire c tly  to the important p art  played  by the A ustralian  
fo rces , but  i t  was already  becoming obvious that MacArthur had every 
in ten tio n  of reducing su b sta n tia lly  the A u stralian  involvement in  
o ffen s iv e  operations . Thus on 7 October MacArthur spoke o f  creating  
two commands in  the southwest P a c i f ic . One command would consist of 
A ustralian  land , naval and a ir  forces and would be responsible for an 
area south o f Madang. The other all-American command would be involved  
in  the advance along the north coast of New Guinea to the P h il ip p in e s ,
172 . Memorandum, Cham berlin to Sutherland , 3 September 1943 , AWM 5 9 4 / 3 / 3 .
1 7 3 . L e tter , Herring  to Blarney, 3 September 1943 , Blarney Papers, 1 7 0 .2 .
174 . Memorandum for f i l e ,  AWM 5 9 4 /3 / 3 .
17 5 . Notes o f Conference on 'D a y t o n ',  Berryman Papers.
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MacArthur would command the American force and exercise  strateg ic
. . . 176
superv ision  over the A u stralian  force .
Nothing came o f this p la n , but on 20 October GHQ issued  RENO I I I ,
the p lan  for the operations culm inating  in  the capture o f  the southern 
. . . 177
P h il ip p in e s . In  five  phases of operations beginn ing  on 1 February
1944 and ending  with the attack on Mindanao on 1 February 1945 the
A ustralian s  were allocated  an o ffe n s iv e  role in  p art  o f only one phase ,
178
namely the occupation o f isla nd s  in  the Arafura Sea in  June 1944 .
No evidence has been discovered to in d icate  what Curtin  thought o f 
this  p la n , but  during this p erio d  h is  mind was concerned more with 
b alan cin g  the war e f fo r t , that w ith  c r it ic a lly  analysing  M acA rth u r 's . 
str a teg ic  p la n s .
Divergence of Views
During the la tte r  h a l f  of 1943 the A u stralian  government continued
its  e ffo r ts  to reconcile  the various claims on A ustralian  manpower. On
the one hand there was the argument that A u stra lia  had done enough fig h tin g
and that her role should b e , as Curtin  said  in  November 1943 , that of
179
the 'hewer o f  wood and ca rrier  o f w a t e r '.  In  sho rt, A u s t r a l ia 's  main
task should be to supply her a l l ie s  w ith  food and m unitions. On the 
other hand there was the b e l i e f  that A u s t r a l ia 's  post-war in fluence  in  
the P a c if ic  would depend on the amount of fig h tin g  undertaken by her
176 . G3 Journal 7 October 1 9 43 , Notes o f D iscussion  between MacArthur 
and H alsey , AWM 5 1 9 /1 /4 .
177 . At the Quadrant Conference at Quebec in  August 1943 the Combined Chiefs  
o f  S t a f f  had decided  to perm it Nim itz to begin  an o ffensive  in  the Central 
P a c if ic  and MacArthur to continue h is  o ffens ive  operations in  the SWPA.
The CCS in structio n s  d id  not say 'an y th in g  about the P h il ip p in e s , but 
disapproved of the plans to take R a b a u l '. Morton, op.cit.,  p . 5 2 0 . Ehrman, 
op.cit.,  v o l .v ,  p . 14 .
1 7 8 . Summary of RENO III-, Appendix 8 of Morton, op.cit..
179 . F .T .  Smith Reports, 17 November 19 43 .
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troops during  the last  years of the war. The problem was not whether
to undertake e ith e r  of these two course; by mid 1943 both courses
were b e in g  purused vigorously  despite  the fact  that i t  was obvious
that the economy could not su sta in  the e f fo r t . The problem was rather
to determine which of these a c t iv it ie s  should be d ra s tic a lly  reduced.
C u r t in 's  statement in  June that A u s tra lia  was safe from invasion
paved the way for the consideration  of these important decisions  and
on 13 July  1943 lie presented  the War Cabinet with h is  views on the
governing p r in c ip le s . He began by stating  that the danger o f  invasio n
had decreased , and that 'the  nature , extent and balance o f A u s t r a l ia 's
war e f f o r t ' was due for review . He sa id  that the adjustments had to.
'be  governed by operational considerations determined by the s tr a teg ica l
p o licy  o f ' General MacArthur, and 'by  the p h y sica l capacity  o f the
Commonwealth to complete the programmes w ith in  the req uisite  t im e '.
In  essence Curtin  gave notice  that a l l  aspects of the war e ffo r t
were to be clo sely  s c r u t in is e d , but for a sta r t , he recommended that
the navy should be m aintained at its  e x is t in g  strength ; the army should
provide three in fantry  d iv is io n s  for o ffensive  operations and 'adequate
forces for defence of A u s tra lia  and New Guinea and for r e l ie f  o f units
in  New G u in e a '. The a ir  force should be m aintained 'a t  the strength
authorised  under the 72 squadron programme to the extent to which a ir c ra ft
180
can be p ro v id ed '. Manpower considerations were to govern the final
size  of the fo rc es , and also the provision  o f m unitions, other s u p p lie s ,
181
works and e s s e n t ia l  serv ice s . The War Cabinet agreed to adopt these
182
rules as p r in c ip le s .
18 0 . At times the programme mentioned 71 , 72 and 73 squadrons. The d iffe re n t  
figures depended on whether certain  squadrons in  the Middle E ast  were 
in cluded .
181 . War Cabinet Agendum, 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3 . The A ustralian  War E f fo r t , 10 July  
1 9 4 3 , CRS A 2671 , item 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3 . Presented  to War Cabinet 13 July  1943 , 
Minute 29 68 . toc.cit.
182 . War Cabinet Minute 2 9 68 , 13 July  1 9 43 , loo.oit.
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Later during the War Cabinet meeting the Defence Committee
recommended that MacArthur might be asked to provide Americans to relieve
A ustralian s  of some of the maintenance services and work p rojects
they were carrying  out on b e h alf  of United States fo rces . This had been
183
the theme o f  Blam ey 's  letter  to Curtin  of 2 June 1 9 43 , and the War
184
Cabinet decided  that representations should be made to MacArthur.
Curtin  had already sent MacArthur a copy of War Cabinet Agendum 
3 1 1 /1 9 4 3  o u tlin in g  the p rin c ip le s  governing the extent and nature o f
185
A u s t r a l ia 's  war e f f o r t , and despite the Cabinet decision  to approach
186
MacArthur ag a in , Curtin  h e sita te d  to do so. Meanwhile Fo rde , the
M in ister  for the Army, had been studying  Agendum 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3 , and he
observed that although i t  embodied the p r in c ip le s  a r is in g  from C u r t in 's
discussions  w ith  MacArthur, i t  did  'n o t  deal s p e c if ic a lly  w ith  the
problem re ferred  to in  General Blam ey 's le tte r ' o f  2 June, namely the
problem of services be ing  provided  by A ustralian s  to the American fo rces .
Forde had arranged for enq uiries  to be made in  England , and these
had revealed  that B r it is h  autho rities  were encountering  sim ilar  problems
188
w ith  the Am ericans. Thus on 31 July  Forde wrote to Curtin  that this
189
further inform ation added w eight to Blam ey 's recommendations.
183 . See p . 27 7 .
184 . War Cabinet Minute 2 9 6 9 , 13 July  1943 , CRS A 2671 , item 1 0 0 /1 9 4 3 , 
Supplement 1.
185 . L e tter , Curtin  to MacArthur, 13 July  1943 , CRS A 26 71 , item  3 1 1 /1 9 4 3
186 . On 21 July  Shedden forwarded an amended version of Agendum 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3  
to MacArthur, but there was no mention o f the matter o f services provided  
to the American fo rces .
187 . L e tter , Forde to C u rtin , 31 July  19 43 , MP 12 17 , Box 306 .
18 8 . Cable LM 2047 , Smart to W ynter, 24 June 1 9 4 3 , too,cit,
189 . L e tte r , Forde to C u r tin , 31 July  1 9 43 , loc*cit.
Spurred by Forde ' s le t t e r , on 5 August Curtin  wrote to MacArthur
and stressed  A u s t r a l ia 's  manpower d i f f i c u l t i e s . He ra ised  the p o s s ib il it y
of American personnel undertaking maintenance and works projects
currently  provided  from A ustralian  resources, where an Army might normally
provide these services from its  own resources, and asked for M acA rthur 's
190
v ie w s .
MacArthur rep lied  on 24 August and stated  that he should lik e  to 
make h is  forces independent of c iv i l ia n  se rv ice s , 'b u t  such a result 
could be achieved  only at considerable  cost to the m ilitary  e ffec tiv en ess  
of my com m and'. I f  ad d itio n al service  and maintenance personnel were 
brought from America w ithout an increase  in  shipping  then less combat 
troops could be sent. The a ltern ativ e  would be for A u s tra lia  to provide 
a d d itio n al combat troops, bu t  he understood that there was not
191
s u f f ic ie n t  surplus manpower in  A u stra lia  to perm it such an in c rease .
Curtin  did  not immediately dispute the facts as o utlined  by MacArthur,
and on 3 September told him that the p rov ision  o f  A ustralian  resources
was 'one o f broad p o lic y ' to be considered 'on  the b asis  o f the p rin c ip le s
governing the nature and extent of the A ustralian  War E f f o r t ' . He
192
prom ised to keep MacArthur inform ed. C u r t in 's  reply was therefore
non-committal, but MacArthur's  ch ie f  o f s t a f f ,  General Sutherland ,
was in  no doubt about the meaning o f C u r t in 's  le t t e r . At the bottom
he p e n c ille d  a comment for the commander o f  the US Army Services of
193
Supply in  A u s t r a lia : 'G en . M arshall, Aussie  d e m o b iliza t io n !'
19 0 . L e tter , Curtin  to MacArthur, 5 August 1943 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 306 .
191 . L e tter , MacArthur to C u r tin , 24 August 19 43 , loo.oit.
19 2 . L e tter , Curtin  to MacArthur, 3 September 1943 , Z-OO.cvt.
193 . Comments on le t t e r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 3 September 1943 ,
RG 31 6 , Box 72 , National A rch ives . Major-General R .J .  M arshall was 
Commanding G eneral, US Army Services of Supply in  A u s tr a lia .
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The government now re a lis e d  th at , i f  the question  ra ised  w ith
MacArthur were to be carried  fu r th er , i t  would have to gather the
194
necessary  manpower s t a t is t ic s . But i t  was not u n til  21 Septem ber,
four weeks after  the receip t  o f  M acArthur's  rep ly , that Curtin  forwarded
195
a copy to Blarney. Furtherm ore,he d id  not ask for Blam ey 's comment. 
N evertheless , on 27 September Blarney inform ed Curtin o f the
196
d i f f ic u l t ie s  being  experienced in  re s t r ic t in g  American demands.
On 30 September Shedden produced a d e ta ile d  review  o f the manpower
situ a tio n  based on inform ation received  from the War Commitments
197
Committee and the Defence Committee. This document was presented
to the War Cabinet by Curtin  the fo llo w ing  day , and i t  was accepted as
198
a statement of government p o lic y . The p o licy  d id  no t , however,
in d icate  a fundamental change in  d ir e c t io n , but rather a s lig h t  s h i ft  
in  em phasis, and i t  represented Shedden 's  own attempt to compromise 
between the various demands on manpower. Indeed on 2 October Shedden
297
194 . Memorandum, A .J .  W ilso n , A ss ista n t  Secretary , Department of D efence, 
to Shedden, 31 August 19 43 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 306.
19 5 . L e tter , Curtin  to Blarney, 21 September 1 9 43 , loc.cit. M acArthur's 
le tte r  o f 24 August had been received  that same day since i t  had been 
sent from Brisbane to Canberra by te lety p e .
1 9 6 . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War C onference , Canberra, 27 September 
1 9 4 3 , MP 12 17 , Box 4 .
19 7 . A Review of the N ature , Extent and Balance of the War E ffo r t  in  the 
L ig h t  of the Manpower P o s it io n , signed  by C urtin , 30 September 1943 ,
MP 1 2 1 7 , Box 305 .
19 8 . War Cabinet Minute 2 0 6 5 , 1 October 1 9 4 3 , CRS A 26 71 , item 3 8 9 /1 9 4 3 .
298
fe lt  compelled to t e ll  the Prime M in ister  that h is  department had produced
199
most o f  the recommendations.
The War Cabinet agreed w ith  the proposition  that by June 1966 
2 0 ,0 0 0  men should be relased  from the S e rv ic e s , 1 0 ,0 0 0  men should 
be released  from m unitions and a ir c r a ft  in d u s t r ie s , and that the monthly 
intake into  the Services should be fixed  by 5 ,0 0 0  men and women. But 
apart from the fact that i t  was decided to 's t a b i l i s e ' the RAAF at its  
'p resen t  stren gth ' in A u s tra lia  at 48 squadrons, rather than attempt to 
expand to 73 squadrons, there was no commitment to reducing 
s u b stan tia lly  the forces fig h t in g  in  the South-West P a c if ic  Area . The 
minute read s , in  p a r t , as fo llo w s :
199 . Memorandum, Shedden to C u r tin , 2 October 1 9 43 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 305 . 
Shedden wrote that 'three  major recommendations were made by the War 
Commitments Committee which were adopted by War C abinet , none by the 
Defence Committee and e ighteen  by the Defence Department. Though 
p u b lic it y  cannot be given to these fa c t s , i t  is  nevertheless important 
that the p recise  p o sitio n  should be fu lly  understood in  fa irness  to 
the S t a f f  who have rendered such able a s s i s t a n c e '. On 27 October 
1943 Shedden wrote to Captain  L .S .  B r aceg ird le , the M ilita r y  and 
O f f i c i a l  Secretary  to the Governor G eneral: ' I  must confess that 
I am the author o f  the documents, but I do so only to a llay  any 
m isgiving  on your part  that you might have unw ittingly  attribu ted  to 
me the authorship  of the words of some other person . As a matter of 
p riv ate  in form ation , you might be in terested  to know that we had 
voluminous reports from the War Commitments Committee and the Defence 
Committee and certain  interested  Departments which presented  varied  
and co n flic t in g  v iew s, and a f ir s t  class problem as to the so lu tio n .
I am glad to say , however, that the Defence Department, in  the usual 
anonymous and u n p ublicised  manner, was able to in d icate  a way out 
o f the m a ze '. MP 1217 , Box 48 .
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War Cabinet reviewed the commitments overseas 
which had been entered into  by A u s tra lia  in 
respect of lan d , sea and a ir  forces before 
the occurrence of the war in  the P a c i f ic .
The follow ing  p r in c ip le s  were affirm ed :
(a) It  is  o f  v it a l  importance to the 
future of A u s tra lia  and her status at the 
peace table in  regard to the settlem ent in  
the P a c if ic  that her military effort should 
be on a scale  to guarantee her an e ffe c t iv e  
voice in  the peace settlem ent.
(b) I f  necessary , the extent of this  e ffo r t  
should be m aintained at the expense of 
commitments in  other th eatres . In  the interests  
of A u stra lia  and the B r it is h  Empire in  the 
P a c i f i c ,  it  is  im perative that th is  view 
should be accepted by the United Kingdom and 
the other Dominions e sp ec ia lly  New Zealand and 
C a n a d a .200
The o f f i c i a l  h is t o r ia n , Paul H asluck , described  this as 'a  new and . 
opportunistic  p r i n c i p l e ' , p o in tin g  out that t i l l  now, the security  
o f  A u s tra lia  and lim its on manpower had governed the A u stralian  war 
e f f o r t . He continued : 'T h is  new idea  that the war e ffo r t  was an 
adm ission t ic k e t  to a peace conference was perhaps not novel in  i t s e l f ,  
but on th is  occasion i t  would almost seem as though the adm ission ticket  
was being  confused w ith  the currency with  which i t  had to be p u r c h a s e d '. 
Hasluck seems to be im plying that the government had developed the 
p r in c ip le  to ju s t ify  one of the ways they hoped to reduce manpower 
e xp en ditu re , w hile  at the same time ju s t ify in g  the use of that manpower 
e lsew h ere .
20 0 . War Cabinet Minute 3065 , 1 October 1 9 43 , Canberra.
201 . H asluck , 77le Government and the Peoples 1942-1945, p p .301 , 302.
2 0 2 .C learly  Hasluck fe lt  restrained  by his role of o f f i c i a l  h is to ria n  
from c r it ic is in g  the government too strongly . More recently  he has 
w ritten  that w ith  'fo u r  or five  outstanding excep tio ns , its  m inisters 
were not h ighly  competent or e f f ic ie n t  and the m inistry  i t s e l f  was 
often  irreso lu te  in  c r is is  and, as some of it s  best  m inisters found, 
i t  was h esitan t  in  coming to grips w ith  a major problem (for exam ple, 
manpower in  1943 and 1944 and the struggle for resources between c iv il ia n  
and m ilitary  a u t h o r i t i e s ) '.  Diplomatic Witness3t p . 159 .
The economic h is t o r ia n s , B u tlin  and Schedvin , were more precise  
in  th e ir  c r it ic is m , p o in ting  out that the government was faced w ith  
a c lear  choice as expressed  by the Director-General o f Manpower, Wallace 
W urth :
(a) re lieve  the Services of r e sp o n sib ility  for 
some of the commitments on which their  
estim ates are b ased , and /or
(b) endorse a further regulation  o f the c iv il ia n  
economy, together w ith  fa ilu re  to a substantial 
extent to meet the B r it is h  and A l l ie d  require­
ments [of food and m a t e r ia ls ] .2 0 3
To B u tlin  and Schedv in , the 'War Cabinet had chosen a s u it  o f the same
colour and style  but one s ize  sm aller: i t  had ducked choosing between
204
W u rth 's  clear-cut a l t e r n a t iv e s '.  The maximum po ssible  offensive-
deployment was to be m aintained .
W hile there is  much truth in  the views o f the o f f i c i a l  h is t o r ia n s ,
they do not link  d irectly  the governm ent's p revaricatio n  to the advice
tendered by MacArthur to Shedden in  May and Curtin  in  June . Yet
MacArthur had used terms almost id e n t ic a l  to those now enunciated  as
government p o l ic y , and in  July  Curtin  had stated  that the A u stralian
war e ffo r t  would be 'governed by operational considerations determined
205
by the s tr a teg ica l  p o lic y ' o f  General MacArthur.
A cynic might observe that w hile  MacArthur claim ed that i t  was in 
A u s t r a l ia 's  in ter est  to provide a su bstantial  s tr ik in g  fo rce , already
206
by October he was making plans to reduce the A ustralian  o ffen sive  ro le .
203 . War Cabinet Agendum 3 7 4 /1 9 4 3 , CRS A 2 6 71 , item 3 7 9 /1 9 4 3 .
204 . B u tlin  and Schedvin , op.cit., p . 365.
205 . War Cabinet Agendum 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3 , 13 July  19 43 , CRS A 26 71 , item 3 1 1 /1 9 4 3 .
20 6 . See p p .2 9 2 , 29 3 .
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Nevertheless , the A u stralian  defence ch ie fs  were in  no daubt that
A u s tra lia  should continue to provide a su b stan tia l  m ilitary  commitment.
Thus on 12 July  Blarney warned C urtin  that 'any  reduction in  the strength
of the str ik in g  forces below three d iv is io n s  [would] greatly  weaken
A u s t r a l ia 's  place in  determ ining the future 'and  that such a reduction
207
was 'most undesirable in  the national i n t e r e s t ' . On 27 September
Blarney told  Curtin  that the operations in  New B r it a in  would be by
American forces 'to  strengthen a claim  to retain  New B r ita in  in  the
, 208
post war settlem ent .
Blam ey 's views were expressed by the Defence Committee in  its
209
report to the War C abin et , and as a re su lt  the governm ent's p o lic y
statement of 1 October included  the paragraph that MacArthur was to be
informed o f :
lim its to which commitments can be accepted 
by the Commonwealth Government for United 
States Service requirements and o f  the 
alternative  choices which such lim its impose.
Furtherm ore, Blarney b e lie v ed  that M acArthur's  argument in  h is  letter
to Curtin  o f 24 August should not go unchallenged , and on 5 October he
wrote in  strong terms to the Prime M in iste r . He agreed with M acArthur's
assertion  that A u stralia  could not provide a d d itio n al combat forces ,
but pointed  out that i f  the Americans continued  to send combat forces
w ithout maintenance personnel then A u s tra lia  would have to disband
further combat form ations. He continued:
207 . Memorandum, Blarney to Forde and C u r t in , 12 July  1 9 43 , CRS A 8 1 6 , 
item 3 1 /3 0 1 /2 7 4 .
20 8 . Minutes of Prime M in is t e r 's  War Conference , Canberra, 27 September 
19 4 3 , MP 12 17 , Box 4.
209* Review by Defence Committee o f  the Strength  and Composition o f 
the Services and the M unition and Works Programme, 15 September 19 43 ,
CRS A 26 7 1 , 3 8 9 /1 9 4 3 .
2 1 0 . War Cabinet Minute 3 0 6 5 , 1 October 1 9 4 3 , loc .cx^t.
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The issue which has arisen  is  that General 
MacArthur has been asked to relieve  us o f a 
burden which is  causing  a reduction in  our fo rces , 
and in  reply takes the view that not only should 
the burden continue to be borne but that i t  should 
be in creased .
Blarney advised  that since MacArthur was d is in c lin e d  to respond to C u r t in 's
req uest , then the Prime M in ister  should take up the matter w ith  the 
211
US government. In  reply Curtin  sa id  that he would be w r it in g  again
to MacArthur, and in  the meantime requested Blarney to provide inform ation
on the number o f A ustralian  army personnel perform ing maintenance and
212
other services  for the Am ericans.
On 8 October Curtin  sent an im portant cable to C h urch ill  settin g
213 •
out the governm ent's d e c is io n , and seeking  the B r it is h  reactio n .
But he d id  not immediately w rite  to MacArthur. Blam ey's argument,
however, seemed unchallengeable , and C urtin  was receiv ing  other evidence
. 2 1 4
to support the suspicion  o f u lte rio r  American m otives. On 22 October
Curtin  complained to a v is it in g  UK Press Delegation that the Americans 
were using  th e ir  preponderance in  f ig h t in g  troops with  a view to p o st­
war commercial in te r e s ts . 'We keep on getting  people out h e r e ',  sa id
C u r tin , 'w ith  letters  saying  they are P residen t  R o osevelt 's  personal
215
rep resentativ es , who seem to be spying out the l a n d '.
211 . L e tte r , Blarney to C u r tin , 5 October 1943 , MP 1217 , Box 306 .
212 . L e tte r , Curtin  to Blarney, 25 October 1 9 4 3 , loc.cit.
21 3 . Cable 26 7 , Curtin  to C h u r c h ill , 8 October 1 9 4 3 , CRS 68 0 , item 
3 5 /1 9 4 3 , f i le  N o .l .
214 . F .T .  Smith Reports, 6 September 19 43 . Curtin  sa id  he was aware of 
US commercial and economic claims in  the Southwest P a c if ic . On 4 March 
1943 the Sydney Morning Herald quoted the US Secretary o f  the Navy, Colonel 
Knox as say in g : 'We are f ig h tin g  for a common cause and expended our own 
money on these b a se s . I imagine that Americans at the Peace table w il l  
make out a very strong case for retention  o f those b a s e s '.  Cutting  in
CRS A 9 8 9 , item 4 3 /2 3 5 /2 0 2 ,  Part  2 .
215 . Notes on talk  between S ir  W alter Layton and C urtin , 22 October 1943 , 
PREM 3 1 5 9 /2 .  On 13 July  1943 the Argus reported : 'I n  the opinion  of 
Chicago Tribune, owned by Colonel McCormick, the B r it ish  territory  in  the 
P a c i f i c ,w i l l , when i t  is  reconquered from the Japanese by US troops, 
become US p r o p e r t y '. Cutting  in  the Shedden Papers, MP 1 2 17 , Box 20 68 .
See also  Thorne, op.cit.,  p . 367 .
On the other hand Curtin  found i t  d i f f i c u l t  to d istrust  MacArthur,
and commented: ' I f  he had been born in  A u s tra lia  and gone to Duntroon
216
he could not have shown a h igher concern for  A u s t r a l ia 's  i n t e r e s t s '.
Nonetheless by the end o f October Curtin  was d isp lay ing  agitation
217
over the lack of p o sitiv e  action  by the Am ericans.
On 1 November 1943 Curtin  wrote a long le tter  to MacArthur inform ing
him that the navy would remain unchanged; the army would co nsist  of
three in fantry  d iv isio ns  and an armoured brigade for o ffensive  operations
plus garrison forces; the a irfo rce  w ould  be set at 49 squadrons. The
manpower problems were d escribed , but in  p a r t ic u la r  he repeated Blam ey's
arguments that the arr ival o f  US combat forces w ithout th e ir  own
maintenance units  would aggravate A u s t r a l ia 's  already c r it ic i a l  manpower
p o s it io n . He sa id  that s p e c if ic  proposals would be subm itted as soon
218
as they had been worked out .
MacArthur rep lied  promptly on 6 November and clearly  he was 
d is s a t is f ie d  w ith  C u r t in 's  p la n s . He had read C u r t in 's  report 'w ith  
some an xiety ' and in  d irect  language he c r it ic is e d  three p a rt ic u la r  
asp ects . F ir s t , he was c r it ic a l  o f A u s tra lia  sending food to B r ita in  
i f  that resulted  in  a reduction o f  the supply to his  own fo rc es . Second, 
i f  A u stralian  c iv il ia n s  could not undertake works for the US fo rces , 
and i f  American c iv ilia n s  were im ported, they too would be a drain  on 
the economy o f  the country. T h ird , although he was endeavouring to have 
US service  troops brought from Am erica, he opposed the p o licy  that each 
force must be able to operate sep arately . MacArthur told  Curtin  that
216 . Ibid.
21 7 . For example on 29 October 1943 Shedden wrote to MacArthur: 'The 
Prime M in ister  is  becoming somewhat a g ita te d  over the absence of a reply 
from y o u ' , concerning the need for a C airns transhipment p o in t .
Sutherland Papers , Correspondence w ith  A u stralian  Government.
21 8 . L e tte r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 1 November 19 43 , CP 2 9 0 /1 6 , 
item  bundle 1 ; also  CRS A 2 6 80 , item 3 5 /4 3  Part  2.
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h is  'proposed solutions [were] fraught w ith  grave p o t e n t ia lit ie s  o f
danger to the m ilitary  e ffo r t  . . .  They could not f a i l  to endanger the
i. • . . 2 1 9
b a s ic  cooperation between our co untries .
For once Curtin  was not to be brow-beaten by MacArthur and in  a
strong le tter  on 13 November refuted  M acArthur's  claim s. He po in ted  out that
the 'e x ten t  of the demands from the United Kingdom for food supplies
from A u s tra lia  [w as], in  fa c t , due to reductions in  d e liv e rie s  from
the United  S t a t e s '.  He o ffe r e d , however, to take up the question  with
C h urch ill and Roosevelt. As for the other q uestio n s , Curtin  reminded
MacArthur that the 'p r in c ip le s  covered by the decisions communicated
to you a re , o f  course, matters for the A u s tra lia n  Governm ent', but
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o ffe re d  to d iscuss them with  MacArthur. MacArthur seemed to realise
that Curtin  was on firm  ground, and accepted the suggestion for  a
meeting at a su itable  tim e:
I s h a l l , as alw ays, present my view to you 
as frankly  and earn estly  as I am a b le , but 
my loyalty  to the execution o f a f in a l  
dec is io n  w il l  not be dependent upon whether 
i t  agrees w ith  my own opinion or n o t .^21
Curtin  was s t i l l  not s a t i s f ie d . On the one hand the bureaucracy seemed
unable to conform to the d irectiv e  of 1 O ctober, prompting Shedden
222
to w rite  a number o f urgent minutes to C u rtin . On the other hand
the Defence Committee could not provide exact figures u n til  they knew
223
the strateg ic  and operational p la n , and this  was a matter for 
M acArthur.
219 . L e tter , MacArthur to C u r t in , 6 November 19 43 . loc.cit.
22 0 . L e tter , Curtin  to MacArthur, 13 November 1 9 4 3 , loo.cit.
221 . Le tter , MacArthur to C u r t in , 16 November 1 9 4 3 , MP 1217 , Box 306 .
222 . L e tte r , Shedden to C u r t in , 20 November 1 9 43 , MP 12 17 , Box 305 . On
21 December Shedden sent a memorandum to Curtin  warning him that 'a f t e r  
three months' d e la y , you are going to carry the r e sp o n sib ility  for 
dec id in g  what can be released  from the m unitions and a ir c r a ft ' in d u s tr ie s . 
loc.cit .
223 . Report by Major-General R .H . Dewing, 18 November 19 43 , WO 1 0 6 /4 8 3 9 .
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On 22 November, a fter  a d iscussion  w ith  Blarney, Curtin  wrote to
224
M acArthur:
The splendid  progress o f  your operations has 
been the subject o f some thought on my p art  and 
d iscussion  by the Government in  relatio n  to your 
future plans and the area o f employment of the 
A ustralian  Forces which have been assigned to you . . .
A u stralia  . . .  has a sp ecia l in terest  in  the 
employment of it s  own forces in  the operations 
for the e jectio n  o f the enemy from territo ry  under 
its  adm in istration , furtherm ore, i t  is  e sse n tia l  
that the Government should be at least  broadly  
aware o f your ideas for the employment o f  the 
A ustralian  Forces in  any areas outside A u s tra lia  
and mandated te r r ito r y , and o f what you may contemplate 
in  regard to operations a ffe c tin g  the la tte r  areas . . .
A lthough, by the most complete cooperation on 
your p a r t , there has never been any need to refer  to 
the documentary b a sis  which governs your relatio n sh ip  
to the A ustralian  Government, you w i l l  be aware that 
the p o sitio n  under the setup in the Southwest P a c if ic  
Area [is so governed]
I would greatly  appreciate advice of 
prospective  plans in  regard to the use o f  the 
A u stralian  land fo rces , in  order that the A u stralian  
Government may co nsider  th eir  contemplated use.
I t  i s ,  o f course , unnecessary for me to add 
that this  request is  not prompted by any desire  to 
in ter fere  in  any way with your conduct of operations , 
or to p a rtic ip a te  in  the form ulation o f  p la n s . The 
A ustralian  Government has at a ll  times had the utmost 
confidence in  your handling  o f these m atters, 
and is  deeply appreciative  o f the remarkable results  
you have achieved w ith  the lim ited  resources at 
your d isp o s a l . My present request arises  solely  from 
the r e sp o n sib ility  to the A ustralian  people which must 
be exercised  by m yself and the A u stralian  Governm ent.225
MacArthur re p lie d  that the d e s ir a b il it y  and necessity  of Curtin  being
inform ed of operational plans was 's e l f  e v id ent ' and agreed to give him
d e ta ils  at a meeting s ix  days la te r .
224 . L e tte r , Curtin  to Blarney, 22 November 1943 , Blarney Papers 5 . 1 .  
M acA rthur 's account in  Reminiscences, p . 181 of the reasons why Curtin  
wrote the letter  do not seem to be correct. For one th in g , Curtin  had 
not yet undertaken h is  overseas t r ip , as claim ed by MacArthur.
225 . L e tte r , Curtin  to MacArthur, 22 November 1 9 43 , Blarney Papers 5 . 1 .
22 6 . L e tte r , MacArthur to C u r t in , 24 November 1943 , MP 12 17 , Box 570 .
MacArthur met Curtin  in  Brisbane on 30 November, and began by
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review ing  the current and prospective  op eratio n s . He sa id  that
General Sutherland had gone to Washington to place h is  plans before 
the Americans and Combined Chiefs  o f S t a f f ,  and then gone on to the 
Cairo  conference between Roosevelt, C h u rch ill  and Chiang Kai-Shek.
He had not yet heard the result  o f these m eetings.
The question which concerned C u r t in , however, was the employment 
o f  the A ustralian  forces . MacArthur mentioned the p o s s ib il it y  of 'an  
A u stralian  advance to clear  the isla nd s  to the west o f New Guinea as 
far  as A m b o in a '. The question  was not pursued since Curtin  thought 
that 'he  was not in  a p o s it io n  to raise  any query ' and he would await 
advice from General Blarney.
The d iscussion  then turned to A u s t r a l ia 's  manpower problems and 
b alan cin g  the economy. Although MacArthur had opposed C u r t in 's  suggestions 
in  vigorous letters  to the Prime M in ister  on 24 August and 6 November, 
by 16 November he had in d icated  that he would loyally  abide by the 
governm ent's d e c is io n . He now told  Curtin  't h a t  he accepted absolutely  . 
that i t  was for the A ustralian  Government to decide the nature and 
extent o f its  war e f f o r t ' . The only p o in t  which MacArthur s t i l l  w ished 
to challenge was that o f A u stra lia  sending  food to the United Kingdom 
rather than to the American fo rces . Curtin  reminded MacArthur that the 
USA had not f u l f i l l e d  her contract to supply B r it a in , and there were other
22 7 . The account o f the conversation is  taken from Notes o f  D iscussions 
w ith  the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , B risb an e , 29th 
November to 1st December 1943 [prepared by Shedden], MP 1 2 17 , Box 2. 
Obviously  the o f f i c i a l  h is to r ia n  was not fu lly  informed when he wrote 
that there d id  'not  appear to be any formal record of the co n v e rs a tio n '.
He also  is  in  error when he states that C u r t in 's  letter  o f 22 November 
suggested a co nversation ; in  fact  the le tter  o f 13 November f ir s t  suggested 
the need for a m eeting. H asluck , The Government and the People3 1942-1945, 
p . 41 5 . These errors may w ell have been caused by Shedden, for in  response 
to a series  o f questions from Gavin Long concerning the d iscussions between 
C u r tin , MacArthur and Blarney at the end of 1 9 4 3 , he wrote that 'much was 
le ft  to the verbal exchange o f v ie w s '.  L e t t e r , Shedden to Long, 19 November 
1 9 5 4 , MP 1 2 17 , Box 5 7 0 .
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considerations such as the maintenance of a market and the e f fe c t  on 
A u s t r a l ia 's  s te rlin g  resources. MacArthur suggested that C urtin  should 
'co v er  h im self against  American cr it ic ism ' by p u ttin g  the matter to 
C h u r c h ill . Curtin  assured MacArthur that whatever shape the A ustralian  
war e ffo r t  might take, i t  would be the maximum o f which A ustralian  
was capable .
Thus MacArthur provided  Curtin  w ith  l it t le  inform ation about the
employment of A ustralian  fo rc e s , but accepted, as in ev itab ly  he had to ,
the A ustralian  governm ent's right to decide the shape of the co untry 's
war e f f o r t . Soon after  the conference Curtin  released  a press statement
stating  that MacArthur had 'expressed  his fu l l  agreement w ith  the
228
general p r in c ip le s  la id  down by the G overnm ent', but in  a broadcast 
Curtin  showed that he was s t i l l  under MacArthur's  s p e l l : he concluded 
by say in g :
I am indebted  to G e n e ra l>MacArthur for the high 
statesm anship and breadth o f  world v is io n  he has 
contributed  to the d iscu ss io n . The complete 
in tegratio n  o f our concepts, which has been a source 
of such strength in  the p a s t , w i l l  continue to the end .
These last  two sentences had been w ritten  by MacArthur, who had requested
229
Curtin  to add them to his  statem ent.
Meanwhile Shedden remained in Brisbane for further p rivate  d isc u ss io n s ,
and MacArthur took the opportunity to c r it ic is e  what he considered  to
230
be the top-heavy organisation  o f  the A ustralian  army. Shedden then
questioned him about Blam ey 's performance as Commander of the A l l ie d  Land
228 . Notes o f D iscussions w ith  Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , 
24th November to 1st December 1943 , MP 1217 , Box 2 .
22 9 . The statement is  reproduced in  MacArthur Reminiscences, p . 18 3 .
Evidence in  the Shedden Papers , MP 1217 , Box 2037 shows that the statement 
was w ritten  by MacArthur and sent by te lep rinter  to C urtin .
23 0 . The account o f this meeting is from Notes o f D iscussio n  between 
Commander-in-Chief, Southwest P a c if ic  A rea , and Secretary , Department of 
Defence, B r isb an e , 2 December 1943 [prepared by Shedden], MP 12 17 , Box 3.
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Forces. MacArthur sa id  that he now saw l it t le  of Blarney, 'because
the la tte r  was trying  to do too many t h i n g s ' , and he only went to New
Guinea as 'a  Task Commander when sp ecia l  operations were a f o o t '.  As a
r e s u lt , MacArthur sa id  that he h im self had had to take personal command
o f a ll  major operation s . He added that Blarney had o rig inated  the
suggestion for the appointment o f task force commanders for operations
by the Land Forces.
It  is  d i f f ic u l t  to b elieve  that MacArthur was completely sincere
over th is  questio n ; since arr iv in g  in  A u s tra lia  he had worked assiduously
to separate the A ustralian  and American forces . Possibly  Blarney had
mentioned the advantage of using  task fo rces , but they would have been
under h is  command as the Land Forces commander. It  has already been
shown that General Krueger was brought to A u s tra lia  w ith  the express
purpose o f removing Blarney from command o f  American fo rces . Blam ey 's
dual role gave MacArthur the opportunity to claim , w ith  some ju s t if ic a t io n ,
that the A ustralian  general was too busy to perform  his  duties as
231
Commander, A l l ie d  Land Forces. I t  should be noted , however, that when
Blarney had sought to ease h is  burden as Commander-in-Chief of the
A ustralian  Army by appointing  Northcott as h is  deputy, the government, a fter
232
advice from MacArthur, had denied  h is  request.
231 . M acA rthur 's attitude  at this time is  revealed  by comments in  Gavin 
L o n g 's  D ia ry , Sydney, 31 December 1943 (N o .4 ,  p . 4 ) :  'A t  the press conference 
at GHQ at which the New B r ita in  landing  was announced, Col D il le r  
[M acArthur's P u b lic  Relations O fficer]  read out to correspondents the 
names of a l is t  of generals and admirals whose names could be mentioned
in  the account o f  the operation s . The l is t  included  no A ustralian s  except 
Admiral Crutchley [who was in  fact  B r it is h ] . Dixon Brown,the En glish  
correspondent, s a id : But c a n 't  General Blam ey 's name be mentioned? I s n 't  
he C-in-C o f the A l l ie d  Land Force? D il le r  s a id : No, h is  name w il l  not 
be m e n t io n e d '. AWM.
23 2 . In  late 1942 Blarney had put this request to the government but the 
government had wanted to await the return of Morshead to A u s t r a lia . It  
is  s ig n if ic a n t  that at his conference with  Shedden in  October 1942 
MacArthur had advised  against  the appointment of a Deputy Commander-in- 
C h ie f . See Blarney Papers 2 3 .8 1 ,  Armstrong Papers (Papers from Mr Garry 
Armstrong, formerly o f the Department of D e fe n c e ) , Northcott Papers 
(M itchell L ibrary) and MP 1 2 17 , Box 2.
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Shedden 's  minutes of the conference recorded M acArthur's  views
on these q u estio n s :
MacArthur described  General Blarney as an able 
o perational Commander with a good str a teg ic a l  
mind which quickly  appreciated  the facts of a 
s itu atio n  and reached a sound conclusion . He 
co nsidered , however, that since he had 
esta b lis h ed  his  p o s it io n , he had become somewhat 
la zy , but nevertheless desired  to control everyth ing .
He was really  attem pting to cover too wide a f ie l d .
I f  M acA rthur 's ideas and plans for future 
operations by the A ustralian  Forces were ca rried  out, 
h is  in ten tio n  was to appoint a Task Force Commander 
who would have c o n t r o l  of a l l  the land and a ir  
forces engaged, but  he had not decided  who would 
be the most su itable  o f f ic e r  for t h is .
The question  o f an A u stralian  task force commander w il l  be pursued in
la te r  ch apters , but i t  should be observed that MacArthur gave the
A ustralians  ample warning o f h is  in tentions  for the last  three years
o f the w ar.
The d iscussio n  then turned to the Commonwealth Prime M in is t e r 's  
conference in  London, planned for early  1 9 44 , and Shedden mentioned 
C u r t in 's  in ter est  in  e sta b lis h in g  machinery for cooperation between 
members of the B r it is h  Commonwealth. Shedden assured MacArthur that 
the government had no in ten tio n  o f a lte r in g  its  re latio n sh ip  w ith  the 
SWPA Command. He sa id  that since America had the resources w ith  which 
to de feat  Japan , 'they  were e n t it le d  to the predominant say in  determ ining 
the s t r a t e g y '. The A ustralian  government would 'be  content to play 
it s  part  by furn ish in g  an appropriate component of the total f o r c e s '.
No doubt MacArthur was pleased  to receive this  assurance, but he 
fe lt  i t  necessary to draw attention  to the 'd iv erg en t  views which had 
arisen  in  the correspondence between him self and the Prime M in ister  in  
the last  few m o n th s '. Shedden mentioned the reports from several 
deaprtments of the 'ex cessiv e  demands and extravagant proposals by the
United States F o r c e s '. He sa id  that :
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Every care was taken in  the d ra ft in g  o f letters  
from the Prime M in iste r , b u t , when a question 
of p rin c ip le  was involved to which the A ustralian  
Government was unable to a g ree , i t  was in ev itab le  
that a divergence of opinion would a r is e . I t  was 
hoped to minimise any m isunderstanding by the fu l le s t  
possible  personal contacts.
Thus 1943 ended w ith  an acknowledgement that there had been
su b stantia l  disagreement between MacArthur and the A u s tra lia n s . But
Curtin  and Shedden seemed to b elieve  that most of the problems had been
resolved . Even Blarney had to acknowledge in  January 1944 that in  recent
months the US Services of Supply organisation  had been b u il t  up and that
233
the Americans were now p lann ing  to send service  personnel to A u s t r a lia .
But i f  Curtin  and Shedden were w il l in g  to give MacArthur the b e n e fit
of the doubt over matters of adm in istra tio n , p a rtic u la r ly  over the
234
control of American demands, Blarney was not. To him , M acArthur's
attitude  over the review  of American expenditure was symptomatic of
his  view of A u s t r a lia n 's  s trateg ic  ro le . Blam ey 's  hardening  attitude
towards MacArthur is  revealed  as a resu lt  of M acA rthur 's le tter  o f 6
November in  w hich , in  p a ss in g , he stated  that i t  had never been h is
235
in ten tio n  to defend A u s tra lia  on the m ainland of A u s tr a lia . Curtin
referred  the matter to Blarney who re p lie d  that there was 'no  ju s t if ic a t io n
236
fo r ' M acArthur's  statem ent. As Blam ey 's biographer noted , 'Even  in  a
23 3 . Le tter , Blarney to C u rtin , 13 January 1944 , MP 12 1 7 , Box 306 .
23 4 . L e tter s , Blarney to Shedden, 8 December, Curtin  to Blarney, 20 December, 
Blarney to Shedden, 20 December, 1 9 4 3 , Blarney Papers 6 . 2 .  Blam ey 's  
attitu de  is  also  revealed in  his  memoirs where he wrote that the lack
o f 'independence o f the A ustralian  government in  certain  m atters' greatly  
handicapped the A u stralian  army. 'Perhaps the most serious o f  these was 
in  the a llo catio n  of A u stralian  produced equipment . . .  The A ustralian  
government . . .  gave the American Command overall authority  in  the 
d istr ib u t io n  of much o f  the A ustralian  produced eq u ip m en t '. For 
correspondence on the same topic in  1945 see MP 7 2 9 /8 ,  item 2 0 /4 3 1 /1 9  
and MP 12 17 , Box 14.
235 . L e tter , MacArthur to C u r tin , 6 November 19 4 3 , CP 2 9 0 /1 6 ,  item Bundle 1.
236 . Le tter , Blarney to C u r tin , 28 January 1944 . Blarney Papers 12 . The 
o r ig in a l  is  in  MP 12 17 , Box 368 .
letter  to h is  Prime M in ister  a serving  so ld ier  can hardly c a ll  h is
superior  o f f ic e r  a l ia r . Blarney could not have gone closer to i t  than
237
he d id ' .
311
23 7 . H eth erin g to n , op .cit., p . 304 .
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CHAPTER SEVEN
BATTLEFIELD COOPERATION WITH THE AMERICANS 
1942-1943
Despite the numerous examples o f the disagreements between the 
B r it is h  and the Australians recounted in  Chapter Two, the most out­
standing  feature of th e ir  jo in t  operations was the fine  cooperation 
d isplayed  at a l l  le v e ls . W ith sim ilar  m ilitary  system s, common tra in in g  
methods and equipm ent, and a shared h e r it a g e , i t  is  not su rp r is in g  that 
A u stralian  units were able to f i t  smoothly into  B r it is h  form ations when 
necessary .
However, b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation with  the Americans was another 
m atter, and the events o f late 1942 and 1943 show that at times both 
sides  needed to display  tact , understanding  and goodwill to achieve 
e ffe c t iv e  cooperation. Furthermore, i t  is  suggested that as American 
power in creased  some senior  American o ff ic e r s  fe lt  less d isposed  towards 
making concessions for the sake o f  a l l ie d  cooperation.
Throughout the p erio d  o f Australian- Am erican cooperation there was 
a two way re latio n sh ip  between the problems o f  strateg ic  p la n n in g , and 
those o f b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation. D i f f ic u l t ie s  in  the one sphere could 
quite  e a s ily  create d i f f ic u l t ie s  in  the other. For exam ple, the 
composition o f  the force to invade the P h ilip p in e s  was determ ined partly  
by problems of b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation. And cutting  across both the 
spheres o f  strategy  and b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation was the problem of 
command r e la t io n s h ip s .
The pas de deux between A u s tra lia  and America over the command 
framework was introduced in  Chapter Three, and continues throughout 
the t h e s is . I t  is  not dealt  w ith  s p e c if ic a lly  in  this  chapter but i t  
is  an underlying  theme behind  the problems o f  b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation.
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Before the Americans jo ined  the land b a ttle  in  November 1 9 4 2 ,
i t  was already  apparent that there would be problems o f cooperation.
The American attitude  is  summed up by M acArthur's  comments to General
Eichelberger when he arrived  in  A u s tra lia  in  August 1942 ; he ordered
him to pay his  respects to the A ustralians  and then have nothing further
to do with them .^ But many Americans r e a lis e d  that i t  was important
to ensure good cooperation, and General Chamberlin exem p lified  this
when he wrote to the American commander o f a jo int  tra in in g  un it  whom
he heard had not showed the required  a d a p ta b ility :
I have had considerable experience in  d ealing  with 
conditions that e x is t  here in  A u s tra lia  and although 
I have to gnash my teeth on many o ccasio ns , I cannot 
help but r e a liz e  that I m yself cannot change th in gs .
We constantly  have to deal w ith  our A l l ie s . Their  
system , their  methods and th e ir  line  of thought are 
d iffe r e n t  from ours. In  many cases measured by our 
own stan dards , these methods appear most in e f f ic ie n t .
We detect when measured from our own standards what 
appears to us to be neglect and lack of e f fo r t . We 
fin d  in  some cases theory and p ractises  which according 
to our own t a c t ic a l  d o c trin es , i f  not by actual 
dem onstration, are faulty  and w i l l  necessarily  lead 
to f a i l u r e . In  sp ite  o f  anyone 's  ideas that these 
things are a ll  wrong, they cannot be corrected abruptly .
Great patience  is  necessary . I t  behooves a ll  o f us to 
know when to give in  and when to be firm . 2
The o ff ic e r  in  question  did  not appear to accept the advice and was
3
soon replaced , and Blarney commented that i t  was 'reg rettab le  that
otherwise capable o ff ic e r s  are not able to adjust  themselves r e a l is t ic a lly
4
to the conditions o f  mutual service  .
1 . L u v a a s , op.oit., p . 30.
2 . Le tter , Cham berlin to Colonel B .Q . Jo n es , Commandant, Jo in t  Overseas 
Operational T rain ing  School, 17 September 1942 , Stephen J .  Chamberlin 
Papers, US M ilitary  H istory  In s t it u t e , C a rly le , Pennsylvania .
3 . L etter , MacArthur to Blarney 26 September 1942 , Blarney Papers 48 .
Also memorandum, Berryman to Blarney, 22 September 1942 , Berryman Papers.
4 . Le tter , Blarney to MacArthur, 13 October 1 9 42 , Blarney Papers 48 .
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By November 1942 the s itu atio n  had developed to a po int  where 
Shedden fe lt  i t  necessary to brin g  the matter to the attention  o f  the 
Prime M in iste r , and he l is t e d  some in c id ents  which were lik e ly  to cause 
bad  fe e lin g . He began with the instances o f American o r ig in :
(i) The critic ism  of senior  A ustralian  permanent 
Army o ffic e r s  by General MacArthur.
(i i )  General M acArthur 's d is s a t is fa c t io n  with the 
standard of tra in in g  o f  the M i l i t ia  Forces 
sent to New Guinea.
( i i i )  General MacArthur's  cr iticism s  o f  the conduct 
o f Operations in  New G uinea .
(iv) A statement by General MacArthur that General
Blarney had asked that the forces being  organised  
to operate against  Lae and Salamaua should be e n tir e ly  
A u stralian . General MacArthur d id  not agree w ith  t h is , 
as he sa id  that he had ava ilab le  a parachute b a tta lio n  
which would be em inently su ited  for this operation , 
but  General Blarney was apparently  reluctant to use i t .
(v) The d iv is io n  o f  the Combined A ir  Force into  the 5th
American A ir  Force and the R .A .A .F .  Command. (I have 
heard reports that the Americans reached the conclusion 
that the only sa tisfa cto ry  arrangement was the entire  
separatio n  o f  the two fo rc e s , both operation ally  and 
in  respect o f ground maintenance u n i t s ) .
(vi) Also related  to the precedin g  item is  a c r itic ism  o f 
A ir  Vice-Marshal Jones in  regard  to the use of 
operational inform ation obtained  by him from A ll ie d  
H eadquarters. I understand h is  cr itic ism  at the 
Advisory War Council o f the a b il it y  and courage of 
American fig h ter  squadrons in  New Guinea reached American 
e a r s .
(v ii) During my v is it  to Brisbane I asked the O f f ic e r  in
Charge o f the Defence S e cre ta r ia t  to obtain  from the 
Combined Operational In te llig e n c e  Centre a copy o f  
the fu ll  d a ily  s itu a tio n  report, in  order that I might 
compare i t  w ith  the s itu a tio n  report furnished  by the 
Commander-in-Chief for the inform ation o f  the Advisory 
War Council. I t  w i l l  be re ca lled  that you had w ritten  
to the Commander-in-Chief regarding  the meagre nature 
o f  these reports . I understand my request was reported 
to the C h ie f  of S t a f f ,  who repeated i t  to the Commander- 
in- Chief, and that there was quite  a d iscussion  as to 
whether the inform ation should be made ava ilable  to me.
I mention this merely to in d icate  that a simple request 
was apparently  viewed w ith  some susp icio n .
(v i i i )  The Commander-in-Chief's le tte r  o f  25th September in  
which an independent attitu de  was adopted on works 
procedure, by statin g  that the Americans had funds at 
th e ir  disposal for the execution  o f the works they 
required  and presumably were not dependent on Lease- 
Lend f a c i l i t i e s .
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(ix ) The extravagant expenditure incurred  under
reciprocal Lease-Lend on items which would not 
be admitted as a p u b lic  charge in  the case of 
the A u stralian  F o rces .^
Shedden thought that MacArthur was quite  e n t it le d  to the views or
actions noted in  paragraphs (i) to ( v ) , but he fa ile d  to take into
account that in  many cases M acArthur 's cr iticism s were ill- inform ed .
Shedden then gave two instances o f  A ustralian  o r ig in :
(i) The statement by General Sturdee when C hief 
o f  the General S t a f f  that the American S t a f f  
were very academic in  th e ir  outlook and lacked 
p ra c t ic a l  experience in  w arfa re , w ith  the re su lt  
that they adopted a rather r ig id  textbook or 
s t a f f  college attitude  towards problems.
( i i )  The statement o f  L ie u t . -General Rowell that
he had had a keen argument with Major-General 
Suth erlan d , C h ie f  o f  S t a f f ,  when the latter  
v is ite d  Port Moresby to ascertain  why certain  
things were not be ing  done. L ie u t . -General 
Rowell sa id  that by working e n tir ely  o f f  the map 
in  Brisbane the American S t a f f  were unaware o f the 
p r a c t ic a b il it y  o f  the execution  o f  the orders they 
were is s u in g . Major-General Berryman, Chief o f 
S t a f f ,  Land Forces Headquarters, also  referred  to 
the issue o f im practicable  orders to local commanders 
in  New G u in e a . 6
No comment was o ffe r e d , but i t  might be observed that in  both cases 
the A u stralian  attitudes appear to have been ju s t i f ie d .
The d ifferen c es  between the A ustralians  and the Americans came 
to a head in  late November 1942 with the so- called 'B a ttle  o f B r is b a n e ',
7
when A ustralian s  fought Americans in  the streets of B risb an e . But 
although the problems on the home front w ith in  A u s tra lia  were important for 
a l l ie d  r e la t io n s , problems on the b a t t le f ie ld  were l ik e ly  to have a more
5 . Memorandum, Shedden to C urtin , 11 November 1942 , M P1217, Box 293 .
6 . Ibid. The problems covered in  item (i i )  are dealt  w ith in  Horner, 
Crisis of Command, Chapter 7 and 8 . W ith  regard to item ( i ) , E ichelberger  
wrote that the A ustralian s  regarded the Americans as 'inexp erien ced  
t h e o r is t s '.  E ic h elb erg e r , op.cit.,  p . 21 .
7 . See D. McCarthy, South-West Pacific Area: First Year, Appendix 3, 
and National Times, 10-15 February 1 9 7 5 . Also Blarney Papers 5 . 2 ( 6 ) .
crucial impact on a l l ie d  strategy , and by the time of the Battle  of 
Brisbane American troops were already  in  action in  New Guinea .
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The Impact of the American Failure  at Buna
The f ir s t  major operation in  which American land forces cooperated 
clo sely  w ith  A ustralian s  was during the last  stage of the Papuan 
campaign, when the a ll ie s  closed in  on the Japanese beachhead at Buna,
Q
Gona and Sana'nanda. However, before the Americans even saw actio n , 
some bad fe e lin g  had been engendered by u n fa ir  cr itic ism  o f the 
A ustralian s  by senior American o ff ic e r s  in  Brisbane during the f ig h tin g  
on the Kokoda T r a il  in  September 1942 . I t  mattered l it t l e  to the 
A ustralians  that MacArthur might have been under great s t r a in , or that 
h is  comments might have been made to e s ta b lis h  an a l ib i  i f  he was 
un su ccessfu l, or that he might have been trying  to secure increased
9
American support. The A ustralian s  were angry and would be watching 
closely  the performance o f the Americans in  their  f ir s t  campaign.
M acArthur's c r itic ism  of the A ustralian s  was no t , however, ju st  
rh e to r ic , for many self- confident Americans b e lie v ed  that their  forces 
would have no trouble d ealing  w ith  the Japanese , whom the less capable 
A ustralian s  had been unable to d e fe a t . For exam ple, one American 
observer noted that:
GHQ was a fr a id  to turn the Americans loose and 
let  them capture Buna because i t  would be a blow 
to the prestige  o f  the A ustralian s  who had fought 
the long hard battle  a ll  through the Owen Stanley  
Mountains and who therefore should be the ones 
to capture Buna.-*-®
8 . An American engineer  unit had taken part  in  the b attle  at Milne Bay 
in  late August 19 4 2 , but their  co ntribution  had no t  been s ig n if ic a n t .
9 . M acArthur's  cr it ic ism  and h is  p o ss ib le  motives are discussed  in  
Horner, Crisis of Command, Chapters 7 , 8 and 9 .
10 . Quoted in  M iln er , op.cit.,  p . 1 3 8 .
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In d ee d , Major-General E .F .  Harding , the commander of the 32nd US
D iv is io n , doubted that the Japanese would defend Buna strongly , and
that he 'm ight fin d  i t  easy p ic k in g s '
I t  came as a severe shock to the Americans when their  assault  on
Buna on 19 November was repulsed , and MacArthur by-passed the chain  o f
12
command to order Harding to 'Take Buna today at a ll  c o s t s '.  But a
week la te r  the Americans had not advanced. The A ustralians now began
to complain that the Americans would not f ig h t , w ith General Vasey,
o f the 7th A ustralian  D iv is io n , com plaining that the Americans had
13
'm ainta ined  a masterly i n a c t i v i t y '.
This was the sort o f  inform ation which Blarney used to give
MacArthur back some o f  the m edicine which he had been forced to swallow
in  August and September when the A ustralians  were being  driven  back
along the Kokoda T r a i l ,  and were in  action at Milne Bay. General
E ic h elb erg e r , who later  took over from H arding , commented that General
Berryman told him in  e f fe c t :
The jokes o f the American o ffic e r s  in  A u s t r a lia , 
making fun o f the A ustralian  Army were told a ll  
over A u s tra lia  . . .  Therefore . . .  when w e 'v e  got 
the least  thing on the American troops fig h tin g  
in  the Buna secto r , our high command has gone to 
General MacArthur and rubbed s a lt  in  h is  wounds.
11 . L e tte r , Harding  to Sutherlan d , 14 October 1942 , AWM 5 8 1 /3 / 5 .
12 . L ida  Mayo, Bloody Buna (Doubleday, New York, 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 102 .
HQ NGF received  this  order at 0240 hours 21 November 19 42 , War Diary 
HQ NGF, G (Air) Branch, November 1942 , AWM 1 / 5 / 5 1 .
13 . L e tter , Vasey to Blarney, 25 November 1942 , Blarney Papers 1 7 1 .2 .  
Vasey told  Blarney: 'The s itu atio n  on the front of 126 US Regt remains 
in activ e  and u n sa tis fa cto r y . I saw Tomlinson [the US commander] this  
afternoon and he said  he was "em barassed" by the present s itu a t io n . I 
sa id  I was t o o ' .
14 . E ichelberger  D ic t a t io n s , Book 2 , p p .V II- 1 2 2 , V II- 123 .
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He added that MacArthur, Kenney and Sutherland  were 'n o t  g u il t le s s '
among those who made disparaging  remarks about the A u s tra lia n s . Blam ey's
attitude  was ne ith er  d ig n if ie d  nor d ip lo m atic , but in  view o f M acArthur's
str ictu res  on the A IF , i t  can be understood. Thus when on 25 November
MacArthur suggested brin g in g  the 41st  US D iv is io n  up from A u s tra lia  to
rein fo rce  the 7th D iv is io n , Blarney o b jected . General Kenney, who was
p r e s e n t , recorded that :
Blarney frankly  s a id  he would rather put in  more 
A u s tr a lia n s , as he knew they would fig h t  . . .  I 
think i t  was a b it t e r  p i l l  for General MacArthur 
to swallow but he agreed that we would fly  in  
the A ustralian  21st  Brigade .
Whatever the calibre  o f the American troops , one problem was the
lack o f coopeation between Harding and h is  immediate A ustralian
su p erio r , Lieutenant- General E .F .  H err in g . Harding  fe lt  that he had
received  less than h is  share o f  adm inistrative  support, and that Herring
'seemed to take an almost detached view o f the tr ia ls  and trib u latio n s
16
o f my all-American c o n t in g e n t '. Herring  thought that Harding cut a
17
’ p a th etic  f ig u r e ' and had lo st  h is  nerve. C ertainly  Harding had lost
the confidence o f  H errin g , Blarney, and eventually  MacArthur and Sutherland ,
18
and early  in  December he was re lie v e d  by General E ich elb erg er .
15 . Kenney, op .cit.,  p . 15 1 . Blam ey 's request to use the 21st Brigade 
added further in s u lt  to h is  cr iticism s o f  the Americans, for the 21st 
Brigade was already understrength and exhausted  from its  battles  on the 
Kokoda T r a i l .
16 . M iln er , op .cit.,  p p .1 0 9 , 201 .
17 . Interview  w ith  Lieutenant- General S ir  Edmund H err ing , 25 June 1974. 
See also  Stuart Sayers , Ned Herringy A Life of Sir Edmund Herring 
(Hyland House, Melbourne, and A ustralian  War Memorial, Canberra, 1 9 8 0 ) , 
p . 239 . On the f i r s t  day o f  the campaign Harding had been on a lugger 
which had been sunk by Zeroes . He had had to swim to shore. This a ir  
attack is  described  in J .W .  O 'B r ie n , Guns and Gunners (Angus & Robertson, 
Sydney, 1 9 5 0 ) ,  p . 171 .
18 . This in c id en t  is  described  in  d e t a il  in  E ic h elb erg er , op.cit., 
p .4 2 f f  and M iln er , op.cit. , p .2 0 3 f f .  See also  H orner, Crisis of Command, 
Ch. Ten.
The impact of E ichelberger  shows the degree to which e ffec tiv e
b a t t l e f ie l d  cooperation depends on p e r s o n a lit ie s . Herring  described
E ic h e lb e r g e r 1s arrival as 'a  very pure breath o f fresh a i r 1 , that 'blew
away a great deal o f  the im purities that were stopping us getting  on
19
with  the j o b ' . A s p ir it  o f  cooperation soon developed and Herring
20
and E ichelb erger  became firm  fr ie n d s . By 11 December Herring  was
21
b egin n in g  to believe  that the Americans might make some progress.
Furtherm ore, as the f ig h tin g  continued it  became obvious that the
A ustralian s  too were having trouble clearing  the Japanese from their
swampy bastions  at Gona and Sanananda.
But Blarney in  Port Moresby continued to make fu l l  ca p ital  out of
the American f a i l u r e . On 4 December he informed C urtin : 'My fa ith  in
the M i l i t ia  is  growing, but  my faith  in  the Americans has sunk to
22
z e r o ' . When H erring  told  Blarney that the Americans were improving
Blarney re p lie d :
I would be very sorry to do anything that would 
im pair the good relatio n s  you have estab lish ed  with 
the Am ericans, but I doubt very much whether Buna 
w i l l  be captured i f  we rely  on them to do i t .^ 3
And indeed  Blarney sent the fresh and experienced  18th A u stralian  Brigade
to Buna, where with the support o f  A ustralian  tanks, they were su cce ss fu l .
One lesson o f  the Buna experience appears to b e , that in  a co alitio n
the in flu en ce  o f  the ju n io r  partner is  related  d irectly  to the re lativ e
19 . L u v a a s , op .cit.,  p . 16 .
20 . H erring  in terv iew ; E ichelberger  Papers , passim; Sayer , op.cit., 
p p .239 , 240 .
21 . L e tter s , Herring  to Blarney, 10 , 11 December 1942 , Blarney Papers 
1 7 0 .2 .
22 . L e tter , Blarney to C urtin , 4 December 19 42 , Blarney Papers 12 .
23 . L e tter , Blarney to H err ing , 11 December 1942 , Blarney Papers 1 7 0 .2 .
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performances o f the f ig h tin g  troops; or more s t r ic t ly , to the perceptions
o f  the relativ e  perform ances. E ich elb erger  seemed to realise  t h is , for
on 25 December he warned MacArthur:
My relatio n s  w ith  General H erring  have been 
most happy and I am in c lin e d  to think that 
his criticism s o f the American troops might 
not have been as strong as General Blarney might 
indicate  . . .  You have been very p atien t  but I 
hope you w il l  not le t  any A u stralian  generals 
talk  down their  nose at you. When these 
[American] troops have been chased by the 
Japanese as often  as the A ustralians  they w il l  
be ju st  as good and I think perhaps b e t t e r . ^
The next day he continued in  the same ve in  cautioning  MacArthur not
to le t  the A ustralian s  's p r in g  the num erical strength o f  my forces
25
on y o u ',  as he had a long supply line  and many men in  h o s p ita l .
Perhaps MacArthur took notice o f E ic h e lb e r g e r ' s caution not to let
Blarney spring  the 'numbers game' on him , for on 27 December he ordered
the f ir s t  regiment o f the 41st US D iv is io n  (163rd) to be sent to
E ic h e lb e r g e r ' s command. This action by-passed the chain o f  command,
since Blarney was Commander o f  the A l l ie d  Land Forces and of New Guinea •
Force, and had intended the regiment to be sent to V asey 's  command in
the Sanananda area . Blarney fe lt  that th is  was a matter o f p r in c ip le ,
and that he was now strong enough to stand up to MacArthur. Hence,
in  a strong letter  to MacArthur he stated  that there were sound m ilitary
reasons for sending the regiment to Vasey . He continued:
I regret s t i l l  more that you should have personally  
taken control of a sin gle  phase o f the a c t i o n . . .
With the greatest  respect I would urge for your 
consideration  that this  a lte ra tio n  o f  p lan  w il l  
profoundly d isturb  [H erring 's] confidence and 
upset h is  arrangem ents. General Herring  is 
responsible  for the whole front and I regret
24 . Le tter , E ichelb erger  to MacArthur, 25 December 1942 , E ichelb erger  
P a p e rs .
2 5 . L e tter , E ichelberger  to MacArthur, 26 December 1942 , 1■oc.cit.
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exceedingly  that he should be p laced  in  the 
p o sitio n  o f doubt and uncertainty  as to 
the troops that w i l l  be ava ilable  to him , and as 
to which authority  he may exercise  over them.
I do not for one moment question  the rig h t  
o f the Commander-in-Chief to give such orders 
as he may think f i t ,  but  I b e liev e  that nothing 
is  more contrary to sound p r in c ip le s  o f command 
than that the Commander-in-Chief or the Commander,
A l l ie d  Land Forces, should take over the personal 
d irec tio n  o f  portion  of the b a t t le . This can only 
resu lt  in  d istu rb in g  the confidence o f the in fe r io r  
commanders.26
In  September Blarney had bowed to the w ishes o f  MacArthur and had 
moved to Port Moresby, tr ig g erin g  the eventual d ism issal o f Row ell.
Then in  October Blarney had not objected  to MacArthur's  strong sign als  
from Brisbane c r it ic is in g  General A llen  on the Kokoda T r a i l , but now 
Blarney sought to protect H erring . This illu s t r a t e s  how clo sely  a 
commander's performance is  t ie d  to what he perceives to be the strength 
o f h is  p o s it io n , and indeed the strength of h is  r i v a l 's  p o s it io n .
MacArthur did  not agree w ith  Blarney, and rep lied  that the Buna area
was the most important and that the Japanese force at Sanananda was
27
less than that im agined by the lo c a l  commanders. He concluded:
I do not for a moment agree w ith  your view that 
I am unduly in t e r fe r in g  with the local d eta ils  
o f  the operation . I am in  no way attem pting 
to control ta c t ic a l  execution  on the front but 
am merely s tr a te g ic a lly  ad v isin g  as to where I 
be lie v e  i t  would be wise to exert  the main e ffo r t  
of the ground fo rces . I think you w il l  realise  
from your own long experience that no Commander- 
in- Chief, present  on the f ie ld  o f operations as 
I am, could have given greater latitu de  to you or
26 . L e tter , Blarney to MacArthur, 27 December 1942 , Blarney Papers, 4 3 .6 3 1 .
27 . In  this  he was wrong. The Japanese forces in  the beachhead probably  
numbered over 8 .0 0 0 .  Of these there were about 2 ,5 0 0  in  the Cape 
Endaiadere-Buna area (McCarthy, op.cit., p . 4 8 5 ) . I f  we assume that 
there were 1 ,0 0 0  troops in  the Gona area (M ilner, p . 145 says 800) that 
leaves some 4 ,5 0 0  for the whole Sanananda area . There would have been
at least  2 ,0 0 0  Japanese in  the defences fac ing  V asey 's  troops.
Blarney and E ichelberger at Buna. Blarney said  that Ma m iracle had been 
perform ed ."
(AWM Negative  N o .14094)
E ic h elb erg er , Herring  and Blarney examine a three inch AA gun captured from 
the Japanese at the Government Gardens , Buna.
(AWM Negative N o .14099)
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expressed both by word and deed greater confidence 
in  the commanders involved . Complete c o r d ia lity , 
understanding and goodwill have p revailed  between 
us up to the present and I cannot but hope that 
this  co nditio n , so e sse n tia l  to success , w i l l  be 
m aintained . You have m istaken my advice as an 
arbitrary  order. Since my assumption o f this 
command, and throughout its  duration , any order 
that I issue has been and w il l  be in  w ritten  form.
My verbal d iscussion s  are advisory o n l y . ^ 8
Yet when Blarney had gone to Milne Bay on 25 September he had 'o rd ered '
29
General Clowes to send troops to W anigela . When Clowes and Rowell
had o b jected , Blarney had been adamant that i t  had been advice only and
not an o rd er . He now found h im self in  the same p o sitio n  as R ow ell.
Nevertheless he chose to ignore the im plied  threat of M acArthur 's
le tte r , accepted i t  at face valu e , and inform ed Herring  that although
there had been 'a  keen d iffe re n c e  of opinion between' h im self and
30
MacArthur, the regiment would go to V asey 's  area . No more was heard
from MacArthur on the su b je c t . At that time MacArthur viewed h is  own
31
p o sit io n  as p re ca r io u s , and in  the event he did  not overrule Blarney.
A fter  the i n i t i a l  d i f f ic u l t ie s  with Harding, there seems to be no
doubt that the a l l ie d  commanders on the b a t t le f ie ld  made every e ffo r t
to ensure cooperation . Indeed on 18 January E ichelberger  wrote that
he had 'no  complaint concerning the A u s tra lia n s . They have seemed w ill in g
32
to extend the hand o f  f r i e n d s h i p '. Problems were quickly  resolv ed .
Ibr example on 16 January Vasey wrote that he was 'not  convinced 
that [the Americans under h is  command], are quite  as aggressive when i t
28 . L etter , MacArthur to Blarney, 28 December 19 42 , Blarney Papers, 
4 3 .6 3 1 ;  also  RG4, MacArthur Memorial.
29 . This in c id e n t  is described  in  Horner, Crisis of Command, p . 17 8 .
30 . L e tter , Blarney to H err ing , 28 December 1942 , Blarney Papers 1 7 0 .2 .
31. On 26 December MacArthur had told H errin g : 'T h is  s itu atio n  is  
becoming very s e r io u s . I f  we c a n 't  clear this  up quickly  I ' l l  be 
fin ish e d  and so w il l  your General Blarney'. Herring  in terview , 25 June 
1974 .
32. L e tter , E ichelb erger  to MacArthur, 18 January 1943 , E ichelberger  
P a p e rs .
Major-General G .A . 
Vasey , Commander of 
7th A ustralian  
D iv isio n^an d  Colonel 
Jens A . Doe of the 
163rd US Regiment. 
Vasey thought that 
Doe 1s men lacked 
o ffen s iv e  s p ir it .
(AWM Negative 
N o .30 258 /1 7 )
Lieutenant- General R .L . 
E ic h elb erg er . He said  
that he had 'no  complaint 
concerning the 
A u s t r a l ia n s ' .
(AWM Negative N o .17264)
comes to close work as is  necessary to f in is h  the J a p s '.  On 18 January
Vasey d iscussed  the^ 'la ck  o f  o ffensive  s p ir it ' of the 163rd  Regiment with 
34
E ic h elb erg e r , but when, at the la t t e r 's  suggestion , they both inspected  
the forward American p i t s , they discovered  that the 163rd  was acting  
a g g r e s s iv e ly .
The experience during the campaign had an important impact on
MacArthur, for early  in  January 1943 he set  in  motion a chain o f  events
35
to remove American units from A ustralian  command. I t  would be an
exaggeration  to claim  that the problems o f  a ll ie d  cooperation in  Papua
in  late  1942 contributed  d irec tly  to this  actio n . Rather i t  is  l ik e ly
that MacArthur had decided to separate the A ustralians  and Americans
36
some s ix  months e a r l ie r . But the events at Buna, and Blam ey's 
h u m ilia tin g  taun ts , convinced him that he could delay no longer.
Incidents  at Nassau and Tambu Bays
A fter  Buna, American combat units came under d ire c t  A ustralian  
command on only one other occasion , and the exercise  proved again the 
d i f f ic u lt y  o f  b a t t le f ie ld  cooperation between a ll ie s  with d iffe r e n t  
system s. The incidents  took place follow ing  the landing  o f American 
troops at Nassau Bay at the end of June 1943 to support the advance 
o f  the 3rd A u stralian  D iv is io n , under Major-General S .G .  S a v ig e , towards 
Salam aua.
The American force , known as MacKechnie Force, consisted  of the 
1st B a ttalio n  o f  the 162nd Regiment o f  the 41st  US D iv is io n  and was
33. L e tte r , Vasey to B rig ad ier  H o p k in s ,16 January 19 4 3 , Vasey Papers 
2 /9 .
34 . War Diary HQ 7 D iv is io n , G Branch, January 19 43 , AWM 1 /5 / 1 4 .
35 . These events are described  in  Chapter S ix .
36. See Chapter Four.
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Operations, Nassau Bay to Salamaua.
From: Reports of General MacArthur3 
V o l . l ,  p . 119.
Nassau Bay, 1 July  
1 9 4 3 , the day after  
the landing  of 
MacKechnie Force.
(AWM Negative 
N o .55710)
Lieutenant- 
General E .F .  
H err in g , GOC 
NGF.
(AWM Negative 
N o .64081)
Major-General S .G .  
Sa v ig e , GOC 3rd 
A ustralian  D iv is io n , 
observing  the 
Japanese p o sitions  
at Komiatum from 
a Forward Obser­
vation Post . In 
front of him is 
B r igadier  M .J .
Moten, Commander of 
the 17th Brigade .
(AWM Negative 
N o .55638)
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commanded by Colonel Archibald R. MacKechnie, the commander of the 162nd
Regiment. Unfortunately MacKechnie was not sure whether he was to come
directly under the command of Savige or of his own divisional commander,
General Fuller. Hence when Savige ordered MacKechnie to advance, the
American claimed that Fuller had instructed him not to do so unless he
37was adequately supported by artillery and heavy weapons.
The problem was caused when Lieutenant-General Herring, the Commander
of New Guinea Force in Port Moresby, left the command arrangements vague
lest the Americans at Nassau Bay should feel uncomfortable in being
38commanded by Savige from his headquarters across the mountains. Herring's
actions had the reverse effect to what he had intended. Indeed Savige
wrote later that, 'while openly supporting the principle of unified
command by written and oral statements, [Herring] undermined action to
39achieve it because he was "diffident" about it'. And it was only after
a conference at Port Moresby on 5 July attended by Herring, Fuller and
Savige, that Herring issued instructions that MacKechnie was to come under
40Australian command. The problem was therefore resolved, but the comments
of the official historian are pertinent:
Whenever the allocation of command is deliberately 
or unconsciously left vague, there is trouble.
This incident might well have served as a warning 
to prevent further such incidents. But for the sane
37. Dexter, op.cit., p.104. Signal, 17 Brigade to HQ 3 Division, 5 July 
1943, War Diary, HQ 3 Divison, General Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
38. Notes of Interview between D. Dexter and Herring, 6 April 1951, Gavin 
Long Correspondence - Herring. Herring said: 'Had I put them under a 
commander 2 or 3 mortars away from the coast they might have protested
to MacArthur'. But Herring claimed that he made the situation clear in 
a conference with Savige and Fuller on 31 May, and again on 15 June with 
Savige, Berryman, McKechnie and Col. Sweeney, a senior US staff officer. 
Herring Comments on Official History, loc.cit.
39. Comments by Lieutenant-General Sir Stanley Savige on the Official 
History, Savige Papers AWM.
40. Savige's notes on the Conference, War Diary, HQ 3 Division, General 
Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
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attitude of the commanders and the genuine friendship 
between the Australian and American troops in the 
front line, relations between the two commands might 
have been strained at this time. Give and take was 
necessary on both sides.
However, within a week the problem flared again, for MacArthur had
authorised Herring to send the 3rd Battalion of the 162nd Regiment along
the coast from Nassau Bay to Tambu Bay, where guns were to be installed
42to bombard Salamaua. This new force, Coane Force, was to be commanded
by Brigadier-General Ralph W. Coane, who was instructed that he came under
43the command of Fuller at Popondetta. Savige was informed that MacKechnie 
Force remained under his command, but since Coane Force (which Savige 
claims he was not aware existed!) included an uncommitted battalion, of 
MacKechnie's 162nd Regiment, he wrongly assumed that the new troops also 
came under his command.
The difficulties thus engendered can be gauged by the reply received
when the Australians attempted to issue orders to the commander of the
3rd Battalion 162nd Regiment:
Regret cannot comply your request through MacKechnie 
force dated July 14. I have no such orders from my 
Commanding Officer [Coane]. As a piece of friendly 
advice your plans show improper reconnaissance and lack 
of logistical understanding. Suggest you send competent 
liaison officer to my headquarters soon as possible 
to study situation. For your information I obey no 
orders except those from my immediate superior.^
This reply was sent by Major Archibald B. Roosevelt, who, although he was
commanding the 3rd Battalion, might well have been more reticent about
offering military advice. His previous military service had been in
the First World War and he was now fifty years of age. It was only
41. Dexter, op.cit., p.,201.
42. Herring to Gavin Long, 6 August 1946, Gavin Long Notes, W4, AWM.
43. Letter of instruction from Fuller to Coane, 11 July 1947, War Diary,
HQ 3 Division, General Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
44. Signal, Roosevelt to 17 Brigade, repeated to 3 Division, 14 July 1943, 
loc.cit. See also Blarney Papers 43.632.
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because he was the son of Theodore Roosevelt, and because of the special
interest of President Franklin Roosevelt, that he was given the command,
and even then he knew he was 'too old physically speaking, and mentally'.
45Indeed he described his tactics as 'both rusty and old fashioned'.
Savige had misunderstood Herring's intention that Coane Force should
remain under American command, and after further futile attempts to give
46orders to Roosevelt, he wrote to Herring warning that 'a confused and
impossible situation has now arisen which makes it impossible to coordinate
47control of operations now progressing in 3 Aust Div area'. As a result,
on 15 July Herring ordered Coane Force to come under the command of the
o j  • • 483rd Division.
This was not, however, the end to the confusion, for some days
earlier Coane, who was the artillery commander of the 41st Division, had
been appointed artillery commander of the 3rd Divison. Now with Coane
Force underway, it was agreed that Coane's artillery deputy, Colonel
William D. Jackson, should act as artillery commander for the 3rd Division
until Coane himself decided to assume duties as CRA (Commander, Royal
Artillery). This of course was an unsatisfactory solution, but for
49the moment Savige was reluctant to change command of Coane Force.
Meanwhile, as he put it later, MacKechnie was 'placed in the
. 50unenviable position of trying to obey two masters . His operations
45. Letter, Roosevelt to MacArthur, 1 May 1943, Sutherland Papers, 
Miscellaneous, National Archives.
46. To an order sent by’Savige through MacKechnie Force, Roosevelt 
replied: 'I do not recognise this signature. I take orders only from my 
commanding general 41 US Div and will hereafter be careful to certify his 
signature'. Signal, Roosevelt to 3 Divison, 15 July 1943, War Diary,
HQ 3 Division, General Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
47. Letter, Savige to Herring, 15 July 1943, loc.cit.
48. Signal, Herring to Savige, 15 July 1943, loc.cit.
49. Savige's Notes on Official History. See also Summary of Decisions
of Conference and HQ NGF, 19 July 1943, AWM 591/7/21, and Record Covering 
Conference HQ NGF, 19 July 1943, War Diary, HQ 3rd Division, General 
Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
50. Miller, op.cit., p.201.
were under the control of the 3rd Division, while his beachhead was
controlled by the 41st Division. As a result he asked to be relieved of
command of the 162nd Regiment,and this request was granted on 22 July.
Although a number of difficult situations had been created, it is
clear that harmony ultimately rested on the personalities of the commanders
involved. The attitude of Major Roosevelt is revealed in a letter which
he wrote to MacArthur, using the special access obtained by his name and
the interest of the President:
The combination of two foreign groups and the ill 
organized control produced, and is now producing, 
contradictory orders and no rigid chain of command 
has or can be established ...
The situation has been brought about by the 
intermingling of the two armies - Australian 
and American - and will steadily become worse to 
the detriment of the American Army.^l
On the other hand the infantry commander of Coane Force, Lieutenant-
Colonel Charles A. Fertig, tried to keep Roosevelt's mind on the main
task. He advised Roosevelt to clean out the Japanese first, and then
'if higher command decides to clean up on the Aussies, we will concentrate
on them. Frankly, Major, I am more concerned about the attitude of
the men of your battalion at the moment than I am about any attempt
52of the Aussies to throw a block on us'.
But while his troops remained inactive, rather than attacking the 
Japanese as had been ordered, Roosevelt continued to harp on the unsatis­
factory arrangements, and in a ten page letter to MacArthur he complained 
of the problem created by two different military systems: 'God knows 
we have as bad failings as theirs, but we are accustomed to our failings 
and are better able to deal with and correct them'. He warned MacArthur 
that friction between the Australians and the Americans could 'flare into 
an international incident' and that his soldiers felt that they were
51. Letter, Roosevelt to MacArthur, 26 July 1943, Sutherland Papers, 
Miscellaneous.
52. Letter, Fertig to Roosevelt, 27 July 1943, loc.oit.
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'being made into Hessians for Australia'. The result would be dangerous
to MacArthur, and Roosevelt concluded by urging him to 'get all American
53ground forces out of New Guinea as quickly as possible'.
54Savige had already lost faith in Roosevelt, and soon began to
loose faith in Coane, who, while commanding Coane Force, appeared to be
sending instructions to Jackson about the control of artillery.^
Savige believed that Coane Force had displayed a lack of aggression
and enterprise, and finally, on 7 August, he recommended the removal
of Coane and Roosevelt from their commands and that MacKechnie should
take over from Coane.^ In an interview with Gavin Long, Savige put
it another way:
the regimental commander (162 Regt) spent all
his time in his tent and most of it lying
on his bed. I decided to sack him and Roosevelt.
They said 'You can't do that. It's very political'.
I did it and waited to see what would h a p p e n . 57
Herring discussed the changes with MacArthur's chief of staff, Sutherland,
and on 11 August MacArthur confirmed that MacKechnie was to resume
command. ^
Thus ended the command problems at Nassau and Tambu Bays, with 
MacArthur supporting the Australian recommendations for the relief of
53. Letter, Roosevelt to MacArthur, 7 August 1943, loc.cit.
54. Precis of telephone conversation, Savige to Brigadier Moten, 23 July
1943, War Diary, HQ 3rd Division, General Staff, AWM 1/5/4.
55. Letter, Savige to Herring, 1 August 1943, loc.cit.
56. Signal, Savige to Herring, 7 August 1943, loc.cit.
57. Interview with Savige, 3 February 1945, Gavin Long Notes, No.69,
AWM.
58. Signal B106, Herring to MacArthur, 10 August 1943, RG 316, Box 72, 
National Archives. Herring agreed with Savige that Roosevelt and Coane 
had 'proved unsatisfactory commanders in the circumstances'. Letter, 
Herring to Dexter, 21 January 1952, Gavin Long Correspondence - Herring.
59. Signal XC-5975, MacArthur to Herring, 11 August 1943, loc.cit. ; also 
RG4 MacArthur Memorial. The message reached Savige on 12 August, War 
Diary HQ NGF, August 1943, AWM 1/5/51.
American officers, but it was to be the last occasion when he would 
allow such a situation to develop. It is not known how much he was 
influenced by Roosevelt's letters, but the events of 1944 were to show 
that he had decided that Americans were no longer to serve under 
Australian command, and furthermore, when Australians formed part of 
American formations they were to use American supplies and equipment.
And this decision was to have repercussions over the employment of 
Australians in the planning of the invasions of the Philippines and 
Japan.
Planning for Lae
The advance by the 3rd Australian Division and the 162nd US
Regiment towards Salamaua coincided with the planning for the attack
on Lae, and during this period certain differences in doctrine and
temperament between the Australian and American planning staffs became
evident. In particular, the main critic of Australian planning was
MacArthur's Chief of Operations, Brigadier-General Steven J. Chamberlin,
and ironically, he was one of the most popular senior Americans with
the Australians. MacArthur described him as 'a sound, careful staff
officer, a master of tactical detail and possessed of bold strategic
60concepts, he was a pillar of new strength . Eichelberger, who had 
no love for MacArthur's staff, wrote to his wife: 'Don't sell Steve
Chamberlin short. Anything he says can be relied on because he is a
, , 6 1  very honest person .
In later years Australian officers were complimentary about
Chamberlin. Berryman wrote to him that
60. MacArthur, Reminiscences, p.168. James, op.cit., Vol.II, p.182, 
says Chamberlin was 'probably the most competent' of the GHQ staff 
section heads.
61. Letter, Eichelberger to his wife, 6 August 1945, Eichelberger Papers.
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Without you I cannot visualise how Headquarters 
would have worked as you were the linch-pin 
that held them together and also the motive 
power in the implementation of General MacArthur's 
plans.62
And the war-time CGS, General Northcott wrote that
we have always appreciated your helpful, honest 
and wholehearted cooperation ... you have 
always been most willing to help the Australian 
Forces. When you could not meet all that we 
asked you have never hesitated to tell us, and 
patiently explain why it could not fit in to the 
general p l a n . 63
Nevertheless, Chamberlin had not seen action before arriving in
Australia, and he had had no opportunity to temper his training with
experience. Indeed, he informed Berryman that he would have achieved
64no more than twenty percent at the US Command and Staff School.
As planning developed for the Lae operation Chamberlin became 
increasingly concerned at the apparent lack of detail supplied by the 
Australian planners. General Blarney had delegated the detailed planning 
to General Herring in Port Moresby, and in turn he had left General 
Vasey of the 7 th Eli vision to organise the air landing arrangements 
with General Whitehead of the Fifth Air Force, and General Wootten of
the 9th Division to organise the amphibious landing with Admiral Barbey
65of the 7th Amphibious Fleet. Chamberlin s concern is shown by a letter 
to Admiral Barbey on 13 July:
62. Letter, Berryman to Chamberlin, 6 September 1948, Berryman Papers.
63. Letter, Northcott to Chamberlin, 3 May 1946, Northcott Papers,
ML MSS 1431/16.
64. Berryman interview, 1 May 1974.
65. Report on Operations, New Guinea 22 January-8 October 1943, by 
Lieutenant-General E.F. Herring, AWM 589/7/1. Both Wootten and Vasey 
were about to begin their fifth campaign of the war. Vasey had fought 
in Libya, Greece, Crete and Papua. Wootten at Giarabub, Tobruk, Milne 
Bay and Buna-Sanananda.
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I hope your planners will continue to push the 
matter of detailed planning. I arranged, before 
I left New Guinea, to have two officers from the 
Sixth Army join the Australian staff to assist in 
planning. These officers, who have just been 
through the mill, and your own planners should 
be able to render great assistance to the Australian 
staff, which is undoubtedly new to the g a m e . 66
In letters and notes to MacArthur, Sutherland, Kenney and Barbey,
Chamberlin criticised the Australians, describing their plans as 'extremely
general and elementary'. However, when on 21 July he recommended.
sending a strong letter of complaint to Blarney, Sutherland
67instructed him to handle the matter informally.
But an informal talk with Blamey's Chief of Staff, Berryman, proved
unsatisfactory, and Chamberlin reported to Sutherland that he gained
the impression that Berryman 'knew nothing of the progress of the
detailed planning of this operation'. He recommended that Sutherland
and a staff team should visit Port Moresby to provide 'on-the-spot'
6 8coordination. Berryman, however, realised that the problem was
the difference in staff methods, and he wrote in his diary:
He [Chamberlin] wanted to know our detailed plans 
for Postern and arrangements for coordination ...
I explained our system was to allow [the] Commander 
concerned to work out plans together with Air and 
Navy on the spot in accordance with the general 
outline plan ... The difference is we work on 
a decentralised basis whilst GHQ have a highly 
centralised one.69
Chamberlin did not give up, and on 2 8 August he informed Sutherland 
of the 'numerous defects' in the orders issued by Herring's New Guinea 
Force: 'The missions omitted are more numerous than those covered'.
He continued:
66. Letter, Chamberlin to Barbey, 13 July 1948, AWM 589/3/9/
67. Memorandum, Chamberlin to Sutherland, 21 July 1943, too.czt.
68. Memorandum, Chamberlin to Sutherland, 5 August 1943, lOQ.cit.
69. Berryman Diary, 4 August 1943. Herring agreed with Berryman's 
summary. Comments on Draft of Official History, 19 March 1954, Gavin 
Long Correspondence - Herring.
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Judged from our standards of the preparation of combat 
orders, it is elementary and incomplete and would 
draw a 'C.U.' at any of our staff schools. It is 
extremely lacking in vision of the function this 
force is to perform. It decentralizes control along 
with execution. Generally speaking, only the 
initiation of the operation is covered. The most 
serious defect is the total lack of appreciation 
of the logistic problem.7®
As a result, on 30 August MacArthur wrote to Blarney requesting him
to supply his plans for the consolidation of the Huon Peninsula and
71the capture of Finschhafen. 'at the earliest practicable date'. The 
ensuing disagreement between Blarney and MacArthur over the strategic
72direction of the campaign has been dealt with in the previous chapter, 
but MacArthur1s letter raised another important question, namely the 
coordination of land and air forces.
The New Guinea Force order of 25 August had delegated the Commander
73of the 1st Australian Corps as 'the authority to arrange details of
74air support and naval support for the operation'. MacArthur, however,
was adamant that this coordination could be carried out by no-one but
himself: 'Any attempt to delegate this responsibility would, I am sure-,
75result in ultimate confusion'. Blarney replied that the order had not
76meant to affect the coordinating role of the high command, but events
70. Memorandum, Chamberlin to Sutherland, 28 August 1943, AWM 589/3/9.
71. Letter, MacArthur to Blarney, 30 August 1945, AWM 423/11/209 and 
Blarney Papers 43.632.
72. See pp.289-292.
73. The planning of the Lae operation was conducted by Headquarters New 
Gunica Force, commanded by Lieutenant-General Herring. On 20 August, 
shortly before the operation, Blarney assumed command of New Guinea Force, 
releasing Herring to command the 1st Corps which was responsible for the 
actual operation.
74. New Guinea Force Operation Instruction No.95, 25 August 1943, AWM 
589/3/11.
75. Letter, MacArthur to Blarney, 30 August 1943, AWM 423/11/209 and Blarney 
Papers 43.612.
76. Letter, Blarney to MacArthur, 31 August 1943, AWM 599/3/3.
during the following month when MacArthur and Blarney had both returned
to Brisbane, were to show that the centralisation of coordination could
lead to possible disaster. With respect to the misunderstanding over
the planning for Lae, the official historian's comments are relevant:
This misunderstanding underlined the weakness whereby 
since April 1942 an American general headquarters on 
which there was quite inadequate Australian represen­
tation reigned from afar over a field army that was, 
for present purposes, almost entirely Australian, and 
whose doctrines and methods differed from those of GHQ.
It was evidence of the detachment of GHQ that, after 16 
months, its senior general staff officers had little 
knowledge of the doctrines and methods of its principal 
army in the field.77
The fault was not, of course, all one sided, and General Mackay, who
in late September assumed command of New Guinea Force, noted that there
was 'a certain impatience to hurry on, or vary, arrangements entered
into with the Americans, or agreed to at pre-operational conferences'.
The result was a 'tendency to try and "wangle" things' which reacted
to the discredit of the Australians. Mackay cited two examples of this
tendency; first when General Vasey attempted to fly an additional
brigade into the Markham Valley, and second, when General Herring gave
orders to load two or three hundred men onto American destroyers, when
7 8the American admiral said he could carry only 150 men.
It is noticeable that both examples concern transportation, and 
throughout the war the Australians had to go 'cap in hand' to the 
Americans for transport. General Lumsden, Churchill's representative 
at MacArthur's headquarters, commented on this problem. He reported that 
cooperation between the American and Australian forces was excellent at 
the top, and this feeling permeated the two forces so that 'in spite of 
unavoidable differences of opinion due to temperament, outlook, organis­
ation and interests', the relationships were good. But he observed that
333
77. Dexter, op.cit., p.283.
78. Letter, Mackay to Blarney, 6 and 7 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.3.
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the main difference was shipping: 'This is controlled entirely by
GHQ and the Australian Army never succeeds in getting the allotment
79it requires'. General Dewing made the same observation:
The Australian Army knows it is man for man 
vastly better than the American Army. It hates 
to feel that the American Command can and sometimes 
does side-track it. It hates to be for ever 
conscious of the restrictions upon equipment, aircraft 
and amenities for itself, while alongside them the
onAmerican Army seems to have everything and rather more. 
Significantly, the last major clash with the Americans over battlefield 
cooperation was to concern transportation.
The Dispute over the Reinforcement .of Finschhafen
At Buna and at Nassau and Tambu Bays the disputes were between 
allied ground force commanders, but the disagreement over the reinforce­
ment of Finschhafen was at a higher level involving allied naval and 
land commanders, and ultimately MacArthur himself. And just as the 
earlier disputes probably convinced MacArthur of the need to separate 
the Australian and American ground units, so did this later dispute 
reveal the inadequacies of the allied command system.
The initial cause was a disagreement about the strength of the 
Japanese forces in the Finschhafen area. MacArthur's staff put the 
strength at between three and four thousand; Blamey's Director of
Military Intelligence (DMI) believed the strength was over 6,000, and
81in the event this proved to be an underestimate. The trouble was
that MacArthur and his staff continued to claim that they had annihilated
the Japanese convoy in the Bismarck Sea in March 1943, while the Austral-
82ians believed that many Japanese had reached the shore. Furthermore,
79. Letter, Lumsden to CIGS, 5 January 1944, WO 106/3383.
80. Report by General Dewing, 23 April 1944, WO 106/4839.
81. Memorandum by General Berryman, 6 November 1944, Blarney Papers 54.1.
82. Interview with Brigadier Sir Kenneth Wills, 9 August 1974.
The Envelopment of the Huon Peninsula.
From: Reports of General MacArthury 
Vol.l. d.126.
Rear-Admiral 
Daniel Barbey, 
Commander of 
the 7th Amphi­
bious Fleet# 
decorating his 
land forces 
adviser,
Brigadier R.N.L. 
Hopkins of the 
Australian Army, 
with the Legion of 
Merit.
(AWM Negative 
No.17695)
(AWM Negative No.ll557C)
Brigadier-General Stephen 
J. Chamberlin, MacArthur's 
Chief of Operations. 'A 
sound, careful staff 
officer'. This photograph 
was taken in Melbourne in 
February 1942 when 
Chamberlin was a Colonel.
The crashed Mitchell 
bomber in which 
Brigadier R.B. 
Sutherland was 
killed on 28 Sept­
ember 1943.
(AWM Negative 
No.57384)
the Deputy DMI, Colonel K.A. Wills, spoke of a force of possibly ten
to twelve thousand, and he had been proved right previously on two
83crucial occasions.
Thus when MacArthur called a conference on 17 September 1942
to plan the Finschhafen landing, Blarney urged a landing by two brigades.
MacArthur wanted to use only one brigade but eventually he agreed that
84one other brigade should stand by to be used if necessary. Blarney
therefore warned the corps commander, Herring, to prepare the second 
, . 85brigade, but apparently MacArthur did not warn his naval commander
that he might have to move it, and indeed it seems likely that he never
thought that the eventuality would arise.
The first troops of the 20th Brigade landed at Finschhafen
on 22 September, and that same day Blarney ordered Herring to send in
86the HQ of the 9th Division and an additional Brigade. Blarney then 
followed MacArthur south to Brisbane, leaving Lieutenant-General Mackay 
in command.
The next day Herring informed Admiral Barbey, the American Commander
of the Seventh Amphibious Fleet, of his orders, and requested him to
arrange transportation of the additional brigade. But unknown to the
Australians, Barbey had received instruction from GHQ to 'go easy on
87Finschhafen' and not to move in more troops. Barbey therefore informed
88Herring that his orders precluded him from complying. Furthermore,
83. Ibid. The two previous occasions were in Java in February 1942 (see 
Chapter Two) and over the Japanese advance to Port Moresby in July- 
August 1942 (see Chapter Four).
84. Ibid. Blarney invited Wills to the conference and asked him to present 
his views to MacArthur. See also Dexter, op.cit., p.445.
85. Letter, Blarney to Mackay, 18 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.3.
86. Memorandum, Herring to Mackay, 26 September 1943, AWM 591/7/21.
87. Letter from Major-General R.N.L. Hopkins, 13 July 1974. Hopkins was 
Barbey's Land Forces adviser.
88. Memorandum, Herring to Mackay, 26 September 1943, AWM 591/7/21.
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as General Berryman observed, relations 'became somewhat cool and Admiral
89Barbey sailed from Buna to Milne Bay'. On the other hand Herring has
90denied that there was any clash of personalities with Barbey.
Meanwhile Berryman, who was acting as Mackay's chief of staff, took
up the matter with General Chamberlin, who was visiting Port Moresby.
Chamberlin could offer little help, but he requested Berryman to try to
solve the problem in New Guinea, and not let it go back to MacArthur 
. , 91m  Brisbane. In some respects Berryman saw the problem as revolving
around the personalities of Barbey and Herring, and he described them
as performing like two prize fighters, while he and Chamberlin acted
92as seconds. But on the other hand, Berryman was becoming annoyed and
he wrote in the diary: 'Our American friends seem to have the impression
we have thoroughly defeated the Japs and that the Army requires but
93little further assistance'.
89. Letter, Berryman to Blarney, 8 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.7. Also 
Berryman Papers. General Hopkins later wrote: 'Milne Bay was the 7th 
Amphibious Force "home base". It was a safe and guarded (both by sea and 
air) anchorage. There was none other. The Official History gives the • 
impression that Barbey left Herring at Buna thro' pique or bloody mindedness. 
Far from it. We called for a conference and we heartily disliked spending 
any more than essential time there. We had been caught there by Jap 
bombers one night on the way back from the 9 Div landing east of Lae and 
damaged a propeller trying to leave in a hurry. The place was full of 
coral and shoal waters and was unprotected in every way'. (Letter, 13 July 
1974).
90. Comments on Draft Official History, Gavin Long Correspondence - Herring.
91. Interview with Lieutenant-General Sir Frank Berryman, 1 May 1974.
92. Ibid. There had been disagreement between Herring and Barbey even 
before the landing on 20 September. For example, on 19 September Berryman 
wrote in his diary: 'The discussion Herring-Barbey on Barbey's flagship 
lasted 4 hrs with [Herring] talking hard. He was tired and twice said he 
would chuck his hand in if he could not get his way. Barbey was 
accommodating and conciliatory but he should have had an accredited ref'.
But Herring wrote later: 'The famous conference at (Milne Bay) between
us and the American Navy and Air Force started off on a not very promising 
note when a deputy chief of air staff - an aggressive vitriolic capable 
fellow stated, 'We'd get on better if the goddam Navy was not as goddam 
frightened of losing some of its goddam ships'. Interview Dexter-Herring,
6 April 1951, Gavin Long Correspondence - Herring.
93. Berryman Diary, 24 September 1943. Earlier during the planning 
Berryman had written in his diary (11 August 1943): 'Chamberlin is quite 
optimistic about Postern and seems to think it is an easy operation and 
there will not be much opposition. They never seem to think there will be 
much when the AIF is concerned, but when it is US then there are many 
[enemy anticipated]'.
Herring saw the problem from another angle. He could not understand
the apparent lack of concern at New Guinea Force Headquarters. 'I just
could not get Mackay to realize that it was up to him as GOC NGF to see
that TAB's orders ... were carried out', he wrote later. He felt that
94Mackay and Berryman were not giving him full support.
On 25 September a conference was held at Port Moresby attended
by Herring, Berryman, Mackay, Kenney and Admiral Carpender, who, as
Commander of the Allied Naval Forces was Barbey's superior. Both
Berryman and Herring gained the impression that Carpender was in
agreement that another infantry brigade should be moved to Finschhafen,
and Carpender promised that in an emergency he would concentrate his
95forces at Finschhafen.
However, later that evening Carpender said that he would have to
seek approval from GHQ, and that Herring had agreed to this during
his conference with Barbey on 23 September. Herring was angry and
telephoned Berryman from his headquarters at Dobodura at midnight,
96insisting on the brigade being sent. The next day he wrote to Mackay:
I made no such agreement but made it clear that as 
Admiral Barbey would not do as I asked so as to enable 
me to carry out my orders I would have to refer the 
matter to higher authority and if necessary, to GHQ 
as my orders were definite.97
Again Berryman took the matter up with the Navy, and on receiving an
unsatisfactory answer, Mackay sent a most immediate signal to Blarney
and MacArthur, relating the history of the negotiations to reinforce
Finschhafen, and concluding that: 'This was foreseen and ordered by you,
94. Sayers, op.cit., p.272.
95. Letter, Berryman to Blarney, 8 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.7, 
Berryman Diary, 25 September 1943, and Sayers, op.cit., pp.272, 273.
96. Berryman Diary, 25 September 1943.
97. Memorandum, Herring to Mackay, 26 September 1943, AWM 591/7/21.
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and both commanders New Guinea Force and Aust Corps consider it
98essential this be done earliest possible1. But in Herring's opinion
99Mackay's signal did not convey the right sense of urgency.
Meanwhile, the situation at Finschhafen was becoming more difficult,
for on 25 September the commadner of the 20th Brigade, Brigadier Windeyer,
had asked for an additional battalion, and on 27 September his forces
captured a Japanese order for an attack on his p o s i t i o n . T h i s  news
was passed to B l a r n e y , w h o  signalled MacArthur, reminding him of their
conference of 17 September, and urging him to authorise the sending
of reinforcements.
By this time Herring was becoming agitated, and when Mackay told
him that Carpender had agreed to move the troops in three to five days'
103time, Berryman recorded in his dairy that Herring became 'quite
104irrational and wanted to go and see GHQ and Sir Thomas'. And Herring's
equanimity was not helped when, on the morning of 28 September, his plane 
crashed on taking off to fly to Milne Bay. His chief operations staff 
officer, and close friend, Brigadier Sutherland, 'was killed in front 
of his eyes by being run through by a long piece of timber while still 
strapped to his seat'
98. Signal 0/8823, New Guinea Force to Land forces, repeated to GHQ SWPA,
26 September 1943, Blarney Papers 43.632.
99. Sayers, op.cit., p.274.
100. Signal, 9th Division to 1st Australian Corps, 27 September 1943,
War Diary, HQ 9th Division, G. Branch, October 1943, AWM 1/5/20.
101. Signal B 48, Mackey to Blarney, 27 September 1943, Blarney Papers 43.632,
102. Signal Z 792, Blarney to MacArthur, 28 September 1942, loc.cit.
103. Letter, Mackay to Herring, 27 September 1943, AWM 591/7/al.
104. Berryman Diary, 27 September 194 3.
105. Hopkins letter, 13 July 1974. Herring's senior intelligence officer, 
Colonel E. Mander-Jones, recalled that a metal strip on the runway was 
kicked up by a preceding plane, and it was this which killed Sutherland, 
(interview, 12 August 1974). Whatever the exact detail, the incident
was most unpleasant. See also Sayers, op.cit., p.274.
MacArthur's intiial replies were not encouraging, but on
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29 September Mackay eventually received notification that the Commander
of the Allied Naval Forces was being directed to comply with the request
. . . 107to send an additional battalion. The danger at Finschhafen was not
over, but transport was now being arranged, and eventually the force
was built up to over a division before the Japanese were defeated.
The incident focusses attention on the problems of allied cooperation.
In the first place there was the disagreement over intelligence assessments.
As Hopkins has observed, 'GHQ were woefully wrong in their intelligence
108estimates but it was nothing to do with Dan Barbey'. When Barbey
and Herring received contradictory instructions it was only natural.
that they could not agree on a common course of action. The problem
was exacerbated by the departure of MacArthur and Blarney from New Guinea,
109for there was no one on the spot who could solve the problem quickly. 
Ironically, Blarney was the commander of the Task Force in New Guinea, 
but he had delegated authority to Mackay, which the Americans claimed 
he should not have done. The Americans were therefore less disposed 
to accept Mackay's authority.
Although he has subsequently denied that he was shaken by the air 
c r a s h , H e r r i n g  does not seem to have approached the problem as tactfully
106. Signal 08831, Blarney to Mackay, 28 September 1943, quoting MacArthur 
to Blarney, 27 September 1943 and Signal G 291, Landops to Landforces,
28 September 1943, quoting MacArthur to Blarney, 28 September. Blarney 
Papers 43.632.
107. Signal Q 9468, MacArthur to Mackay, 20 September 1943, loc.cit.
108. Hopkins' letter, 13 July 1974.
109. Letter, Mackay to Blarney, October 1943, Blarney Papers 43.672.
110. Quoted in I. Chapman, Iven G. Mackay> Citizen and Soldier, (Melway, 
Melbourne, 1975), p.279. Mackay wrote to Blarney on 6 and 7 October 1943 
that Herring 'was probably more deeply shaken by the accident than appeared 
at first sight ... [he] has not quite exhibited his normal poise. This 
unfortunately is not understood by everybody with the result that rather 
disturbing situations have occurred. For example, there has been open 
criticism of other services and formations, sometimes, possibly, with 
justification, sometimes not, but in all cases tending to destroy mutual 
confidence and cooperation'. Blarney Papers 170.3.
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as he might. He was probably right when he claimed that 'We damn
nearly lost Finschhafen', but the incident did not help allied cooperation.
Herring remained convinced that he had acted correctly and later wrote
to the official historian:
All I can say about myself is that I think I 
did do my very best to get those orders carried 
out, and though I may have been somewhat outspoken 
about the failure of NGF and the Navy to play their 
part, or perhaps when you contemplate how much 
depended on these orders being carried out, you 
may think a little plain speech was justified. What 
you have to do, I believe, is to discover what 
activiated NGF to act as it did. Berryman, I 
considered responsible for the trouble really and I 
told TAB so when I reached Australia ...
Both Mackay and Berryman must face the fact 
that it was NGF's job to see that TAB's orders were 
carried out,and that they failed to get this done, 
and what is perhaps still more difficult to under­
stand, passively resisted all my attempts to restore
the position.
Berryman did not believe that he was responsible in any way, and
wrote later of the impact on the US Navy:
Unfortunately the controversy has left a scar in that 
Admiral Carpender in speaking to me very confidentially 
said that the Navy resented the implication that 'Uncle 
Sam's Navy was letting us down at Finschhafen'. He also 
said he was glad he was here and very pleased that he 
had Sir Iven [Mackay] to deal with as he pressed our 
case firmly and tactfully and at the same time was 
scrupulously fair and tolerant in listening to the 
Navy's views. With the relief of [Herring] by [Morshead]
I hope there will be an improvement in our relations with 
the Navy but the position from our point of view is not 
satisfactory.
112
111. Hopkins letter, 13 July 1974; Berryman Diary, 1 October 1943, 
letter, Berryman to Blarney, 8 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.7.
112. Chapman, op.cit., p.279. On 25 October 1943 Mackay wrote to Blarney: 
'Had 24 Aust Inf Bde followed 20 Bde quickly to Finschhafen, I agree with 
you that the result might have been very different and Satelberg could 
have been seized early'. Blarney Papers 170.3. Brigadier Windeyer had
no recollection of being desperate, but did admit that it would have been 
awkward without the arrival of the 24th Brigade. Interview with Major- 
General Sir Victor Windeyer, 2 May 1974.
113. Letter, Herring to Dexter, 21 January 1955, Gavin Long Correspondence - 
Herring.
114. Letter, Berryman to Blarney, 8 October 194 3, Blarney Papers 170.7.
This relief had been planned some weeks earlier and was not related to 
the Finschhafen incident.
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Later Berryman discussed the incident with Barbey and noted in his
diary that Barbey:
told me the only regret he had in all his [operations] 
was that he did not give us earlier support at Finsch.
Although tipped by GHQ to go easy had he realised the 
position we were in lie would have done it without 
asking GHQ. He said he thought Herring very unbending 
and with a tendency to cry wolf and he did [not] get 
on with him. Barbey was very honest and said he had a lot 
of worries himself at the time, as it turned out Herring was 
right but he handled Barbey badly and only succeeded in 
getting his back up. Barbey was very honest in admitting
his error. U S
116But Mackay had the last word:
With all due respect to our friends, I think this 
incident shows the weakness of trying to fight 
battles from a distance with fixed assumptions that 
the enemy is bent on withdrawing and that he is 
incapable of increasing the number of his forces.
In point of fact, far from withdrawing, his intention 
seems to be just the opposite ...117
For MacArthur, the incident provided further evidence of the
difficulties of allied cooperation. Significantly a report written by
General Rowell from Cairo on 25 July covering the allied landings in
North Africa, also noted the problems of 'mixed task forces'. He concluded
that he was 'sure that we will see an ever-increasing tendency for us
118and the Americans to work in our own boxes'. This was, in fact, just
what MacArthur was planning, and considering that he envisaged that 
future operations would be over widely separated areas with attendant 
communication difficulties, he was probably right.
115. Berryman Diary, 27 September 1944.
116. In Berryman's opinion, Mackay 'was a tower of strength in handling 
what might have become a delicate situation'. Personal account written 
by Berryman, 21 November 1944, Berryman Papers.
117. Letter, Mackay to Blarney, 24-25 October 1943, Blarney Papers 170.3.
118. Letter, Rowell to Morshead, 25 July 1943, Morshead Papers.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
AUSTRALIA AND ALLIED STRATEGY, January-May 1944
No News from Sextant
At the beginning of 1944 strategic decision-makers in Australia
found themselves waiting upon decisions being made across the globe in
Cairo, London and Washington. Throughout the latter half of 1943
Curtin had struggled to determine the shape and size of the Australian
War effort. The Australian government had decided that if it were to
maintain the food and materiel production, which was important to
Britain and the American forces in the South-West Pacific Area, then.
MacArthur could be supplied with no more than a striking force of three
infantry divisions and an armoured brigade, garrison forces, 48 RAAF
squadrons and a Navy which would not increase in size. MacArthur
2had agreed to this allocation, and it remained only for Britain and 
America to agree. The prime strategic question for early 1944 was not, 
therefore, the size and shape of the Australian commitment, but rather 
how the forces were to be used, and this was a matter which involved 
cooperation with allies who had already proven unwilling to listen to 
their junior partners.
From the Australian point of view this was a convenient time to 
raise these matters, for it was obvious that within a few months there 
would be fewer Australian troops engaged in combat in New Guinea than 
at any time since July 1942. Indeed on 23 December 1943, in a most 
secret policy directive/Blarney had laid down the role of the army for 
the following year, stating that:
1. Letter, Curtin to MacArthur, 1 November 1943, CP 290/16 item bundle 1.
2. Prime Minister's speech to Premier's Conference, 25 January 1944,
MP 1217, Box 611.
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The operational role of the Australian Military Forces 
engaged in forward operations in New Guinea will be 
taken over by USA Forces in accordance with plans 
now being prepared. Aggressive operations will be 
continued and reliefs necessary to maintain the 
initiative will be made by GOC New Guinea Force until 
Commander USA Forces takes over responsibility.
At the end of the period of relief all but two of the six Australian
divisions comprising the 1st and 2nd Corps would have returned to
3Australia for 'training and rehabilitation' on the Atherton Tableland.
This policy was reiterated at the Advisory War Council on 15 February
1944 when Blarney reported that 'it had been decided that the Australian
Military Forces should be totally withdrawn from an active operational
4role in New Guinea'. Now, with the Japanese on the defensive, decisions 
could at last be taken with a long term view. One possibility that had
already been mentioned was that for future operations the Australians ’
5would be based on Darwin.
The changes in the fortunes of war had also coincided with new 
perceptions in Australia's relationship with America. Throughout 1943 
there had been increasing evidence of American intentions to seize bases 
in the South-West Pacific. As a reaction to this threat Evatt had 
spoken at various times of securing Australian sovereignty over Fiji, 
the Solomons, the New Hebrides, Portuguese Timor, Java and Dutch New
3. AMF Policy Directive 1943-1944, 23 December 1943, Blarney Papers 23.11. 
The two divisions remaining in New Guinea, the 3rd and 11th, were 'in 
turn to be withdrawn from active operational and administrative functions 
for rehabilitation and training'.
4. Advisory War Council Minute 1295, 15 February 1944 CRS A2884, 
item 1392. At this meeting 'The Prime Minister expressed his complete 
confidence in General Blarney as Commander-in-Chief, and Mr Menzies 
said that he still held the same high opinion of General Blarney as when 
he had appointed him General Officer Commanding AIF'.
5. War Cabinet Minute 3264, Canberra, 21 January 1944, MP 1217, Box 570.
Guinea.^ Both Australian and American declarations were motivated
by fears for the future defence of the region.
The Australians reacted in a number of directions. On the one
hand Curtin saw the value of increasing the British presence in the
Pacific. Indeed on 11 December 1943 General Dewing cabled the War
Office that 'Australians from Prime Minister down want to see British
7troops in this area'. British Commonwealth cooperation was, in fact,
a topic which Curtin intended to raise at the Prime Ministers' Conference
7scheduled for May 1944.
On the other hand,Australia's increased military power made her 
able to occupy her own territories and reestablish her own sovereignty. 
Thus on 22 November 1943 Curtin had reminded MacArthur that Papua was 
part of Australia and that she had a mandate from the League of Nations 
over Australian New Guinea, New Britain and Bougainville. New Zealand 
had a mandate for Samoa, and the British had a mandate for Nauru which 
was administered by Australia. 'Australia', said Curtin, 'therefore 
has a special interest in the employment of its own forces in the
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6 . Bell, op.cit., pp.147, 148, 157. Paradoxically, at one stage 
Roosevelt had suggested that Australia might purchase Portuguese Timor. 
Telegram T 867/3, Roosevelt to Churchill, 22 June 1943, WO 106/3441.
7. Dewing to War Office, 11 December 1945, AWM 9/2/3. Curtin had dealt 
with this topic at length during an interview with members of the Leth­
bridge Mission on 3 November 1945. Curtin said that his two major 
anxieties were ,firstly the upholding of British prestige in the area, and 
secondly, the shortage of Australian manpower. 'He stated emphatically 
that British prestige could only be upheld by deeds and not by words, and 
that in his judgment the presence of British Imperial Forces in the 
Pacific theatre was essential'. Curtin said that Australians 'resented 
American braggadocio' (his words) and the only American division which 
had been in action in New Guinea had not distinguished itself. Report 
JSL/1, by Major General J.S. Lethbridge, 3 November 1943, ADM 116/4906.
8. Throughout 1943 Churchill had made repeated efforts to arrange a 
Prime Ministers' Conference but on at least four occasions Curtin had 
asked for the Conference to be postponed. Finally, on 9 November 1943, 
Curtin had agreed to a Conference in late April or early May 1944 
(PREM 4, 42/2).
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operations for the ejectment of the enemy from territory under its
9administration'.
In Parliament on 9 February 1944 Curtin summed up the government's
view:
The scale of Australia's military effort will 
have an important bearing on our status at the 
peace table. It is of vital importance to our 
future that the part which we play should be 
such as to guarantee us an effective voice in the 
peace settlement. There is, therefore, a minimum 
below which our military effort cannot be permitted 
to fall.l°
But Curtin had few definite ideas on the role of the Australian striking 
force in the forthcoming year. He had entrusted the Australian forces 
to MacArthur's command and he continued to look to the American Commander- 
in-Chief for strategic advice. One of Curtin's great traits was loyalty.
It remained to be seen whether MacArthur deserved that loyalty.
Like the Australians, MacArthur too was waiting on overseas
. ' . » *J I
decisions. When,in November 1943, Curtin had asked him for an outline of
his plans, ^  he had quite rightly told the Prime Minister that they
12depended upon the Cairo Conference (Sextant). MacArthur received some
idea of the situation when after Cairo Marshall visited him in New Guinea
13on 15 December, but the details of the Pacific strategy remained to 
be decided by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington in December and 
January. As General Handy disingenously observed, the Sextant decision 
gave the Joint Chiefs 'almost complete liberty of action in the Pacific
9. Letter, Curtin to MacArthur, 22 November 194 3, Blarney Papers 5.1.
10. Review of War Situation by Prime Minister in House of Representatives, 
9 February 1944, Ml1 1217, Box 305.
11. Letter, Curtin to MacArthur, 22 November 1943, Blarney Papers 5.1.
12. Notes of Discussions [by Curtin] with the Commander-in-Chief, South­
west Pacific Area, 29 November to 1 December 1943, MP 1217, Box 2.
13. James, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.369-371.
14without reference to the British Chiefs of Staff'. This had, of course, 
been the case for almost two years.
Clearly the Australian government was annoyed at being excluded
15from the discussions of Pacific strategy at Cairo, and this was
the last straw which motivated Evatt to arrange the Australia-New Zealand
Agreement in January 1944. But although Australia's exclusion from
the discussions in Cairo was the motivating factor, Evatt's concern that
Australia should play a leading part in the Pacific can be traced back
to a speech to Parliament made on 14 October 1943, when he had recounted
the so-called success of his overseas mission earlier in the year.
He had then gone on to stress the need for permanent collaboration
between New Zealand and Australia. When the Australian and New Zealand
ministers met in Canberra in January 1944, they proposed to establish
a regional organisation to be called the South Seas Regional Commission.
Furthermore, they spoke of the need to take a strong part in the
administration of the colonies to the north, and of the need to establish
in collaboration with other allies bases and major defence works in the
16islands to ensure regional security. It followed from these views 
that if Australia were to obtain any influence in the Pacific then 
Australian forces would have to be involved actively in the operations 
to the north of Australia, and this attitude was shown by Australia's
14. Morton, op.cit., p.601.
15. On 6 December 194 3 Curtin told reporters that, with respect to the 
Cairo Conference, 'They don't tell us anything'. F.T. Smith Reports, No.87. 
That day Sir Ronald Cross wrote to Curtin promising information on the 
conference as soon as it became available. CRS A1608, item W/41/1/1.
16. For an outline of the agreement see Tenant, op.cit., pp.156-159;
Ross, op.cit., Ch.26; P. Hasluck, 'Australia and the Formation of the 
United Nations', Royal Australian Historical Society, Journal and Proceed- 
ingsj , Vol.XI, 1954, Part III and Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, Chapters 10 
and 11. For the defence aspects of the agreement see CRS A816, item 
11/301/511 and MP 1049/5, item 1846/4/256. For the British reaction
to the agreement see PREM 4 50/12. For a discussion of the decolonisation 
aspects of the agreement see W.R. Louis, Imperialism at Bays 1941-19453 
United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1977), Chapter 18.
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efforts to persuade New Zealand to withdraw her division from Italy to 
. . 17the Pacific. The Australian ministers were bitterly disappointed at
18the lack of response from New Zealand.
The agreement upset the British and antagonised the Americans, and
Bell has claimed that following the agreement America became more
'reluctant to endorse Australia's efforts to play an expanded military
19or political role in the Pacific'. Curtin, however, agreed with
Evatt's sentiment when the latter complained that the 'first news [the]
Australian Government received of the Cairo decisions was through the
20medium of the press'. Nevertheless, the Prime Minister showed remarkable
restraint in waiting while the details of the allied plans reached
Australia in a most unsatisfactory and piecemeal fashion.
On 15 December 1943 the British High Commissioner gave Curtin a
21
summary of the main conclusions of the military decisions at Cairo. Then 
in January 1944 Australia learnt that Britain was making available a naval
17. Bell, op.cit., p.152.
18. For example, on 22 October 194 3 Curtin told a British press 
delegation, led by Sir Walter Layton, that he was 'mad as a hatter' over 
New Zealand's decision to keep its troops in the Middle East. He 
thought that New Zealand was 'passing the economic buck to us'. When
it was suggested that the choice was between the 'blood buck' and 
the 'economic buck', he pointed out that the New Zealanders had no 
forces in New Guinea, and it was a question of their avoiding the 
'malaria buck'. PREM 3 159/2.
19. Bell, op.cit., p.157.
20. Evatt to American Minister, Canberra, 24 February 1944, CRS M100, 
February 1944.
21. Referred to in Cable No.20A, Bruce to Curtin, 7 February 1944, 
loc.cit.
task force of a battle cruiser, two aircraft carriers, four cruisers
and twelve destroyers for operations in the Pacific. The task force
would probably operate under Nimitz's command and would be based on
22Sydney. Bruce in London was not satisfied that the United Kingdom
government had passed on all relevant information. On 24 December he
told Curtin of the preparation of a telegram describing the 'overall'
23plan for the defeat of Japan, but on 20 January he informed Curtin
24that there had been a delay in the despatch of the telegram. The 
delay had been caused by a dispute which the British official historian 
described as 'a long and complicated debate which was to end only in 
September 1944, after involving the Prime Minister and the British
25Chiefs of Staff in perhaps their most serious disagreement of the war'.
On 1 February 1944 Bruce advised Curtin that there had been a 
'further hold up' in the despatch of the telegram; he informed Curtin 
that Churchill wished to modify the strategic concept that had been 
agreed at Cairo and that he wanted to reopen the discussion with Roosevelt. 
He pointed out to Curtin that 'the facts I have given you ... are not 
known even to the members of the War Cabinet'. He suggested that if
Curtin received no news in the next few days then he should consider
26asking Churchill for more information. Six days later Bruce reported 
that the position had 'not been straightened out' and there was 'little
22. Advisory War Council Minute 1284, 20 January 1944, CRS A2684, Volume 
VII.
23. Cable 246A, Bruce to Curtin, 24 December 1943, CRS M100, December 1943.
24. Cable 11A, Bruce to Curtin, 20 January 1944, CRS M100, January 1944.
25. The course of this dispute is related in detail in J. Ehrman, Grand 
Strategy 3 Volume V3 August 19 4 3-Sep tenter 1944 (HMS0> London, 1956) , 
chapters XI, XII. A. Bryant, Triumph in the West 1943-1946 (Collins, London, 
1959), provides an interesting insight into the dispute.
26. Cable 18A, Bruce to Curtin, 1 February 1944, CRS M100, February 1944.
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prospect of the contemplated telegram being despatched to you in the
near future1. He therefore suggested 'for your consideration the
27desirability of your cabling to the Prime Minister'.
Hasluck suggests that the movement of the Japanese Combined Fleet
to Singapore in late February and the consequent threat to the west coast
of Australia, or a question directed to Curtin in Parliament and answered
on 2 March, made him 'more acutely conscious that only sketchy information
28had been provided about the decisions reached at Cairo'. Whatever 
the reason, on 4 March, three months after the Cairo conference, Curtin 
cabled London asking for further information to enable him to consult
with his military advisers before leaving Australia to attend the Prime
29Minister's conference. This cable was sent at a particularly pertinent
time, for the next day he received from London the agenda for the
conference. Item 2 of the agenda was 'Questions arising from
the conduct of the war against Japan, including the provison of forces
30from the British Commonwealth for that purpose'.
Churchill's reply was received on 14 March. He told Curtin that 
the main decisions at Sextant had concerned the cross-channel operation, 
but there was a 'preliminary study' of the overall plan for the defeat 
of Japan. The British Chiefs of Staff were studying two broad conceptions, 
an advance across the Indian Ocean against the Malay barrier, and a plan
27. Cable 20A, Bruce to Curtin, 7 February 1944, CRS M100, February 1944.
28. Hasluck, The Government and the People 1942-1945, pp.423, 424. 
Information about the movement of the Japanese Fleet was provided by 
intercepts of radio messages between Tokyo, Singapore and Rabaul. (Letter, 
Blarney to Shedden, 2 March 1944, Blarney 54.3) Blarney requested Shedden
to destroy the messages after they had been read by himself and the 
Prime Minister.
29. Cable 56, Curtin to Churchill, 4 March 1944, Blarney Papers 5.6 
Also CRS A816, item 31/301/336.
30. Cable D.335, Dominions Office to Curtin, 5 March 1944, PREM 4 42/3, 
and also quoted in Notes of Discussions [by Shedden] with the Commander- 
in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, 17 March 1944, MP1217, Box 3. See 
also letter Curtin to Blarney, 13 March 1944, Blarney Papers 154.1.
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to place the bulk of the naval forces plus some land and air forces
on the left of the US forces in the Pacific. In the latter case
Australia would be the base and Churchill suggested, subject to Curtin's
agreement, sending a small party of experts to Australia to examine
31its base potentialities.
To Bruce in London this reply was 'somewhat disingenuous'. On
14 March he explained to Curtin that despite the impression created 
by Churchill's cable, 'a firm decision was reached at Sextant in favour 
of the broad strategic plan' for the Pacific. The details of the plan 
were :
A. The main effort against Japan to be made in the 
Pacific by a combined advance through the Central 
Pacific and along the north coast of New Guinea 
towards the Formosa, Philippines area, priority 
being given initially to the Central Pacific.
B. Operations in the S.E. Asia area to be subsidiary 
to the Pacific and designed to improve the air
route to China and open a land route when possible ...
C. Preparations to be made for operations in the North 
Pacific after the defeat of Germany on the assumption 
that Russia will probably enter into the war shortly 
after the defeat of Germany.
Bruce went on to explain that the initial plan would involve the
despatch of a British fleet to the South-West Pacific with two infantry
divisions moving from India to Australia before the end of the year.
Between seven and twelve months after the defeat of Germany a further
four divisions and 65 RAF squadrons would follow. The main difficulty
was whether Australia could support these forces, and to determine
32this a party under Rear-Admiral C.S. Daniel had already left the
31. Cable 66, Churchill to Curtin, 11 March 1944, received 14 March 1944, 
Blarney Papers 5.6. Also CRS A816, item 31/301/336.
32. Daniel, a former Director of Plans at the Admiralty, had discussed 
this mission with Bruce on 2 February, almost six weeks before Bruce's 
cable. Memorandum by Bruce, 2 February 1944, CRS M100, February 1944.
United Kingdom for Australia via America. Bruce personally doubted
whether Australia could support the force, but he believed that in the
33long run the broad strategy agreed at Cairo would be adopted.
34At last Curtin was in receipt of more explicit information, and
35it revealed Churchill s continuing disdain for Australia, for without
receiving Curtin's views he had already despatched Daniel's mission
36 .to Australia. The United Kingdom had no right to expect that Australia
would willingly agree, for Australia had previously objected to various
37aspects of the British mission commanded by General Dewing. Not sur­
prisingly, when on 16 March the Australian Chiefs of Staff considered 
Churchill's cable they stated that they considered themselves quite 
capable of preparing plans for the reception and maintenance of British 
Forces. They noted that substantial information had already been 
forwarded to Whitehall and that information had been supplied to the
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33. Cable 42A, Bruce to Curtin, 14 March 1944, CRS M100, March 1944.
34. On 15 March the Australian CGS received a cable from the CIGS 
explaining the purposes of the proposed mission to Australia. CIGS 
to CGS, 15 March 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
35. Churchill's disdain for the Australian contribution to the war is 
revealed in his papers. On 25 January 1944 he referred to reports 
that Australia proposed to maintain only 3 divisions on the offensive: 
'There is really no excuse for this'. (Churchill to Cranborne) On
16 April 1944 he said that the maintenance of three divisions 'was a 
very poor show'. (Churchill to Ismay) The Chiefs of Staff in a 
memorandum on 1 May 1944 stressed to Churchill that the Australians 
had 'carried out practically the whole of the fighting in New Guinea', 
and that the effort of the Australian Army was 'a very remarkable 
achievement'. PREM 3 63/8.
36. On 3 March 1944 a Dominions Office official said that it was 
'important that nothing should be said to the Dominions Governments about 
the proposed Admiralty Mission until (a) Mr Curtin and Mr Fraser had 
been informed of the final decision about our Pacific strategy and
(b) an answer had been given to Mr Curtin about manpower1. Minute of 
Meeting at Dominions Office, 3 March 1944. ADM 1/16251.
37. See Appendix 6 .
Lethbridge Mission. General Blarney concurred with these observations.
There is no evidence that the Chiefs of Staff had seen Bruce's cable 
with the news that Daniel was proceeding to Australia.
Strategy in the Balance in the South-West Pacific Area
It is convenient to leave for a moment the communications between
Australia and Britain and to examine the way the strategy of the SWPA
was actually developing. February 1944 marks one of those periodic
crises in MacArthur's career when it looked as though he was to be
denied the opportunity to 'return' to the Philippines.
At Cairo the two pronged advance against Japan had been endorsed
by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, but with the proviso that if there
should be conflicts then 'due weight' should be given to the fact that
the Central Pacific offered the prospect of a more rapid advance
39towards Japan The result was that during December and January Nimitz
and King began to prepare plans for a campaign in the Marianas. Then
at the end of January Nimitz and members of his staff, met Sutherland,-
Kenney and Admiral Kinkaid at Pearl Harbour to coordinate the new
campaign. Nimitz encountered immediate opposition from the representatives
of the South-West Pacific Area. Therefore, early in Februa.ry Nimitz
and his staff and General Sutherland adjourned to Washington to
40reconsider the plans with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
38. Minute by Defence Committee, 16 March 1944, CRS A816, item 31/301/336. 
The Chief of the Naval Staff, Sir Guy Royle, minuted on the draft
reply to the UK government, 'I suggest that we should not turn down 
this offer of help too abruptly'. The Chief of the Air Staff added,
'I agree'.
39. 'Overall Plan for the Defeat of Japan', 2 December 1943, Morton, 
op.cit., Appendix T.
40. This period of planning is dealt with in M. Matloff, Strategic 
Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944, pp.455-459; R.R. Smith,
The Approach to the Philippines (OCMH, Washington, 1953), pp.3-11;
P.A. Crowl, Campaig>i in the Marianas (OCMH, Washington, 1960), pp.12-20.
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Meanwhile Nimitz's forces captured important positions in the
Marshalls, seized Eniwetok on 17 February, two months ahead of schedule,
and struck strongly with carrier-borne planes against Truk.
It was now clear to MacArthur that the Navy was once again trying
to secure control of the Pacific War, and he bombarded Marshall with
radiograms defending the South-West Pacific approach. Towards the end
of February there was an ominous development when Nimitz suggested
that all the islands north of New Guinea should be transferred from
the South-West Pacific Area to Halsey's command, thus enabling the
41latter to develop a base at Manus Island. To MacArthur this was 
the first step towards Nimitz's assumption of Supreme Command in the 
Pacific.
MacArthur reacted with vigour and on his behalf Sutherland delivered 
a forceful letter to Marshall. MacArthur wrote that he was 'in complete 
disagreement with the recommendation of Admiral Nimitz ... He thus 
has proposed to project his own command into the South-West Pacific 
by the artificiality of advancing South Pacific Forces into the area'
He explained that under this new arrangement Nimitz would have to deal 
with the Australian government which was 'in complete opposition to 
change of this sort. The Prime Minister has expressed to me his 
intention to resist further modification in strategic boundaries of 
this area'. Indeed MacArthur concluded that to change the boundaries
42would reflect on his 'professional integrity' and his 'personal honour'.
MacArthur also sought the assistance of General Blarney, stressing
that the boundaries could not be changed without the concurrence of
43the Australian government. Always sensitive to slights to the Australian
41. James, op.cit.3 Vol.II, p.388.
42. MacArthur to Marshall, 27 February 1944, Marshall Library, Lexington 
Va.
43. Notes of Blarney interview with MacArthur 1300 hrs, 25 February 1944, 
Blarney Papers 43.1.
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government, Blarney generally supported MacArthur, discussed the
matter with Curtin, and followed this with a letter to Shedden. But
Blarney realised that the British Chiefs of Staff were re-assessing
the Pacific strategy, and he added a rider to his letter:
It is unlikely that the boundary will be altered 
without consultation with [Curtin], but before he 
supports MacArthur's claim he may require much 
more information from either Washington or London as 
to the means and intentions of further progress.44
Shedden replied that the Prime Minister beleived that if there was
any dispute between the US Army and Navy then the President would
45save it to discuss with Curtin when he visited Washington.
While the argument continued over the eventual possession of 
the Admiralty Islands MacArthur began a daring 'reconnaissance in
46force' of the islands, and within a few days Los Negros was secure.
The important point was that with the capture of the Admiralties one 
month ahead of schedule, MacArthur was now able to accelerate his 
plan to advance along the New Guinea coast. On 5 March he sent a 
revised plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and three days later Sutherland 
presented the new plan called RENO IV. This plan had four phases:
a. To capture Hollandia and Geelvink Bay in Dutch 
New Guinea beginning on 15 April;
b. To secure air bases in the Arafura Sea islands 
beginning on 15 July;
c. To capture Vogelkop and Halmahera starting about 
mid September; and
d. To land on Mindanao on 5 November and to establish 47bases to attack the Formosa - Luzon - China coast area.
44. Letter, Blarney to Shedden, 3 March 1944, Blarney Papers 5.1.
45. Letter, Shedden to Blarney, 13 March 1944, loc.cit.
46. See Miller, op.cit., Chapter 16.
47. R.R. Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, p.10; P.A. Crowl, 
op.cit., p.18; Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-19443 
p.458.
The Westward Drive along New Guinea.
From: Reports of General MacArthur> 
Vol.l, p.135.
On 12 March the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued a revised directive
which although it did not give MacArthur the full support which he
desired, in effect gave approval to RENO IV. Thus, although the decision
as to whether Luzon or Formosa was to be captured was left open,
MacArthur, who was ordered to plan for Luzon, could be sure that he was
48slated to lead the Philippines operation. Furthermore, by this stage,
after a stormy visit from Halsey, MacArthur had resolved the disagreement
49over Manus Island.
Sagacious advice from MacArthur
Whilst the directive for 1944 was being thrashed out in Washington,
Shedden was concerned with the forthcoming overseas trip,^^ and on 4 March
1944 he summarised for Curtin the papers then being prepared. In view
of his past experience of the 'importance of ensuring Australia an
adequate voice in the machinery for Higher Direction and the control
and command of its forces', he had prepared papers on the history of
the return of the AIF and its importance in the South-West Pacific Area,
the relief of the Australian garrison of Tobruk, and Blamey's despatches
on Greece. Papers were also prepared on aspects of global strategy and
51the specific needs of the South-West Pacific Area. One paper prepared
by the Department of External Affairs stated that, 'The post-war settlement
in the Pacific is a vital matter for Australia because the stability
52of the region in which we live is at stake'. But with Churchill's
48. R.R. Smith, The Approach to the Philippines, p.12; Matloff, Strategic 
Planning for Coalition Warfare 1943-1944, p.459.
49. James, op.cit., Vol.II, pp.401, 402; Miller,, op.cit. 3 pp.349, 350.
50. On 13 March 1944 Shedden wrote to Blarney, 'Things have been fairly 
strenuous, as usual, here, the subject occupying the most time being 
Higher Command and its strategy'. Blarney Papers 154.1.
51. Memorandum, Shedden to Curtin, 4 March 1944, Blarney Papers 154.1.
52. PM's Conference Paper No .7, CRS A989, item 44/735/192, Part 1. This 
file contains copies of the papers prepared for the Prime Minister. However 
it should be noted that the Department of External Affairs prepared few 
briefs for the conference, the main work being done by the Department of 
Defence. For further discussion see Appendix 7.
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suggestion of sending a team of experts to Australia, and with
the deliberations still continuing in Washington, Curtin and Shedden
looked to MacArthur for advice. On 10 March Shedden wrote to MacArthur:
I hope it will be possible to see you before we leave, 
as I shall certainly feel better equipped to help the 
PM if I am reinformced by your sagacious a d v i c e . 53
54By 14 March Shedden had set up the meeting, and on 17 March MacArthur
flew to Canberra for a Parliamentary dinner to mark the second
55anniversary of his arrival in Australia.
After the dinner MacArthur, Curtin and Shedden met privately and
56the Commander-in-Chief outlined his future operations. MacArthur 
said that he intended to land at Hollandia, thus by-passing Japanese, 
strongpoints along the New Guinea coast. Rabaul was also to be by­
passed. Meanwhile Nimitz was to carry out operations in the Mariana 
and Palau Islands. After clearing New Guinea MacArthur was to capture 
the Halmahera Islands as part of the approach to the Philippines.
There was also the possibility of an operation in the Arafura and Banda 
Seas. Although this operation was certainly in American plans, a 
month earlier MacArthur had told his staff that he did not favour the
splitting of his forces, and that the operation which would have been
57carried out by Australian forces, would probably not come off. There 
is the impression that MacArthur was stringing the Australians 
along; as early as December 1943 the US War Department had indicated
53. Letter, Shedden to MacArthur, 10 March 1944, RG4. MacArthur Memorial.
54. Teleprinter message Shedden to MacArthur, 14 March 1944, MP 1217,
Box 389.
55. During this visit to Canberra, which lasted less than 24 hours, the 
Governor-General, Lord Gowrie, invested MacArthur with the Knight Grand 
Cross of the Order of the Bath.
56. The following report of the meeting is based on Notes of Discussions 
[by Shedden] with the Commander-in-Chief, Southwest Pacific Area, Canberra,
17 March 1944, MP 1217, Box 3.
57. Record of Conversation Major-General Chamberlin, Brigadier White,
1500 hrs, 25 February 1944, Blarney Papers 43.5 Part 1.
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that reserves would not be sufficient to support the operation in the
5 8Arafura Sea.
Referring to the suggestion to alter the boundaries of the South-
West Pacific Area, MacArthur told Curtin that he had threatened to
resign if such a change were made. On 13 March Blarney had pointed out
to Shedden that even a minor alteration to the boundaries required the
59consent of the Australian government. Nevertheless when this matter
was raised at the meeting MacArthur advised that the dividing line
'was merely one of current operational convenience within the South-West
Pacific Area and that it was constantly being changed with the progress
of the tactical situation'. MacArthur agreed with Curtin that the
organisation to the South-West Pacific Area could not be varied without the
consent of the government and he added that 'it would be destructive at
this stage of the campaign for the Governments concerned to attempt
60or even seriously consider so drastic and inadvisable a step'.
MacArthur continued his outline of operations explaining that the 
target date for the Mindanao landing was November and that the Philippines 
were to be cleared by February when Formosa would be attacked. He 
would then deal with the Netherlands East Indies. When that stage was 
reached a change in organisation in the Pacific would no doubt be 
necessary, but at that point the end would be in sight.
As he had mentioned on earlier occasions, MacArthur expressed the 
view that, as the operations moved away from Australia, Blarney would 
have to decide whether to go with him, or remain in Australia as C-in-C 
of the Australian Military Forces. MacArthur contemplated that the 
spearhead of his advance to the Philippines would be the three AIF
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58. Matloff, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare3 1943-1944, p.455.
59. Letter, Blarney to Shedden, 13 March 1944, Blarney Papers 5.1.
60. Letter, Shedden to Blarney, 31 March 1944, loc.cit.
divisions and an American paratroop division. It is difficult to know
whether MacArthur was being completely candid. His outline plan for
the recapture of the southern Philippines, known as RENO III, and issued
on 20 October 1943, listed the combat units for the advance to Mindanao.
61There was no mention of Australian units. RENO IV presented by
Sutherland in Washington nine days before the meeting, was really only
an accelerated and streamlined version of RENO III. Nevertheless,
Blamey's senior planning officer has pointed out that these were only
MacArthur's proposals, and that there was an essential difference
between proposals, planned operations, ordered operations and executed 
62operations.
As part of his advance to the Philippines MacArthur envisaged 
a change in the present system of commanders of the Allied Naval, Land 
and Air Forces, to one of Task Force Commanders. The Australian Corps 
would, of course, be commanded by an Australian, but this appeared to 
MacArthur to be somewhat less of a command than that which had been 
exercised to date by Blarney as Commander of the Allied Land Forces. 
MacArthur said that the commander of the corps might possibly be 
Lieutenant-General Sir Leslie Morshead or Lieutenant-General Berryman.
The latter, who had been a capable staff officer, had demonstrated in 
the Finschhafen fighting the qualities of a good commander and 'when 
things were not going well, he had displayed those tigerish qualities 
which were so necessary to fight back and overcome the enemy'. MacArthur 
thought that Morshead possessed good soldierly qualities as a corps 
commander, but was not as experienced as the other senior officers in 
jungle warfare. MacArthur had also gained from him 'the impression that
61. Summary of RENO III, Morton, op.cit., Appendix S. For the details 
of RENO III see Blarney Papers DRL 6643, item 86, AWM.
62. Interview with Major-General L. de L. Barham, 11 December 1978.
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he was content with his record and not anxious for further advancement 
and the responsibility which it would entail1.
Thus, as he had in December 1943, MacArthur outlined his projected 
command organisation; one which was to exclude Blarney and work through 
a more junior task force commander. Now was the time for Curtin to 
complain if he thought that Blarney should remain an effective Commander 
of the Allied Land Forces. If Curtin and Shedden agreed with MacArthur 
then they should have set about formalising the arrangement. Either 
way it is hard to believe that Blarney remained in ignorance of the plan. 
Only an independent role for the Australians could assure him of his 
position. Nonetheless, if MacArthur were to be believed, the Australian 
corps was committed to the Philippines.
MacArthur now turned to Curtin's forthcoming trip to Washington, 
and gave the Prime Minister advice about how to deal with Roosevelt, 
whom he said 'was quite unscrupulous ... in getting away from his own 
expression of agreement and repudiating his word if it suited him'. 
Marshall 'was a very well informed and pleasaat person, but he really 
did not have a strategic mind'. King 'had a hard and unattractive 
personality'. Arnold's main interest was the bombing of Germany. 
MacArthur advised Curtin to see and have discussions with the President 
only, and not with the Combined or Joint Chiefs of Staff. Curtin 
enquired if there was anything he could do to help MacArthur, who replied 
that as the Pacific was a sphere of American responsibility 'only harm 
could come by intrusion by the Prime Minister which might be described 
by those who resented it as an attempt at political interference'.
Curtin then raised the matter of the cables from Churchill and 
Bruce about the British strategy for the Pacific. MacArthur thought 
that they were 'entirely academic'. As a soldier 'it was his principle 
never to refuse any aid' and he recommended that Curtin should accept 
anything offered, but he pointed out that the time factor was the vital
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consideration. Furthermore, any British forces should operate under 
the existing command system. He endorsed the view of the Australian 
Chiefs of Staff that they were capable of providing London with the
63necessary information.
Therefore, in a very one-sided discussion MacArthur had outlined his
future operations and given Curtin his views on the line the Prime Minister
should take in Washington and London. The events overseas were to
show how much Curtin followed MacArthur's advice.
Having secured MacArthur's views Curtin replied, on 22 March,
to Churchill's cable of the eleventh. He repeated the statement of
the Australian Chiefs of Staff that they were capable of assessing
Australia's potential, and added that MacArthur would be able to furnish
any opinions that may be desired on the operational aspect of the base
potentialities of, and the operation of forces from Australia.
Curtin then referred Churchill to his cable of 8 October 1943 when he
had mentioned the desirability of a British Empire effort in the Pacific,
and concluded:
British forces could ... operate in the South-West 
Pacific Area only by being assigned to the Commander- 
in-Chief in accordance with the terms of his directive.
A separate system of command could not be established. 
Furthermore, the base facilities on the mainland are 
under the control of the Commander Allied Land Forces, 
who is also Commander-in-Chief of the Australian 
Military Forces, the Australian Chief of the Naval 
Staff and the Australian Chief of the Air Staff ... 
information should be furnished by those sources 
and the administrative experts sent to Australia 
should be attached to the staffs of the respective 
Australian services.64
63. In a letter to Curtin on 22 March 1944 MacArthur reinforced this 
view stating that 'the proposed visit of parties of administrative 
experts seems a waste of time and energy'. CRS A816, item 7/301/32.
64. Cable 68, Curtin to Churchill, 22 March 1944, CRS A816, item 
31/301/336; also Blarney Papers 1.2
Blarney had forseen the possibility that the British leaders might wish
to establish a separate command in the area, and he was the author of
this final paragraph.
When, on 17 March, Churchill had pressed the United Kingdom Chiefs
of Staff for the capture of Simalu to the north-west of Sumatra, the
CIGS, General Brooke, had written in his diary, 'I began to wonder
whether I was in Alice in Wonderland or qualifying for a lunatic
asylum!1 ^  The receipt of Curtin's cable did little to help the argument.
The Australian Army Representative, Lieutenant-General Smart, reported
that the British Chiefs thought that the Australian reply was 'completely
correct' but that the general effect was 'thought somewhat discouraging'.
The British Chiefs were now considering whether to send just the Navy
6 7to the Pacific. That same day Brooke wrote to Dill in Washington:
I am quite clear in my own mind that strategically 
it is right for us to use all our forces in close 
cooperation from Australia across the Pacific 
in the general direction of Formosa.^8
Australian Attitudes on the Eve of Curtin's Overseas Visit
Curtin's advisers during his overseas visit were to be Shedden and 
Blarney, and on the eve of their departure Blamey's main strategic 
problem was the employment of the Australian Army. He was aware that 
the respective RENO Plans made little provision for the Australian 
striking force, and on 3 March he told Morshead that the operational
69role of the Australian forces in New Guinea had 'practically terminated'. 
For a while he had hoped that MacArthur would use the Australians to
65. Letter, Shedden to Blarney, 2 3 March 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
66. Diary, 17 March 1944, Alanbrooke Papers.
6 7 . Cable, Smart to Northcott, 30 March 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
68. Quoted in Bryant, Triumph in the West, p.169.
69. Letter, Blarney to Morshead, 3 March 1944, Blarney Papers 170.5;
Morshead Papers, 101/9, AWM.
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advance northwards from Darwin, but as mentioned, MacArthur had
70dampened that idea on 25 February.
During the preceding month Blamey's staff had prepared plans to
71seize islands m  the Arafura Sea with a target date of 1 June 1944.
As part of the preparations General Allen at Darwin had detailed the
works necessary to improve the port and the Engineer-in-Chief and
72the Quartermaster-General had begun a number of studies. Despite
the probability that the operation would continue to be postponed
General Chamberlin had suggested that Darwin should be developed in
73case it should be required. By 28 February Blamey's staff were
74planning on beginning the operation on 1 August 1944, but on 3 March
Blarney told Shedden that it 'now seems probably that any operation
75by the Australian Force across the Arafura Sea may be delayed'.
While Blarney did not completely give up hope, on 23 March he wrote to
Morshead:
On the question of future operations, you will 
have heard many rumours, chief of which have 
centered around the fact that Darwin is being 
developed. While the development of Darwin 
will continue definitely to meet early Air Force 
requirements, and possibly later Naval require­
ments, and while the Army has been charged 
with the main part of the development work, it is 
unlikely that it will be used as an Army base for 
forward movement for very many months, if at all.^^
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70. See page 356.
71. 'Appreciation of the Situation on 30 December 1943' by Brigadier 
W.M. Anderson, Blarney Papers 43.5 Part I.
72. Blarney to Allen, 2 February 1944; Allen to Blarney, 3 February 1944; 
Steele to Allen, 4 February 1944; Blarney to Allen, 9 February 1944;
loc.oit.
73. Record of Conversation Major-General Chamberlin-Brigadier White 
1500 hours, 25 February 1944, loc.cit.
74. Memorandum Brigadier L. de L. Barham to Blarney, 7 March 1944,
Minutes of Conference LHQ, 28 February 1944 - AUBURN, loc.cit.
75. Letter, Blarney to Shedden, 3 March 1944, Blarney Papers 154.1.
76. Letter, Blarney to Morshead, 23 March 1944, Blarney Papers 170.5, 
also Morshead Papers, 101/9, AWM.
During this period Captain Alan Hillgarth, the Chief of the 
Intelligence Staff of the British Eastern Fleet, visited Australia 
and talked to MacArthur about the attack on the Philippines. He reported 
that:
I asked what forces he proposed to use to attack 
the Philippines, and he said that he would have 
always 60,000 men ready for battle. Asked if 
these include Australians, he repeated, '60,000 total 
always ready for battle', thus evading my question.
As a result of these discussions Hillgarth was certain that MacArthur
would not use Australian troops if he could do without them, but he
thought MacArthur was 'reluctant to relinquish control over the AIF -
probably the finest jungle fighters in the world - in case he has to
4-1, . 78use them .
Hillgarth later told Mmiral Mountbatten that although the senior
Australian officers to whom he spoke had no knowledge of Culverin,
(Churchill's projected operation against Sumatra) they were keen for
the AIF to fight with SEAC, and that three Australian divisions could
79be made available for such an operation. These unsolicited and
unofficial views reached Churchill on 21 April with a note from Ismay
80that it was undesirable that they should be seen by US officers.
It is important to note that while Hillgarth did not speak to 
Blarney he did speak to many of the senior staff at advanced Land Head­
quarters and GHQ in Brisbane. It was there that he learnt of the 
suggestion that there should be an entirely Australian expedition from
77. After meeting Hillgarth in Canberra on 19 March 1944, Gavin Long 
noted that he was a 'shrewd, much-travelled bloke'. Gavin Long Diary,
No.4, p.43, AWM.
78. Extracts from a report on a visit to Australia 6-28 March 1944 by 
Captain A. Hillgarth RN, PREM 3 159/9. Hereafter Hillgarth Report.
79. Cable 35, Mountabtten to Ismay, 20 April 1944, PREM 3 63/13.
Although Australian army officers had no knowledge of British plans, 
they did know that General Lethbridge had recommended that two United 
Kingdom divisions should be sent to Australia. Advisory War Council 
Minute, 1304, Canberra, 15 February 1944, CRS A2682, Vol.VII.
80. Memorandum, Ismay to Churchill, 21 April 1944, PREM 3 63/13.
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Darwin using the three AIF divisions. He felt that the AIF was looking
to Blarney for a lead as to where it was to be next employed. He
gained the impression that Blarney was 'probably rightly, regarded as
a great general and the best man available for land fighting against
the Japanese'.^
From the above evidence it seems likely that when Blarney left
Australia on 5 April 1944 he belie.ved that the Australian forces were
to be left behind by MacArthur, and that the best course of action was
to look for an alternative employment. He already knew of the
plans for basing a force on Australia, and although the so-called
'middle strategy' had not yet been put forward in London, Blamey's
ideas were shaping in that direction.
When Hillgarth visited Canberra he gained similar impressions
to those he had formed in Brisbane. The Governor-General, Lord Gowrie,
told him that the question of the future employment of the AIF was
agitating everyone. Hillgarth, who thought that the standard of the
Australian politicians was generally low, detected a feeling that they
would like to see British forces in Australia.
Only some Irish and a few thugs like Mr Eddie Ward 
are still anti-British ... Dr Evatt, the strong man 
of the Cabinet, is now in full favour of a pro- 
British policy, though he is by nature suspicious 
and still dislikes us at heart ...
Hillgarth thought Evatt had brains, energy and ambition, Curtin was
'too honest for his extremists', and Forde was 'of small consequence'.*
If Blarney looked forward to the opportunity of in some way
influencing Allied Strategy, with perhaps the chance of increasing
83the British commitment to Australia, there is no evidence that Curtin
364
81. Hillgarth Report.
82. Ibid.
83. Hetherington, op.cit., p.330.
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felt the same way. The Prime Minister did not feel that Churchill
would approach Australia's problems with sympathy. Indeed Churchill
had not replied to his important cable of 8 October 1943 outlining
84the extent and nature of Australia's war effort, and Curtin had
85pointedly referred Churchill again to this cable on 22 March 1944.
The lack of a British response deeply offended Curtin, and when 
the Admiralty, through the Australian CNS, suggested that the RAN should 
man some RN ships, Shedden noted that: 'the Prime Minister went so far 
as to say that if Mr Churchill did not choose to reply to his represen­
tation about the concentration of the Australian war effort in the 
South-West Pacific by the return of naval crews and RAAF squadrons, he
certainly was not going to adopt such a humble attitude as to offer
86gifts by manning additional ships'.
When the United Kingdom High Commissioner, Sir Ronald Cross, saw
Curtin off in the USS Lurline, on 5 April, he found him '... almost
speechless and terribly depressed1, he was tired and lacked self
87confidence. Cross thought this was because Curtin, whom he thought
had 'a great facility of speech' and was 'an able man of good purpose,
found himself in the midst of events that dwarfed the little realm of
88his life's thought, knowledge, experience and undertakings'. He felt
that Curtin was terrified of cutting a poor figure before Churchill
89and the formidable collection of United Kingdom ministers. In this
84. Cable No.267, Curtin to Churchill, 8 October 1943, CRS A2680, item 
Appendum No.35/1943. This cable was considered by the British Chiefs 
of Staff on 12 October 1943 and the Service Ministers were directed to 
report separately on the effect of Curtin's requests. However it was 
not until 28 January 1944 that Churchill began to consider Curtin's 
telegram. See ADM 1/14987.
85. Cable No.68, Curtin to Churchill, 22 March 1944, CRS A816, 31/301/336.
86. Letter, Shedden to A.J. Wilson, 1 April 1944, MP 1217, Box 305.
87. Letter, Cross to Cranborne, 13 April 1944, PREM 4 50/15.
88. Letter, Cross to Churchill, 2 April 1944, PREM 50/15.
89. Letter, Cross to Dominions Office, 3 March 1944, PREM 4 50/15.
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assessment Cross may have misjudged Curtin as he did many other matters
in Australia. In Hillgarth's opinion Cross and his staff did not 'cut
, . . • . 9 0much ice' in Australia.
Nevertheless, Cross was correct that Curtin did not want to go
91to England. Between June 1942 and November 1943 he received six
invitations from Churchill and Roosevelt, but in each case he felt unable
to leave Australia. In Shedden's opinion Curtin had shrewdly taken notice
92of Menzies' fate after his overseas trip in 1941. When Evatt suggested
that the Prime Ministers' meeting should be expanded to become an Imperial
93 .Conference which he should attend, Curtin replied firmly that there
94would be too many ministers absent from Australia. To Curtin the trip
was, therefore, a necessary evil, and he told Shedden that 'if he had to
95go he was going only to avoid being a ,defaulter'.
The overseas trip proved to be a severe physical strain for Curtin.
His great fear of flying meant that he crossed the Pacific in each
90. Hillgarth Report. Coincidentally, E.H. Cox of the Parliamentary Press 
Gallery used exactly the same terms in describing Cross's influence in 
Australia and he had no knowledge of the Hillgarth report. E.H. Cox 
interview, 20 November 1978. During an interview with Mr Bruce on 31 March
1943 Sir Campbell Stuart, who had just returned from Australia, 'drew the 
most appalling picture of Cross' ineptitude and quite frankly suggested 
that he had to be removed from Australia. He said he was a complete snob, 
disliked Australia and the Australians'. CRS M100, item, March 1943. Sir 
Paul Hasluck thought that Cross was 'one of the less successful occupants 
of that post'. Diplomatic Witness, p.117.
91. E.H. Cox recalled that Curtin told him that he did not want to leave 
Australia as Forde would then be Acting Prime Minister, and he was ill- 
equipped to deal with MacArthur and Nelson Johnson, the US Minister. Cox 
interview, 20 November 1978. On 1 May 1944 Johnson reported that, 'Mr 
Curtin is the one man who can keep the Labor flock in the fold - he has 
more to fear in his absence from his followers than from the Opposition'. 
Political Report for February and March 1944, Records of the Department of 
State, RG 59, file 847.00/421, National Archives. While Curtin was overseas 
Gavin Long visited Forde, the Acting Prime Minister. On 28 April 1944 he 
wrote in his diary: 'I saw Forde on 27 April. He was tired and dull ... 
Today he was weary and worried'. Gavin Long Diary No.4, p.70.
92. Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 3, Chapter 45, p.l.
93. Letter, Evatt to Curtin, 17 December 1943, loc.cit., p. 2.
94. Letter, Curtin to Evatt, 23 December 1943,ibid.
95. Shedden Diary, 20 December 1943, MP 1217, Box 16.
direction by sea, but he still could not relax. Throughout each
voyage he remained tense, pacing the deck, and very agitated about
the possibility of having to abandon ship. He crossed America in each
direction by train, and he found the Atlantic air trip frightening.
Curtin's fear for his physical safety added to his nervous condition,
97and thus helped contribute to his early death.
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Developments during Curtin's Journey to England
When Curtin, Shedden and Blarney arrived in Washington on 23 April
1944, they had no intention of discussing matters of strategy concerning
Australia. Curtin felt it proper that he should first attend the
Prime Ministers' conference and secure British approval of the projected
Australian war effort for 1944 and 1945. Nevertheless the visit did
provide Curtin with an opportunity to smooth American feathers ruffled
by the Australia-New Zealand Agreement and Evatt's subsequent strong
98statements.
Blarney too was able to make some unofficial contacts. At a meeting 
of the Combined Chiefs of Staff on 24 April 1944 he gave a first hand
96. In a memorandum on 5 October 1943, the US Minister in Australia, 
Nelson Johnson, noted that Curtin so disliked air travel that he had
made only two aeroplane trips since he had become Prime Minister. Records 
of the Department of State, RG 59, file 033.4711/147, National Archives.
97. This paragraph has been based on: (1) an interview with S. Landau, 
who was detailed by Shedden to accompany Curtin on his nightly walks on 
deck; (2) Shedden's Diary of the overseas trip, MP 1217, Box 16.
Shedden noted thatone night Curtin was so afraid that something would 
happen to the ship that he sat up all night with his light on. Curtin 
insisted on carrying a heavy kapok life-belt rather than a rubber 
inflatable one. (3) Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 4, Ch.57.
98. Thorne, op.cit., pp.483, 486. The US Secretary of State, Cordell 
Hull, recorded that he told Curtin that 'we frankly do not appreciate 
the attitude of Dr Evatt' on the Anzac Agreement. 'The Prime Minister 
then referred to persons with ambitions in a vague sort of way'.
Memorandum of Conversation, 24 April 1944, Records of Department of 
State, RG 59, file 033.4711/160, National Archives.
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account of the war in the Pacific. It was at this meeting that, after
saying his piece and while discussion continued, Blarney had gone to
s l e e p . B l a r n e y  enjoyed his stay in Washington'*’^  where 'an ADC well
acquainted with the night life of the city and with an expense account,
102was placed at his disposal and kept suitably employed'.
It may be postulated that since the overseas trip led to Blamey's
further estrangement from Curtin, his conduct directly affected
103Australian strategy later in the year. Before the trip Curtin had
maintained a strictly business relationship with his army Commander-in-
Chief. Now he was forced to deal with Blarney on a personal basis. Curtin,
a teetotaller who in earlier years had had a drinking problem, was not
impressed by Blamey's rowdy parties on board the Lurline which was
104supposed to be a 'dry ship'. Nor was he pleased when Blarney entertained
99. Letter, Brigadier H. Redman and Colonel A.J. Farland, Combined 
Secretariat of Combined Chiefs of Staff to Blarney, 21 April 1944, Blarney 
Papers 5.0.
100. Williams, op.cit., p.315; D.H. Dwyer, Interlude with Blarney, unpub­
lished MS. Blarney arrived in Washington by train at 0915 hours on 23 April 
and the 45 minute meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff began at 1215 
hours on 24 April. Blarney's Diary, Blarney Papers, DRL 6643, item 144.
101. Letter, Blarney to Marshall, 27 April 1944, Blarney Papers 160.14.
102. Letter, Lumsden to Ismay, 15 July 1944, PREM 3 159/4. The ADC was 
Captain Albert McCleery, formerly a 'theatre man', and in subsequent years 
head of the National Broadcasting Corporation. Dwyer, op.cit. and Current 
Biography 1972. A 'Memorandum for the President'prepared in the US Depart­
ment of State for the visit of Curtin, Shedden and Blarney, described the 
latter as 'short, stubby, jolly, friendly, energetic and frank' and noted 
that he 'was sometimes referred to as "Boozy Blarney"'. Shedden was 
described as 'somewhat silent and not aggressive, yet able to hold his own 
in discussions ... Some say that Sir Frederick excels in laying out 
administrative plans on paper but is not able in their execution'. 
Memorandum by John D. Hickerson, Office of European Affairs, Division of 
British Commonwealth Affairs, 22 April 1944, Records of Department of 
State, RG59, file 847.00/4-2244, National Archives.
103. This topic will be dealt with in the next chapter.
104. Landau interview, 13 December 1978; Dwyer, Interlude with Blarney; 
Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16. Shedden wrote: 'Gen B had obviously 
had too much before dinner last night (11 Apr). He was very jolly and 
talkative and the PM commented on it to m e '.
a mixed party till early hours in his suite at Blair House. These, and
other incidents, roused Shedden to comment later about Blarney: 'Though
good as a Commander-in-Chief, he is not suitable as a member of a Prime
106Minister's party for the reasons evident'.
. 10Curtin's party left Baltimore for London by flying boat on 28 April.
Meanwhile, news from Australia made it increasingly clear that MacArthur
was planning to exclude the Australians from his offensive plans. When
Blarney had left Australia troops of the 11th Division were still some ten
108miles south of Bogadjim, while elements of the 32nd US Division were
pushing tentatively along the coast from Saidor.
However, as the operations controlled by HQ New Guinea Force declined
in importance, the role of Advanced Land Headquarters in Brisbane resumed
its main planning function. Originally Blamey's deputy at Advanced LHQ
had been General Vasey, and then General Berryman. But from the beginning
of 1944 his chief operations staff officer was the relatively junior
Brigadier L. de L. Barham, and with Blarney now overseas Barham was in a
difficult position. General Lumsden later observed that Barham was 'afraid
of his own shadow lest it fall between him and his job and darken his
future prospects of employment. He appears to possess a very timid nature
109and to have no particular abilities'.
105. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16. Blamey's Diary, 26 April 1944; 
Blamey's Papers, DRL 6643, item 144.
106. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16.
107. Curtin sat up all night in the plane from Bermuda to London 'with 
his business hat pulled securely down over his ears ... fully clothcd and 
tight lipped'. Blarney slept in a luxurious bed which had been prepared 
for Curtin who could not relax enough to use it. Dwyer, op.cit. When 
Curtin's party arrived at Baltimore airport and began walking from the 
car to the airport building, Rodgers, Curtin's press secretary, said to 
Shedden, 'the PM will now get the wind up with the sight of the flying 
boats'. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16.
108. Dexter, op.cit. 3 p.777. The HQ 11th Division took over from the 
7th on 8 April.
109. Comments by Lumsden in Notes of an Interview with General MacArthur,
1 August 1944, CAB 127/33.
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On 10 April 1944 General Chamberlin advised Barham that the 32nd
US Division at Saidor was to be replaced by the 5th Australian Division
which was to have an offensive role. Barham pointed out that in accordance
with Blamey's policy 'an offensive role for 5 Aust Div [was] not
acceptable even for the capture of Bogadjim, other than patrolling'. ’*’’*’^
This did not mean that Blarney was opposed to using Australians in
offensive operations, but he did not want Australian resources to be
wasted on an unproductive advance along the northern New Guinea coast.
The next day Barham flew to Melbourne and explained the American plan
to General Northcott, the CGS, who was the Acting Australian Commander-
in-Chief. Northcott felt that an offensive could not be supported •
with the resources available, but that he was sure that offensive
patrolling would be successful 'in view of the indications of withdrawal
from Bogadjim'. Mindful that Blarney had previously declined to allow
an 'offensive role' for the division, Northcott believed that 'GHQ [were]
trying to put this over as soon as his [Blamey's] back [was] turned',"*’"*’"*’
and therefore he decided to fly to Brisbane and discuss the situation 
112with MacArthur. Small though this incident was, it created in
MacArthur's mind the idea that Blarney was attempting to restrict the
113operations of the Australians m  New Guinea.
110. Memorandum by Brigadier Barham, 11 April 1944, AWM 519/6/49. See 
also GHQ G.3 Journal, 11 April 1944, copy in papers of G. Hermon Gill, 
5/28/50 AWM. After visiting Major D. McCarthy, the Australian liaison 
officer with the 6th US Army, Gavin Long wrote that General Savige, the 
GOC New Guinea Force, had his hands 'tied by orders not to commit his 
forces to any major action'. Gavin Long Notes, No.40, AWM. Major-General
C.H. Finlay, who was on the staff of LHQ at the time, thought that Blarney 
stopped the Australians after the 32nd US Division at Saidor allowed the 
Japanese to escape. Interview, 5 June 1979.
111. Letter, Northcott to Morshead, 12 April 1944, Morshead Papers 101/11.
112. Letter, Northcott to Blarney, 13 April 1944, Northcott Papers MSS 
1431/14, Mitchell Library.
113. Notes of Discussions [by Shedden] with Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
Pacific Area, 27 June 1944, MP 1217, Box 3. Also Lumsden to Ismay,
18 July 1944, PREM 3 154/4.
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When Northcott met MacArthur the latter made it clear that while
he realised the Australian difficulties due to manpower restriction,
he had been promised by Blarney and Curtin that the AIF Corps and twelve
brigades with administrative troops would be maintained and available
to him. MacArthur said that he had been informed that the AIF divisions
would not be ready by the time originally promised and he urged that
the preparations be speeded up. With regard to future operations he
listed the areas in New Guinea where Australian troops were to take-over
from American forces, but there was no mention of the future role of
114the AIF. One is left to wonder whether MacArthur was, by now, aware
of the anger in the State Department over the signing of the Anzac
treaty, which had revealed Australian sensitivity to the threat of
American annexation of the reconquered islands. On 1 May 1944 Northcott
cabled Blarney and related his discussions with M a c A r t h u r M a c A r t h u r
had stressed the need for garrison forces in New Britain, New Ireland,
the Admiralties and the Solomons. Northcott reported that MacArthur
also referred to other British Islands in the Pacific 
which are at present garrisoned by U.S. troops and the 
desirability of these being relieved as soon as possible 
by British or Dominion garrisons. He explained quite 
frankly that continuation U.S. garrisons when no longer 
in zone of operations may influence U.S. claims in post
war settlement.
This thinly veiled threat, which greeted Blarney on his arrival in
London, would have strengthened his hand in attempting to persuade the
117British of the necessity for their presence in the Pacific. It is
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114. 'Notes on discussion MacArthur' AWM 519/6/49. This note is in 
Northcott's handwriting with no date, but may be placed as 14 April 1944 
by evidence in Northcott's letter to Blarney, 13 April 1944 (Northcott 
Papers).
115. It is not certain whether Northcott was referring to his discussion 
of 14 April, or to a subsequent discussion. In the interim, Northcott had 
visited New Guinea.
116. Cable, Northcott to Blarney, 1 May 1944, Blarney Papers 43.66.
117. The British were informed of these developments in almost exactly the 
same terms in cable 104, Dewing to ACIGS (0), 8 May 1944, WO 106/3405, 
and also in a letter from Lumsden to Ismay, 24 April 1944, PREM 3 159/14.
not known what advice General Smart, the amiable but somewhat ineffective
118Australian Army Representative, gave to his Commander-in-Chief when he
119met him at Croydon airport, but it may be surmised that it followed
the lines of a letter he had sent to Northcott a fortnight before.
Smart had written:
the position is now that all the Services favour the 
use of Australia as a main base and the strategy that 
would go with it. For a number of reasons, including 
the diplomatic and prestige value of mounting our 
effort from India, the value of mounting it from 
the very well publicised SEAC under Mountbatten etc. 
etc., Winston Churchill was hard to convince and 
reluctant to make the approach to Australia. As 
our reply to his cable was rather reserved I gather his 
reaction was to drop the project and revert to the 
original conception of mounting the British effort 
from India. However, it is said that he is coming 
round to the Services v i e w . 120
Blarney also received the news that the Lethbridge Mission had found
that India was unsuitable as a base for a large force and that they
121had emphasised the superior possibilities of Australia.
The most important news for Blarney would have been the suggestion
from the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff of a 'Middle Strategy'. This
was a compromise strategy which, in early April, the British joint planners
had been ordered to investigate. This plan assumed that the American
advance would not be as rapid as anticipated and that British forces
would advance from northern and western Australia to Ambon (March 1945)
122and then on to the Celebes, Borneo and Saigon. Subsequently this
plan was replaced by the so-called 'Modified Middle Strategy' which
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118. Interview with Major-General A.G. Wilson, 13 December 1978. Wilson 
was Assistant Military Liaison Officer in London. Interview with J.P. 
Buckley, 22 January 1979. See also the Bulletin, 15 April 1942 and 
Stirling,op. cit., p.373, for a description of Smart.
119. D.H. Dwyer, op.cit.; Blamey's Diary, 29 April 1944, Blarney Papers 
DRL 6643, item 4.
120. Letter, Smart to Northcott, 15 April 1944, AWM 9/2/3.
121. Cable, Wynter to Blarney, 20 April 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
122. Ehrman, op.cit., Vol.V, p.459.
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would be an advance from the American occupied north coast of New
123Guinea to Borneo, by-passing Ambon. Thus at the beginning of May
there were four possibilities to consider: 'Culverin1, the Pacific
124strategy, the Middle Strategy and the Modified Middle Strategy.
Strategic Discussions in London
With the British Pacific strategy revolving around four possibi­
lities, the Commonwealth Prime Ministers met in London on 3 May to 
discuss the war against Japan. Churchill mentioned the alternative 
strategies, but Curtin said that he thought that the speed of MacArthur's 
advance would be greater than that expected by the Chiefs of Staff. 
Churchill thought that the 'American programmes might be unduly sanguine'. 
When Curtin inquired if the British force would be under MacArthur,
Churchill said that it probably would be, but that the matter had still 
125to be considered.
After this opening discussion, Curtin outlined the situation in 
the Pacific and Blarney reviewed the course of operations in New Guinea-. 
Curtin then gave details of the Australian war effort. lie described 
the manpower problem pointing out that one in every two men between 
the ages of 18 and 40 was serving in the forces, and explained the
decision of 1943 which he had presented in the 8 October cable to
126Churchill. He reminded the British Prime Minister that he had never
12 3. Ibid., pp.460, 461.
124. There were, in fact, five possibilities if the American plan for an 
offensive in northern Burma is included.
125. 'Meeting of Prime Ministers, 3 May 1944', PREM 3 160/1 also PREM 4 
42/4. The Prime Ministers had met previously on 1 and 2 May but had not 
discussed the war with Japan.
126. Ibid. This paper had been prepared by Shedden who had then forwarded 
it to MacArthur for comments. MacArthur had made a few suggestions and 
had stressed 'the comparative paucity of our means'. Nevertheless he 
told Shedden that his paper was 'a very able and brilliant analysis of 
the Australian situation'. Letter, MacArthur to Shedden, 31 March 1944, 
Sutherland Papers, Correspondence with Australian Government.
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received a reply to this cable. Despite the need to reduce the
Australian military effort Curtin was aware that Australian influence
in the Pacific would be related directly to the amount of fighting it
128did, not to the amount of food supplied.
Curtin then turned to the question of basing United Kingdom forces
on Australia, warmly welcoming the proposal and promising the fullest
collaboration and co-operation while adhering to the principles set out
129m  his telegram of 22 March. Curtin suggested that Blarney and the
Australian Naval and Air representatives in London discuss with the
United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff the technical aspects of the procedure
to be followed in examining the matter. He reminded the conference 1
that Australia was a sphere of American strategic responsibilities
and of the need for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to approve any change
130to the nature of the Australian war effort. It was agreed at the
meeting that the future balance of the Australian war effort should
be referred to a private conference lead by the British Minister of 
131Production. But already one British Minister had made up his mind,
for the next day L.S. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, told
Churchill that it was obvious that Australia did not have a strong enough
132economy on which to base British forces.
127
127. Cable 11, Curtin to Forde, 3 May 1944, CRS A2680, item Agendum 
No.16/1944. In reply to this complaint the Dominions Secretary, Lord 
Cranborne, said that a draft reply had been prepared, but not despatched 
pending the resolution the decision over the use of British forces in
the Pacific. 'Meeting of Prime Ministers, 3 May 1944', PREM 3 160/1. For 
the draft reply, which was prepared on 2 3 January 1944, but not sent, see 
PREM 3 63/8. This reply mentioned that Britain planned to send at least
4 divisions to Australia which in turn would need to provide 3 offensive 
divisions.
128. 'Meeting of Prime Ministers, 3 May 1944', PREM 3 160/1.
129. See p.360.
130. Cable 11, Curtin to Forde, 8 May 1944, CRS A2680, item Agendum 
16/1944.
131. 'Meeting of Prime Ministers, 3 May 1944', PREM 3 160/1.
132. Amery to Churchill, 4 May 1944, PREM 3 160/1.
The next fortnight was a round of meetings between the British
Chiefs of Staffs, Blarney and the Australian Naval and Air Representatives
in England, Admiral Sir Ragnar Colvin and Air Vice-Marshal H.N. Wrigley.
Blarney brought with him more recent news of MacArthur's intentions
and the British Chiefs now learnt that MacArthur intended to capture
Halmahera. Blarney said that it was planned that three AIF divisions
would be used for this operation later in 1944 and that the other
133Australian divisions would be occupied in New Guinea. This created
problems for the British since it was likely that MacArthur would be
in the Philippines before their forces could reach the Pacific.
The timetable and composition of the British force was a matter
which greatly interested the Australians but it took a good number
of days before the British were able to give the Australians a detailed 
134statement. Assuming that Germany was defeated by the end of 1944
Britain anticipated sending 4 fleet carriers, 10 cruisers and correspond­
ing other vessels by October 1944, This force was to be expanded to 
a fleet of 6 battleships, 5 fleet carriers and 25 cruisers by late 1945. 
Two infantry divisions might arrive from India in January and March 1945 
and three from Europe in February, March and April 1945 respectively.
78 RAF squadrons would be sent. Nevertheless Brooke felt constrained 
to warn the Australians that
It should be clearly understood that the statement 
does not imply any commitment or the adoption of 
any specific policy or plan of operation in the 
Pacific.
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133. Secretary's Standard File - Australian War Effort, 5 May 1944, 
Blarney Papers 1.2.
134. The British had not prepared a pre-conference paper dealing with 
the role of British Forces in the war against Japan. It was assumed 
that the topic would be dealt with orally by Churchill assisted by the 
Chiefs of Staff. Memorandum by Dominions Secretary, 22 April 1944,
CAB 66/49, W P (44)219.
135. COS (44) 408 (0) Revised Final, 10 May 1944, War Cabinet Chiefs of 
Staff Committee. Blarney Papers 1.2. The emphasis is in the original.
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The problem for the British Chiefs of Staff was that they wanted
Australia to give a definite commitment to begin the development of
bases, while at the same time, being unable to get Churchill to agree
to the strategy they proposed, they were unable to give any guarantee
136to the Australians. On 18 May 1944 Brooke wrote in his diary:
... we had a meeting with the Planners in order to 
try and settle a final Pacific strategy to put up to 
the PM. The problem is full of difficulties, 
although the strategy is quite clear. Unfortunately 
the right course to follow is troubled by personalities, 
questions of command, vested interests, inter-allied 
jealousies, etc. Curtin and MacArthur are determined 
to stand together, support each other and allow no 
outside interference. Winston is determined Mount- 
batten must be given some operation to carry o u t . 137
The previous day Curtin had reminded Churchill that although it was
important for British prestige for the Empire to be represented in the
Pacific, the command organisation could only be altered by the Combined
•j OO
Chiefs of Staff.
Blarney met the British Chiefs again on 22 May. By this time they
had received a telegram from Admiral Daniel, who had finally received
139permission from the Australian government to enter the country,
saying that he 'saw no reason why the whole Naval force which it was
contemplated to build up in Australia by mid 1945 could not be supplied
140by Australia'. Therefore, on 22 May the British Chiefs agreed with
136. Ibid., also COS (44) 408 (0) Final, 12 May 1944, British Commonwealth 
Forces for the Far East, Blarney Papers 1.2.
137. Diary, 18 May 1944, 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers.
138. Memorandum, Curtin to Churchill, 17 May 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
139. Daniel had to wait at Guadalcanal before the Australian government 
allowed his party to proceed. On 23 April 1944 Churchill had cabled
to Australia: 'To avoid further delay, they are being instructed to 
proceed to Australia ... Considering our idea is to come and help you, 
we hope no obstacles will be placed in the way'. CRS A816, item 7/301/32.
140. COS (44) 442 (0), 20 May 1944. Memorandum by the First Sea Lord. 
Blarney Papers 1.2.
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Blarney that the British reconnaissance parties to go to Australia should
be integrated with the Australian staff and that their report would
be from the Australian Chiefs of Staff. Again, to emphasise that no
strategy had been settled, Brooke stressed that the officers 'could
141in no way be regarded as forming a planning staff'. However Brooke's
optimism is shown by his comments in his diary: 'Blarney in complete
agreement, so much so that we shall now be accused by Winston of
142settling things without his agreement behind his back'. The
British representatives were to include 17 naval officers, 12 army
officers and 4 RAF officers. These included Admiral Daniel and Brigadier
E.W. Milford who were already in Australia and would therefore need
revised instructions.^
As a result of these discussions, on 22 May the British Chiefs
put the 'Modified Middle Strategy' to Churchill, with Ambon as the
target. The forces would be based on the north and west coast of
Australia and provided
for a substantial Imperial and Dominion contribution 
by forces under the command of their own British 
commanders, though subordinate to an American Supreme 
Commander receiving his directions from the Combined 
Chiefs of Staff.
The Chiefs of Staff went on to elaborate this point:
At present General MacArthur as Supreme Allied 
Commander in the South-West Pacific Area, takes 
his instructions from the United States Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, and the British Chiefs of Staff 
have no say in the choice of his operations. Since 
it is one of our objects to ensure that the British 
Empire plays the greatest possible effective part
141. COS (44) 442 (0), 22 May 1944, Blarney Papers 1.2.
142. Diary, 22 May 1944, 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers.
143. Cable War Office to Dewing, no date, Blarney Papers 1.2. See also 
letter Northcott to Forde, 16 June 1944, CRS A816, item 2/301/306; 
cable 44, Curtin to Forde, 24 May 1944, CRS A816, item 7/301/32,
and cable ZL 119, Blarney to Northcott, 26 May 1944, loc.cit.
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in the operations for the defeat of Japan, we feel 
it is only right that the Command arrangements should 
be altered and that the South-West Pacific Area should 
become a theatre of joint responsibility, subordinate to 
the Combined Chiefs of Staff, so that we may share in 
the control of operations in that theatre. Recognising 
that the American contribution during the first phase 
will predominate, we suggest that we should be willing 
to accept Gen<? ral MacArthur as Supreme Commander 
over the Allied Forces, but that the British and Dominion 
forces should operate as a distinct Command with British 
Commanders under General MacArthur's supreme direction.
We feel, however, that even this arrangement should be 
left open to reconsideration at a later d a t e . 144
This paper seemed to interest Churchill, for the next day he met with
the Chiefs of Staff, and Brooke recorded that 'I think we have at last
got him swung to an Australia-based strategy as opposed to his
145old love, the Sumatra trip'. The stumbling block was Curtin, who
although he had suggested a revised arrangement some months before as
146an inducement to the British to enter the South-West Pacific, was
147no longer willing to alter the command arrangement.
Although Blarney supported Curtin in all formal meetings, there is
evidence to suggest that in private conversations with Brooke he was
becoming, if he had not already been, attracted to the idea of a semi-
148separate command in the area to the north of Australia. Brooke met
144. Memorandum, Chiefs of Staff to Churchill, 22 May 1944, PREM 3 160/4.
145. Diary, 24 May 1944, 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers. Other1supporters of the plan 
to base the UK forces in Australia were the Secretary of State for War,
Sir James Grigg (Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16) and the Foreign Secretary, 
Anthony Eden (Minute, Eden to Churchill, 12 June 1944, PREM 3 160/4).
146. Ehrman, op.cit., Vol.V, pp.439, 440.
147. On 18 May 1944 Brooke wrote in his diary: 'Curtin and MacArthur are 
determined to stand together, support each other, and allow no outside 
interference'. Diary 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers.
148. The British official historian says: 'The idea of a British or 
Commonwealth Command attracted the Australian military authorities 
particularly as the future of their troops was by no means clear if the 
campaign developed an increasingly American character. Ehrman, op.cit.,
Vol.V, p.482. In a memorandum to Churchill on 1 May 1944, the Chiefs
of Staff pointed out that MacArthur's policy would result in Australia's 
'fine seasoned troops' being used in garrison duties: 'the Australian 
Government is unlikely to acquiesce in their being given a partly 
passive role'. PREM 3 63/8.
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Blarney on a number of occasions and 'found him easy to get on with,
149but not inspiring'. At a meeting on 10 May Brooke, Blarney and
General Puttick, the New Zealand CGS, discussed MarArthur's plans to
. . 150use British Commonwealth troops for garrison duties. Since it
was pertinent to these discussions, it may be surmised that the CIGS
was later shown and explained the implications of a cable from Northcott
to Blarney. This cable stated that in a staff discussion with General
Bridgeford and Brigadier Barham, General Chamberlin had outlined future
operations:
May, July, September, November objectives on your 
map are all American land forces objectives. GHQ 
then move Philippines. Possible role Australian 
land forces - garrison New Ireland and relieve 
American garrison division New Britain Nov. Arafura 
area Nqv. New Britain, New Ireland considered 
New Guinea Force role but would appear our future 
offensive operations are likely to be determined 
unless American forces held up en route to Philippines.
In any case no amphibious or other shipping or air 
transportation likely to be available to use for 
Arafura even if required. This may affect British 
co-operation in Pacific for provision of resources.
words, the only hope for an Australian offensive role rested *
plans for a British Commonwealth offensive on the American flank,
the Modified Middle Strategy.
15 2United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff paper of 22 May raised 
indirectly the possibility that Blarney might command this force. One
149. When Brooke met Blarney on 5 May 1944, he wrote in his diary: 
'Blarney is not an impressive specimen. He looks entirely drink-sodden 
and somewhat repulsive'. After a meeting on 12 May Brooke noted that 
'Blarney looked as if he had the most frightful "hang-over" from a 
debauched night! His eyes were swimming in alcohol. However, we made 
considerable progress ...' Diary 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers.
150. Cable 95293, ACIGS to Dewing, 17 May 1944, and Memorandum, General 
Kennedy (ACIGS (0)) to CIGS, 10 May 1944, WO 106/3405.
151. Cable, Northcott to Blarney, 22 May 1944, Blarney Papers 43.66.
My emphasis.
In other 
with the 
that is, 
The
152. See pp.377, 378.
part of the paper referred to the intention that 'British and Dominion
forces will operate together under one command', and that although these
forces should operate under MacArthur, 'even this arrangement should
153be left open to reconsideration at a later date'. This meant that
the commander of the force could eventually become an Allied Supreme
Commander on a par with Eisenhower, Mountbatten, Alexander, MacArthur
and Nimitz. Shedden wrote later that since the forces in the first
phase of the proposed operations were to be dominion land and air
forces with a predominantly British navy, he suspected that Blarney
154had an ambition to become the commander. Such a command, when
linked with his role as Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army,
may have been sufficient to warrant Blamey's promotion to Field Marshal.
Hence, Shedden wrote that 'General Blamey's personal assistant [Major
Dwyer] had flown a kite with my assistant [Landau] regarding the deserving
155case of General Blarney for promotion to Field Marshal'.
Blamey's hopes can be gauged by a closer examination of the British 
Chiefs of Staff paper of 22 May.^^^ This paper referred 'to the anxiety 
that Australia is ready and anxious to use her forces in offensive 
actions as soon as possible'. Shedden noted later that the British Chiefs 
could not have formed this view from any of the Prime Minister's state­
ments, and 'was presumably related to an opinion expressed by General
15 3. Notes of Discussions [by Shedden] with Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
Pacific Area, 27 June 1944. MP 1217, Box No.3.
154. Ibid. In November 194 3 a certain Lieutenant-Commander Shepherd RN 
had visited Australia and had reported that Blarney wanted to form an all- 
British force of AIF, AMF, RAAF, RAN and RN and wanted to be Commander- 
in-Chief of all of it. Shepherd's report was passed to Ismay by Admiral 
Somerville in a letter dated 19 January 1944. Ismay Papers IV/Som.
155. Ibid. Landau does not deny this conversation, but he did not place 
much importance upon it. There was no way of knowing whether it was 
Dwyer's or Blamey's idea. Interview, 13 December 1978.
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156. This was known as COS (44) (449) (0).
Blarney*. This attitude should be contrasted with Blarney's instruc-
tions to Northcott to hold the Australian troops back from an offensive,
and also with Shedden's recollection that whilst in London Blarney remarked
'when referring to General MacArthur's plans and the use of the AIF,
159that one should not be too eager to use our own forces.
Furthermore, the paper proposed that the dominion forces should 
be used for the capture of Ambon and Halmahera. This was an intrusion 
into General MacArthur's line of advance, as Halmahera was his next 
objective. It would disrupt his plans and postpone his programme.
The proposal was surprising in view of the fact that Blarney had told
160
the British Chiefs on 5 May that Halmahera was MacArthur's next objective.
But since then Blarney had received Northcott1s advice that, at variance
161with previous plans, no Australian troops were to be used.
Although Shedden believed that the British Chiefs of Staff paper
of 22 May was a good indication of Blamey's attitude, the Australian
162general played his cards very close to his broad chest. On 25 May
1944 he discussed the Pacific Strategy with S.M. Bruce and said that 
the forces sent to Australia would have to come under MacArthur's command. 
Bruce recorded:
157. Notes of Discussion [by Shedden] with Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
Pacific Area, 27 June 1944, MP 1217, Box No.3.
158. See p.370.
159. Notes of Discussion [by Shedden] with Commander-in-Chief, Southwest 
Pacific Area, 27 June 1944, op.cit.
160. See p.375.
161. Cable, Northcott to Blarney, 22 May 1944, Blarney Papers 43.66. See 
P-
162. Blamey's PA, Major Dwyer has written: 'While ... I was on the trip 
with Blarney and Curtin to London in 1944, the matter of the General's 
efforts to establish a separate Commonwealth Command in the area from 
Darwin to the Netherlands East Indies was a matter of top security and 
one which the General never actually discussed with me except in the 
most general terms'. Letter, 18 December 1978.
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I asked Blarney whether the three AIF Divisions were 
definitely earmarked for any particular operation 
under MacArthur, but Blamey's reply was quite definitely 
that they were not so earmarked but that they would be 
at MacArthur's disposition. We then had some discussion 
on the plan of a parallel advance based on Darwin to the 
northward move to New Guinea. This, however, did not get 
us very f a r .  ^ 3
Blamey's actions on return to Australia were to reveal his true feelings 
about the proposed scheme.
Whilst Blarney was discussing the British commitment to the Pacific
Curtin was concerned with winning British approval for the allocation
of the Australian war effort. This was dealt with in typical Churchillian
fashion. Churchill invited Curtin to tea at Chequers on Sunday 21 May,
telling Curtin that he would like him to meet his daughters and it would
be a good excuse for them to be released from their respective services
for the purposes of entertaining a distinguishing guest. When Curtin
arrived on Sunday afternoon there was no sign of any daughters and he
was ushered into a room where Churchill had Lord Leathers, Lord Cherwell
164and General Hollis armed with a large notebook. At this meeting
Curtin detailed the Australian war effort planned for 1945 and Churchill
agreed to return to Australia as soon as possible the Australian ships,
165men and aircraft that had been sent to Europe. This meeting turned
out to be a 'final showdown' with Churchill on Curtin's appeal to the 
United States in December 1941 and Curtin appeared to gain the better
163. Notes of Discussions [by Bruce] with General Sir Thomas Blarney,
25 May 1944, CRS M100, May 1944.
164. Notes of Discussion [by Bruce] with Prime Minister of Australia,
25 May 1944, CRS M100, May 1944. Lord Leathers was Minister of War 
Transport, Lord Cherwell was Paymaster-General and Churchill's scientific 
adviser and Hollis was Secretary of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.
165. Minutes of Conference held at Chequers, 21 May 1944, PREM 3 63/8.
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of the exchange. Curtin said later that the following night he had
'received a record of the conversation which represented anything but
what had taken place. This record however was altered by Shedden and
167the United Kingdom people had to accept it'.
The conferences continued. On 26 May Curtin and Blarney again met
the British Chiefs of Staff, Churchill, Eden, Attlee, Lyttelton and 
168Leathers. At the meeting Churchill outlined the Modified Middle
Strategy, but Curtin said that it was impossible for him to commit
himself to a change in the command arrangements in the South-West
Pacific Area without consulting his colleagues. He then went on to
outline the history of the command arrangements, referring to the
establishment of the Pacific War Councils in London and Washington.
The London body had, to all intent and purposes, 
ceased to exist, and the Washington body was 
completely deficient. He, therefore, had had to 
deal with General MacArthur ... He feared that 
there was a danger of the gravest misunder­
standings with the United States if Australian 
Forces were taken away from General MacArthur's 
direct command and placed under a new commander.1^9
166. Shedden recalled that: 'Curtin was the guest of Churchill at Chequers 
during the week-end, 20th-21st May. Late on 20th May, after dinner, Churchill 
duly fortified looked forward to a long discussion with Curtin whom he 
queried on his direct appeal of December 1941 to the United States, the 
inference being that this procedure was contrary to all concepts of Imperial 
principles. Curtin asked Churchill, "If the British Commonwealth had been
at war with Japan, and war with Germany arose later, what would you have 
done? Would you have appealed to the United States?" Churchill replied 
"Yes, most certainly". Curtin said, "Well, that was just what I did when 
we were at war with Germany and Japan came in." The discussion of this 
subject ended at that'. Shedden Manuscript, Book 4, Box 4, Chapter 46, p.18.
167. Notes of Discussion [by Bruce] with Prime Minister of Australia,
25 May 1944, CRS M100, May 1944. For the amended minutes and Curtin's 
letter to Churchill of 23 May 1944 see PREM 3 63/8 and MP 1217, Box 5.
168. It was probably at this meeting that Shedden noted that 'Blarney, 
who was sitting opposite Churchill and the UK Ministers, was drowsy and 
kept nodding and closing his eyes'. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16.
See also Blarney Diary, 26 May 1944, Blarney Papers DRL 6643, item 1214.
169. War Cabinet Agendum 342/1944, 4 July 1944, CRS A2680, item Agendum 
No.17/1944 [Part l]. Also COS (44) 467 (0), 26 May 1944, PREM 3 160/4.
In a note to Curtin before the meeting Shedden urged him to reserve any 
decision on the Modified Middle Strategy until he could consult the government 
and MacArthur. MP 1217, Box 5. Clearly Curtin followed Shedden's advice.
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It seems from this that the command arrangements in Australia had,
at least, been discussed. After the meeting Brooke wrote:
The meeting started badly as Curtin, who is 
entirely in MacArthur's pocket, was afraid we 
were trying to oust MacArthur'. He consequently 
showed very little desire for British forces to 
operate from Australia. On the other hand I know 
[presumably from Blarney that] this outlook is not 
shared by the rest of Australia.
However, as the meeting went on it took a 
far better turn, and in the end we obtained all 
we wanted for the present; namely Darwin and 
Fremantle to be developed for future operations by us...
That afternoon Brooke had further private discussions with Blarney with
171whom he 'made good progress'.
The next day Churchill wrote to Curtin to stress that a paper known
as 'The War Against Japan', which outlined the Modified Middle Strategy,
had been given to him merely to indicate the way the British minds were
working, and he urged Curtin to make no mention of it in Washington.
Indeed in a postscript to the letter Churchill asked Curtin to burn
the paper in case someone, who did not know that it was not an agreed
172document, should read it. However the most important part of the
letter, as far as Curtin was concerned, was the confirmation that the
British government had generally agreed to the allocation of the
Australian war effort. All that remained was for it to be approved
173by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Curtin, Shedden and Blarney left London on 29 May, a week before
the D Day landings. Blarney was disappointed at missing the opportunity
174of seeing something of this great event, but Curtin had no similar
170. Diary, 26 May 1944, 5/8 ,Alanbrooke Papers. See also Blamey's Diary, 26 
May 1944. Blarney Papers DRL 6643, item 144.
171. Diary, 26 May 1944, 5/8, Alanbrooke Papers.
172. Letter, Churchill to Curtin, 27 May 1944, PREM 3 160/4 and MP 1217,
Box 5. The paper, 'The War Against Japan', was not destroyed and can be 
found in the latter source.
173. Cable 44, Curtin to Forde, 29 May 1944, CRS A2684, item 1496.
174. Dwyer, op.cit.
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ambitions. Indeed when, soon after, rockets started landing on
London, Curtin said that he was glad he had got away when he did. His
private secretary observed that if Curtin had been in London when the
rockets began, the exit would have been rapid 'or the PM would have
175had a bad attack of neuritis'.
It seems that Curtin had not enjoyed his stay in London. He was
annoyed that Churchill did not take more interest in his plans for Empire 
176cooperation, and he avoided one of Churchill's invitations to Chequers
177because 'I do not care to sit in an arm chair and listen to one man'.'
Shedden also noticed Curtin's attitude:
The PM showed no interest in the countryside, the 
historical places, nor the noticeable shopping 
centres. A visit to the country made no appeal 
to him ... He went to Lords on two occasions to 
see cricket matches. He did not see any advantage 
in meeting people to talk to, and as a result many 
eminent authorities whose views were invaluable 
were not seen either in London or Washington.
Nevertheless, to many, Curtin made a good impression in London, and
Ismay recorded that 'He was both frank and friendly - a difficult 
179combination'.
On 30 May Curtin arrived at Ottawa, where he told a press conference 
that the European nations were too far distant from Australia to be 
competent judges of her position in the Pacific. He declared that 
Australia must have a powerful voice in the conduct of Pacific affairs
175. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16.
176. Although the British did not appear to take much notice of Curtin's 
proposals, they did in fact form the main basis of the discussions on 
Commonwealth defence cooperation at the Prime Ministers' conference in 
1946. See papers in AIR 9/266.
177. Roskill, op.cit., Vol.Ill, p.591.
178. Shedden Diary, MP 1217, Box 16.
179. Letter, Ismay to Casey, 13 June 1944, Ismay Papers IV/cas. On
19 December 1944 Hankey wrote to Shedden that Curtin 'made a favourable 
impression here'. MP 1217, Box 7.
During his visit to London in May 1944 Curtin 
visited RAAF units. Here he is talking to 
Group Captain H.I. Edwards VC, DSO, DFC, at 
the headquarters of No.460 Squadron RAAF.
This was the closest Curtin came to meeting 
troops in a combat zone.
(AWM Negative No. RAAF SUK 12246)
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after the war. When questioned as to whether he was completely
satisfied with the decisions taken at the London conference, Curtin 
replied:
My dear man, the only person who is completely 
satisfied is the man who is put in Valhalla or is 
seated near the throne of the Almighty. I am very 
pleased with the advances that have been made at 
the Prime Ministers' conference.
He then travelled to Washington to present proposals regarding Australian
manpower and war effort to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The proposal put forward by Curtin to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
on 2 June 1944 followed the details determined by the Australian
government in late 1943. Curtin explained that he had discussed with
Churchill the possibility of basing United Kingdom force on Australia
but that the preparations now beginning did not imply any commitment.
Australia's war effort was to be on the following basis:
a. The maintenance of six divisions for active operations;
b. The maintenance of the RAN at its present strength;
c. The maintenance of the RAAF at a. strength of 54 squadrons;
d. Food for Great Britain (including India) to be exported 
on the 1944 scale; and
e. Australia to review other aspects of the war effort 
with a possibility of increasing production.
Curtin ended by stating that as Austalia was 'in a sphere of American
strategic responsibility' Churchill had agreed that he should discuss
182the matter in Washington.
180. Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 2 June 1944.
181. Notes of Press Conference, Ottawa, 31 May 1944 CRS A989, item 
44/80/1/67.
182. Memorandum by the Prime Minister, 2 June 1944, MacArthur Memorial 
RG4 and MP 1217, Box 5. This memorandum is reproduced in Appendix 11.
In his verbal presentation Curtin mentioned that Australia wanted to take 
part in the recapture of the Philippines. CCS 161st Meeting, 2 June 1944, 
MP 1217, Box 5.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff immediately referred these proposals
183to MacArthur who replied that he considered that Australia's war
184effort should be determined by Australia. MacArthur had, of course,
previously discussed the proposals with Curtin. Thus the Australian
185war effort received the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
and Curtin could set out for Australia.
183. Signal W 45292, Marshall to MacArthur, 2 June 1944, RG4 MacArthur 
Memorial.
184. Signal, MacArthur to Marshall, 3 June 1944. RG4 MacArthur Memorial.
185. War Cabinet Agendum 342/1944, 4 July 1944, CRS A2680, Agendum
No.17/1944 [Part 1]. Also letter, CCS Secretariat to Shedden, 3 June 1944, 
MP 1217, Box 5.
